Gerardo Arizmendi, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Jason Christophel, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2008, Jason Christophel of the Columbus Police Department (CPD) signed a probable cause affidavit alleging Gerardo Arizmendi had committed Class A felony dealing in cocaine. An arrest warrant was issued but not served until 2019, when Arizmendi was arrested on another matter. Arizmendi spent almost six months in jail before the Class A felony dealing in cocaine charge was ultimately dismissed and he was released. Thereafter, Arizmendi sued Christophel, alleging liability for false arrest under the state and federal constitutions as well as negligence. Christophel moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Arizmendi now challenges the grant of summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 25, 2008, officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by Arizmendi. Arizmendi consented to a search of the vehicle, and officers found “a homemade press commonly used to press cocaine along with two bottles of Inositol, a common cutting agent used in the distribution of [c]ocaine.” App. Vol. II p. 164. After finishing the search, officers released the car back to Arizmendi, who drove it to Taller Mecanico Aztecs—a mechanics shop in Columbus. IMPD officers followed him and surveilled his vehicle and the business.

[3] The IMPD officers then contacted CPD to request local assistance with obtaining a search warrant. Christophel responded to the scene, and officers relayed to him the information they had gained from their investigation. Christophel drafted and submitted a warrant request to search the shop as well as Arizmendi's vehicle. The search warrant was issued and executed that same day. Officers conducting the search detained Arizmendi as he was exiting the building and found another man hiding inside the building. In the shop, officers found a “large amount of a compressed powder, which field tested positive for the presence of [c]ocaine” as well as digital scales, a wooden press, and heating lamps, which are commonly “used in the preparation of cocaine for distribution.” Id. at 163-64.

[4] About a month later, IMPD officers contacted Christophel and requested his help in submitting paperwork to the Bartholomew County Prosecutor's Office to file criminal charges against Arizmendi. Christophel did so, and the Bartholomew County Prosecutor's Office then drafted a probable cause affidavit and charging information alleging Arizmendi committed Class A felony dealing in cocaine. Christophel and Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Kathleen Burns signed both documents. On April 1, 2008, the Bartholomew County Superior Court issued an arrest warrant for Arizmendi. The warrant stated it was “valid until served[.]” Id. at 171.

[5] On January 27, 2019, Arizmendi was arrested on an unrelated matter and transported to the Marion County Jail. At this point, the 2008 Bartholomew County warrant was discovered and Arizmendi was transported to the Bartholomew County Jail, where he remained until July 21, when the case was dismissed and he was released.

[6] In June 2020, Arizmendi filed suit against Christophel in his individual capacity, as well as CPD and the City of Columbus (the City).¹ As to Christophel, Arizmendi alleged four claims: (1) liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, (2) violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, (3) false arrest and imprisonment, and (4) negligence. For relief, Arizmendi requested compensatory damages and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees.

[7] In January 2025, Christophel, CPD, and the City filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims. A hearing was held on the summary judgment motion in May. The following month, the court granted summary judgment without explanation.² Arizmendi appeals only the judgment as to the claims against Christophel.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “We review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same standard of review as the trial court.” Johnson v. City of Michigan City, 172 N.E.3d 355, 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. A trial court shall grant a motion for summary judgment “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). When the defendant is the moving party, the defendant must show the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiffs’ cause of action or that the defendant has a factually unchallenged affirmative defense that bars the plaintiffs’ claim. Leo Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 936 N.E.2d 855, 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), aff'd on reh'g, 940 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “All facts and reasonable inferences from the designated evidence are construed in favor of the nonmovant.” Apuri v. Parkview Health Sys., Inc., 185 N.E.3d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. The appellant bears the burden of proving the trial court erred in granting a motion for summary judgment. Crossno v. State, 726 N.E.2d 375, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Even so, we “carefully assess the trial court's decision” to ensure a nonmovant was not improperly denied a day in court. Wisniewski v. Bennett, 716 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. 1999).

I. Federal False Arrest Claim

[9] Arizmendi first argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to his Fourth Amendment false arrest claim.³ Arizmendi brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State ․ subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law[.]

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

To prevail on a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest, Arizmendi must establish he was arrested without probable cause. See Gaddis v. DeMattei, 30 F.4th 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2022).

“Probable cause for an arrest provides an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.” Id. (citing Farnik v. City of Chicago, 1 F.4th 535, 545 (7th Cir. 2021)). And “[p]robable cause to justify an arrest exists if the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable, prudent person in believing that the arrestee had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.” Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). The inquiry is “purely objective,” and “the officer's subjective state of mind and beliefs are irrelevant.” Id. “Moreover, the court's inquiry is limited to what the officer knew at the time of the arrest and not what has been gained from hindsight.” Harney v. City of Chicago, 702 F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). This knowledge is assessed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable police officer. Abbott, 705 F.3d at 714 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003)).

The probable cause balance favors the government when an arrest is executed pursuant to a warrant. “When a judge authorizes an arrest, as one did here, ‘we presume the validity of [the] warrant and the information offered to support it.’ ” Dollard v. Whisenand, 946 F.3d 342, 354 (7th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Camm v. Faith, 937 F.3d 1096, 1105 (7th Cir. 2019)). That is, we presume probable cause. That presumption can give way if the warrant application was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Edwards v. Jolliff-Blake, 907 F.3d 1052, 1060 (7th Cir. 2018)); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). In such circumstances, “even a facially valid arrest warrant does not shield otherwise unreasonable conduct.” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 444 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Johnson v. Myers, 53 F.4th 1063, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 2022).

[10] Thus, because Arizmendi was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, we presume that the warrant and the information in support of it are valid. See id. at 1069. To overcome this presumption, Arizmendi must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether (1) “a reasonable officer would have known that the warrant application failed to establish probable cause,” or (2) Christophel “made false statements or omitted material facts in support of probable cause.” Id. at 1070.

[11] Arizmendi fails to make either showing. He does not allege Christophel made any false statements or omitted material facts in the probable cause affidavit; nor does he argue a reasonable officer would have known the warrant application failed to establish probable cause. Instead, he merely states, “Officer Christophel had no basis upon [which] to swear that Arizmendi possessed cocaine. Thus[,] he was seized without probable cause.” Appellant's Br. pp. 10-11. These conclusory statements are insufficient to rebut the presumption that the warrant and the information in support of it are valid. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on this issue.

II. State Constitutional Claim

[12] Next, Arizmendi contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Christophel on the state constitutional claim. Specifically, Arizmendi alleged Christophel violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and sought compensatory and punitive damages. See App. Vol. II pp. 24-27. However, Indiana state courts—and federal courts applying Indiana law—have held “there can be no claim for monetary damages arising out of the Indiana Constitution.” McIntire v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 15 N.E.3d 131, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied; see also Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 501 (Ind. 2006) (citing to various federal cases that had “found no civil damage remedy for searches and seizures in violation of the Indiana Constitution”). Arizmendi acknowledges this precedent but urges us to deviate from it, citing cases from other states regarding their constitutions. We see no reason to do so. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Christophel on Arizmendi's state constitutional claim.

III. State Negligence Claim

[13] Finally, Arizmendi argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to his negligence claim. Christophel responds that summary judgment was appropriate as to this claim because he was shielded from personal liability under Indiana Code section 34-13-3-5, also known as the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The ITCA “governs lawsuits against political subdivisions and their employees.” Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003); Ind. Code § 34-13-3-1 et seq. “The statute sets forth certain parameters to determine liability for negligent acts or omissions on the part of government employees and ‘provides substantial immunity for conduct within the scope of the employee's employment.’ ” Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 852 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Bushong, 790 N.E.2d at 472). The purpose of the ITCA is to “ensure that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.” Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind. 2000).

[14] Indiana Code section 34-13-3-5(b) reads in part, “A lawsuit alleging that an employee acted within the scope of the employee's employment bars an action by the claimant against the employee personally.” In order to bring a suit against an employee personally, the plaintiff must “allege that an act or omission of the employee that causes a loss is: (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee's employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the employee personally.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c) (2003). In addition, the plaintiff's complaint “must contain a reasonable factual basis supporting the allegations.” Id. “Although the issue of immunity under the ITCA may at times require factual development, the issue remains a question of law for the courts.” St. Joseph Cnty. Police Dept. v. Shumaker, 812 N.E.2d 1143, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[15] Christophel argues “Arizmendi's complaint [ ] foreclosed Arizmendi from recovering damages from Christophel personally” on the negligence claim. Appellee's Br. p. 37. We agree. In his complaint, Arizmendi alleged:

40. Jason Christophel ․ negligently and carelessly prepared and submitted a defective probable cause affidavit.

41. The negligence was the proximate cause of the arrest and imprisonment of Gerardo Arizmendi for 168 days.

42. Jason Christophel was acting within the scope of his employment with the Columbus Police Department and the City of Columbus when he negligently prepared and submitted to the Court a defective probable cause affidavit which resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of Gerardo Arizmendi.

App. Vol. II p. 26 (emphasis added). Not only did Arizmendi fail to allege the act or omission by Christophel was criminal, clearly outside the scope of his employment, malicious, willful and wanton, or calculated to benefit Christophel as required to bring suit against him personally under Subsection 5(c); but he specifically pled that Christophel was acting within the scope of his employment. As such, the ITCA bars his negligence claim against Christophel, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on this issue.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Arizmendi also asserted claims against Kathleen Burns in her individual capacity. These claims were dismissed in 2023 after Burns’ death.

2.   Special findings are neither required nor binding in summary judgment proceedings. Akin v. Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). However, such findings offer valuable insight into the trial court's rationale for its decision and help facilitate our review. Id.

3.   In the trial court, Arizmendi also asserted a state false arrest claim, but he does not renew this argument on appeal.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.