IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.C. (Minor Child) and D.J. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.J. (“Father”)¹ appeals an order involuntarily terminating his parental rights over Mi.C. (“Child”) upon the petition of the Marion County Department of Child Services (“DCS”). The sole, restated issue on appeal is whether the trial court clearly erred when it terminated Father's parent-child relationship with Child. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on December 15, 2023, and was in Mother's custody. In May 2024, Child “was found wandering in the street without appropriate supervision, and Mother could not be located.” Appealed Order at 2. On May 16, DCS removed Child from Mother's custody and filed a petition alleging Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) due to Mother's neglect, unknown location, lack of “stable housing[,]” and substance abuse. Ex. at 16. On June 17, DCS filed an amended CHINS petition in which it alleged Father was incarcerated and unable “to provide for the needs” of Child. Id. at 25. Child was placed with his paternal grandmother (“Paternal Grandmother”), where he remained throughout the CHINS and eventual termination of parental rights (“TPR”) proceedings.

[3] At an October 31 fact finding hearing, Father waived his right to a hearing, and the court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. Following the December 5 dispositional hearing, the court ordered Father to engage in services,² including: Father's Engagement; a family function assessment; random drug screens; continuation of the substance abuse disorder treatment he had already begun through Transitions (a community provider); and signing “any releases necessary” for the DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) to obtain “copies of any Substance Use Disorder Assessments, Random Drug Screens[,] and regular reports to confirm that [Father] is complying with all Substance Use treatment recommendations.” Id. at 35.

[4] Father had begun attending supervised visits with Child through Father's Engagement in October 2024. Father also sent money to Paternal Grandmother to help support Child. However, at some point, Father attempted to visit Child at times that were not scheduled, supervised times. After DCS informed Father that he could not visit with Child outside of scheduled visits through Father's Engagement, Father stopped visiting with Child because the supervised visits were “a hassle[.]” Tr. at 16.

[5] By the time of the February 27, 2025, periodic review hearing approximately two months after the parental participation order, Father was no longer engaging in inpatient treatment through Transitions, he had not signed any release of information forms to allow DCS to obtain his treatment records, he had not obtained a substance abuse assessment to which DCS had referred him, he had not done drug screening through DCS, and he was not participating in Father's Engagement/parenting time. By the time of the May 15 permanency hearing, Father was incarcerated again on charges of possession of marijuana and methamphetamine. Paternal Grandmother informed the court that Father “should be out [of prison] in Jan[uary] 2026.” Ex. at 41. Paternal Grandmother wished to adopt Child, and the court changed Child's permanency plan to reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption.

[6] On June 27, DCS filed a petition for TPR. On October 15, the court conducted a TPR hearing, at which time Father appeared by telephone because he was still incarcerated for a conviction of possession of methamphetamine. Father testified that he had begun participating again in Father's Engagement two weeks prior to the TPR hearing. Father testified that he would be released from prison on December 31, 2025. He stated that a friend was “going to give [him] a job” at Taco Bell in Lafayette after he was released. Tr. at 13. He stated that he would be living with a friend in Lafayette. However, he admitted that he had no “means to provide for a stable home or employment for [Child] at [the] time [of the TPR hearing.]” Id. at 10.

[7] Child's Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) and FCM also testified. Both stated that Father had not completed any of the court-ordered services, and the FCM testified that Father had never provided DCS with signed release of information forms as ordered. Both the GAL and FCM also stated that Child is bonded and thriving with Paternal Grandmother, who wishes to adopt Child. And both further testified to their beliefs that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests.

[8] On November 3, 2025, the court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights. In addition to the facts stated above, the order included the following findings:

29. Father has a lengthy criminal history including convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor and robbery. He has numerous convictions for possession of methamphetamine.

30. Father has been incarcerated many times during his lifetime; including 3 times since [Child] was born and 2 times during the pendency of the CHINS case.

31. DCS referred all court ordered services for Father.

32. Father did not provide DCS with a release of information for substance abuse treatment at Transitions or provide proof that he completed his substance abuse treatment at Transitions.

33. After failing to receive information about his compliance with substance abuse treatment, DCS referred Father for a substance abuse disorder assessment. Father did not complete a substance use disorder assessment.

34. Father did not complete a parent family functional assessment or submit to random drug screens through the CHINS case.

35. Father participated briefly in a father's engagement program but has yet to successfully complete the program.

36. Father has not demonstrated that he is able to provide [Child] with stable housing.

37. Father stated that shortly before his most recent arrest, he bought methamphetamine so that he could go back to rehab since he had no other place to live at the time.

38. The Child has been placed with Paternal Grandmother since May 2024. Paternal Grandmother meets all of the Child's needs and is willing to adopt the Child. The Child is attached and bonded to Paternal Grandmother and is thriving in her care.

Appealed Order at 4-6.

[9] The court concluded, in relevant part, as follows:

6. Conditions Resulting in Removal or Reasons for Placement Outside the Home (IC 31-35- 2-4(d)(3).

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d. The Child was removed from Father's care as a result of substance abuse and incarceration.

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g. Due to Father's lack of engagement in services, lengthy criminal history, and pattern of incarceration, the Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal and for continued placement outside Father's home will not be remedied. IC 31-35- 2-4(d)(3).

7. Threat to the Child's Well-Being (IC 31-35-2-4(d)(4))[.] There is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child's well-being.

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a. Mother and Father have not shown initiative in completing services or shown any progress in becoming better able to provide the stability and safety the Child[ ] needs. Their lack of engagement with the DCS and/or their unwillingness or inability to participate in services, the length of the CHINS case, and the Child's need for stability and permanency demonstrate that continuation of the parent-child relationship with parents is a threat to the child's emotional, mental, and physical well-being.

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8. Termination in the Child's Best Interests (IC 31-35-2-4(c)(3))[.]

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b. Family Case Manager Sia believes termination of parental rights is in the Child's best interests.

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d. While Father has expressed some willingness to work toward reunification, he has not successfully completed any services and is currently incarcerated. His criminal history, substance abuse history, and pattern of incarceration indicate a pattern of instability.

e. The child needs permanency and stability, which neither Mother nor Father has provided and is not poised to provide [sic].

f. The Guardian ad Litem agrees with Family Case Manager Sia's recommendation for termination.

g. ․ The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. IC 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

Id. at 9-11. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[10] We begin our review by acknowledging that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Z.G. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re C.G.), 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011). However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[11] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

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(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c), (d)(3)-(4) (2024). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C.§ 31-37-14-2).

[12] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[13] Here, in terminating Father's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support them.” Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. v. LaPorte Cir. Ct. (In re T.S.), 906 N.E.2d 801, 804 (Ind. 2009). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 923. When, as here, the findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true. See, e.g., N.R. v. A.R., 273 N.E.3d 1118, 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Thus, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Id.

Conditions that Resulted in Removal/Continued Placement

[14] Father challenges the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. When we consider the likelihood of remediation of conditions, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the first step, we consider not only the initial reasons for removal, but also the reasons for continued placement outside the home. T.Q. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., (In re N.Q.), 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[15] However, the court must also “consider a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” R.C. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re K.T.K.), 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231-32 (Ind. 2013) (quotations and citations omitted). The “trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, or social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” A.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re P.B.), 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. In evaluating the parent's habitual patterns of conduct, the court may disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and weigh the history of the parent's prior conduct more heavily. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. And DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. K.T. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re C.T.), 896 N.E.2d 571, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

[16] Here, the conditions that led to Child's placement outside Father's care were Father's substance abuse and incarceration. To address Father's substance abuse, on December 17, 2024, the CHINS court ordered him to engage in random drug screens, continue to engage in substance abuse treatment, and provide DCS with release of information forms necessary to confirm his compliance. Yet, by the time of the periodic review hearing just over two months later, Father had ceased engaging in the substance abuse treatment program through Transitions, had not signed any release of information forms to allow DCS to access his treatment records, and had not done any drug screens through DCS. At no point during the ensuing CHINS or TPR proceedings did Father ever submit to drug screens, reengage in substance abuse treatment, provide DCS with substance abuse treatment records, or otherwise address his substance abuse.

[17] Father had also been ordered to engage in a family functional assessment and follow all recommendations and participate in Father's Engagement and follow all recommendations. Yet Father had never done a family functional assessment, and he had stopped engaging in supervised parenting time with Child through Father's Engagement in May 2025 because “it was a hassle.” Tr. at 16. Father did not resume participation in Father's Engagement until two weeks before the October 15, 2025, TPR hearing. Moreover, Father had a lengthy criminal history and a pattern of incarceration and was, in fact, once again incarcerated for drug-related crimes at the time of the TPR hearing.

[18] In sum, the unchallenged findings show that, at the time of the TPR hearing, Father had not addressed his substance abuse problems, was once again incarcerated for a drug crime, had not completed court-ordered services designed to assist him in maintaining his relationship with Child, and had voluntarily stopped visiting with Child months ago. Given Father's habitual patterns of substance abuse, criminal conduct, and incarcerations, and his failure to engage in services until shortly before the time of the TPR hearing, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that there is a reasonable probability Father is not likely to remedy the reasons Child had been removed and remained out of his care since the beginning of the CHINS case. See In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234 (citation modified) (noting court was “within its discretion to disregard the efforts Mother made only shortly before termination and to weigh more heavily Mother's history of conduct prior to those efforts”).³ Father's contentions to the contrary are requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. See, e.g., id.

Best Interests of Child

[19] Father also asserts that the court erred in concluding that termination of his parental rights is in Child's best interests. In making such a determination, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Such evidence, “in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” L.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.D.S.), 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[20] The evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that, throughout the CHINS and TPR proceedings and even at the time of the termination hearing, Father was unable to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision for Child due to Father's incarceration and unaddressed substance abuse issues. Father had not completed substance abuse treatment or any other service the court had ordered to preserve the parent/child relationship, and Father was once again incarcerated for a drug-related conviction. In addition, Father had not seen Child in months because he found engaging in supervised visitation through Father's Engagement to be “a hassle.” Tr. at 16.⁴

[21] Moreover, the FCM and GAL testified that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests and that Child needs permanency which can be provided by his Paternal Grandmother, who intends to adopt him. Given that testimony, in addition to evidence that Child needs permanency and stability that Father cannot and/or will not provide ⁵ and that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal and continued placement outside Father's home will not likely be remedied, we conclude that the totality of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.

Conclusion

[22] The trial court's uncontested findings of fact support its judgment terminating Father's parental rights. The trial court did not clearly err.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Me.C.’s (“Mother”) parental rights were also terminated, but Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Father was apparently no longer incarcerated at the time of the dispositional hearing, although the record does not contain any indication of when he had been released.

3.   Because DCS met its burden to show that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's placement outside Father's care are not likely to be remedied pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)(3), we need not address Father's contentions regarding whether DCS has proven its allegations of a threat to Child's well-being under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)(4). See, e.g., id.

4.   These unchallenged facts distinguish this case from those cited by Father, where appellate courts reversed terminations of parental rights when the parents had made “good-faith,” if unsuccessful, efforts to better themselves as parents. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1262; see also, e.g., B.G. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re H.G.), 959 N.E.2d 272, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) noting “significant efforts at self-improvement”), trans. denied.

5.   Father correctly points out that a child's need for permanency, alone, is not sufficient to support a finding that termination is in a child's best interests. See, e.g., In re H.G., 959 N.E.2d at 293. However, the trial court's judgment was not based solely on Child's need for permanency; rather, that was one important factor the court correctly considered, along with Father's failure to address the reasons for removal, Father's present inability to care for Child, and the recommendations of the FCM and GAL.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.