ABELL v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] John C. Abell, pro se, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him. He contends he received insufficient service of process and therefore the judgment should have been set aside as void for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 19, 2021, Abell was arrested and charged with several drug-related crimes, including Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine. At the time of his arrest, Abell had $4,570 in U.S. currency in his possession, which the Morgan County Sheriff's Department (“MCSD”) seized. On August 24, the State of Indiana sought and obtained a court order that probable cause existed for the seizure.

[3] Also that day, the State filed a complaint for civil forfeiture of the money.¹ The summons furnished with the complaint designated the manner of service as “Personal service via law enforcement.” Id. at 6. The summons informed Abell the State had instituted a civil forfeiture action against him in the Morgan Superior Court and a response was due within twenty days or default judgment may be entered against him. According to an affidavit of service filed with the court, MCSD officer David Rogers served the summons and complaint on Abell personally at “160 N. Park Ave., Martinsville, IN”—the address of the Morgan County Jail—on August 25. Id. at 17.

[4] Abell did not answer the complaint. On September 29, the State moved for default judgment, which the trial court granted.

[5] Four years later, in July 2025, Abell filed a pro se “motion to return property,” in which he alleged “he never received” the summons and complaint. Id. at 23–24. He also challenged the merits of the forfeiture, arguing $4,117 of the money seized came from the sale of scrap metal. He attached to the motion a receipt from a scrap metal company dated two days before his arrest. The trial court denied Abell's motion.

The trial court did not err in denying Abell's motion.

[6] Through his “motion to return property,” Abell sought relief from the default judgment entered against him after he failed to answer the complaint. Abell argued, in part, there was insufficient service of process. Abell renews this argument on appeal, contending he “does not remember” receiving process in the Morgan County Jail and alleging the proof of service was insufficient because it does not contain his signature. Appellant's Br. at 7.

[7] A default judgment “may be set aside by the court for the grounds and in accordance with the provisions of [Trial] Rule 60(B).” Ind. Trial Rule 55(C). Rule 60(B) sets forth eight circumstances in which a court may relieve a party from a judgment, including if the judgment is void. T.R. 60(B)(6). A judgment entered where there has been insufficient service of process is void for want of personal jurisdiction. Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 759 (Ind. 2014). Although motions to set aside void judgments must be made “within a reasonable time,” T.R. 60(B), “a judgment that is void for lack of personal jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked at any time” and “the ‘reasonable time’ limitation under Rule 60(B)(6) means no time limit.” Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (Ind. 1998). Accordingly, we treat Abell's “motion to return property” as a timely Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside a void judgment, and his appeal as challenging the trial court's denial of that motion.²

[8] Typically, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment for an abuse of discretion. Hair v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 18 N.E.3d 1019, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But whether personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant is a question of law we review de novo. Id. When a defendant argues a lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present evidence to show there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “The defendant ultimately bears the burden of proving the lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Id.

[9] A court acquires jurisdiction over a person who is served with summons under the Trial Rules. See T.R. 4(A). “A trial court does not acquire personal jurisdiction over a party if service of process is inadequate.” Munster, 829 N.E.2d at 57. At the time the State filed its civil forfeiture complaint, Abell was incarcerated in the Morgan County Jail. Rule 4.3 governs service on institutionalized persons:

Service of summons upon a person who is imprisoned ․ shall be made by delivering or mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the official in charge of the institution. It shall be the duty of said official to immediately deliver the summons and complaint to the person being served and allow him to make provisions for adequate representation by counsel. The official shall indicate upon the return whether the person has received the summons and been allowed an opportunity to retain counsel.

T.R. 4.3.

[10] To prove service was made, the person making service must file a return which includes a statement “that service was made upon the person as required by law and the time, place, and manner thereof” and “such other information as is expressly required by these rules.” T.R. 4.15(A). The filed return and affidavit become part of the record and are evidence of service. See T.R. 4.15(B). An alternate way to prove service is to file a written admission signed by the person served. T.R. 4.15(D) (“A written admission stating the date and place of service, signed by the person being served, may be filed with the clerk who shall file it with the pleadings. Such admission shall ․ constitute evidence of proper service[.]”).

[11] Here, the summons designated the manner of service as: “Personal service via law enforcement.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 6. In the affidavit of service, Rogers averred he was “a law enforcement officer with [MCSD].” Id at 17. It is unclear on this record if Rogers was the “official in charge of” the jail as Rule 4.3 prescribes. But we can reasonably infer from the affidavit that the summons and complaint were delivered to the MCSD, which oversees the Morgan County Jail, to then be delivered by an MCSD officer. In the affidavit, Rogers also swore he served a copy of the complaint and summons on Abell personally at the Morgan County Jail on August 25, 2021. The method of service used in this case—personal service by an MCSD officer—was sufficient to establish the trial court's jurisdiction over Abell under Rule 4.3.

[12] Still, Abell argues the return of service was insufficient because there is “no documentation showing that Abell received [the complaint and summons] by him signing them, [which is] a violation of Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(D).” Appellant's Br. at 6. Abell misunderstands Rule 4.15(D), which provides an alternative method to prove service. Here, Rogers filed an affidavit of service under Rule 4.15(A) stating how, when, and where he served Abell. Under that method, Abell's signature was not required.³

[13] Because Abell received sufficient service of process, the default judgment entered against him after he failed to respond to the complaint was not void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Abell's motion to set aside the default judgment.

Conclusion

[14] The default judgment entered against Abell was not void, and therefore the trial court did not err in denying Abell's Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Specifically, the State alleged the money “had been furnished or was intended to be furnished in exchange for a violation of a criminal statute, or used to facilitate any violation of a criminal statute[,] or [was] traceable as proceeds of the violation of a criminal statute under Indiana law, as provided in I.C. 34-24-1.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 7.

2.   To the extent Abell argues the merits of the forfeiture, that issue is not before this Court. Because default judgment was entered against him, Abell must first seek to set aside the judgment. See T.R. 55(C).

3.   Although the return states Rogers served Abell with the summons, it does not include a statement of whether Abell was “allowed an opportunity to retain counsel” as Rule 4.3 requires. Abell neither cites Rule 4.3 nor argues the return was deficient for this reason. Accordingly, any such argument is waived for failure to make a cogent argument supported by citations to the relevant legal authority. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) (providing the argument must contain “the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and “by citations to the authorities, statutes,” and parts of the record relied on).Waiver notwithstanding, technically insufficient service may nevertheless be sufficient if it is “reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him, the name of the court, and the time within which he is required to respond.” T.R. 4.15(F). This savings provision “excuses minor, technical defects in the method of service where actual service has been accomplished.” Munster, 829 N.E.2d at 64. Service may be made upon an individual in several ways, including by “delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally.” T.R. 4.1(A)(2). Even if service was not made by the method prescribed in Rule 4.3, it was accomplished under Rule 4.1(A)(2) when Rogers personally served the summons and complaint on Abell. This was sufficient to subject him to the trial court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Maust v. Estate of Bair ex rel. Bair, 859 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting incarcerated defendant's argument that a default judgment was void for want of personal jurisdiction where the summons and complaint were mailed directly to him rather than to the official in charge of the prison, in part because of the Rule 4.15(F) savings provision).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.