KINNAMAN v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Franklin Circuit Court revoked Paul J. Kinnaman's probation and ordered him to serve thirty years of his previously suspended sentence. Kinnaman appeals and argues that the court abused its discretion in imposing his sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2011, the trial court sentenced Kinnaman to forty-two years in the Department of Correction after Kinnaman was convicted of Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine and Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Our court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See Kinnaman v. State, No. 24A01-1105-CR-229, 2012 WL 892533 (Ind. Ct. App. March 16, 2012) (mem.).

[4] Thereafter, Kinnaman filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a motion to modify his sentence. The trial court granted Kinnaman's motion to modify his sentence over the State's objection. On November 19, 2014, the court ordered Kinnaman released from incarceration and suspended the nearly thirty-four-year balance of his sentence to probation. Kinnaman then withdrew his petition for post-conviction relief.

[5] In July 2016, the State charged Kinnaman with several criminal offenses in Johnson County under case number 41D03-1607-F1-6 after he fled from and attempted to shoot a police officer. As a result, on August 10, the State filed a petition to revoke Kinnaman's probation. A hearing was not held on the petition to revoke probation for several years as the Johnson County case pended.¹ Ultimately, the Johnson Superior Court convicted Kinnaman of Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Level 6 felony pointing a firearm at another, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and with being a habitual offender. The court imposed an aggregate sixty-two and one-half-year sentence.

[6] On January 31, 2025, over five years after the Johnson County case had been resolved, the State requested that the trial court set a hearing on its petition to revoke Kinnaman's probation. Thereafter, Kinnaman agreed to admit that he violated his probation by committing the offenses in the Johnson County case, and the court held a disposition hearing on July 21.

[7] At that hearing, the State presented evidence that Kinnaman's criminal history began in 2002, and he had several prior misdemeanor and felony convictions. Kinnaman testified that he had served nine years and one month of his sentence in the Johnson County case, and during that time he had completed hundreds of rehabilitative programs, including anger management, parenting classes, and vocational classes. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 24. And Kinnaman has a job in the correctional facility. However, he also agreed that the “only time [he's] ever done any programs or really behaved is while [he's] been in prison.” Id. at 29. Kinnaman argued that there would be no rehabilitative purpose to ordering him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence and requested that the court order him to serve fifteen years.

[8] The court noted that it had previously granted Kinnaman leniency by suspending thirty-three years, nine months, and sixteen days of his sentence to probation, and that Kinnaman did not take “probation very seriously at all.” Id. at 33. The court also noted the serious nature of the crimes in the Johnson County case. The court then revoked Kinnaman's probation and ordered him to serve thirty years of his previously suspended sentence, with the remaining three years, nine months, and sixteen days suspended to probation, to be served consecutive to the sentence in the Johnson County case. As a result, Kinnaman will likely be well into his nineties before he is released from the Department of Correction.

[9] Kinnaman now appeals.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Kinnaman to serve thirty years of his previously suspended sentence.

[10] Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion. Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014). Upon finding that a defendant has violated a condition of his probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). “We review a trial court's sentencing decision in probation revocation proceedings for an abuse of discretion.” Cox v. State, 850 N.E.2d 485, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). An abuse of discretion occurs only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Bennett v. State, 119 N.E.3d 1057, 1058 (Ind. 2019). We will not reweigh the evidence or reconsider witness credibility. Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 839-40 (Ind. 2003). Rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment to determine if there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the court's ruling. Id.

[11] Kinnaman cites Article 1, Section 18 of the Indiana Constitution, which requires Indiana's penal code to be “founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” Citing this principle, Kinnaman argues that the trial court's sentencing order is not reasonable because the court effectively imposed a life sentence which constitutes “punishment with no rehabilitative purpose.” Appellant's Br. at 10. Finally, Kinnaman notes the evidence he presented that he has participated in hundreds of rehabilitative programs and has been employed while incarcerated.

[12] First, we observe that Article 1, Section 18 “applies only to the penal code as a whole, not to individual sentences.” Henson v. State, 707 N.E.2d 792, 796 (Ind. 1999). Thus, Kinnaman's argument that his particular sentence violates Article 1, Section 18 is not a cognizable claim on which relief can be granted because “particularized, individual applications are not reviewable” pursuant to that constitutional provision. Kedrowitz v. State, 199 N.E.3d 386, 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 542 (Ind. 1998)), trans. denied. Section 18 simply “does not protect fact-specific challenges.” Id. (quoting Ratliff, 693 N.E.2d at 542).

[13] In 2014, Kinnaman sought and was granted leniency when the trial court ordered him released from incarceration and gave him the opportunity to serve the remainder of his sentence on probation. Kinnaman failed to take advantage of the trial court's leniency. Less than two years after he began serving his sentence on probation, he committed attempted murder when he tried to shoot a police officer, possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, pointing a firearm, and resisting law enforcement when he fled from the officer attempting to conduct a traffic stop. By his own admission, Kinnaman has only participated in rehabilitative programs and has only behaved in a law-abiding manner while he has been incarcerated. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 29. The trial court considered Kinnaman's rehabilitative efforts during his incarceration and his plea for leniency due to the length of his sentence in the Johnson County case but weighed that evidence against Kinnaman's substantial criminal history consisting of serious felony offenses and his inability to take advantage of the leniency afforded to him in this case by committing additional criminal offenses.

[14] Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it ordered Kinnaman to serve thirty years of his previously suspended sentence.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Johnson County refused to transport Kinnaman to Franklin County for the probation violation hearing. Appellant's App. p. 11.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.