IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of I.W. (Minor Child) and T.T. (Father) and A.W. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Bartholomew Circuit Court involuntarily terminated A.W.’s (“Mother's”) and T.T.’s (“Father's”) parental rights over their minor child I.W. (“Child”). Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) appeal, arguing that the order terminating their parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents are the biological parents of Child, who was born July 30, 2024. “Umbilical cord tissue [that] was collected at [Child's] birth ․ tested positive” for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 66. While in the hospital following Child's birth, Mother was “aggressive and belligerent with hospital staff ․” Id. On August 2, while Child was still in the hospital, Parents submitted to drug screens, and they both tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. That same day, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”), and DCS removed Child from Parents’ care following an emergency detention hearing. After she was initially placed in foster care, Child was soon placed with her maternal grandparents.

[4] After several delays, the trial court held the fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition on February 27, 2025. Father failed to appear for the hearing. The court found that: Mother had voluntarily participated in an intensive outpatient program to treat her substance abuse, but she did not complete the program; Mother had previously been convicted of possession of methamphetamine; Mother and Father had ended their relationship and Mother was dating a man who had both a pending domestic battery charge and a dealing in methamphetamine charge; and that Mother's “erratic behaviors seriously endangered [Child's] physical and mental condition by failing to supply [Child] with a sober caregiver because she appeared to be under the influence and tested positive for illicit substance[s] during delivery.” Id. at 68. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Child was a CHINS.

[5] In its dispositional order, the trial court ordered Parents to, among other things, complete substance use assessments, complete mental health assessments, submit to random drug screens, participate in home-based case work, and participate in therapy. Other than attending supervised visits with Child, neither Mother nor Father has even attempted to participate in any other ordered services. And while Mother's visits with Child were consistent at the outset, Mother's visits with Child have been inconsistent since February 2025.

[6] In July 2025, the trial court changed the permanency plan to adoption. And in August, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights over Child. At the final hearing in November, DCS presented testimony from various service providers regarding the multiple attempts they had made to contact Parents and engage them in services. Parents did not complete either substance abuse or mental health assessments; Mother submitted to a few random drug screens, but she failed to screen dozens of times; and Father did not submit to any drug screens. Parents participated in supervised visits with Child, but Mother's visits with Child became “sporadic” after February 2025. Tr. p. 16. And when the home-based services provider, Robert Daugherty, contacted Father in person about participating in those services, Father told him, “this is bulls**t,” and refused to engage. Id. at 28.

[7] In December, the trial court issued an order involuntarily terminating Father's and Mother's parental rights over Child. In its thorough findings and conclusions, the court described Parent's refusal to engage in services. And the court concluded in relevant part that the conditions that caused Child's removal and continued placement outside of Parents’ homes would not be remedied; that continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat to Child's well-being; and that termination of Father's and Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[8] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[9] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[10] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required, in relevant part, to prove that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2) to (c)(3) (2024).

[11] In addition, DCS must prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances relevant here:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) to (d)(4). We need only discuss one of these elements raised by Parents in this appeal, namely, whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for her placement outside of Father's or Mother's home will not be remedied.

[12] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

Reasons for Removal

[13] Father and Mother argue that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside of their homes will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[14] Father argues that, other than a few months when he was recovering from injuries he sustained in a car accident, he has consistently visited with Child and they are bonded. And Father contends that he finally underwent an evaluation at Centerstone on October 30, one week before the final hearing, which showed that he has ADHD. But Father's argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence. Father ignores the evidence that he refused to submit to random drug screens for the duration of the CHINS case. And while he testified that he underwent an evaluation at Centerstone, Jennifer Jaggers, who manages referrals from DCS, testified that she did not have any record that Father had completed the evaluation.

[15] Mother argues that she voluntarily sought substance abuse and mental health treatment, along with drug screens, at Grace Recovery and Wellness from August 2024 until February 2025. But Mother did not provide DCS with any documentation of her treatment there. And, in any event, Mother testified that she did not successfully complete her treatment. Further, DCS presented evidence that Mother had missed phone calls from Cordant, the drug screening facility, 187 times, and Mother had missed sixty-eight screens that were requested. Mother did submit to random drug screens four times from August 2024 to March 2025, and she tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine three times. Finally, Mother's supervised visits with Child became sporadic after February 2025.

[16] DCS removed Child from Parents’ care because Child was born with amphetamine and methamphetamine in her umbilical cord and because of Mother's mental health issues. Both Mother and Father tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine just days after Child's birth. DCS presented ample evidence to show that Mother continues to abuse drugs and refuses to participate in programs designed to help her. And Father has likewise refused to participate in any ordered services, and his failure to submit to any drug screens makes it impossible to verify his alleged sobriety.

[17] The clear and convincing evidence shows that it is reasonably probable, given Mother's and Father's habitual conduct, that they will be unable to provide stability for Child. Parents’ arguments on appeal focus solely on the evidence in their favor, which amounts to an impermissible request that we reweigh the evidence.

[18] For all of these reasons, we conclude that DCS proved that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside of Parents’ homes will not be remedied.

Best Interests

[19] Parents also argue that DCS failed to prove that termination of their parental relationships with Child is in her best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[20] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[21] Once again, Parents’ argument on this issue amounts to an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence. Child has not been in Parents’ care since her birth in July 2024. Parents never progressed beyond supervised visits with Child during the pendency of this case. Child is thriving in her pre-adoptive home with her maternal grandparents, and maternal grandmother testified that Parents will be welcome to visit with Child after the adoption.

[22] The Guardian ad Litem testified that adoption by Child's maternal grandparents is in Child's best interests. Given that evidence, coupled with Parents’ refusal to participate in the services necessary to show that they can provide Child with any stability, the trial court did not err when it found that the termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[23] Parents have not persuaded us that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous, and we affirm the court's order terminating Father's and Mother's parental rights over Child.

[24] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.