Joseph L. Porter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After a jury found Joseph L. Porter guilty but mentally ill on nine counts, the trial court entered judgment of conviction on four counts: Level 1 felony attempted murder;¹ Level 5 felony battery causing bodily injury to a public safety officer;² Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement;³ and Class A misdemeanor striking a law enforcement animal.⁴ The trial court ordered him to serve consecutive sentences totaling forty-six years. Porter appeals his convictions and sentence, raising two issues for our review: (1) Does the record support the jury's determination that Porter was guilty but mentally ill rather than not guilty by reason of insanity? and (2) Is his sentence inappropriate? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In March 2023, Porter lived with his girlfriend of four years, Robyn; Robyn's son; and his and Robyn's one-year-old daughter. Robyn's parents lived next door; her brother and sister-in-law lived across the street.

[3] Robyn said in the days leading up to March 18, Porter was sleep deprived and had been acting “strange[ ] and erratic.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 210. And Robyn described Porter as acting “paranoid all day long” on March 18. Id. She said that in the four years she and Porter were together, she had never seen Porter behave like he did that day. In the early evening, Porter, Robyn, and their daughter were home. Porter called a local news station to report an earthquake (there had been no earthquake) and then a few minutes before 6 p.m., he called 9-1-1 to ask for security at his house because of a suspicious-looking man walking by. Robyn looked out the window but did not see anyone. Officer Michael Meraz was dispatched to investigate the call.

[4] At trial, Robyn described what happened next:

I remember sitting in the front room on the couch, watching TV with my daughter, and I remember Mr. Porter pacing back and forth from the kitchen to the front room, and I'm constantly telling him to calm down, “Calm down, you're paranoid, just sit down and calm down,” and continued watching the TV. And Mr. Porter went back in the kitchen. He came in saying to me what did I do, what did I do. I was confused, I didn't know what he was talking about, and he was just saying, “What did you do? What did you do?” I [saw] he had something behind his back, didn't know what it was, and he kept coming closer to me. He had a pair of scissors in his hands. He kept asking me what did I do, what did I do. And he came closer and he stabbed me with a pair of scissors. He came and stabbed [me] on the top of my head, on the side of my face, my shoulders, the back of my head. I'm yelling, “Stop, stop[.]”

Id. at 199–200. Porter and Robyn's daughter was “just feet away” in a swing. Id. at 202. Robyn recalled her “[c]rying, screaming” while Porter attacked Robyn. Id. Then Porter wrapped his arms around Robyn's throat, “like a sleeper hold ․ you see in wrestling.” Id. Robyn could not breathe and thought she was going to die, but she “fought [her] way out” and was able to run to the front door and escape the house. Id. at 203. Although Robyn said she “didn't know who [Porter] was that day[,]” she thought he knew who she was while he was attacking her. Id. at 214 (when asked if Porter knew who she was while the assault was taking place, Robyn answered, “As I know of”).

[5] Robyn went first to her parents’ house next door, “yell[ing] and scream[ing], ‘Help, help, someone help me.’ ” Id. 203–04. When no one answered, she went across the street to her brother's house, still screaming. Robyn's neighbor heard the commotion, saw Robyn “in a very bad state,” and called 9-1-1 a few minutes after 6 p.m. Id. at 223. In the meantime, Porter put his daughter on the front porch of the house and then left through the back door. He got in his car—a Chevrolet Trailblazer—and drove away.

[6] While Officer Meraz was en route for the initial 9-1-1 call, he received “an additional call saying ․ there was a female with blood all over her ․ in the street” outside the house where he was already headed. Id. at 233. When Officer Meraz arrived, he found Robyn on the front porch of her brother and sister-in-law's house, “[s]cared, crying, shaking, upset” and “covered in blood.” Id. at 234. Officer Meraz called for medics and then went across the street where he found the child with blood on her, sitting in a swing. The child was not injured.

[7] Medics took Robyn to the hospital where she was assessed as a Level 1 trauma—“the most severe of traumas”—because of penetrating wounds to her neck and chest. Tr. Vol. 3 at 33. Robyn had 16 total lacerations. Of particular concern to the emergency room physician was a stab wound to Robyn's armpit that was the likely cause of a pneumothorax.⁵ Because an “untreated large pneumothorax can be fatal,” Robyn was admitted and kept under observation so doctors could monitor whether the volume of air in her chest was expanding. Id. at 38. The physician summarized that the “numerous, erratic-appearing stab wounds of variable trajectory and depth [were] highly dangerous” and it looked as if the person who stabbed Robyn was trying to kill her. Id. at 39. Robyn has scars from some of the stab wounds.

[8] At about 6:30 p.m. the day of the attack, Tina Hadley returned to her home on Nadina Cove after work. Her house is approximately twenty minutes from Robyn's home. Hadley saw an unfamiliar vehicle in her driveway and when she pulled in, a man Hadley did not know but who was later identified as Porter got out of the vehicle. Porter knocked on her passenger window then entered her car. Hadley noticed he was not wearing any shoes or socks and there was blood all over his hands and jacket. Hadley asked what he was doing, and Porter replied, “I'm the new actor from Wakanda․ You know me.” Id. at 46. Hadley assumed Porter had done something to her son who was in the house and she got out of the car to check on him. By the time she got to the house, Porter was driving away in his vehicle. Officer Joel Lengerich responded to a 9-1-1 call and spoke with Hadley. Hadley gave him a description of the vehicle Porter was driving—an older model Chevrolet Trailblazer. Hadley later obtained footage from a neighbor's Ring doorbell of Porter crawling under her partially raised garage door before she got home and walking back and forth saying, “I messed up. I can't believe I messed up.” Id. at 47.

[9] Around 7:30 p.m., Officer Treven Brown located a Chevrolet Trailblazer in a school parking lot about five minutes from Hadley's house. He pulled in behind the vehicle, verified it was the vehicle police were looking for, and radioed for assistance. Officer Lengerich was the first to arrive. As soon as he did, Porter stepped out of his vehicle, said he did not have any weapons, and showed his hands. Porter initially complied with commands to walk away from his vehicle and get on his knees but then got up and took off running, eventually crouching down on the far side of the Trailblazer. Officer Brown got his K9 partner, Alex, out of his car. When Porter saw Officer Brown and Alex approaching, he climbed onto the hood of the Trailblazer and said, “This is going to hurt.” Id. at 64.

[10] Officer Brown deployed Alex, who jumped onto the hood. Porter punched Alex in the side several times. Holding Porter's coat in his teeth, Alex pulled backwards and both Porter and Alex fell off the hood. Porter landed on his feet, grabbed Alex, and swung him into the grill of the vehicle twice. Officer Lengerich deployed his taser, causing Porter to fall to the ground. Officers moved to take him into custody and “gave him repeated commands to stop resisting and fighting ․ Unfortunately, he did not.” Id. at 65. Porter bit Officer Brown in the leg and continued to kick and fight, yelling “[s]hoot me” several times. Id. at 77. After several drive stuns ⁶ with the taser, Porter relented enough for officers to put him in handcuffs. Porter was taken to the hospital for medical clearance. While in the ambulance, Porter asked the EMT, “Is she dead?” Id. at 97. At the hospital, the attending physician noted nothing of concern about Porter's mental state.

[11] The State charged Porter with nine counts stemming from these events.⁷ Porter gave notice of his intent to raise a defense of mental disease or defect. The trial court appointed Dr. David Lombard, a licensed clinical psychologist, and Dr. Stephen Ross, a licensed clinical and forensic psychologist, to evaluate Porter regarding his sanity at the time of the alleged offenses. Both doctors conducted their evaluations in April 2024, over one year after the events at issue.

[12] At Porter's trial in May 2024, the trial court preliminarily instructed the jury about the insanity defense and the various verdicts it could return—guilty, not guilty, not responsible by reason of insanity, or guilty but mentally ill. The State presented witnesses who testified to the events described above. After the State rested its case-in-chief and Porter rested without presenting any additional evidence, the trial court called Doctors Lombard and Ross to testify.

[13] Dr. Lombard explained the purpose of a sanity evaluation:

Sanity evaluations, what we're looking for is – we refer to it as a two-pronged assessment. We're looking first for is there the presence of a diagnosable mental health condition; not just symptoms, because we all struggle from time to time, so we all have symptoms, but a diagnosable mental health symptom that impairs somebody. Then, the second prong is did that mental health condition impair a person's ability to understand the nature and consequences of their action at a particular moment in time, and, usually, that particular moment in time is a crimina offense.

Tr. Vol. 3 at 166–67.⁸ Dr. Lombard described his conversation with Porter during the evaluation. Porter gave a clear account of most of March 18: he remembered his 9-1-1 call, being upset, and picking up the scissors and returning to the living room where Robyn was. But at that point, “he went black” and remembered nothing until he dropped the scissors and ran out of the house. Id. at 171. He left the house instead of helping Robyn because “he was scared of what he had just done and didn't want to be arrested.” Id. He remembered driving for a while, stopping and telling someone he was an actor in a movie, and then driving to a school and encountering police. Dr. Lombard also testified he learned during the evaluation that Porter had been treated at a behavioral health center three times as a teenager and had been an in-patient at a psychiatric facility once as an adult, about six years before this incident. Porter reported being diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoia, and bipolar disorder.

[14] Dr. Lombard stated that Porter had a diagnosable mental health condition but he “can't have an opinion” on Porter's sanity at the time of the offenses:

[S]ince [Porter] reported having a memory lapse that he referred to as going black and not remembering and then realizing the situation afterwards, I can't give you a professional opinion as to whether or not his mental health conditions impaired his thoughts that led to his actions, since he can't tell me his thoughts.

Id. at 168–69. Dr. Lombard explained that having a mental illness is not the same as being insane and not everyone who has a mental illness is prevented from being able to understand the nature and consequences of their behavior. Dr. Lombard testified Porter's symptoms, “although there, were not severe enough that it would impair somebody's understanding of their day-to-day actions in life.” Id. at 175.

[15] Dr. Ross testified he could not “be certain that whatever mental health crises [Porter] was experiencing caused him to be unable to appreciate right from wrong.” Id. at 192. Dr. Ross explained the reason for his uncertainty was because he did not have “good data” such as contemporaneous mental health records and verification of Porter's medication history. Id. at 193. The last records Dr. Ross was able to review were from mid-2022. He stated the documentation he received indicated Porter's “mental stability” had been affected by an automobile accident in 2020 after which he experienced “increased rage, poor sleep, difficulty holding a job, difficulty controlling his emotions, and hypersensitivity.” Id. at 200. But Dr. Ross was unable to offer an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty regarding Porter's sanity at the time of the offenses.

[16] During final instructions, the trial court instructed the jury about the insanity defense:

The defense of insanity is defined by law as follows: A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense․ On the issue of insanity, the burden rests upon the Defendant to prove to each of you, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was not responsible by reason of insanity at the time of the offense charged․ The jury is not bound by the definitions or conclusions of experts who have testified as to what is a mental disease or mental defect․ [Y]ou are instructed to consider expert testimony in light of all other testimony presented concerning the development, adaptation, and functioning of the Defendant's mental and emotional processes and behavior controls and not necessarily accept the ultimate conclusions of the experts as to the Defendant's legal sanity or insanity. This is your decision and only your decision.

Id. at 222–23. In his closing argument to the jury, Porter's counsel said, “I'm not making excuses for Mr. Porter's actions, what he did was horrible, but he did not have the mindset to create [ ]the intent to do these things. He was, clearly, out of his mind, out of touch with reality.” Id. at 240. The jury returned verdicts of guilty but mentally ill on all nine counts.

[17] At Porter's sentencing hearing, the trial court vacated five of the counts for double jeopardy reasons, entering judgment of conviction against Porter for attempted murder with respect to Robyn, battery with respect to Officer Brown, resisting law enforcement, and striking a law enforcement animal. The trial court reviewed the presentence investigation report, took testimony from Robyn, heard a statement in allocution from Porter, and heard the arguments of counsel. The trial court found the following aggravators: Porter's juvenile and adult criminal record with failed efforts at rehabilitation; the nature and circumstances of the crime, especially that there was a child present during his assault on Robyn; and the significant impact on Robyn. As mitigators, the trial court found Porter expressed genuine remorse and has significant mental health issues. The trial court ordered Porter to serve forty years for attempted murder, four years for battery, one year for resisting law enforcement, and one year for striking a law enforcement animal. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of forty-six years.

The evidence supports the jury's rejection of Porter's insanity defense.

[18] Porter first argues the jury erred when it rejected his insanity defense and instead found him guilty but mentally ill.

[19] To convict a person of a criminal offense, the State must prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Robinson v. State, 53 N.E.3d 1236, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied; see also I.C. § 35-41-4-1(a) (1977). But criminal responsibility can be avoided if the defendant successfully establishes the insanity defense. Robinson, 53 N.E.3d at 1241. To establish this affirmative defense, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence both that (1) he suffers from a mental disease or defect, and (2) the mental disease or defect rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense. I.C. §§ 35-41-4-1(b) (burden of proof); 35-41-3-6(a).⁹

[20] That Porter suffers from a mental disease or defect is not in dispute. The only question is whether his mental illness prevented him from understanding the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offenses and that is a question for the trier of fact. Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1075 (Ind. 2015). A defendant who claims his insanity defense should have prevailed at trial appeals from a negative judgment, and we will reverse and set the conviction aside “only when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.” Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004). “When reviewing a jury's verdict which rejected the defense of insanity, we will not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, or disturb reasonable inferences made by the trier of fact.” Robinson, 53 N.E.3d at 1240. A finding that the defendant was not insane at the time of the offense is entitled to substantial deference from a reviewing court. Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ind. 2010). As this Court has observed: “[W]hile, all too often, horrific acts are irrational, this does not mean that the perpetrator of those acts must be legally insane.” Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[21] Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2 provides for the use of expert testimony to assist the trier of fact in determining the defendant's insanity. Such testimony is merely advisory, however, and even unanimous expert testimony is not conclusive. Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709. In making a sanity determination, the jury may consider all relevant evidence, including expert opinion, lay testimony, and demeanor evidence. Barcroft v. State, 111 N.E.3d 997, 1002–03 (Ind. 2018). Lay testimony regarding the defendant's behavior before, during, and after a crime “may be more indicative of actual mental health at [the] time of the crime than mental exams conducted weeks or months later.” Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149.

[22] Porter acknowledges neither expert could determine whether he had the ability to understand the nature and consequences of his actions at the time he stabbed Robyn. But he argues the testimony about his “bizarre behavior before and after the stabbing” proves by a preponderance of the evidence he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Appellant's Br. at 20. He focuses on Robyn's testimony about his unusual behavior in the days and hours leading up to the stabbing and his interactions with Hadley and police afterwards. Porter claims “this evidence of his demeanor ․, along with the testimony of the two psychologists, leads only to the conclusion that [he] was insane at the time he committed the offenses.” Id. at 22. We disagree.

[23] Robyn testified she thought Porter knew who she was as he was attacking her. Porter had called 9-1-1 minutes before the attack and was told police were on the way; he told Dr. Lombard that he left the house rather than assist Robyn because “he was scared of what he had just done and didn't want to be arrested.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 171. Porter's vehicle was parked in front of the house, but he left the house through the back door. Robyn explained there was a security camera at the front door, which Porter knew because he had installed it. At Hadley's house, security cameras captured him repeatedly saying “I messed up” while he was hiding in her garage. Id. at 47. He resisted police in an effort to avoid arrest for his earlier conduct. Although Dr. Lombard was unable to say whether Porter was legally insane at the time of the crimes, he noted Porter's “conduct of leaving [the house] out of fear of being arrested is telling me that, when he saw the police, he knew that they were there to arrest him. He knew that he was at least in danger of being arrested for some crime, whether he'd done it or not[.]” Id. at 175. And when Porter was on the way to the hospital, he asked the EMT if Robyn was dead.

[24] Importantly, neither expert testified that Porter was insane at the time of the offenses. “[A]s a matter of law, a person is either sane or insane at the time of the crime; there is no intermediate ground.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 711. The trier of fact has only two options regarding sanity, and its decision must be based on probative evidence. Id. In sum, although the evidence established that Porter was suffering from a mental disease or defect on the date of the offenses, there was no probative evidence that Porter was insane. See id. (stating an expert who testifies he has no opinion does not provide probative evidence to assist the jury). Rather, evidence of Porter's actions and demeanor following the attack on Robyn showed he understood that stabbing her was wrong. In other words, the evidence does not lead only to the conclusion that Porter was insane when the crime was committed. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's rejection of Porter's insanity defense.

Porter's forty-six-year sentence is not inappropriate.

[25] Porter next argues his forty-six-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.

[26] The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[27] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[28] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[29] When a person is found guilty but mentally ill, “the court shall sentence the defendant in the same manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense.” I.C. § 35-36-2-5(a) (2018). The defendant is then further evaluated and treated “in such a manner as is psychiatrically indicated” during his incarceration. I.C. § 35-36-2-5(c).

[30] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). Porter was convicted of Level 1 felony attempted murder of Robyn, which carries a sentencing range of twenty to forty years with an advisory sentence of thirty years—the trial court ordered Porter to serve the maximum forty years.¹⁰ Porter was also convicted of Level 5 felony battery causing bodily injury to Officer Brown, a public safety officer, which carries a sentencing range of one to six years with an advisory sentence of three years—the trial court ordered Porter to serve four years.¹¹ And Porter was convicted of two Class A misdemeanors—resisting law enforcement and striking a law enforcement animal—each of which can be punished by a sentence of up to one year.¹² The trial court ordered Porter to serve one year for each conviction. And the trial court ordered all sentences to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of forty-six years. The maximum possible sentence was forty-eight years.

[31] “The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances surrounding the offense and the defendant's participation.” Mullis v. State, 256 N.E.3d 567, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citation omitted), trans. denied. Here, Porter stabbed his partner of four years multiple times and strangled her for no apparent reason. He committed these crimes in the presence of his one-year-old daughter, who was crying and screaming during the attack. The child had her mother's blood on her when she was found by Officer Meraz. Robyn testified at Porter's sentencing hearing that she was afraid to return to her home for months after the attack and now she “can't trust [men] with [her] kids and [she] can't trust them with [her] life.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 18–19. And she testified her daughter has night terrors and “wakes up out of her sleep screaming, crying, yelling for Mommy, telling Daddy to stop.” Id. at 19. After assaulting Robyn, Porter fled and sought refuge in a stranger's garage. When Hadley returned home, Porter entered her car covered in blood and caused her to think he might have injured her son who was in the house. And when police tracked Porter down in a school parking lot, he tried to avoid arrest and battered both a police officer and his K9 partner. As Porter acknowledges, his actions at his and Robyn's home “created a dangerous and horrific scene[.]” Appellant's Br. at 28. Nonetheless, he argues his actions “were the product, at least in part, of a severe mental health crisis.” Id. The jury acknowledged his mental illness but still determined he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.

[32] As for Porter's character, “a defendant's life and conduct are illustrative of his ․ character.” Mullis, 256 N.E.3d at 584 (citation omitted). The presentence investigation report showed Porter was forty years old at the time of sentencing. His criminal history began in 2002, when he was seventeen. He has two juvenile adjudications, including one that would have been a felony if committed by an adult. As an adult, he has nine misdemeanor and four felony convictions. Many of his prior convictions are for drug or driving offenses. He has had suspended sentences revoked twice, and probation modified once and revoked once. He has also been satisfactorily discharged from the home detention program several times. Porter “reported being diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia” in 2015 and said he had not been taking his prescribed medication for some time before these events. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 149. Porter expressed his remorse during the sentencing hearing, which the trial court accepted as genuine.

[33] The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam). This is not such a case. Although Porter suffers from a diagnosable mental health condition and had not previously been in trouble for violent behavior, he has not presented evidence portraying the nature of this offense or his overall character in such a positive light as to persuade us his sentence is an outlier requiring revision.

Conclusion

[34] The evidence supports the jury's rejection of Porter's insanity defense, and his forty-six-year sentence is not inappropriate.

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1) (2018); 35-41-5-1(1) (2014).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1(g)(5)(A) (2020).

3.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2021).

4.   I.C. § 35-46-3-11(a)(1) (2014).

5.   The doctor described a pneumothorax as “air that had escaped from a puncture in her lung and was trapped between her lung and her chest wall[.]” Id. at 37. A pneumothorax can lead to a collapsed lung. See id. at 38.

6.   Officer Lengerich explained a drive stun “is kind of when the taser's deployed, but it's when the cartridge is pulled off and just sparks.” Id. at 91.

7.   The State charged Porter with aggravated battery, three counts of domestic battery, strangulation, and attempted murder for events involving Robyn, and battery, resisting law enforcement, and striking or interfering with a law enforcement animal for events at the school.

8.   Dr. Ross explained the evaluation similarly in his testimony. See id. at 190 (stating, “[Y]ou have to have a diagnosis or, at least, a mental condition, and you have to ascertain whether that condition prevented them from understanding right from wrong[.]”).

9.   “ ‘[M]ental disease or defect’ means a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person's perception, but the term does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct.” I.C. § 35-41-3-6(b).

10.   I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b) (2014).

11.   I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014).

12.   I.C. § 35-50-3-2 (1977).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.