Yusef Byrd, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Yusef Byrd and Elonda Elston had known each other for over fifteen years when, in December of 2024, Elston visited Byrd in Indianapolis and became subject to Byrd's physical abuse and confinement, which resulted in criminal charges against Byrd. A jury found Byrd guilty of Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and the trial court sentenced Byrd to concurrent 180-day sentences. Although Byrd was convicted of domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor, his sentencing order indicated a conviction for domestic battery as a Level 6 felony. Byrd contends that the trial court erred in entering the sentencing order. Byrd also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after Elston made certain comments during Byrd's cross-examination of her. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Byrd's motion for a mistrial but agreeing that the sentencing order incorrectly indicates a conviction for Level 6 felony domestic battery, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2024, Byrd and Elston had been in an “on and off relationship” for over fifteen years. Tr. Vol. II p. 73. In December of 2024, Byrd visited Elston in Illinois for one week, and Elston drove Byrd back to his home in Indianapolis. After Byrd had accused Elston of engaging in a relationship with his cousin, Elston attempted to leave Byrd's house, and Byrd took Elston's phone and “grabbed [her], threw [her] on the bed, said [she] wasn't leaving, locked the door.” Tr. Vol. II p. 78. Elston was choked, thrown on the bed, and, for hours, confined to Byrd's bedroom, until Byrd eventually left the room. When Elston managed to leave the room, Byrd approached her and began hitting her with his fist. Eventually, Elston found her phone and managed to call the police, at which point Byrd allowed her to leave. Elston met police nearby.

[3] On January 14, 2025, the State charged Byrd with Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony criminal confinement, Level 6 felony kidnapping, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. Before trial, the State moved to dismiss the kidnapping charge, which motion the trial court granted. A jury trial commenced on September 29, 2025. When the State informed the trial court that it intended to introduce testimony regarding Byrd's drug use during the events at issue, Byrd had no objection, “because it's going to elicit that she's using drugs.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9.

[4] During Byrd's cross-examination of Elston, defense counsel reminded Elston to answer his questions with “[y]es, no or I don't know. Your answers are yes, no, or I don't know.” Tr. Vol. II p. 94. Defense counsel, at some point during cross-examination, stated to Elston, “I'm not asking you a question. I'm not asking you a question right now[,]” to which Elston responded, “This is too aggressive.” Tr. Vol. II p. 95. The trial court reminded Elston to “[p]lease only answer the questions from what is posed to you[,]” and held a side-bar with the attorneys at that point. Tr. Vol. II p. 95.

[5] Defense counsel resumed cross-examination. Defense counsel complained that Elston was not answering his questions, and Elston made the remark, “[i]t's just argumentative.” Tr. Vol. II p. 97. The trial court asked the parties to approach, and told defense counsel, “You can ask, you can say yes or no all you want, you know she's not going to do that, more often than not and it is asked that answers [(sic)], you just move on, okay?” Tr. Vol. II p. 97.

[6] Later on during defense counsel's cross-examination of Elston, the following exchange occurred:

Q: Okay, so this is all because of his cousin is what you're saying, like I said?

A: You have to ask him. That's just what the battery to me started.

Q: So that's what you're saying. It's because of his cousin, right?

A: It was because of him.

Q: No, you are saying because of him.

A: You talk to him, he hit me. He beat me–

Q: I am not–

A: He burned me. He put drugs in me–

THE STATE: Objection, Your Honor.

A: He did that.

THE COURT: Ma'am, keep a deep breath, and answer only the questions that are posed to you.

Q: Well let's talk about these burn marks. You never told the police that he burned you, did you?

A: Because they like you. Men like you, black men. I wanted to go home. Okay. And then when I got to the hospital and I got the reports and that day I told the women–

[Defense Counsel]: Judge. I'm going to object. This is not responsive.

A: I don't want to be battered. I don't want to be yelled at.

THE COURT: Ma'am, just hang, take a deep breath, okay?

[Defense Counsel]: Not responsive, judge-

THE COURT: I get it. Ma'am, take a deep breath.

WITNESS: I have PTSD from all this. And I just tell him-

[Defense Counsel]: Judge, can we approach?

THE COURT: Sure.

WITNESS: I need to stop being yelled. I need to stop being yelled at.

[Defense Counsel]: I'm going to object to this. Why [is] she testifying to you.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 99–100.

[7] Defense counsel argued, “If she's being nonresponsive, she's trying to put things that are not in evidence in front of the jury.” Tr. Vol. II p. 101. The trial court and State agreed that Elston was “providing answers to [defense counsel's] questions.” Tr. Vol. II p. 101. Defense counsel argued, “Well she's going to do it again. So I'm going to be asking for a mistrial. She's not answering my questions.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 101–02. After the trial court removed the jury, defense counsel argued the following:

Judge, I'm just going to go ahead and ask for a mistrial. She's being nonresponsive. She's talking to you. She's talking without a question, being in front of her. She's done this several times. Now she's causing outbursts. These are evidentiary, or well not things that we can necessarily cross on. These are not things that we can necessarily comment on. I mean, obviously I'm going to talk about her in closing, but these are not things that a jury should be subjected to. And again, I understand your- I guess what state's contention that she answered my question. I asked her, you didn't tell the officer that he burned you with a crack pipe and she went to a whole diatribe about black men. So I would ask that this be a mistrial based on her evidentiary harpoons and her commentary.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 102–03.

[8] The State responded that Elston was answering the questions asked. The trial court stated, “I don't think it rises to the level of a mistrial. It doesn't, but it's out there. So do you want me to, I mean, I don't know how you, I can tell the jury to disregard that comment about that she made directly toward you, alright, and that brings more light to it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 104. Defense counsel noted that he would address Elston's answers in closing and maintained that Elston was out of control.

[9] After the trial court denied the motion for mistrial, the trial court asked defense counsel “what instructions do you want me to give her?” Tr. Vol. II p. 107. Defense counsel responded, “I think the State needs to go talk to their witness and explain to her how she's supposed to testify.” Tr. Vol. II p. 107. The trial court agreed with defense counsel, stating to the prosecutor, “I do agree with [defense counsel] on that. You need to go talk to her and say she's to refrain from personal exchanges to the degree that were personal, with the defense attorney or the prosecutor. And she needs to do her best to answer in the line.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109. When the trial resumed, the trial court reminded Elston to, “please answer the questions that are asked to you, in the form the questions are asked to you[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 109.

[10] The jury found Byrd guilty of Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. On October 27, 2025, the trial court sentenced Byrd to concurrent 180-day sentences. Although Byrd was convicted of domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor, his sentencing order indicated that he had been convicted of domestic battery as a Level 6 felony.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Sentencing Order Does Not Correctly Reflect Byrd's Conviction for Class A Misdemeanor Domestic Battery

[11] The parties agree that the trial court made a scrivener's error in the sentencing order, as the order incorrectly asserts that Byrd was found guilty of Level 6 felony domestic battery, rather than Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. We remand with instructions for the trial court to correct the sentencing order to reflect Byrd's conviction for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying Byrd's Motion for a Mistrial

[12] Byrd contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial during Elston's cross-examination.¹ Specifically, Byrd contends that Elston's testimony that Byrd had burned and drugged her, and her comment to defense counsel referencing race, warranted a mistrial. Byrd argues that the challenged comments had a probable persuasive effect on the jury's decision, citing to the factors set forth in White v. State, 257 Ind. 64, 272 N.E.2d 312 (1971), for support.²

[13] We review the denial of a mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion. Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. 2014). “A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is warranted only when less severe remedies will not satisfactorily correct the error. A timely and accurate admonition is presumed to cure any error in the admission of evidence.” Banks v. State, 761 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ind. 2002) (citation and quotations omitted).

In determining whether a mistrial was warranted, we consider whether the defendant was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. The gravity of the peril is determined by the probable persuasive effect on the jury's decision. When a motion for mistrial has been denied, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate both that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected and that no other remedy can cure the perilous situation in which he was placed.

Brooks v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1234, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied. “Moreover, a reviewing court accords great deference to the trial court's ruling on a mistrial motion.” Id.

[14] Byrd concedes that “after the State spoke with Elston, she did not put any other improper testimony before the jury.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. However, Byrd contends that regardless of whether the error was repeated, the error was not “cured” for the jury. Appellant's Br. p. 18. Byrd contends that Elston's testimony that he had burned and drugged her involved improper evidence “analogous to propensity evidence of other acts” for which he was not charged. Appellant's Br. p. 18. Byrd also contends that when he attempted to impeach Elston on her claim that he had burned her, she deflected with a racial remark directed towards Byrd's counsel, which deprived him of a fair trial and undermined the judicial process.

[15] When faced with circumstances that a defendant believes might warrant a mistrial, “generally the correct procedure is to request an admonishment. If counsel is unsatisfied with the admonishment or it is obvious that the admonishment will not be sufficient to cure the error, then counsel may move for mistrial.” Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 482 (Ind. 2015) (citation omitted). Byrd contends that the “improper testimony was highly inappropriate, and the trial court should have stepped in and instructed the jury to disregard” the testimony. Appellant's Br. p. 19. However, the trial court considered doing so, stating, “I don't think it rises to the level of a mistrial. It doesn't, but it's out there. So do you want me to, I mean, I don't know how you, I can tell the jury to disregard that comment about that she made directly toward you, alright, and that brings more light to it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 104. Byrd did not request an admonition for the jury at this time, or at any other time. After the trial court denied Byrd's motion for mistrial, the trial court asked, “what instructions do you want me to give her?” Tr. Vol. II p. 107. Defense counsel, again did not ask for an admonition, but instead responded, “I think the State needs to go talk to their witness and explain to her how she's supposed to testify.” Tr. Vol. II p. 107.

[16] Based on the circumstances, and even applying the White factors as Byrd suggests, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Byrd's motion for mistrial or in failing to sua sponte admonish the jury. Again, Byrd must establish that the challenged conduct placed him “in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected and that no other remedy can cure the perilous situation in which he was placed.” Brooks, 934 N.E.2d at 1243. Elston testified without objection that Byrd had been “burning her” with a pipe during direct examination. Tr. Vol. II p. 79. As the State points out, Byrd had no objection to evidence that he had been using drugs during the alleged events “because it's going to elicit that [Elston is] using drugs.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. To the extent that Byrd argues that Elston's testimony that he had “put drugs in [her,]” Tr. Vol. II p. 99, placed him in a position of grave peril, we note that Elston had already previously testified that she had woken up early Sunday morning, thinking Byrd “was kissing [her]” and “felt like [she] was intoxicated with something that was unfamiliar to [her,]” which she “found out [․] was crack cocaine.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 75–76. We cannot conclude that the challenged comment had such a prejudicial an effect as Byrd suggests, based on the above testimony suggesting that Byrd was blowing “crack cocaine” into her lungs.

[17] Furthermore, while we agree with Byrd that racial remarks can be prejudicial and inflammatory, we do not believe that Elston's comment here was so prejudicial that Byrd was placed in a position of grave peril which no other remedy could have cured. The cases which Byrd cites for support are readily distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Birk v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1090, 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), a panel of this court concluded that “[e]vidence of racist remarks that were uttered by [family members of the victim], who were not present when the shooting occurred, was too remote and unfairly prejudicial to aid Birk in accomplishing his goal” of challenging the victim's credibility and revealing her motives. In People v. Turner, 367 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977), the Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that the prosecutor's racial innuendos and clear “attempts to arouse racial fear and animosity and to malign defendant and her witness” so prejudiced the defendant and inflamed the jury that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.

[18] Here, however, Elston's comment regarding the race of the police officers, which appeared directed at defense counsel to an extent, was an isolated comment in response to defense counsel's question, was not repeated by Elston or the State, did not add to the State's evidence, and, if anything, likely harmed her credibility with the jury by evincing unwarranted bias. Moreover, there was ample other evidence of Byrd's guilt, including Elston's testimony regarding Byrd's repeated physical violence and confinement of Elston when she asked and attempted to leave.³ Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that Elston's comment had a probable persuasive effect on the jury. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Byrd's motion for mistrial.

[19] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to correct the sentencing order.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State contends that the alleged error was invited because both of Elston's statements were “in response to [Byrd]’s questions.” Appellee's Br. p. 12. We choose to decide this case on the merits.

2.   In White, the Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged a number of factors that courts had considered in determining the adequacy of striking testimony and admonishing the jury as opposed to declaring a mistrial, including (1) the effect of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules relating to harmless error; (2) the degree of materiality of the testimony; (3) other evidence of guilt; (4) other evidence tending to prove the same fact; (5) other evidence that may cure the improper testimony; (6) possible waiver by the injured party; (7) whether the statement was volunteered by the witness and whether there had been deliberate action on the part of the prosecution to present the matter to the jury; (8) the penalty assessed; (9) whether or not the testimony, although volunteered by the witness, was in part brought out by action of the defendant or his counsel; (10) the existence of other errors; (11) whether the question of guilt is close or clear and compelling; (12) the standing and experience of the person giving the objectionable testimony; and (13) whether or not the objectionable testimony or misconduct was repeated. 257 Ind. at 69, 272 N.E.2d at 314–15.

3.   We further disagree with Byrd's comparison of this case to Mack v. State, 736 N.E.2d 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. In Mack, a panel of this court concluded that the admission of a detective's testimony that the defendant was “someone known to deal drugs in the area” required reversal due to an “absence of corroborating evidence and the prejudice presumed from being labeled in front of the jury by the only identifying witness a known drug dealer[.]” Id. at 804.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.