IN RE: Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.B. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] J.B. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to C.B. (“Child”). Mother raises the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence supporting certain findings; and

II. Whether the trial court's judgment that Mother's parental rights should be terminated was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother is the biological mother of Child, who was born on March 24, 2013. Mother was a single parent, and Child's father is unknown. Prior to the instant case, Mother had a long history of substance abuse, multiple criminal convictions related to substance abuse and endangering children, and a history with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”).

[4] In October 2011, Mother was convicted of Class D felony possession of a controlled substance, Class D felony neglect of a dependent, and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication and was sentenced to 730 days with 455 days suspended. In May 2017, she was convicted of Class B misdemeanor public intoxication and sentenced to 180 days, all suspended to probation. In July 2017, she was convicted of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person less than eighteen years old and Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent and was sentenced to two years and 182 days with 304 days suspended. She was also convicted of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction and sentenced in January 2022 to 910 days with 545 days suspended.

[5] Mother's substance abuse began approximately in 1999 when she had surgery on her arm, and her drug of choice was hydrocodone. Mother's older son (“Brother”), who was over eighteen at the time of this case, observed Mother ingesting drugs and specifically remembered her crushing up “a Xanax and her Suboxone at the same time and snort[ing] them together.” Tr. Vol. I p. 148. In the past, Mother also attempted to drive Brother and Child on multiple occasions when Brother did not believe that she was safe to drive. When Child was nine years old, Mother gave him a pill bottle and a hundred dollars and told him to go over to his cousin's house “to pick up pills for her.” Id. at 164.

[6] In 2010, Mother's parental rights to Brother were terminated, and Brother was eventually adopted by his grandfather. When grandfather died in 2018, Brother lived periodically with Mother until he was about seventeen years old. When Brother reached the age of eighteen, he moved out of Mother's home. Prior to the instant case, Child was involved with DCS in two child in need of services (“CHINS”) cases. In February 2015, Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS when Mother admitted that Child needed services “to ensure a stable and appropriate living environment free from substance abuse” and agreed that “she could benefit from services to address her substance abuse issues and mental health issues.” Ex. Vol. I p. 90. That case ended in September 2015 when Child was reunited with Mother and returned to her care. In April 2021, Child was again adjudicated a CHINS when Mother admitted that services were necessary because she “struggle[d] with substance abuse related issues that impede[d] her ability to provide care for [Child.]” Id. at 86. The CHINS case concluded in July 2022 when DCS terminated its wardship and reunified Child with Mother.

[7] In April 2024, Mother fell and then suffered an aneurysm and had a stroke that left her hospitalized in a coma for approximately two months. Mother tested positive for amphetamines when brought to the hospital. The night she had her stroke, Mother had left Child, who was eleven years old at the time, home alone and had gone to a casino. When Brother was alerted to the fact that Mother had a stroke, he picked up Child from Mother's home around 5:00 a.m. and took Child to the home where Brother was living with his girlfriend's parents (“Foster Parents”). Child had been living with Foster Parents since that time.

[8] After Mother's stroke, she remained in the hospital for approximately two and a half months and was then placed in a rehabilitation facility for about one month. She had to leave that facility due to her insurance no longer covering it, and she then moved to a care facility where she stayed an additional three weeks until she checked herself out and returned home. At the time she returned home, Mother was not able to care for herself or Child and received daily assistance from a home health aide which continued to the date of the termination hearing.

[9] In June 2024, Child was living with Foster Parents, and when Mother expressed her desire that Child move back home with her, Foster Parents called DCS because they were concerned about Child's safety due to Mother's substance abuse issues and health complications. On June 28, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS based on Mother's inability to provide Child with a safe, suitable home, her substance abuse, and her inability to properly supervise Child. On July 2, 2024, the trial court authorized Child's continued removal from Mother's care.

[10] On August 19, 2024, Mother entered into an agreed entry in which she admitted Child was a CHINS because she “need[ed] assistance providing a safe and stable home, free from illegal substance use” and that the coercive intervention of the court was required. Id. at 14. Among other things, Mother agreed to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, submit to random drug screens, complete home-based case management, complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations, complete a mental health evaluation and follow all recommendations, and participate in visitation with Child. In the agreement, DCS noted that there was a pending petition to find that reunification efforts were not required, but DCS agreed to delay pursuing the petition for at least ninety days “to allow [Mother] the opportunity to demonstrate her ability to provide a safe and stable home environment.” Id. at 15. The trial court accepted Mother's admission, adjudicated Child a CHINS, and ordered Mother to participate in the services. After the agreed entry, family case manager Brian Jones (“FCM Jones”) made several referrals for Mother to receive the required services, including referrals for random drug screens, home-based casework, and visitation with Child.

[11] FCM Jones supervised three visits between Mother and Child in Mother's home while DCS was awaiting a therapeutic visitation supervisor to take over the visitation supervision. During these three visits, there were no concerns, and both Mother and Child acted appropriately. Around the beginning of August, a provider from Firefly began supervising the visits. Mother had supervised visits until November 21, 2024, when Firefly discharged her from visits.

[12] Mother was initially cooperative with her services, but around November 2024, her behavior changed. She had “increased confusion,” became “combative and argumentative with the providers,” and demonstrated “a lot of paranoia,” and there was suspicion that she was intoxicated. Tr. Vol. I p. 86. At one point in time, Mother alleged that FCM Jones “broke into her home, stole her phone,” “deleted all [the] files from her phone,” and then “secretly gave it to her son” to bring back into the home. Id. at 80. Mother was argumentative with FCM Jones when he told her something she did not like, particularly when he offered to administer drug screens. She also told FCM Jones that the trial court told her she did not have to sign anything, argued about the providers that came to administer services because she believed they worked for FCM Jones, and thought FCM Jones “tried to turn her oldest child against her.” Id. at 85. FCM Jones also witnessed some cognitive issues with Mother, including confusion and “moments where she can't recall” things. Id. at 77.

[13] On December 17, 2024, the trial court, after a hearing, issued an order finding that reasonable efforts to reunify Child with Mother were not required under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6(b)(4) (“no reasonable efforts order”).¹ See Ex. Vol. I p. 19. The trial court specifically found that Mother had her parental rights terminated as to Brother in October 2024, Child had been adjudicated a CHINS in two prior cases, Mother had not “made significant progress toward reunification” in the current case, Mother had been “provided ample opportunity to obtain her sobriety and ha[d] been unable to do so even with DCS’[s] long history of working with [her][,]” Child testified he “did not wish to reunify” with Mother, and it was in Child's best interests for no reasonable efforts to be provided. Id. The trial court also changed Child's permanency plan to adoption on the same date. After the order, DCS continued to offer services and left the referrals open even though it was not required to do so because of the no reasonable efforts order.

[14] On January 29, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. The trial court held the termination fact-finding hearing on April 28 and June 9, 2025. At the time of the hearing, Child was twelve years old and had been removed from Mother's care for over one year.

[15] At the hearing, FCM Jones testified that Mother did not maintain weekly contact with DCS as required by the dispositional order. He also testified that DCS referred Mother to Cordant for drug screens. In the tests that Mother submitted, she did not test positive for any drugs other than those to which she was prescribed. However, FCM Jones was concerned about the amount of screens Mother submitted because she had not submitted a drug screen through Cordant since November 21, 2024. She also refused to submit to drug screens for FCM Jones when requested. FCM Jones testified that DCS referred Mother for home-based case management and individual therapy and provided the services as in-home services, so Mother did not need to schedule transportation for her DCS services. Mother told FCM Jones that she had independently completed a substance abuse assessment through Aspire before DCS put in a referral. Mother did not participate in any substance abuse programs during the underlying CHINS case, and she did not inform FCM Jones that she was participating in a substance abuse program not affiliated with DCS.

[16] At the beginning of the case, Mother had supervised therapeutic visitation with Child once a week for two hours that took place in Mother's home. These visits took place until November 21, 2024, when the visitation supervisor discharged Mother. After the no reasonable efforts order was issued, DCS did not seek an order suspending visitation, and at the time of the hearing, DCS still had an active referral for visitation with Child open. Child had a visit with Mother on his birthday on March 24, 2025. This was the last time Child had contact with Mother prior to the hearing. In the ensuing three months before the termination hearing concluded, Mother did not reach out to FCM Jones to schedule more visits with Child or to ask for a telephone number to call Child. FCM Jones testified that there were no orders in place that would prohibit Mother from calling and talking to Child. During the entirety of the case, Mother never progressed beyond therapeutic fully supervised visitation with Child.

[17] At the time of termination, Mother was living in a home she owned, and she received $700 per month through social security as her source of income. She testified that she did not receive any other public assistance, such as food stamps or Medicaid. After paying for her utilities, she stated that she had approximately $100 left over each month. At the time of the hearing, Mother was receiving home health assistance for a few hours each weekday to help with cleaning her home, bathing, getting groceries, and doing laundry. Mother could not walk without assistance or drive a vehicle.

[18] At the time of the termination hearing, Child had been in the care of Foster Parents since April 2024 and remained in their care after DCS became involved and the CHINS case was filed in June 2024. Child did not leave the care of Foster Parents over the duration of this case and was never returned to Mother's care. Brother also lived with Foster Parents as he was dating their daughter. Foster Parents have ample space for Child to live with them and sufficient income to afford to support him, and they expressed interest in adopting Child if termination was ordered. Foster Parents stated that Mother never sent them any clothing for Child but that Brother had gone over to the house to retrieve some things for Child. Child was receiving individual therapy and had wrap-around services provided to him at school. When Child lived with Mother, he had failing grades, but at the time of the hearing, he no longer had failing grades. He also previously got into trouble at school and would get into fights but at the time of the hearing, he was no longer getting into fights and had received a citizenship award from the school.

[19] In October 2023, Child was bitten by a dog and suffered a significant injury to his arm. Since Child was placed with Foster Parents, foster mother worked with Child on helping him maintain his range of motion in his arm. Mother had spoken to an attorney about seeking compensation for the dog bite, but she was unsure of the status of the case. Child's court appointed special advocate (“CASA Abernathy”) sought a third-party attorney to protect Child's interests in the negotiated settlement for his dog bite case because she was concerned that the “settlement money ․ would not go towards [Child's] benefit.” Tr. Vol. II p. 43.

[20] Child testified at the hearing that he wished to be adopted by Foster Parents and for Mother's parental rights to be terminated. He stated that he was “done” with Mother being under the influence of drugs and “sleeping out on the couch” and that there were not any circumstances under which he thought it “would be best for [him] to go back and live with [Mother.]” Tr. Vol. I pp. 18, 19. Brother testified that he believed that it was in Child's best interests that he stay with Foster Parents because Child had “made a complete turn around [sic]” and did not get angry like he used to. Id. at 126. Brother testified that he did not want Child to “grow up like” Brother had because Mother had not been an effective parent to Brother. Id. He did not believe that Mother would ever become a fit mother, and he specifically testified that she “has never been a fit mother and never will be.” Id. at 128.

[21] At the hearing, Mother testified that she experienced memory issues. She further testified that she had no recollection of the CHINS agreement that she signed in the present case. She stated that her attorney from the CHINS case never had a conversation with her about what she was required to do to be reunified with Child. Mother also testified that she never sought independent drug screenings and that she had completed a mental health evaluation with Aspire but that they did not recommend that she participate in any services as a result of the evaluation.

[22] FCM Jones testified that he recommended that Mother's parental rights be terminated and that it was in Child's best interest because of his prior removals from Mother's care and Child's wish to not return to Mother's care. FCM Jones testified that it was DCS's belief that Mother could not safely care for Child at the time of hearing or anytime in the near future. DCS's plan for Child if Mother's rights were terminated was adoption. CASA Abernathy testified that it was her recommendation that Mother's parental rights be terminated and that Child be adopted by Foster Parents. CASA Abernathy based her recommendation on Mother's “long history of drug abuse,” the family's “long history of DCS involvement[,]” and Child's prior removals from Mother's care. Id. at 92. CASA Abernathy also testified that she believed that it was harmful to a child to have multiple involvements with the child welfare system as such repeated involvements can cause trauma to a child.

[23] On August 15, 2025, the trial court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. Specifically, the trial court found that Mother was not able to safely parent Child at the time of the hearing or in the near future and that at “no point during the underlying CHINS case” did Mother make “significant progress toward reunification.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 21. The trial court also found that, although “Mother has progressed in enhancing her physical abilities following the devastating stroke, ․ she still ha[d] significant challenges in both physical capacity and in cognition[,] memory[,] [and] judgment.” Id. at 20. The trial court further stated that it was “unwilling to force [Child] to return to [Mother's] care yet again after having been removed from the same on this now third occasion.” Id. at 21. The trial court concluded that termination was in the best interests of Child and there was a satisfactory plan for Child, which was adoption. The trial court further concluded that, under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d), (1) the CHINS court had entered a finding under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification were not required, (2) there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside of Mother's care would not be remedied, and (3) Child had been adjudicated a CHINS on two separate occasions prior to the underlying CHINS case. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[24] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in resolving a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[25] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). “We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 642 (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions in an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

I. Findings Supported by the Evidence

[26] Mother asserts that the majority of the trial court's findings were not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which support it. Stewart v. Randolph Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 804 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Even erroneous findings are not reversible error if they amount to harmless surplusage. See, e.g., In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“We may reverse a trial court's judgment ․ only if its findings constitute prejudicial error ․ A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless it directly supports a conclusion.”), trans. denied. An erroneous finding is “merely harmless surplusage” when the unchallenged findings “provide ample support for the trial court's ultimate conclusion.” Id.

[27] Initially, we note the sheer number of Mother's challenged findings. Out of fifty-five findings in the order, Mother challenges approximately thirty-six of them. For the most part, Mother's challenges amount to impermissible requests for this court to reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642 (“We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”). Nonetheless, we proceed to address these challenges.

[28] Mother first challenges Findings 9(b), 9(d), 9(e), and 10(c), asserting that the trial court erred in these findings because it wholesale adopted the CHINS court's findings in the no reasonable efforts order and the December 2024 permanency hearing and that the evidence at the termination hearing contradicted these findings. While Mother argues that the evidence at the termination hearing did not support these findings, we disagree. Findings 9(b), 9(d), and 9(e) are simply recitations of findings contained in the no reasonable efforts order, and the evidence supported that these were indeed the findings contained within that order. See Ex. Vol. I p. 19. As to Finding 10(c), it is just a recitation of the trial court's findings after a permanency hearing was held in December 2024, and the evidence supported that the trial court made such findings in its order. See id. at 20–22.

[29] Mother argues that the evidence did not support Finding 12 regarding Child's memories of Mother's drug use in his presence. However, Mother seems to concede that the evidence contained in Finding 12 was presented at the hearing because she contends that “Child made multiple new allegations at his second round of testimony,” and instead, she questions the veracity of Child's statements at the hearing, asserting there was “improper communication with a witness mid-trial.” Appellant's Br. p. 26. This is an impermissible request to judge the credibility of a witness, which we will not do.

[30] As to Finding 13, which states that “[Child] is in therapy to deal with the trauma caused by Mother's deficient parenting behaviors[,]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 19, Mother asserts that the evidence did not support that Child was in therapy because of Mother's parenting but that she already had Child in therapy prior to the opening of the current CHINS case. The evidence presented at the hearing established that Child was in therapy at that time, that CASA Abernathy believed that repeated involvements with the child welfare system can cause trauma to a child, and that the present case was the third time that Child had been removed from Mother's care and involved in a CHINS case. From this, the trial court could reasonably infer that Child experienced trauma based on Mother's parenting deficiencies and repeated removal from her care. Further, although Mother testified that Child was in therapy before the current CHINS case began, she also stated that such therapy was actually initiated during a prior CHINS case, and therefore, the evidence did not support that she was the one who sought therapy for Child. Evidence therefore supported Finding 13.

[31] Mother next challenges Findings 14, 22, and 49, which stated:

14. Mother has failed to comply, or has failed to provide independent evidence of compliance, with the pending CHINS court's dispositional orders issued to her with her agreement in the Facilitated Agreement, including those to

a. Initiate contact with the FCM at least once each week;

b. Obtain and maintain a legal and stable source of income sufficient to support herself and her son;

c. Not use or manufacture illegal substances; and

d. Meet the child's basic needs.

․

22. Mother did not engage in random screens to establish proof of her sobriety.

․

49. There is no point during the underlying CHINS case that [Mother] made significant progress toward reunification.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 19, 21. Mother claims that the evidence shows that her contact with FCM Jones was satisfactory, that she had a safe and stable home for Child and had support from her family to care for Child, and that DCS's own drug screen exhibits and FCM Jones's testimony refute that Mother failed to participate in drug screens. Contrary to Mother's contentions, the evidence supported these findings. FCM Jones testified that Mother did not maintain weekly contact with him since the beginning of the case. Additionally, although Mother received $700 a month in social security benefits, she testified that, after she paid $600 in utilities, she only had $100 left each month; this was sufficient evidence to support that Mother did not have a source of income sufficient to support both her and Child and was unable to meet Child's basic needs. Further, although there was evidence of negative drug screens, Mother had not submitted to a drug screen since November 2024, and she refused to submit to drug screens for FCM Jones when requested. “A parent whose drug use led to a child's removal cannot be permitted to refuse to submit to drug testing, then later claim the DCS has failed to prove that the drug use has continued.” In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)), trans. denied. All of this evidence collectively supported that Mother failed to meet Child's basic needs and failed to make significant progress toward reunification. Sufficient evidence supported Findings 14, 22, and 49.

[32] We now turn to Findings 17 and 25, which stated:

17. Mother has provided nothing to the placement family for the child's ongoing care after the child was most recently detained although she did permit [Brother] to retrieve from Mother's home some of the child's belongings at the outset of the child's detention.

․

25. Mother's income is $700 monthly through social security disability; she has only $100 for personal use after she pays monthly utilities and receives no SNAP (“food stamp”) benefits.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 19. Mother lists these as challenged findings but does not appear to dispute the evidentiary support for these findings, instead contending that the trial court improperly drew “a negative conclusion as to Mother not providing material support for Child while in foster placement.” Appellant's Br. p. 27. In any case, evidence was presented that Mother received $700 per month through social security, did not receive any other public assistance, and that after paying her utilities, she only had approximately $100 left over each month. Evidence was also presented that Mother never sent Foster Parents any clothing for Child but that Brother had gone over to the house to retrieve some of Child's belongings. Thus, the evidence supported these findings.

[33] Mother next challenges Findings 18 and 19, which stated:

18. There were no CHINS or other court orders disallowing Mother to have telephone or other contact with [Child], although she had no routine communication or visitation with him.

19. Mother has had little communication with the placement family about [Child's] care or well-being.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 19. Again, Mother does not argue that the evidence did not support these findings and, instead, argues that the trial court used her compliance with the dispositional order against her because if she had attempted to unilaterally contact Child there would have been a negative finding concerning that decision. However, the dispositional order did not prohibit Mother from contacting Child via the telephone, nor did it prevent her from seeking communication from Foster Parents about Child's well-being. There was also evidence presented that, other than a visit on Child's March 2025 birthday, Mother did not request to have any additional visits with Child after they ended in November 2024. These findings were supported by the evidence and do not reflect impermissible considerations by the trial court.

[34] Mother next challenges Findings 20, 21, 23, 44–46, and 48, which all pertain to Mother's memory and cognitive issues related to her stroke:

20. Mother has no recollection of some actions she has taken in the related CHINS case, including having executed a mediated agreement.

21. She has no recollection of receiving advice from her CHINS attorney about what she might do to pursue reunification.

․

23. Mother does not recall working with local mental health provider Aspire or what they may have done for her.

․

44. Mother has progressed in enhancing her physical abilities following the devastating stroke, but she still has significant challenges in both physical capacity and cognition/memory/judgment.

45. As an example of her issues with

cognition/memory/judgment, Mother appeared at the most recent evidentiary hearing wearing flannel pajamas, reflecting her inability to discern even appropriate attire for a court setting.

46. Other examples are her inability to recall multiple things that have transpired in the currently pending CHINS action.

․

48. The Court finds that, notwithstanding her love for the child, Mother is not able to safely parent this child now or in the near future.

Id. at 19, 20, 21. Mother only explicitly argues that Finding 23 was not supported by the evidence, asserting that Mother testified that she recalled working with Aspire and completed a substance abuse assessment. Although Mother did testify that she worked with Aspire, she also stated that she did not “really know ․ what they did for me.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. As to the rest of the above listed findings, Mother claims that they are “irrelevant” and “superfluous” as to whether her parental rights should be terminated. Appellant's Br. pp. 27–28. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support Findings 20, 21, 23, 44–46, and 48.

[35] Findings 27–30 discuss the qualifications of FCM Jones and CASA Abernathy, the trial court's determination that their opinions should be given significant weight, and CASA Abernathy's observations that contributed to her belief that termination was in Child's best interests. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 19–20. Mother challenges these findings claiming that there was no evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings as to FCM Jones's and CASA Abernathy's expertise. However, both of them testified as to their experience and qualifications. See Tr. Vol. I pp. 54–55, 114–15. The majority of Mother's challenges to these findings boil down to assertions regarding the weight that the trial court gave the testimony of both FCM Jones and CASA Abernathy, which is not something that we will engage in on appeal. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 640. As to Finding 30, which listed CASA Abernathy's reasons for supporting the termination of Mother's parental rights, all of the statements were testified to by the CASA. See Tr. Vol. I pp. 92–98. Sufficient evidence supported these challenged findings.

[36] As to Findings 31–41, Mother does not challenge the evidentiary support but, instead, asserts that the “findings merely demonstrate that Child is currently in a home perceived by the trial court to be better than Mother's home, which is a forbidden basis upon which to terminate parental rights.” Appellant's Br. p. 29. These challenged findings discuss Child's placement with Foster Parents, their circumstances that demonstrate that they could provide Child with stability and safety, how Child had progressed in his behaviors and academics at school, Brother's opinion based on his experience with Mother that it was in Child's best interest to not return to Mother's care, and that permanency was the goal for Child. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 20. The evidence presented at the hearing supported all of these findings. And, while Mother is correct that a parent's constitutional right to raise her own child may not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, a child's need for permanency is a factor to be considered in determining whether termination is in the child's best interest. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1152 (Ind. 2016). Thus, the evidence contained in the findings was an intricate part of the trial court's determination as to what was in Child's best interests, and Findings 31–41 only constituted a small portion of the trial court's findings, which makes it clear that, in making its termination decision, the trial court did not rely solely on the fact that Child was in better home.

[37] Lastly, Mother challenges Findings 43, 47, and 52, which stated:

43. The Court gives substantial weight to this child's desire expressed to this Court on multiple occasions that he does not wish to return to Mother's care and that he wants instead to be adopted into his current placement's family.

․

47. The question before the Court is whether Mother is now or in the immediate future will be able to independently and competently parent this child.

․

52. This Court is unwilling to force this child to return to his biological mother's care yet again after having been removed from the same on this now third occasion.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 20, 21. Mother asserts that these findings “demonstrate that the trial court has inappropriately passed the decision-making authority on termination of parental rights directly to the Child, which is clearly contrary to Indiana law.” Appellant's Br. p. 29. She also claims that Finding 47 imposes a non-statutory element, that she have the ability to “independently” parent Child. Id. at 30. Mother again does not actually argue that the evidence did not support these findings, and we do not find that they are clearly erroneous. First, our court has concluded that a trial court can take into account the wishes of the child as one consideration in determining whether parental rights should be terminated. See Stone v. Daviess Cnty. Div. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“We conclude that in termination proceedings, as in custody cases, the wishes of the child is only one of the many factors the trial court must consider in determining and effecting the best interests of the child.”), trans. denied. Second, Mother's reliance on In re O.G., 159 N.E.3d 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied, is misplaced. There, this court reversed the trial court's order terminating a mother's parental rights because, after a previous remand, the trial court focused its termination decision on “Child's struggles with prior reunification efforts, that future reunification efforts would be hard on Child, and that Child is comfortable with his foster family,” and the trial court “did not say a single word about [the mother's] fitness as a parent.” Id. at 44.

[38] Here, the trial court did consider Mother's unfitness to parent Child, making findings regarding Mother's history with DCS, substance abuse history, criminal history, failure to complete services, failure to submit to drug screens, and inability to care for Child due to her cognitive issues. Third, the trial court's statement that the question in front of it was whether Mother “is now or in the immediate future will be able to independently and competently parent this child” is clearly just a reference to whether Mother would be able to parent Child without the intervention of DCS. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 20. These challenged findings were supported by the evidence.

II. Sufficient Evidence for Judgment

[39] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision terminating her parental rights to Child. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As stated above, a petition must allege the existence of one or more of the circumstances contained in subsection (d). Here, the pertinent alleged circumstances in subsection (d) were as follows:

(1) That a court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.

․

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

․

(5) That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(1), (3), (5). The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

A. Subsection (d)

[40] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion under subsection (d)(3) that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of Child and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied. She asserts that all of the conditions had been remedied at the time of the termination hearing. However, Mother does not dispute that there have been two prior CHINS adjudications as to Child, nor that a finding was made by the CHINS court that reunification efforts were not required as alleged under (d)(1) and (d)(5). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, and therefore, DCS was required to prove only one of the circumstances alleged in subsection (d). See In re G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (because statute written in the disjunctive, DCS need only prove one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied.

[41] Here, DCS alleged the existence of three of the circumstances under subsection (d): that a court had entered a finding that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification were not required; that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied, and that Child had, on two separate occasions, been adjudicated a CHINS. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 9 (citing Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)). The evidence clearly supported the allegations under subsection (d)(1) and (d)(5). Prior to the instant case, Child was involved with DCS in two CHINS cases, one of which resulted in a CHINS adjudication in February 2015 and another that resulted in an adjudication in April 2021. See Ex. Vol. I pp. 86, 90. Additionally, on December 17, 2024, the trial court, after a hearing, issued the no reasonable efforts order, finding that reasonable efforts to reunify Child with Mother were not required under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6(b)(4). See Ex. Vol. I p. 19. As the facts supported the trial court's conclusions regarding the allegation under subsections (d)(1) and (d)(5), we need not address whether its findings also supported a conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of Child and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied.

B. Best Interests

[42] Mother additionally argues that DCS also failed to present clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of a parent to those of the child. Id.

[43] Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 82. Testimony of the service providers, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Before terminating the parent-child relationship, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[44] Our review of the totality of the evidence reveals that, at the time of the termination hearing, Child was twelve years old and had not been in Mother's care for over a year. Mother had a long history of being unable to provide a stable and suitable home for Child. Prior to the instant case, Mother had a substance abuse problem for years, multiple criminal convictions related to substance abuse and endangering children, and a history with the DCS. Mother's substance abuse began in 1999 when she had surgery on her arm, and her drug of choice was hydrocodone. On multiple occasions, Mother attempted to drive Brother and Child when Brother did not believe that she was safe to drive. In 2010, Mother's parental rights to Brother were terminated. Prior to the present CHINS case, Child was twice adjudicated a CHINS, in February 2015 and in April 2021.

[45] Child was removed from Mother's care after she suffered a stroke, which resulted in Mother being hospitalized for months and then spending time in two different rehabilitation facilities. At the time that Mother suffered her stroke, she had left Child alone, and when she suffered her stroke, it was discovered that she had amphetamines in her system. Because of her hospitalization and rehabilitation from the stroke and concerns regarding her substance abuse, Child was adjudicated a CHINS. Over the course of the case, Mother did not demonstrate that she had taken steps to address her substance abuse or that she remained sober through court-ordered drug screens. Although Mother did not test positive for any drugs other than those to which she was prescribed, FCM Jones was concerned about the limited number of screens to which Mother submitted. Mother had not submitted a drug screen since November 21, 2024, and refused to submit to drug screens when requested by FCM Jones. Mother told FCM Jones that she had independently completed a substance abuse assessment through Aspire, but there was no evidence that Mother participated in any substance abuse programs through DCS, and she did not inform FCM Jones of participation in a substance abuse program not affiliated with DCS.

[46] Although Mother was initially cooperative with her services, around November 2024, her behavior changed when she began to have “increased confusion,” became “combative and argumentative with the providers,” and demonstrated “a lot of paranoia,” and there was suspicion that she was intoxicated. Tr. Vol. I p. 86. Mother was argumentative with FCM Jones when he told her something she did not like and when he offered to administer drug screens. FCM Jones also witnessed some cognitive issues with Mother, including confusion and memory loss. Mother testified to having memory issues and that she had no recollection of the CHINS agreement she signed and did not remember having any conversation with her CHINS attorney about what she was required to do to be reunified with Child.

[47] After the no reasonable efforts order was issued in December 2024, DCS continued to offer services and left the referrals open and did not seek an order suspending visitation. However, Mother did not participate in any further services. At the time of the hearing, DCS still had an open referral for visitation between Mother and Child. Nevertheless, after November 21, 2024, Mother did not have any visits with Child until Child's birthday on March 24, 2025, which was the last time Child had any contact with Mother prior to the hearing. Mother never reached out to FCM Jones to schedule more visits with Child or to ask for a telephone number to call Child.

[48] In looking at Child's need for permanency and stability, the evidence clearly supported the conclusion that termination was in Child's best interests. This was Child's third CHINS case and removal from Mother's care. Child had shown growth and improvement since living with Foster Parents. When Child lived with Mother, he had failing grades and got into fights at school, but at the time of the hearing, his grades had improved and he was no longer getting into fights and had received a citizenship award from the school. Child, now twelve years old, testified that he wished to be adopted by Foster Parents and for Mother's parental rights to be terminated because of Mother's substance abuse, because he wanted to be done dealing with DCS, and because he wanted to be in his “forever home.” Id. at 40. Brother testified that he believed that it was in Child's best interests to stay with Foster Parents because of the improvements in Child's behavior and his decreased anger. Brother testified that, based on his own experience in Mother's care, Mother was not a fit parent and never would be a fit parent.

[49] Additionally, both FCM Jones and CASA Abernathy testified that they believed that termination was in the best interests of Child. FCM Jones testified that he recommended that Mother's parental rights be terminated because of Child's prior removals from Mother's care and Child's wish to not return to Mother's care. It was DCS's belief that Mother could not safely care for Child at the time of the hearing or anytime in the near future. CASA Abernathy testified that she believed that termination was in Child's best interests because of Mother's “long history of drug abuse,” the family's “long history of DCS involvement[,]” and Child's prior removals from Mother's care. Id. at 92. CASA Abernathy also testified that she believed that multiple involvements with the child welfare system can cause trauma to a child.

[50] The trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that [his or] her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015). Looking at the totality of the evidence, the trial court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Conclusion

[51] We, therefore, conclude that the evidence supported the challenged findings. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

[52] Affirmed.

Attorney for Appellant, Michael C. Price, Zionsville, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee, Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Abigail R. Recker, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

FOOTNOTES

1.   Under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6(b)(4), reasonable efforts to reunify a child with the child's parent are not required if the trial court finds that “[t]he parental rights of a parent with respect to a biological or adoptive sibling of the child have been involuntarily terminated by a court under ․ IC 31-35-2 (involuntary termination involving a delinquent child or a child in need of services)[.]”

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.