IN RE: the Adoption of: C.W. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] C.W. (Child) began living with B.L. (Adoptive Mother) at 16 months old after the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) removed Child from her biological mother's home and initiated a series of proceedings concerning Child's welfare. Child's biological father, C.P., who could not be located, first appeared in the child welfare proceedings nearly two years later. Although he thereafter complied with required parenting services and built a relationship with Child, C.P. never took the steps necessary to become Child's legally recognized parent: he did not execute a paternity affidavit, complete a paternity action, or register with the putative father registry.

[2] While the child welfare proceedings continued, Adoptive Mother petitioned to adopt Child, and C.P. moved to contest it. After conducting a preliminary hearing focusing on uncontroverted evidence, the adoption court determined that C.P. was required to establish paternity before Adoptive Mother filed her adoption petition to be eligible to contest it and that he had failed to do that.

[3] C.P. appeals, arguing that the trial court was required to conduct a full evidentiary hearing before reaching that conclusion. He also claims the trial court erroneously failed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as requested. As C.P. was not deprived of an evidentiary hearing and C.P. has failed to show that special findings were required, we affirm.

Facts

[4] A.W. (Mother) and C.P. are the unmarried parents of Child, born September 16, 2020. C.P. never registered with the putative father registry in Indiana, where Child is alleged to have been conceived, or in Utah, where she was born. C.P. also never executed a paternity affidavit as to Child.

[5] In January 2022, when Child was approximately 16 months old, DCS filed a petition in the Marion Superior Court alleging she was a child in need of services (CHINS). At the start of the CHINS case, Child was placed with Adoptive Mother as a foster parent and has remained primarily in Adoptive Mother's care ever since. When Child first began living with Adoptive Mother, she weighed 16 pounds, could not walk or talk, and her feet were curled in a knot. Although Child continues to have special needs, Child has made significant progress.

[6] When the CHINS petition was filed, C.P.’s whereabouts were unknown to DCS. DCS was unable to locate and properly serve C.P. with the CHINS petition. The court adjudicated Child a CHINS and entered a dispositional decree in June 2022.

[7] During the CHINS proceedings, Mother signed a consent to Child's adoption and an agreement for post-adoption contact in June 2023. DCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Child's parents in late 2023. DCS represented that it lacked C.P.’s address, although it left notice of the proceeding with a member of C.P.’s family. C.P. appeared at the initial hearing on the termination petition to contest it. He thereafter began participating in the CHINS proceedings.

[8] In January 2024, C.P. underwent a paternity test as part of the CHINS proceedings that showed he was Child's father. Three months later, DCS sought, and the trial court granted, a modification of the permanency order from adoption to concurrent adoption and reunification. The court also entered a parental participation order requiring C.P.’s involvement in various services and allowing him unsupervised visitation with Child on weekends. In light of C.P.’s successful participation, DCS moved to dismiss the termination of parental rights petition to explore reunification with C.P. The trial court granted that motion in June 2024.

[9] In November 2024, Adoptive Mother petitioned to adopt Child in Hamilton County, where they were living. The adoption petition alleged that C.P.’s consent to the adoption was not required because he had abandoned or deserted Child, had failed to communicate significantly with her, had failed to provide support, and/or was unfit to be a parent. Both C.P. and Mother initially contested the adoption, and Mother sought to revoke her consent to the adoption. In late December 2024, DCS filed a Notice of Intent to Withhold Consent to the adoption due to its efforts to reunite C.P. and Child. Mother subsequently re-executed her consent to adoption on September 23, 2025. Mother is not a party to this appeal.

[10] Shortly after Adoptive Mother filed her adoption petition, C.P. filed a Verified Petition to Establish Paternity, Custody, Parenting Time and Child Support in Marion County. C.P. failed to notify the paternity court of the pending adoption and did not serve notice of the paternity action on Adoptive Mother. She learned of the action, however, and was allowed to intervene in the paternity action. The trial court also granted her motion to consolidate the paternity and adoption actions in March 2025. The Hamilton County court thereafter presided over the adoption and paternity actions while the CHINS proceedings continued in Marion County.

[11] Two months later, the Hamilton County court approved an Agreed Entry of Paternity, Custody, Parenting Time and Child Support filed by C.P. and Mother. The following day, Adoptive Mother moved to set aside that agreed entry, and the trial court granted the motion the same day it was filed. The Hamilton County court set C.P.’s motion contesting the adoption and Mother's motion to revoke consent for a hearing in August 2025.

[12] In late March 2025, Adoptive Mother amended her adoption petition to allege only one basis for her claim that C.P.’s consent to the adoption was not required: that he had failed to establish paternity before the adoption filing. She also moved for a preliminary hearing on the necessity of C.P.’s consent to adoption (hereinafter, “consent hearing”). In her motion, Adoptive Mother alleged:

10. Pursuant [to] I.C. 31-19-9-l(a)(2), consent to the adoption of a child born out of wedlock is only required from “․the biological father of the child if the father's paternity has been established by: (A) a court proceeding other than the adoption proceeding, except as provided in IC 31-14-20-2; or (B) a paternity affidavit executed under IC 16-37-2-2.1[.]” ․

11. Further, I.C. 31-19-9-8(a)(3) expressly states that consent of a “biological father of a child born out of wedlock whose paternity has not been established (A) by a court proceeding other than the adoption proceeding; or (B) by executing a paternity affidavit under IC 16-37-2-2.1” is not required ․

12. Indiana law specifies in I.C. 31-14-2-1 that paternity is established exclusively: 1) by execution of a paternity affidavit pursuant to I.C. 16-37-2-2.1 or 2) through an action under Article 14 of Title 31 ․

13. Parties agree that the child was born out of wedlock, that [C.P.] is the biological father of the child, and that [C.P.] has not established paternity by execution of a paternity affidavit.

14. While parties do not agree that [C.P.] has failed to establish paternity by court proceeding, judicial notice will show that [C.P.] waited to file his Petition to Establish Paternity (now cause 29D05-2503-JP-000379) until December 2, 2024, over four (4) years after the child's birth and after the adoption petition was filed.

15. Further, judicial notice will confirm that paternity has not been established in the paternity action pending before this court nor in any other court proceeding under I.C. 31-14.

16. Thus, as a matter of law, [C.P.’s] consent to this adoption is not required.

17. Finally, the Indiana State Board of Health Affidavit will show that [C.P.] has failed to register with the Putative Father Registry pursuant to I.C. 16-37-2-2.1 as required by both I.C. 31-14-5-7 and I.C. 31-14-20-1.

18. By failing to register with the Putative Father Registry, pursuant to I.C. 31-14-20-2, [C.P.’s] consent to the adoption is irrevocably implied as a matter of law.

19. Petitioner alleges that [C.P.’s] consent to the adoption is not required due to his failure to establish paternity pursuant to I.C. 31-19-9-8(a)(3). Extensive testimony is not required to make the determination as to whether he has or has not established paternity and whether or not his consent is required.

App. Vol. II, pp. 49-50 (emphasis omitted and errors in original retained).

[13] At the outset of the consent hearing, C.P. objected to the limited proceeding, arguing that Adoptive Mother's request was not a proper dispositive motion under the Indiana Trial Rules and that C.P. had not had an opportunity to respond with evidence or affidavits. C.P. also requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. In explaining the purpose of the limited hearing, the court stated:

I don't anticipate that there is going to be any sort of evidence that's going to be presented here other than maybe something that's already been filed or perhaps something I can take judicial notice of. Because I think if we are getting into that, well, then that's for the hearing in August.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 7. The hearing proceeded over C.P.’s objection.

[14] Later during the consent hearing, when C.P. continued to debate its propriety, C.P. asked the court whether he and Mother would be able to admit evidence. The court responded:

[C.P.’s counsel], I've not said you're not able to present evidence. I've said what I'm intending on doing on this hearing which is a limited purpose hearing is to hear evidence that is uncontroverted, evidence that is something I can take judicial notice of, evidence of something being filed in a case, or something like that. If you want me to take judicial notice, you've asked me to take judicial notice of a number of things and I said I have. So you have presented evidence. You're attempting to present other things that it's stuff I can't take judicial notice of and I'm asking you to just stay away from that. Please continue.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 18.

[15] As the consent hearing progressed, Adoptive Mother offered three exhibits: a Putative Father Registry Affidavit from the Indiana State Board of Health, a Utah Putative Father Registry Affidavit, and a Department of Health record completed April 1, 2025. These documents showed that C.P. was not listed on the putative father registry in either Indiana or Utah and that C.P. had not executed a paternity affidavit. The trial court admitted the exhibits over C.P.’s hearsay objection.

[16] At the parties’ requests, the court also took judicial notice of the CHINS case (Cause No. 49D22-2201-JC-320); orders and findings entered in that case; DCS's Notice of Intent to Withhold Consent; the termination of parental rights petition and its dismissal; and C.P.’s paternity action. C.P. did not call any witnesses or present any exhibits at the hearing.

[17] In its later Order Regarding Consent of Biological Mother and Father, the court found the following undisputed material facts:

• Child was born out of wedlock in Utah;

• C.P. did not register with the putative father registry in Indiana or Utah;

• Child had been primarily in Adoptive Mother's care since January 2022;

• Mother signed a consent to adoption on June 15, 2023, but no adoption petition was filed until November 14, 2024;

• DCS filed a termination of parental rights petition against C.P. in September 2023 that did not proceed to final hearing and was dismissed in July 2024; and

• C.P. filed a paternity action in December 2024, more than four years after Child's birth, without alleging any exception to the two-year limitations period and without serving notice on Adoptive Mother.

[18] After the hearing, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that C.P. had not established paternity through either exclusive statutory mechanism—a paternity affidavit or a court proceeding under Indiana Code § 31-14—and that his consent to the adoption was therefore not required under the adoption statutes. The court separately found that C.P.’s failure to register with the putative father registry independently implied his irrevocable consent by statute. The court further found that because C.P. was not entitled to notice of the adoption by statute due to his failure to establish paternity, he was not entitled to contest the adoption by statute. The court therefore denied C.P.’s motion to contest the adoption and vacated the upcoming hearing on that motion.

[19] In October 2025, the trial court conducted a final adoption hearing from which C.P. was excluded. Adoptive Mother appeared with Child, then five years old. Adoptive Mother testified that Child has special needs resulting from the conditions that led to her removal; that DCS had consented to the adoption and supported it; and that Adoptive Mother had entered into a post-adoption contact agreement with Mother allowing monthly contact. The court granted the adoption. The Final Adoption Decree incorporated the court's earlier order finding C.P.’s consent was unnecessary and specified that C.P.’s consent is not required and is irrevocably implied by statute. C.P. appeals that judgment.

Discussion and Decision

[20] C.P. raises two arguments. First, he contends the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his motion to contest the adoption as allegedly required by statute. Second, he asserts the trial court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law under Indiana Trial Rule 52. Both arguments require interpreting the Indiana adoption statutes, thereby presenting a question of law that we review de novo. Matter of Adoption of A.F., 192 N.E.3d 929, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

I. C.P. Has Failed to Show Error in the Consent Hearing

[21] C.P. contends that he was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing before the trial court could find that his consent was unnecessary. A timely filing of a proper motion to contest an adoption triggers Indiana Code § 31-19-10-5(a), which provides that “the court shall, before entering [an adoption decree], set the matter for a hearing to contest the adoption.” C.P. argues that the hearing required by Indiana Code § 31-19-10-5(a) must be “evidentiary,” although he points to no specific authority for that proposition.

[22] C.P. simply cites several adoption statutes verbatim under a section of his brief entitled “Standard of Review.” Appellant's Br., pp. 19-20. But the assertions within the approximately three-page “Argument” section of his brief are not supported by citations to either specific statutes or appellate decisions. Id. at 21-24. C.P. has waived this issue by failing to offer cogent argument and supporting authority. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that arguments in the appellant's brief be “supported by cogent reasoning” and “by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on”).

[23] Even if we were to ignore this waiver, C.P. cannot prevail. It is true that an evidentiary hearing on a motion to contest an adoption may be required under certain circumstances. Indiana Code § 31-19-10-6 specifies:

After setting the matter for a hearing under section 5 of this chapter, the court:

(1) may dismiss the petition to contest the adoption under IC 31-19-10-1.2(g) or on other procedural grounds; or

(2) shall, after hearing evidence at the hearing:

(A) dismiss the petition for adoption if the court:

(i) finds that the person who filed the motion to contest the adoption has established that it is in the best interests of the child that the motion to contest the adoption be granted;

(ii) finds that a required consent to adoption has not been obtained in writing or has not been implied under IC 31-19-9; or

(iii) permits a necessary consent to adoption to be withdrawn; or

(B) deny the motion to contest the adoption.

Ind. Code § 31-19-10-6.

[24] Here, the trial court complied with Indiana Code § 31-19-10-6 because it conducted an evidentiary hearing, albeit limited in scope. At the consent hearing, the court allowed the presentation of “evidence that is uncontroverted, evidence that is something I can take judicial notice of, evidence of something being filed in a case, or something like that.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 18. The court maintained the original factfinding hearing date for presentation of additional evidence—that is, until the court found that the evidence of the uncontroverted facts conclusively established that C.P. was not entitled to contest the adoption.¹

[25] Both parties presented evidence at the consent hearing. Adoptive Mother presented such evidence in the form of exhibits and requests to take judicial notice of various rulings in the CHINS proceeding. C.P. presented such evidence through requests to take judicial notice of the paternity action and the CHINS proceeding.

[26] No additional evidentiary hearing was required. The trial court found, and the record supports, that the following facts were undisputed: Child was born out of wedlock; C.P. did not execute a paternity affidavit; C.P. did not file a paternity action until more than four years after Child's birth and did not allege any exception to the two-year limitations period applicable to such paternity actions; the DNA test during the CHINS proceeding did not constitute legal establishment of paternity ² ; and C.P. did not register with the putative father registry.

[27] The uncontroverted facts showed that C.P. had failed to establish paternity by either “a court proceeding other than the adoption proceeding” or “by a paternity affidavit executed under IC 16-37-2-2.1.” Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(2). These are the exclusive means for establishing paternity of a child born to unmarried parents. See generally Ind. Code § 31-14-2-1.

[28] As a result of C.P.’s failure to establish paternity in the manner specified in Indiana Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(2), C.P.’s consent to Child's adoption was not required. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(3) (specifying that consent to an adoption is not required from “the biological father of a child born out of wedlock whose paternity has not been established: (A) by a court proceeding other than the adoption proceeding; or (B) by executing a paternity affidavit ․”). The trial court's decision to schedule the consent hearing was an efficient way of handling C.P.’s motion to contest the adoption when the uncontroverted facts showed, as a matter of law, that the filing party was not eligible to file the motion to contest. Thus, even if we ignore C.P.’s waiver of this issue, C.P.’s claimed deprivation of an evidentiary hearing fails.

II. C.P. Has Failed to Show Error in the Findings

[29] C.P.’s final claim is that the trial court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law allegedly required by Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). This rule specifies:

Upon its own motion, or the written request of any party filed with the court prior to the admission of evidence, the court in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ․ shall find the facts specially and state its conclusions thereon. The court shall make special findings of fact without request (1) in granting or refusing preliminary injunctions; (2) in any review of actions by an administrative agency; and (3) in any other case provided by these rules or by statute.

T.R. 52(A).

[30] C.P. orally requested findings of fact and conclusions of law at the beginning of the consent hearing but did not file any such written request. “An oral request for findings of fact and conclusions ․ does not invoke Indiana Trial Rule 52(A).” Estate of Henry v. Woods, 77 N.E.3d 1200, 1203-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). C.P. does not allege that the special findings were required by any other rule or statute. Accordingly, we find no error.

Conclusion

[31] As the trial court did not err in conducting the consent hearing or in failing to enter special findings, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On appeal, C.P. does not assert a right to contest the adoption. He merely challenges the procedure used by the court to find that he lacked that right.

2.   In the trial court proceedings, Mother appeared to argue that Father established paternity in the CHINS proceeding. However, as the trial court noted, this Court has rejected the view that DNA testing in a court proceeding equates to a legal determination of paternity. In re Adoption of M.D., 258 N.E.3d 1087, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (determination that absent a court order establishing paternity, DNA testing within a paternity action did not establish paternity for purposes of the adoption statutes).

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.