Derek Reasor, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] When Derek Reasor was 16 years old, he was involved in a drug-related shooting that left one person dead and one person injured. He was convicted of felony murder, Level 3 felony attempted robbery resulting in bodily injury, Level 3 felony attempted armed robbery, and Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 57 years. He now appeals, challenging both his convictions and sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 26, 2023, 16-year-old Quayvon George went to his friend's apartment near Franklin Road and 42nd Street in Indianapolis. The friend lived with his mother, and 20-year-old Jyaih Stevenson stayed there sometimes. When Quayvon arrived at the apartment that afternoon, Jyaih, 15-year-old Kayjuan Gay, and 14-year-old D.G. were already there. Reasor, who was also 16, arrived about 20 minutes later carrying a gun in the front of his pants. See Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 56-57.

[3] The group smoked some marijuana and decided they wanted more. Jyaih texted his “weed man,” T.W., and they made plans to meet at a nearby gas station for “two zips” of marijuana. Id. at 42, 44. Jyaih, Kayjuan, Quayvon, and Reasor walked to the gas station to meet T.W. Reasor wore a “ski mask and carried his gun and a backpack. Exs. 109-10; Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 83-84. They waited about 20 minutes but T.W. never came, so they walked back to the apartment.

[4] T.W. later agreed to meet them at the apartment building. 18-year-old Bryce Brown pulled into a parking space in front of the building with K.D. in the front passenger seat and T.W. in the back seat. Jyaih—who had “counterfeit[ ]” money from Reasor—and Quayvon—who had his own money—got into the car while Reasor, whose face remained “covered” by the mask, waited near the apartment building with Kayjuan and D.G. Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 51, 84. Bryce handed “two zips” of marijuana to Jyaih. Id. at 53. Jyaih and Quayvon smelled the marijuana but it wasn't “good weed.” Id. Jyaih and Quayvon then exited the car, and Jyaih said he would be right back. They walked over to Reasor, Kayjuan, and D.G. Jyaih and Reasor had a “conversation,” and Kayjuan, who had his own gun, handed it to D.G. and told him, “It's yo time to show ․ if you down.” Id. at 54, 55. Quayvon understood this to mean D.G. would “[use] [the gun] to get the weed.” Id. at 56.

[5] D.G. and Jyaih then walked to Bryce's car. Outside the front passenger door, D.G. raised the gun and said, “Give me that.” Id. at 58. On the driver's side, Jyaih tried to “wrestl[e] with [Bryce] for the weed.” Id. “That's when a shot r[a]ng off.” Id. at 61. D.G. fired the “first shot.” Id. Quayvon turned and saw Reasor, who was still near the apartment building, “tryna up his gun.” Id. Quayvon then heard “[m]ultiple shots r[i]ng off.” Id. at 87; see also id. at 71 (Quayvon answering “Yes” when asked if Reasor had “fired some shots”). Bryce was shot in the head and died. K.D. was shot in the stomach but survived. Quayvon, Kayjuan, and Reasor fled the scene together.

[6] Shortly after the shooting, Reasor flew to Florida but remained in contact with his friends on Instagram. Early on May 27, Reasor posted an Instagram story marking his location at the Indianapolis International Airport with the word “Gone” by it. Ex. 151A p. 18; Tr. Vol. 3 p. 143. On May 29, Reasor posted another Instagram story showing a photo of a building with palm trees and the words, “Phone Tapped Don't Tm.” Ex. 151A p. 14; Tr. Vol. 3 p. 143.

[7] Reasor was in an Instagram group chat that included Kayjuan, D.G., and Quayvon, and several messages were sent on May 29. Reasor wrote, “All i need is the backpack. Thats the only piece they got on me.” Ex. 151A p. 40. Kayjuan remarked that someone had burned the hoodies, and Reasor responded, “Good.” See id. at 40-41. Kayjuan asked if he should sell his gun, and Reasor responded, “Yea but not to nb out east.” Id. at 52. Reasor said he was trying to sell his. At one point, Kayjuan said they couldn't run forever, and Reasor responded, “Yes i can i am in florida and i will be in mexico tmr if i have to. if they goto mexico ill be in Paris. U see how fast i came down here.” Id. at 64-65. Reasor later remarked, “The streets turnt me to a Killer.” Id. at 66; see also id. at 88 (Reasor messaging someone in a different conversation, “im on the run for a M”). On May 30, Reasor wrote in the group chat that he sold his gun for $200. Kayjuan said he couldn't find his gun, to which Reasor responded, “U done for” and “Now they got real proof u dumbass everything was circumstansial [sic].” Id. at 69-70.

[8] The next day, May 31, members of the group chat discussed that the police had been at the apartment complex showing photos and asking questions. Reasor responded, “Im finna Smoke myself. Keep it hunnid im not going to jail for life․ Leave the world on some real gangster shit.” Id. at 58-59. He later wrote, “They don't have concrete evidence.” Id. at 60.

[9] In July 2023, the State charged Reasor with Count I: murder (Bryce); Count II: felony murder (Bryce); Count III: Level 2 felony attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury (Bryce); Count IV: Level 1 felony attempted murder (K.D.); Count V: Level 3 felony attempted robbery resulting in bodily injury (K.D.); Count VI: Level 3 felony attempted armed robbery (T.W.); and Count VII: Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm.¹

[10] Before trial, Reasor moved to exclude the following message he sent in the Instagram group chat on May 21, 2023, five days before the shootings: “We need to rob a gas man ASAP.” Ex. 151A p. 35. (A “gas man” is a “weed man.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 43). The State argued that the message was admissible as a “statement of future intent” and “planning.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 31. The trial court granted Reasor's motion to exclude the gas-man message but said it would revisit the issue at trial if the State presented evidence linking the gas-man message to the charged crimes.

[11] A jury trial was held in November 2024. During voir dire, the State asked the potential jurors about various hypotheticals. In one hypothetical, the deputy prosecutor described a plan to steal the judge's purse with the other deputy prosecutor and a detective. Id. at 79-81, 119-20. Each person had a different role, and the deputy prosecutor asked the jurors whether each participant should be guilty of the same offense. Reasor did not object. Reasor's attorney then used the hypothetical to ask the prospective jurors what evidence they would want to see about the plan to steal the purse. Id. at 92-93.

[12] During trial, the trial court and the parties returned to the admissibility of the gas-man message. The court determined that the statement was admissible based on the State's theory that it was part of the plan to commit these crimes. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 9. The trial court admitted the following redacted messages (standonbusiness46 is Reasor's account):

Author standonbusiness46 (Instagram: 58285654418)

Sent 2023-05-21 20:01:35 UTC

Body We need to rob a gas man ASAP

Author mr.facesum4x (Instagram: 8065003744)

Sent 2023-05-21 20:01:58 UTC

Body Definitely

Author standonbusiness46 (Instagram: 58285654418)

Sent 2023-05-21 20:03:52 UTC

Body Where they at

Author standonbusiness46 (Instagram: 58285654418)

Sent 2023-05-21 20:03:54 UTC

Body [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Ex. 151A p. 35.

[13] Quayvon testified about the shootings as detailed above. Jyaih, who was serving a prison sentence in an unrelated case, also testified, though his testimony was less forthcoming. After the presentation of evidence, the trial court, over Reasor's objection, instructed the jury on accomplice liability. See Tr. Vol. 4 p. 7; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 40.

[14] During closing argument, the State argued that Reasor was the one who shot Bryce, but that even if he wasn't, “he aided, induced, or caused that murder” and “aided, induced, or caused all of those robberies.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 21. After 10 hours of deliberations, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on Count I (murder of Bryce) and Count IV (attempted murder of K.D.), and those counts were later dismissed. The jury found Reasor guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court vacated Count III (attempted robbery of Bryce) on double-jeopardy grounds.

[15] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered Reasor's presentence investigation report (PSI) and psychological evaluation. According to the PSI, Reasor was first arrested when he was 10 years old. He had juvenile adjudications for battery, resisting law enforcement, battery by bodily waste, theft of a firearm, residential entry, and auto theft. He had been placed at Boys School and was on probation at the time of these offenses. He had not completed any school after the seventh grade and had a child who was born in February 2024, after these crimes. While awaiting trial in the Marion County Jail, Reasor was found guilty of disrupting jail operations on 18 occasions, assaulting staff, and committing two other assaults.

[16] In the psychological evaluation, the psychologist summarized Reasor's family and background, including his DCS and juvenile-delinquent history. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 136-54. The psychologist performed a clinical interview and mental-status examination, including a battery of tests (cognitive functioning, intelligence, academic achievement, adaptive behavior, social- emotional functioning, and substance-abuse functioning/risks). One of the tests measured Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE), which assesses “trauma” and is used “to help clinicians better understand the impact of negative emotional experiences on childhood and youth development - biological, social, and emotional.” Id. at 149. Here is how Reasor scored on the ACE:

ACE Variable Presence 1 Intimidation and Fear Present 2 Physical Abuse Present 3 Sexual Abuse Not Present 4 Family Instability/Support Present 5 Neglect Present 6 Separation/Divorce Present 7 Mother Abused Present 8 Problem Drinker/Drugs Present 9 Mental Illness/Suicide Attempt Present 10. Prison/Jail Present 11Chronic Illness Not Present 12. Death of Fam ily/Friend Present 13Involved in Natural Disaster Not Present 14. Complex Multiplier Present ACE Score: 12 (Clinical)

Id. The psychologist's primary diagnostic impression was adolescent onset schizophrenia, and his secondary diagnostic impression was borderline intellectual functioning. Id. at 153.

[17] The trial court found the following aggravators: (1) Reasor's history of delinquent behavior, (2) he was on probation when he committed these crimes, (3) the nature and circumstances of the crimes, and (4) “there are separate victims on each count.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 89. The trial court found the following mitigators:

I will certainly find his young age, the ACEs, the Adverse Child Experiences, I -- that was a rather large number in that report that you gave us, and I understand that his childhood was not what one would want it to be. I will show that also imprisonment of the person will work an undue hardship ․

Id. The court sentenced Reasor to 50 years on Count II (felony murder of Bryce), 7 years on Count V (attempted robbery of K.D.), 7 years on Count VI (attempted robbery of T.W.), and 1 year on Count VII (dangerous possession of a firearm). The court ordered only the sentences for Counts II and V to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 57 years.

[18] Reasor now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Any error in the admission of the messages as redacted was harmless

[19] Reasor contends that the trial court erred in admitting the May 21, 2023 messages about robbing a gas man. He asserts that the unredacted messages make clear that the discussion was about robbing a different person:

Author standonbusiness46 (Instagram: 58285654418)

Sent 2023-05-21 20:03:54 UTC

Body Let rob dat mexican

Author standonbusiness46 (Instagram: 58285654418)

Sent 2023-05-21 20:03:56 UTC

Body Jayden nem

Supp. Ex. p. 34. Reasor argues:

The unredacted exhibit shows that the discussion days earlier related to robbing a Mexican named Jayden, a different act. The redacted messages distorted the meaning of the original messages. By redacting the messages, the State made it appear that there was an evidentiary link between the statement of intent to rob a gas man several days earlier. There was no such evidentiary link.

Appellant's Amended Reply Br. p. 11. Reasor's argument continues:

Although the jury was misled into believing the gas man message referred to Bryce Brown, the victim in this case[,] [t]he State certainly knew the messages referred to a different act referring to a Mexican named Jayden, the gas man. The State was, therefore, able to use this chat ․ to prejudice the jury with the “forbidden inference” that [Reasor] had a propensity to commit another robbery.

Id. at 12.

[20] Reasor's argument cuts against itself. Because the references to Jayden were redacted, the jury never learned that the earlier discussion involved someone other than Bryce. The jury therefore could not have drawn the “forbidden inference” Reasor identifies. But even assuming the trial court erred in admitting the messages as redacted, we agree with the State that the error was harmless.

[21] When an appellate court must determine whether a non-constitutional error is harmless, Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A)’s “probable impact test” controls. Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied. “Under this test, the party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence in the case, the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Id. “Importantly, this is not a review for the sufficiency of the remaining evidence; it is a review of what was presented to the trier of fact compared to what should have been presented.” Id. And when conducting that review, we consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case. Id. “Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Id.

[22] Here, in addition to the evidence about the day of the shooting, the jury heard evidence that shortly after, Reasor flew to Florida and posted an Instagram story tagged at the Indianapolis airport with the word “Gone.” Days later he posted a second story from Florida captioned “Phone Tapped Don't Tm.” In the group chat with his co-participants, Reasor wrote that “[a]ll i need is the backpack” because “[t]hats the only piece they got on me”; approved of burning the hoodies; told Kayjuan he was selling his gun and ultimately did sell it for $200; said he would flee to Mexico or Paris rather than face prosecution; and remarked, “im on the run for a M” and “The streets turnt me to a Killer.” Reasor bears the burden under Hayko of showing that the redacted messages’ probable impact undermines confidence in the verdict. See 211 N.E.3d at 492. In light of the eyewitness testimony, Reasor's flight to Florida, and his own post-offense statements, he has not carried that burden. Considering the entire record, our confidence in the outcome is not undermined. Any error in admitting the messages as redacted was harmless.

II. The trial court did not err by instructing the jury on accomplice liability

[23] Reasor next contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on accomplice liability. His claim, however, is narrow: because the State argued he was either the principal or an accomplice, he contends the jury should have been required to agree unanimously on which theory supported guilt. See Appellant's Br. p. 25. That argument is foreclosed by Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324 (Ind. 2006), a case Reasor does not address. In Taylor, the defendant— charged with murder—made a similar unanimity argument after the State proceeded on alternative theories that he acted as either the principal or an accomplice. Our Supreme Court rejected that claim, explaining that although jury unanimity is required as to guilt, it is not required as to the particular theory of culpability. Id. at 333. That rule follows from Indiana's settled principle that there is “no distinction between the responsibility of a principal and an accomplice.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021).

[24] The same rule resolves Reasor's claim. The State argued that Reasor was guilty either because he shot Bryce or because he “aided, induced, or caused” the murder and “aided, induced, or caused all of those robberies.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 21. Thus, the jury had to agree unanimously that Reasor was guilty of the charged offenses, but it did not have to agree unanimously on whether he acted as the principal or an accomplice. The trial court therefore did not err by instructing the jury on accomplice liability without requiring unanimity as to whether Reasor acted as the principal or an accomplice.

III. The deputy prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire

[25] Reasor also contends that the deputy prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire by using a hypothetical that was “designed ․ to indoctrinate the jurors to the State's facts.” Appellant's Br. p. 31. When a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is properly preserved for appeal, we ask “(1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected otherwise.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ind. 2025) (quotation omitted). Because Reasor's attorney did not object to the hypothetical, Reasor must establish fundamental error on appeal.

[26] Fundamental error is an “extremely narrow” exception to the general rule that a party's failure to object at trial results in a waiver of the issue on appeal. Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018). “An error is fundamental, and thus reviewable on appeal, if it made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Id. (quotation omitted). This exception “encompasses only errors so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation.” Id.

[27] Reasor cannot meet that burden. The purpose of voir dire “is to ascertain whether jurors can render a fair and impartial verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence.” Perryman v. State, 830 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Counsel may use hypotheticals to probe “the jurors’ attitudes towards the offense charged and to uncover preconceived ideas about defenses that the defendant intends to use,” but those hypotheticals may not “suggest prejudicial evidence not adduced at trial.” Adcock v. State, 933 N.E.2d 21, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[28] Here, the deputy prosecutor posed a hypothetical about planning to steal the judge's purse with the other deputy prosecutor and a detective. Each participant had a different role, and the deputy prosecutor asked whether each should be guilty of the same offense. The hypothetical was designed to illustrate accomplice liability and to determine whether the prospective jurors could follow the law. It did not suggest prejudicial facts not in evidence. Cf. Robinson v. State, 297 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ind. 1973) (State's voir dire hypothetical was “clearly improper” and “prejudicial” where it suggested that a father killed his daughter because she resisted his sexual advances—facts that had no support in the evidence at the defendant's trial for murdering his daughter).

[29] Moreover, Reasor's own attorney used the same hypothetical to ask the jurors what evidence they would want to see about the plan to steal the purse. One prospective juror wanted to know “[w]hat they actually talked about, like a recording of them talking or ․ texting or something like that, like what the plan was.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 92. Another wanted to know “[i]f there were text messages to and fro about a plan of ․ what action was going to take place.” Id. Defense counsel's use of the same hypothetical in his own questioning further undermines any claim that the deputy prosecutor's use of it made a fair trial impossible. Reasor has not established fundamental error.

IV. Reasor has failed to prove a double-jeopardy violation

[30] Reasor next contends that his convictions for Count II (felony murder of Bryce) and Count V (attempted robbery of K.D.) constitute double jeopardy. The parties agree that our Supreme Court's three-step test in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), applies, so we analyze the issue under that framework. See Appellant's Br. pp. 33-34; Appellee's Br. p. 29.² Under Wadle:

[W]e first look to the statutes themselves. If either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, whether expressly or by unmistakable implication, the court's inquiry comes to an end and there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy. But if the statutory language is not clear, then a court must apply our included-offense statutes to determine whether the charged offenses are the same. See [Ind. Code] § 35-31.5-2-168. If neither offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy. But if one offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged), then the court must examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial. If, based on these facts, the defendant's actions were so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction, then the prosecutor may charge the offenses as alternative sanctions only. But if the defendant's actions prove otherwise, a court may convict on each charged offense.

151 N.E.3d at 253 (quotation omitted).

[31] To dispose of Reasor's argument, we need only address the second step. “We have held that, under Wadle, where ‘one of the material elements of both offenses is a victim, and a separate victim is alleged for each offense, it would seem by definition one offense cannot be either a factually or inherently included lesser offense of the other.’ ” Stone v. State, 264 N.E.3d 109, 113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied), trans. denied.

[32] Here, the victim of felony murder was Bryce, and the victim of the attempted robbery was K.D. Because the two offenses involved different victims, neither was inherently or factually included in the other. There is therefore no double-jeopardy violation under Wadle.

V. The trial court did not err in sentencing Reasor

[33] Finally, Reasor contends that the trial court erred by failing to find two mitigators.³ The finding of mitigators rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review such decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. Wert v. State, 121 N.E.3d 1079, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. One way a trial court abuses its discretion is by not recognizing mitigators that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration. Id.

[34] Reasor first argues that the trial court failed to consider “his progress while incarcerated.” Appellant's Br. p. 39. Reasor relies on a letter written by his teachers at the Marion County Jail, which he submitted at sentencing. See Ex. p. 101; Tr. Vol. 4 p. 79. But the trial court also had before it contrary evidence: Reasor had been found guilty of disrupting jail operations on 18 occasions, assaulting staff, and committing two other assaults. The court did not abuse its discretion in not finding this mitigator.

[35] Reasor also argues that the trial court failed to consider his mental health. Although the trial court did not expressly identify Reasor's “mental health” as a separate mitigator, it did find the ACE evidence mitigating. And the psychological examination ties Reasor's mental health to the ACE findings the court expressly considered. It is thus apparent that the court considered Reasor's mental health. To the extent Reasor argues the court should have assigned greater weight to that evidence, that claim is not reviewable. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007) (“The relative weight or value assignable to reasons [for imposing a particular sentence] ․ is not subject to review for abuse.”), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its finding of mitigators.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Quayvon was charged with murder, Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, Level 3 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury, and Level 3 felony armed robbery. Quayvon pled guilty to Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury and was sentenced to 22 years, with 10 years suspended. See Cause No. 49D30-2307-MR-19478. Kayjuan was charged with murder and Level 2 felony attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. He pled guilty to Level 2 felony attempted robbery and was sentenced to 25 years, with 8 years suspended. See Cause No. 49D30-2405-MR-13888. D.G. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for committing what would be murder if committed by an adult. See Cause No. 49D09-2307-JD-5967. Jyaih was not charged for these events. See Tr. Vol. 3 p. 228

2.   The State notes that Reasor does not “also challenge his conviction for Count VI, the attempted robbery of T.W.” Appellee's Br. p. 29. The State speculates that this is because he was sentenced concurrently for that robbery.

3.   Reasor cites Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) but doesn't make any argument under it. He has therefore waived any 7(B) review.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.