Jonathan Dikteruk, Appellant-Defendant v. CCR LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jonathan Dikteruk, pro se, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment. Dikteruk raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the court erred when it denied his motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] In April 2011, Dikteruk took out a loan from a bank, and the debt was subsequently assigned to Unifund, CCR, LLC (“Unifund”). On March 20, 2018, Unifund filed a complaint against Dikteruk and alleged that he had failed to repay the debt, which resulted in a past due amount of $891.90. The same day, the court clerk issued a summons to Dikteruk at 5012 N. Emerson Avenue in Indianapolis. The sheriff both left a copy of the summons and complaint at that address on April 2 and mailed a copy. Dikteruk failed to answer and, on July 17, the court entered a default judgment against him and ordered him to pay $891.90 plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum.

[3] On August 24, 2025, Dikteruk filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(4). Dikteruk alleged that he had not received a copy of the summons or complaint because he had “already moved from the service address.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 28 (emphasis removed). Thus, he alleged that the judgment against him was “void for lack of personal jurisdiction.” Id. In support of his motion, he attached a document that listed his address from June 2018 to April 2021 as “148 Pine View Dr, Apt 6, Carmel, IN[.]” Id. at 30.

[4] In September 2025, Unifund initiated garnishment proceedings. On September 5, the court ordered Dikteruk to appear in court on February 18, 2026. Then, on September 24, Fifth Third Bank froze $1,462.64 from Dikteruk's savings account. The next day, Dikteruk filed a motion for emergency release of funds, arguing that “no writ of garnishment or final garnishment order” had been entered. Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 13. He maintained that “the funds currently held by Fifth Third are without legal basis and must be released.” Id. The trial court agreed that the bank was “holding [Dikteruk's] funds pursuant to a freeze that is not supported by any writ or garnishment order in this case” and granted Dikteruk's motion. Id. at 14. Then, on October 15, the trial court denied Dikteruk's motion for relief from judgment. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Dikteruk contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for relief from judgment. We first note that Dikteruk proceeds pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation omitted).

[6] Generally, a grant or denial of equitable relief under Indiana Trial Rule 60 is within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Baker v. Baker, 50 N.E.3d 401, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “However, if a trial court's ruling is strictly based upon a paper record, we will review the ruling de novo because we are in as good a position as the trial court to determine the force and effect of the evidence.” Jahangirizadeh v. Pazouki, 27 N.E.3d 1178, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing In re Adoption of C.B.M., 992 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ind. 2013)). The trial court here ruled solely upon a paper record, and so our review is de novo.

[7] In his motion for relief from judgment, Dikteruk alleged that he was entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(4). Trial Rule 60(B)(4) provides discretion to our trial courts to afford relief from judgments, including default judgments, when “entry of default or judgment by default was entered against such party who was served only by publication and who was without actual knowledge of the action and judgment, order or proceedings.” Dikteruk specifically contended that he lacked notice of Unifund's complaint or the summons because he had “already moved from the service address[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 28 (emphasis removed).

[8] However, in his opening brief on appeal, Dikteruk does not reference Trial Rule 60(B)(4) or argue that he did not receive notice of the original complaint.² Rather, he appears to contend that the court erred when it denied his motion for relief from judgment because the court acknowledged “that the garnishment action, as executed, could not stand.” Appellant's Br. at 4. And he maintains that the court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment “preserved a judgment that had already been proven incapable of lawful enforcement.” Id. In other words, Dikteruk argues that, because the court granted his motion for release of funds based on a lack of a garnishment order, the underlying default judgment was improper.

[9] We acknowledge that Dikteruk's bank garnished his funds without a proper garnishment order. The trial court similarly acknowledged that flaw and granted Dikteruk's motion for emergency release of funds. But Dikteruk has not directed us to any authority to demonstrate that a default judgment is invalid simply because a bank subsequently and improperly withheld funds. In addition, other than baldly stating that the “emergency release [of funds] underscores the constitutional deficiency of the garnishment process used,” he has not explained how the default judgment violated his rights. Id. As such, Dikteruk has failed to make cogent argument on this issue, and it is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

Conclusion

[10] Dikteruk has not demonstrated that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to set aside the default judgment. We therefore affirm the trial court

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   In his Reply Brief, Dikteruk argues for the first time that he “lacked actual knowledge of the lawsuit” because he “relocated during 2018[.]” Reply Br. at 5. However, a party cannot raise a new argument in a reply brief. See, e.g., Town of Zionsville v. Town of Whitestown, 49 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2016). Thus, Dikteruk has waived his argument for our review. Waiver notwithstanding, Dikteruk has not explained how his move to Carmel in June 2018, nearly three months after the sheriff left a copy of the complaint and summons at his address in Indianapolis and mailed a copy to the same address, denied him notice of the lawsuit.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.