Miguel J. Carter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Miguel J. Carter guilty of Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine and Level 6 felony dealing in marijuana, and the trial court sentenced him to 23 years in prison. He appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the cocaine-dealing conviction and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. We affirm.¹

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2024, police interviewed Carter as part of an unrelated investigation. The interview led to a search of Carter's apartment. Officers located a partial brick of cocaine weighing 51.08 grams, a large amount of marijuana, a box of plastic baggies, two digital scales with white residue, a bulletproof vest, and $5,785 in cash. The State charged Carter with Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine (possession of at least 10 grams with intent to deliver) and Level 6 felony dealing in marijuana (possession of at least 30 grams with intent to deliver).

[3] A jury trial was held in July 2025, and the jury found Carter guilty as charged. In sentencing Carter, the trial court found four aggravating circumstances: Carter's criminal history (two felony convictions and several misdemeanor convictions); Carter had three pending criminal cases at the time of sentencing; Carter was on pretrial release in another case when he committed these offenses; and the nature and circumstances of the offenses show that Carter is a “high level dealer.” Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 21-22. The court found as a mitigating circumstance that Carter's incarceration will be a hardship for his mother and his children. Finding the aggravators to outweigh the mitigator, the court sentenced Carter to 23 years for dealing in cocaine and 2 years for dealing in marijuana, to be served concurrently.

[4] Carter now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The evidence is sufficient to support Carter's conviction for Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine

[5] Carter contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine. When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We will only consider the evidence supporting the conviction and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[6] To convict Carter of Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine as charged here, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter knowingly or intentionally possessed at least 10 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 15; Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(2), (e)(1). Carter concedes that he possessed 51.08 grams of cocaine but argues that the State failed to prove intent to deliver.

[7] Carter's argument fails at the outset because the cocaine-dealing statute provides that a person can be convicted of possession with intent to deliver if “the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams.” I.C. § 35-48-4-1(b)(2). The jury was instructed on this statute. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 85, 112. Carter's possession of 51.08 grams of cocaine, standing alone, supports his conviction. And there is other evidence in addition to the weight of the cocaine that supports a jury finding of intent to deliver. Carter also possessed plastic baggies, digital scales with white residue, a bulletproof vest, and a substantial amount of cash, all of which are consistent with drug dealing. See, e.g., McGuire v. State, 613 N.E.2d 861, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that a defendant's possession of a large quantity of drugs, large amounts of currency, scales, plastic bags, and other paraphernalia is circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The evidence is sufficient to support Carter's cocaine-dealing conviction.

II. Carter hasn't shown that his sentence is inappropriate

[8] Carter argues that if we affirm his convictions, we should reduce his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that an appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The court's role under Rule 7(B) is to “leaven the outliers,” and “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019). “Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). Because we generally defer to the judgment of trial courts in sentencing matters, defendants must persuade us that their sentences are inappropriate. Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1044-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[9] Carter was convicted of a Level 2 felony and a Level 6 felony. The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is 10 to 30 years, with an advisory sentence of 17.5 years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is 6 months to 2.5 years, with an advisory sentence of 1 year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). Therefore, he faced more than 30 years in prison. The trial court sentenced him to 23 years.

[10] As to the nature of his offenses, Carter contends that his conduct “did not extend beyond the act(s) necessary to commit the crime.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. But he possessed over 50 grams of cocaine, much more than the 10 grams needed for the Level 2 felony dealing conviction. Carter also claims that the cash found in his apartment belonged to his girlfriend, but he initially told police that only a small amount of the cash was hers. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 150.

[11] As for his character, Carter claims that he had a difficult childhood, he has a strong support system, he sees and supports his children, he has helped his mother in the past, he has some history of employment, he is religious, he has some health issues, and he was shot when he was younger. He also claims that he is a drug addict, but he doesn't point to any evidence that he has tried to deal with that addiction. Regardless, Carter's extensive involvement in the criminal-justice system reflects very poorly on his character and supports his above-advisory sentence. Before these offenses, he had two felony convictions and several misdemeanor convictions. When he committed these offenses, he was on pretrial release in another case. And at the time of sentencing, he had three pending criminal cases.

[12] Carter has not shown that his sentence is an outlier in need of revision.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Carter also argues that the trial court erred by striking a prospective juror—Juror 15—for cause, but the record shows that Juror 15 was removed with a peremptory strike. It is true that the State made a for-cause challenge to Juror 15, who had expressed some skepticism of police. But the trial court ultimately stated, “I'm not gonna strike him for cause.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 73. The parties then completed and submitted their peremptory strikes, and that is when the court said that Juror 15 was excused. Id. at 74. The peremptory-strike sheets aren't in the record, but presumably it was the State that struck Juror 15. In any event, the court didn't strike him for cause, so Carter's argument fails.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.