Roshay Davis, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Roshay Davis (“Davis”) appeals from the trial court's order revoking her probation. She raises one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to serve four years of her original sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”) as a sanction for violating her placement on community corrections. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 6, 2023, the State charged Davis with three counts of Level 5 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury, three counts of Level 5 felony operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II substance in blood causing serious bodily injury, three counts of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person less than eighteen years of age, and one count of Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. On March 7, 2025, Davis pleaded guilty to two counts of Level 5 felony operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II substance in blood causing serious bodily injury, and in exchange, the State dismissed the remaining counts. For the first count, the trial court sentenced Davis to four years with two years served on home detention and two years suspended. For the second count, Davis was sentenced to a consecutive term of four years with one year on home detention and three years suspended with one of those three years on probation.

[3] On April 18, 2025, less than two months after Davis was sentenced and placed on home detention, the community corrections department filed a notice of violation, alleging that Davis had “compromised and/or removed” her electronic monitoring device and had failed to report to community corrections as directed. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 165. On April 21, 2025, the trial court issued a warrant for Davis's arrest. The warrant remained active until Davis was arrested on September 24, 2025. On September 25, 2025, the probation department also filed a notice of violation, alleging that Davis failed to comply with the terms of her community corrections placement and citing the notice of violation that community corrections filed on April 18, 2025.

[4] On October 16, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Davis's alleged violations, where Davis admitted that she had tampered with or removed her electronic monitoring device and had failed to report to community corrections as ordered. She told the trial court that she had been “going through a rough patch in [her] life,” had had a miscarriage, “did not know how to control [her] emotions[,]” and regretted violating the terms of community corrections. Tr. Vol. II p. 39. The trial court found that Davis had violated the terms of her placement on both community corrections and probation and then sanctioned her to concurrent four-year sentences for each count executed in the DOC. However, the trial court told Davis that she could petition to modify her sentence after one year if she had no conduct violations in the DOC. Davis now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Davis argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to serve part of her previously suspended sentences in the DOC. For the purposes of appellate review, we treat the revocation of placement in a community corrections program the same as we do the revocation of probation. Brown v. State, 947 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Placement in a community corrections program is an alternative to commitment to the DOC and is within the sole discretion of the trial court. Id. A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in a community corrections program, and as with probation, placement in the program is a “matter of grace” and a “conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.” Id. It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine probation conditions and to revoke probation if these conditions are violated. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).

[6] Probation revocation is a two-step process, wherein the trial court first makes a factual determination as to whether the probationer violated the terms of probation. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). If a trial court determines that a person has violated a term or condition of probation within the probationary period, the court may impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). We review a trial court's selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion. Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[7] When a probationer admits the allegations against her, she must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation. Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). However, in determining the appropriate sanction upon finding a probation violation, trial courts are not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation. Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. As long as the trial court follows the proper procedures in conducting a probation revocation hearing pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3, it may order execution of a suspended sentence upon finding a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582.

[8] Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion in its sanction because the underlying criminal offenses were Davis's first criminal offenses and “she stayed out of trouble during the approximate two years between her arrest and her original sentence date.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. She also asserts that her violations were the first violations filed by community corrections and the probation department and that she admitted the violations and saved the State from its burden of proving them. Davis makes a contention that “[o]ur legislature arguably adopted a graduated response to a trial court's handling of probation violations” under Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) and that, instead of applying one of the lesser sanctions under the statute, the trial court “elected to impose the most punitive statutory option by sentencing Davis to DOC for part of her originally suspended sentence[.]” Id.

[9] However, contrary to Davis's assertion, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) is not written as a graduated statute where the least punitive sanction corresponds with a first violation, and the more violations that occur, the more egregious the sanction. Instead, under the statute, a trial court may, in its discretion, impose one or more of the sanctions contained in subsection (h) if it finds that any violation has occurred. See I.C. 35-38-2-3(h). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the facts and circumstances of this case. Davis violated the terms of her placement twice within two months of her sentencing when she tampered with her ankle monitor, failed to report to community corrections as ordered, and ultimately absconded for five months.

[10] In its sentencing for Davis's underlying criminal convictions, the trial court granted her the grace of a suspended sentence with placement in community corrections and probation. However, within two months, Davis squandered that grace by tampering with her ankle monitor and by not reporting to community corrections as ordered; she was then wanted on a warrant for five months before she was located. Based on these violations, the trial court could reasonably conclude that further placement on community corrections was not a viable option for Davis. However, the trial court again extended its generosity to Davis by not revoking her entire sentence; instead, it only ordered her to serve four years of her original aggregate sentence of eight years. Further, the trial court told Davis that she could petition the court to modify her sentence after one year if she had no conduct violations in the DOC. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in selecting its sanction for the violations.

[11] Affirmed.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.