IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] N.P. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to Z.P., T.P., C.P., P.P., and Ne.P. (together, “the Children”). Mother raises the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children; and

II. Whether she was deprived of due process.

[2] Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother is the biological mother of the Children, Z.P. born in December 2012, T.P. born in July 2015, C.P. born in July 2018, P.P. born in June 2019, and Ne.P. born in January 2021.¹ Prior to the present proceedings, Mother had a history of contact with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). In September 2004, DCS filed a child in need of services (“CHINS”) petition regarding one of Mother's older children, K.D., who is not a part of the present case. See Ex. Vol. 2 p. 5. Mother admitted that K.D. was a CHINS and the case was eventually closed in November 2005. See id. at 7. Five years later, in November 2009, DCS filed another CHINS case regarding K.D. Id. at 17. K.D. was again adjudicated a CHINS, with the court finding that Mother “failed to have the child regularly attend school and that [M]other has a drug abuse problem involving the use of methamphetamine that affects her ability to properly provide, care for, and supervise her children.” Id. at 19. Mother's parental rights to K.D. were eventually involuntarily terminated in October 2011.

[4] In 2013, DCS filed a CHINS petition alleging Z.P. to be a CHINS. Z.P. was adjudicated a CHINS, with Mother admitting that (1) she had an extensive history of drug abuse and had failed treatment, (2) she tested positive for methamphetamine in November 2012 while pregnant with Z.P., and (3) that Z.P. was born in December 2012 with opiates in his system. See id. at 48. In May 2014, the trial court adopted the recommendations of DCS and dismissed its wardship.

[5] In August 2018, DCS filed CHINS petitions alleging Z.P., T.P., and C.P. to be CHINS. See id. at 52, 68, 85. Mother admitted that: (1) she had a history of substance abuse and required services to address her recent relapse and (2) a day after C.P. was born, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and admitted to relapsing and using methamphetamine while the child was in the hospital, and the children were adjudicated CHINS. See id. at 85. Mother complied with the case plan and DCS eventually moved to terminate wardship over the three children and closed the case.

[6] Mother also had a criminal history. In 2010, Mother pleaded guilty to Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine and was sentenced to four years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction and six years suspended to probation for an aggregate sentence of ten years. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 146; Ex. Vol. 3 pp. 24–25. Mother later violated her probation by testing positive for illegal substances, resulting in the revocation of the suspended portion of her sentence. See id. at 26.

[7] The circumstances of the present case began on September 2, 2023, Mother left the Children at home in the care of E.P., who is the biological father of C.P., T.P., and P.P. Mother was aware that E.P. struggled with mental health issues but left the Children at home with the him because she “was in a bind.” Ex. Vol. I p. 34. DCS received a report of an “[i]mpaired caregiver[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 91. After arriving on scene, DCS learned that E.P. had physically battered T.P. “with a closed fist[,]” had injured C.P. by shooting him “in the chest with a BB-Gun,” and had also shot P.P. in the face “with a BB-Gun[.]” Ex. Vol. I p. 34. E.P. was arrested by law enforcement and remained incarcerated for the duration of the case. The day after the incident, family case manager Alicia Hammons (“FCM Hammons”) made contact with the family. When FCM Hammons arrived, the Children were outside the home and had marks, cuts, and bruising all over their bodies. See Tr. Vol. II p. 93. FCM Hammons made the following observations:

P.P. had a burn on his lip and he had the gun shot wound under his hairline from the BB gun[,] ․ C.P. had the open wound and the burn on his chest from the BB gun shot ․ T.P. had a small bruise on his face[,] [a]ll of the children were dirty ․ the inside of the house was a little bit in disarray. It did have working utilities, and running water[.]

Id. The Children remained in Mother's care at that time. A few days later, FCM Hammons returned to the home and after observing Mother appear “a little bit shaky” and making movements that were “different” than what FCM Hammons noticed during her previous visit, she asked Mother to take a drug screen. Mother refused to submit to the drug screen. See id. at 95.

[8] On September 18, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging the Children to be CHINS. An initial hearing was held on September 27, 2023, where Mother failed to appear. The same day, the trial court issued its detention order, authorizing DCS to detain the Children. See id. at 96; Ex. Vol. I pp. 72–74. A fact-finding hearing was held on January 3, 2024, and six days later, the trial court adjudicated the Children as CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing, the trial court issued a dispositional order on January 19, 2024. In relevant part, the dispositional order required Mother to maintain contact with the FCM, maintain housing, not possess or consume illegal substances, submit to random drug screens, secure a legal source of employment, keep appointments, and follow recommendations from all assessments. See Ex. Vol. I pp. 91–93.

[9] In February 2024, a no-contact order was issued prohibiting Mother from having contact with the Children's kinship placement (“Foster Placement”). Mother had engaged in inappropriate behavior which FCM Hammons described as Mother attempting to “contact the department, seek out information about the [C]hildren's dentist visit[,] and the pharmacy to try and locate the [C]hildren.” Tr. Vol. II p. 102. FCM Hammons further explained that Mother's 2019 in-home CHINS placement was converted to an out of home placement after Mother absconded with the children.

[10] On January 6, 2025, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 45. Three days later, guardian ad litem Braden Dean (“GAL Dean”) filed an appearance. The fact-finding hearing was held on July 11, 2025, and at the time of the hearing, Z.P. was twelve years old, T.P. was eight years old, C.P. and P.P. were both six years old, and Ne.P. was four years old. See Tr. Vol. II p. 111. At the hearing, DCS presented testimony from GAL Dean, three representatives from DCS, multiple service providers, a sheriff's deputy, and Foster Placement.

[11] After the filing of the CHINS petition and prior to the dispositional hearing, Mother did not consistently submit to random drug screens. After the January 3, 2024, fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition, Mother did submit to some drug screens but continued to fail to submit to the majority of the screens. Mother called in for random drug screening eleven of twenty-two required times in January 2024, five of twenty-two required screens in February, and failed to call in during March. See Ex. Vol. I p. 96. From January 16 through March 28, 2024, Mother submitted to only six screens, all of which returned negative test results until the March 28 screen, which was positive for methamphetamine. Mother then entered an inpatient treatment program from April 3 through April 26, 2024. On May 24, 2024, Mother again tested positive for methamphetamine and failed to submit to any drug screens over the next year. On May 21, 2025, Mother submitted to a drug screen and tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. From May 22, 2025, until June 27, 2025, Mother missed eleven required drug screens. At the termination fact-finding hearing in July 2025, Mother admitted she would “probably” test positive for methamphetamine if she were to screen. Tr. Vol. II p. 150.

[12] Todd Heim (“Counselor Heim”), a licensed mental health counselor, completed a psychological parenting evaluation of Mother in August 2024. He was primarily concerned with Mother's “lengthy legal histories, ․ substance abuse, and domestic violence.” Id. at 39. Mother disclosed her drug of choice to be methamphetamine. As a result of the evaluation, Counselor Heim made a number of recommendations including: “supervised visitation, ․ [i]ndividual therapy, substance abuse treatment, ․ random drug screens, ․ and for her to participate in a parenting education program.” Id. at 43. Counselor Heim practiced under the supervision of Dr. Jeff Burnett (“Dr. Burnett”), who reviewed Mother's psychological evaluation test results and concluded that Mother suffered from stimulant use disorder, ADHD, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and anti-social personality disorder.

[13] As a part of the dispositional order, Mother was required to participate in home-based case management. Mother completed her intake and was recommended to complete three sessions per week to work on decision making and parenting skills. In January 2024, Mother did not complete any of her skill sessions and only completed two in February. From February 2 through July 25, 2024, Mother did not participate in any skill sessions. FCM Hammons noted that from April 1 through April 26, 2024, Mother was in in-patient treatment, but “got back into the swing of things in August of 2024[.]” Id. at 100–01. However, by September 2024, Mother was no longer participating in the three weekly sessions. Id. at 101.

[14] Mother also failed to complete the recommendations based on her psychological parenting evaluation. See id. at 105. Specifically, Mother was recommended to complete a program called Firefly, which was an online trauma training program. Mother did not complete the Firefly program, although she contended at the hearing that she did not recall being provided a link to complete the Firefly program. See id. at 131.

[15] In addition to the requirement that she participate in recommended services, Mother was required to “[s]ign any releases necessary for the [FCM] to monitor compliance with the terms of the court's order.” Ex. Vol. I p. 92. DCS was “never able to confirm those services” at the Aware program, the out-patient follow up treatment Mother alleged she participated in for eight months after her inpatient treatment. Tr. Vol. II p. 114. DCS did receive Mother's information from her inpatient stay with Indiana Recovery Center.

[16] Under the terms of the dispositional order, Mother was required to maintain stable housing and obtain employment. FCM Hammons characterized Mother's housing as “[u]nstable.” Id. at 108. In February 2025, Mother was evicted and FCM Hammons noted that there were times prior to the eviction “where the home did not have electricity.” Id. After Mother left rehab in late April 2024, there was a “three (3) week period” where she was working sixty hours a week at Etna Green. Id. at 117. At that point, Mother had stable housing, employment, and was “clean for that three (3) week period.” Id. at 118. After Mother relapsed, she quit her job at Etna Green “because they were scheduling her too many hours.” Id. at 121. Mother testified that, at the time of the hearing, she was employed and had been working for a couple of months renovating and flipping houses for another person. She explained that she provided DCS with contact information to verify her employment and believed the work she was doing could support herself and the Children. See id. at 124. FCM Hammons was unable to verify Mother's employment.

[17] FCM Hammons noted that over the course of the case, Mother had eight different phone numbers and did not comply with the dispositional order requirement that she was to notify DCS of a change in phone number within five days. See id. at 117. During the course of the case, FCM Hammons scheduled child and family team meetings (“CFTMs”) every six weeks, but Mother attended only four of the “approximately sixteen” CFTMs. Id. at 106.

[18] Senior Deputy Mitchell Scott (“Senior Deputy Scott”) from the Fulton County Sheriff's Office testified that Mother was a suspect in a burglary investigation and in March 2025, was charged in Fulton County with Burglary as a Level 5 felony, theft as a Level 6 felony, and trespass as a Class A misdemeanor. See id. at 31; Ex. Vol. 3 pp. 3–15. Senior Deputy Scott also described an incident from 2024 where Mother drove a confidential informant to a “controlled buy” of illegal drugs. Tr. Vol. II p. 31.

[19] Mother's visitation with the Children was supervised by Willowtree Therapeutic Services and visit supervisor Carcricia Walters (“Therapist Walters”). In January and February 2024, Mother was offered three visits each month; however, Mother “had barriers to attending each one.” Ex. Vol. I p. 97. Mother was late to visits, had a flat tire for one visit, and had miscommunications with the visit supervisor leading to a visit being canceled. Visits were suspended after an incident during the March 2, 2024, visit. C.P. had become visibly upset and physically pushed Mother away. The matter escalated, with Mother responding in a “really emotional” and “hysterical” way that Therapist Walters felt presented a safety concern. Tr. Vol. II pp. 60, 63. Mother disregarded the supervisor's instructions to give C.P. time alone to calm down, and instead, attempted to hold C.P., which he resisted.

[20] Ultimately, Therapist Walters “felt that safe[t]y concerns were really serious and that we needed to reevaluate what we were doing at that time in the case for the sake of the [C]hildren.” Id. at 65. Therapist Walters met with the team to discuss “visitation, safety concerns, mom's inconsistency with visits[,] and ․ pause visits until mom was participating ․ consistently, in some type of ․ substance and therapeutic ․ program[.]” Id. In March 2024, it was decided that Mother's visits should be discontinued and Mother has not had any visits with the Children since.

[21] When the Children were removed from Mother's care in September 2023, all the Children besides C.P. were placed with Foster Placement. Three of the Children had also been placed with her in 2019 during a CHINS case. See id. at 72. When the Children came to Foster Placement's care, they all had dental issues and had “marks on them.” Id. at 68. P.P. had eleven cavities, T.P. had five cavities, Ne.P. had the start of cavities, and Z.P. had other dental issues.

[22] Foster Placement described each child's behavioral disposition at the time the Children were placed in her care. She noted that Z.P. had anger issues, was abusive toward her children and other children, inappropriately touched one of her children, “portrayed like, a lot of anxieties, ․ a lot of anger[,] and ․ combative behavior towards other people.” Id. at 69. Z.P. was “biting, hitting, [and] was cussing.” Id. T.P. exhibited “anxiety, fidgeting ․ pull[ing] his ears, ․ hair, ․ [and] shirt.” Id. T.P. inappropriately touched one of Foster Placement's children and would “talk about sexual acts[.]” Id. P.P. “would be destructive” and “would throw things[.]” Id. at 70. Ne.P. exhibited anxiety and would wake up “having bad dreams.” Id. Foster Placement explained that the Children had been in therapy and were participating in soccer and church. She expressed interest in adopting the Children if Mother's parental rights were terminated, noting that she and her husband “love them dearly.” Id. at 72.

[23] On May 15, 2025, FCM Alexis Lytle (“FCM Lytle”) received a report that Mother's boyfriend had allegedly sexually abused C.P. when C.P. was five years old and living with Mother and her boyfriend. FCM Lytle scheduled a forensic interview for C.P. and discovered during her investigation that Mother's boyfriend was a registered sex offender. Ultimately, FCM Lytle substantiated the allegations of sexual abuse against the boyfriend and at the time of the termination fact-finding hearing, there was a pending criminal investigation of the boyfriend. See id. at 80.

[24] During Mother's case in chief, her biological daughter K.P., who was the subject of a previous termination proceeding, testified. At the time of the termination fact-finding hearing, K.P. was twenty-three years old. K.P. read a prepared statement that was supportive of Mother and described in a positive light Mother's skills as a parent, Mother's care for each of the Children, and her relationship with Mother after she turned eighteen. See id. at 159–62. Mother's mother and her cousin also testified on Mother's behalf.

[25] FCM Hammons testified that adoption was in the best interests of the Children. FCM Hammons reasoned that “we had a lot of opportunity to offer services but [M]other chose not to take those services or had very little opportunity to actually help her overcome her barriers and her parenting.” Id. at 109. FCM Hammons noted that Mother did not have stable income or housing, was currently using illegal drugs, and maintained relationships that were dangerous to the Children. See id. FCM Hammons also identified the following safety concerns if the Children were returned to Mother's care: lack of food and stable housing; uncertainty regarding Mother's ability to financially support the Children; lack of communication by Mother; lack of reliable transportation; the history of medical neglect; and Mother's inability to demonstrate changed behaviors as a result of the services offered. See id. at 110. Ultimately, FCM Hammons believed that Mother was not an appropriate caregiver at this time because Mother was “currently using substances and not working with us to prove that she's not using substances.” Id. at 111. FCM Hammons testified that the referrals provided to Mother for services remained active throughout the case. See id. at 112.

[26] GAL Dean also believed termination was in the Children's best interests. GAL Dean was appointed to the case in January 2025. GAL Dean did not personally meet with the Children, but reviewed progress reports, participated in CFTMs, and reviewed documentation and exhibits provided to him.  ² GAL Dean shared many of the same concerns as FCM Hammons as to housing instability, Mother “not completing all the services,” and Mother having the Children around an “inappropriate person[.]” Id. at 83–84. GAL Dean expressed concerns about Mother's lack of contact with the Children noting that Mother had not had visitation with the Children since March 2024. GAL Dean believed Mother was still continuing to use illegal drugs based upon Mother's positive screen for methamphetamine in May 2025, and the subsequent refusal to submit to drug screens. Ultimately, GAL Dean believed that the conditions that led to the removal of the Children had not been remedied. See id. at 85.

[27] At the end of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On July 13, 2025, the trial court issued its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children (“the Order”). The trial court specifically found that “Mother failed to make lasting progress toward the goals outlined in the Order of Disposition.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 143. The trial court further found that “Mother has not visited with the [C]hildren since March 2024,” that “Mother failed to comply with her drug screens and/or failed her drug screens[,]” and that both FCM Hammons and GAL Dean believed that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. Id. at 144, 145.

[28] The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal would not be remedied; that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the Children; that there was a satisfactory plan for the Children, which was adoption; and, that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests.³ See id. at 148–52. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficient Evidence for Termination Judgment

[29] Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to the Children, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's termination decision. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). However, “parental interests are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Id. (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.). We note that “[p]arental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” Id.

[30] “Decisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive— so we review them with great deference to the trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). “We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 642 (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). Our review is confined to two steps: “whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229–30 (Ind. 2013)). “[W]e will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229; Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)). “The judgment will be set aside if found to be clearly erroneous.” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)).

[31] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur, the State must allege and prove in pertinent part:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d); [and]

․

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (3). With respect to subsection (d) of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4, DCS alleged the following circumstances:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (4). “DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.” In re R.S., 158 N.E.3d 432, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). “Due to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) being written in the disjunctive, the trial court need only find that one requirement of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Id. (quoting In re W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)). Because Mother failed to challenge any of the trial court's factual findings, we accept the trial court's factual findings as true.

A. Conditions Not Remedied

[32] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from the home and placement outside home will not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). To determine if the trial court's conclusion is supported by sufficient evidence, we engage in a two-step analysis. “First, we must ascertain what conditions led to their placement and retention in foster care. Second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010)). The second step “requires trial courts to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re W.M.L., 82 N.E.3d 361, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643). “Habitual conduct may include parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment.” Id. (citing A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.). Further, “[t]he trial court may also consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.” Id.

[33] The Children were removed from Mother's care due to her neglect in leaving the Children in the care of E.P., who Mother knew had mental health issues and who physically abused the Children. Mother was also suspected of using illegal drugs and refused to submit to a drug screen. At the time of the termination fact-finding hearing on July 11, 2025, the Children had been removed from Mother's care since September 2023 and remained outside of her care due to her substance abuse issues, housing instability, and lack of compliance with services. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. Mother argues that “the failure of DCS to use reasonable efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship ․ made it impossible for the trial court to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home would not be remedied[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 10 (capitalization removed).

[34] However, Mother fails to offer any substantive challenge under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(3). Rather, Mother generally makes broad conclusory statements claiming Mother was treated unfairly but fails to cite legal authority or ground her argument in the law. For example, Mother argues that: “[f]rom the beginning of the underlying CHINS cases the relationship between [Mother] and DCS was extremely adversarial. [Mother] harbors a deep distrust of the system, which of course all of us in the system must agree is unjustified.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mother argues her relapse was based upon the trial court's issuance of the protective order, arguing that after it was issued Mother “fell into despair and turned to methamphetamine, a familiar coping mechanism for her.” Id. at 12. Mother argues that “the failure of DCS to make reasonable efforts to reunify this family ․ deprived the trial [c]ourt of the ability to know all of the evidence and circumstances of this case. In the absence of this information, “the Court could not reach the conclusions that it did, particularly not by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 14.

[35] Mother fails to address whether the unchallenged findings of the trial court supported its conclusion that the conditions that led to the Children's removal would not be remedied by Mother. Specifically, the trial court found that:

[The Children] were removed from the home due to abuse by [E.P.] and Mother's substance abuse issues, failure to supervise, lack of stability, and lack of housing. During the CHINS cases, [Mother] failed to maintain contact; failed to successfully participate in and/or complete services; failed to consistently attend visitations; and failed to remain free of using illegal substances.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 148. Here, the unchallenged findings of fact support the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from the home and placement outside the home will not be remedied.

[36] Mother failed to comply with many of the dispositional order's requirements. Mother had limited participation in drug screening, and after May 2024, she did not participate in another screen until May 2025 where she tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Indeed, at the termination fact-finding hearing in July 2025, Mother admitted she would “probably” test positive for methamphetamine if she were to screen. Tr. Vol. II p. 150. Further, Mother was ordered to obtain safe, suitable, and stable housing. During the hearing, FCM Hammons characterized Mother's housing as “[u]nstable.” Id. at 108. At the time of the hearing, Mother was in the process of moving to another home that DCS had not yet had a chance to verify or access. Moreover, Mother was required to maintain a legal and stable source of income, but FCM Hammons was only able to verify Mother's employment for a “three (3) week period.” Id. at 118. FCM Hammons noted Mother quit that job “because they were scheduling her too many hours.” Id. at 121. Additionally, Mother was required to obey the law, but she accumulated “two (2) new criminal charges during the life of the case, the most recent one being in March for the burglary.” Id. at 103. Lastly, Mother had not seen the Children since March 2024.

[37] The trial court is tasked with judging “a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re W.M.L., 82 N.E.3d at 367 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643). Here, the trial court was presented with little evidence that Mother has taken any appreciable step to achieve sobriety or to comply with the court-ordered services. Rather, the unchallenged findings of fact support the trial court's conclusion that the conditions that led to the Children's removal will not be remedied. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court's findings under subsection (d)(3) were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Mother also raises a challenge under subsection (d)(4), but Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive. Because we have determined that subsection (d)(3) was supported by sufficient evidence, we do not have to reach her argument under subsection (d)(4).

B. Best Interests

[38] Mother next challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination is in the Children's best interests. See Appellant's Br. p. 10. To determine if termination is in the best interests of a child, the trial court “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.). A central interest is a child's need for permanency. Id. (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009)). “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.). “Recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)), trans. denied.

[39] Like Mother's challenge to the conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from the home and placement outside home will not be remedied, here too, her challenge to the best interest prong of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3) is premised on her perceived unfairness of the process and not the law.

[40] The totality of the evidence reveals that, at the time of the hearing, Mother had not appreciably improved her ability to adequately and safely care for the Children. In fact, Mother was not in compliance with the dispositional order and had not seen the Children since March 2024. As a result of Mother's lack of compliance with services, FCM Hammons believed that adoption was in the Children's best interests. See Tr. Vol. II p. 109. GAL Dean also believed that the Children's permanency plan of termination and adoption was in their best interests. See id. at 84. Both GAL Dean and FCM Hammons identified the following concerns as to Mother: her housing stability, her refusal to continue drug testing, and her having the Children around an inappropriate person who was a registered sex offender. At the conclusion of the hearing, FCM Hammons and GAL Dean both opined that adoption was in the best interests of the Children. Both still had concerns as to Mother's housing stability and her substance abuse. GAL Dean believed that the conditions that led to the Children's removal had not been remedied. See id. at 85.

[41] A trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that [his or] her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E. v.

Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015) (quoting In Re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted)). Here, based on the totality of the evidence and the unchallenged findings of fact, the trial court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

II. Due Process Challenge

[42] Mother argues that she and the Children were deprived of due process because DCS allegedly failed to “use reasonable efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 10 (capitalization removed). Mother claims that the trial court deprived her of “the ability to know all of the evidence and circumstances of this case.” Id. at 14. Our court has previously concluded that “a parent may waive a due-process claim in a CHINS or termination proceeding by raising that claim for the first time on appeal.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194–95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). Here, Mother failed to raise a due process challenge at the fact-finding hearing and therefore, has waived this due process claim. As the State points out, there is a limited exception to waiver for claims of fundamental error; however, Mother did not argue fundamental error in her appellate briefing.

Conclusion

[43] Based on the above, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children, and Mother waived her due process challenge.

[44] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The biological father of C.P., T.P., and P.P. voluntarily relinquished his parental rights, as did the biological father of Ne.P. and Z.P.; neither biological father participates on appeal.

2.   He indicated he did not meet personally meet with the Children because he was only involved in the case for a “short window” and believed that introducing a new person to the Children “this late in the game is usually ․ not good for the [C]hildren, especially children who are alleging sexual abuse from a man.” Tr. Vol. II p. 85.

3.   We note that the trial court's Order cited to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2), which was a previous version of the termination statute. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 140, 148, 150, 151. When the petition to terminate Mother's parental rights was filed on January 6, 2025, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c) governed the requirements for a petition to terminate parental rights. See Pub. L. No. 70-2024, § 4 (eff. March 11, 2024). The substantive statutory provisions did not change as a result of the amendment to the statute.

Foley, Judge.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.