Crystal O'Donnell, Appellant-Petitioner v. Michael O'Donnell, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Crystal O'Donnell (“Mother”) appeals the Hendricks Superior Court's order modifying custody of Mother's daughter, A.O. (“Child”), with Michael O'Donnell (“Father”). Mother presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it modified custody of Child.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it restricted her parenting time with Child.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father were married and have one child together, Child, who was born December 21, 2010. The trial court entered the dissolution decree in July 2023, which incorporated the parties’ final settlement agreement whereby they agreed to share legal and physical custody of Child. Pursuant to the agreement, Child alternated weeks living with each parent.

[4] On February 11, 2025, Father filed a verified petition to modify custody of Child. Father requested sole legal and physical custody of Child due to Child's “high emotional distress while at Mother's home.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 41. In particular, Father alleged:

7. [C]hild is subjected to daily and multiple verbal fights between Mother and her live-in boyfriend.

8. [C]hild has ongoing health challenges and has been in therapy. Father states [that,] although [C]hild has been in therapy for some time, the constant emotional distress [Child] experiences, is worsening the situation.

9. [Child] allegedly did not want to return to Mother's home per her most recent stay with Father, but he wishes to abide by the court's current order until if, and when, the court changes it.

Id. at 41. Father also asked the trial court to appoint a Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”).

[5] A few weeks later, on March 6, Father filed a verified emergency motion for an in camera interview of Child and renewed his request for a GAL. Father alleged:

3. [C]hild is under stress living at Mother's house during Mother's parenting time. She is having a rough time at school and is sent home due to sickness. In addition, [C]hild is traumatized [sic] Mother gave away [C]hild's dog, but allegedly not Mother's boyfriend's dog.

4. [C]hild now has suicidal ideation under her stress [and] does not wish to be in Mother's house.

5. Father believes [that] waiting another three (3) months [until the scheduled hearing] for some resolution in this young girl's life is absolutely traumatic beyond belief.

6. Father requested [that] the Court appoint a Guardian ad Litem for [C]hild.

7. Father requests [that] the Court now allow [C]hild to have an in camera interview with the judge to ascertain [C]hild's wishes and have a brief 15-minute hearing on the outcome of that interview as soon as possible.

Id. at 49-50. The trial court denied Father's motion, but the court set a hearing for March 17.

[6] Following the March 17 hearing, the trial court denied Father's request for an in camera interview with Child, but the court appointed a GAL. In addition, the court ordered the parties to mediation after the GAL issued her report.

[7] On July 1, the GAL, Lisa Manning, filed her report with the court. Manning also asked the trial court to read, in camera, a letter Child had written. In her report, Manning observed that

[Child] has struggled since her parents separated. [Child] has missed several days of school because of illness. [Child] has anxiety and has recently begun having heart palpitations and tachycardia. She has an IEP at school and Mother reports she has been to the school nurse 40-50 times since January. [Child] has also recently expressed suicidal ideations and her therapist has reported that [Child] has thoughts of self-harm. [Child] has engaged in therapy for some time but recently started in person therapy consistently.

[Child] reports an incredibly strained relationship with Mother. [Child] wrote a letter for this Court's review that she has asked to keep confidential from her parents. [Child] struggles to bond with Mother. She has attempted to repair her relationship with Mother. She has raised concerns for Mother to address, and they have resulted in little change. [Child] is often disciplined at Mother's home, and she is not always aware of why she is being disciplined. She is more relaxed at Father's home, and she is more bonded to Father. [Child]’s weeks at Mother's home aggravate her anxiety and she dreads the extended parenting time with Mother, particularly over the summer. Even though [Child] has not yet started high school, she is already seeking employment. She is eager to get her driver's license and pay for a car. She is seeking to find some control over her life and her schedule that she does not currently possess.

[Child] firmly believes her mental health will improve with Father having primary custody. She has expressed this to both her parents. [Child]’s wishes are to see Mother every other Saturday for several hours and on holidays. She does not want to have overnights at Mother's home and does not want extended parenting time in the summer at Mother's home. [Child] thought about her preferred schedule for some time and believes every other Saturday would work best for her.

Id. at 66-67. Manning recommended that the court grant Father primary physical custody of Child, with Mother exercising parenting time every other weekend from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. through Sunday at 6:00 p.m., holidays other than summer break pursuant to the Parenting Time Guidelines, and two one-week periods during summer vacation.

[8] Following an unsuccessful mediation, the trial court held a hearing on Father's petition to modify custody on September 12. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Father's petition, in part. In particular, the court ordered the parties to continue to share legal custody of Child, and the court awarded primary physical custody of Child to Father. With respect to Mother's parenting time, the court ordered that Mother would have “restricted parenting time” and adopted Manning's recommended schedule. Id. at 24. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[9] Our Supreme Court has made clear that, in family law matters, Indiana has a preference “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993)). A trial court's decisions regarding custody modification and parenting time lie within its broad discretion, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020); Gomez v. Gomez, 887 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court misinterpreted the law.” Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). An appellate court is “in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124 (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).

[10] “[O]n appeal we will not ‘reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.’ ” McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 288 (quoting Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)). “[I]t is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Duncan v. Duncan, 843 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “It is not impossible to reverse a trial court's decision regarding child custody on appeal, but given our deferential standard of review, it is relatively rare.” Hecht v. Hecht, 142 N.E.3d 1022, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

Issue One: Custody Modification

[11] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Father primary custody of Child. “The party seeking a modification of custody bears the burden of demonstrating that the existing custody order should be altered.” Maddux v. Maddux, 40 N.E.3d 971, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The trial court “may not modify a child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under [Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8].” Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21(a). In making its determination, the trial court is required to “consider the factors” listed under section 31-17-2-8. I.C. § 31-17-2-21(b). The list of factors in section 31-17-2-8 is as follows:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parent or parents;

(B) the child's sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by eith parent.

[12] Mother first contends that there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that modification of custody is in Child's best interests. In particular, Mother argues that “the trial court relied substantially on the GAL's recommendations” and that that reliance was unfounded because of Manning's “lack of thoroughness in completing her investigation․” Appellant's Br. at 30. In particular, Mother contends that Manning relied on Child's “own statements” to form Manning's conclusions without corroborating Child's alleged mental and physical issues by consulting her health care providers. Id. Mother also maintains that Manning's opinions were based on stale information. And Mother claims that Manning's investigation was not “balanced” because she only met with Mother once but met with Father and Child multiple times. Id. at 33.

[13] In support of her argument on appeal, Mother cites Cunningham v. Cunningham, 787 N.E.2d 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In Cunningham, the trial court denied the father's petition to modify custody of the parties’ children despite the recommendations of both a GAL and the family's therapist that the court award Father primary custody. On appeal, we noted the father's “great emphasis” on the reports submitted by the GAL and family therapist in support of reversing the trial court. Id. at 936. We concluded that that emphasis was unfounded. We stated,

after reviewing the experts’ reports and their testimony at the hearing, we are troubled by the fact that both experts only spent approximately three hours interviewing and observing the children, parents, and other relevant individuals.[] In preparing his report, Dr. Edwards only interviewed Father, Mother, and the children. Additionally, in his evaluation he relied on the Incomplete Sentences Blank worksheet filled out by the children, but admitted at the hearing that it is hard to determine what a child means in making a response on the worksheet without conducting a follow up interview, which he did not do. Although the GAL spoke with all family members concerned in the custody evaluation, he did not speak with any of the children's teachers or school counselors, despite the fact that the decline in K.C.’s school performance is a primary issue in this case. Also in their evaluations, neither Dr. Edwards nor the GAL addressed the fact that Father's fiancée and her thirteen-year old son now reside with Father.

Id.

[14] We reject Mother's attempt to analogize Cunningham to this case. Our standard of review on appeal prohibits us from reweighing evidence, and we give broad deference to the trial court. We affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition to modify custody in Cunningham based, in large part, on the inadequacies we observed in the reports by the GAL and the therapist. But we perceive no such inadequacies in Manning's report. To reverse the trial court here, the evidence would have to “positively require” that we conclude that the court could not have relied on the GAL's report or testimony. See Duncan, 843 N.E.2d at 969. Here, the GAL met with Child three times and frequently corresponded with Child by phone and text message; and she met with Mother and Father one time each, although she spoke with Father for ten or fifteen minutes on another occasion when she met Child at Father's house. In addition, the GAL reviewed Child's “school records ․” Tr. p. 18. Mother's argument that Manning's report and testimony were unfounded is meritless, and the evidence does not support reversal on the issue of Child's best interests.

[15] Still, Mother argues that “the substantial changes the trial court found to justify a modification of custody are arguably not changes at all and there is no evidence showing they are substantial.” Appellant's Br. at 36. Mother maintains that there is no evidence: that the “conflict” between Mother and Child is new or that their relationship has “deteriorated” since the dissolution decree; that Child's wishes have changed; or that Child's mental health struggles have changed. Id.

[16] Mother's argument again is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Father and Mother's divorce was final in July 2023. Manning testified that, after parents’ marriage was dissolved, Mother had told her that Child had told Mother that she wanted to live with Father, which shows a change in Child's wishes. Manning also testified that, sometime in 2024 or 2025, Child wrote Mother a letter “to express some of her concerns with [Mother]” and Mother confronted Child to discuss the letter, which “really spun [Child] out a lot ․” Tr. p. 15. That evidence, among other evidence, supports a reasonable inference that Child's relationship with Mother had deteriorated since the divorce. Finally, Manning testified that joint custody “has really been detrimental to [Child's] emotional wellbeing” and has affected her physical wellbeing. Id. at 12. That evidence supports a reasonable inference that it is the custody agreement that was imposed by the final decree that has had a negative impact on Child. Mother has not shown that the trial court clearly erred when it found a substantial change in circumstances to modify custody.

[17] In sum, the evidence supports the trial court's findings that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that modification of custody is in Child's best interests.

Issue Two: Parenting Time

[18] Mother argues that the trial court erroneously restricted her parenting time without making the necessary statutory findings. Indiana Code section 31-17-4-1 provides that “a parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable parenting time rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time by the noncustodial parent might endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional development.” Although the statute uses the word “might,” this Court “has previously interpreted the language to mean that a court may not restrict parenting time unless that parenting time ‘would’ endanger the child's physical health or emotional development.” S.M. v. A.A., 136 N.E.3d 227, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). The court's written explanation must include both “a factual basis and a finding as to potential endangerment.” Id. (quoting Rickman v. Rickman, 993 N.E.2d 1166, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)).

[19] At the hearing on Father's modification petition, Manning testified that she recommended that Mother's parenting time be “restricted” because Manning was “concerned for [Child's] safety.” Tr. p. 23. And the trial court “adopt[ed]” Manning's recommendations, including “restricted parenting time,” but made no findings that parenting time with Mother would endanger Child's physical health or significantly impair her emotional development. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 23-24. Section II(D) of the Parenting Time Guidelines recommends that Mother exercise parenting time with Child on alternating weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m., one evening per week for up to four hours, and on all scheduled holidays. But, based on Manning's recommendations, the court ordered that Mother exercise parenting time with Child every other weekend from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m., two non-consecutive one-week periods during the summer, and holiday parenting time in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, excluding the traditional extended summer schedule.

[20] Father argues that the diminished parenting time schedule is merely a “deviation,” which is permitted as long as the trial court explains “why the deviation is necessary or appropriate in the case.” Ind. Parenting Time G. Preamble (C)(3). Father distinguishes the parenting time order here from that in Stafford v. Stafford, 256 N.E.3d 595, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), where we held that a parenting time order that eliminated all overnights was a restriction and not a deviation. And Father argues that Matter of Paternity of J.K., 184 N.E.3d 658, 667-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), is analogous here. In J.K., we noted that, because father lived in Texas and child was a teenager involved in several extracurricular activities, it was “next to impossible to gauge what the minimum [parenting time schedule] is under these circumstances.” Id. at 666. And we held that the order crafted by the trial court was a reasonable deviation and not a restriction. Id.

[21] Here, while the parenting time order does not eliminate all overnights, it reduces Mother's alternating weekend visits from two overnights to one overnight, eliminates mid-week visits altogether, and severely restricts summer vacation visitation. Tellingly, again, Manning testified that she recommended that Mother's parenting time be “restricted” because Manning was “concerned for [Child's] safety.” Tr. p. 23 (emphases added). But the trial court ordered that Mother's parenting time be “restricted” without making any findings that more parenting time would endanger Child's physical health or significantly impair Child's emotional development. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 24.

[22] The facts and circumstances before us lead us to conclude that the trial court restricted Mother's parenting time and abused its discretion when it did not enter the requisite statutory findings supporting the restriction. Accordingly, we reverse the parenting time order and remand to the trial court with instructions to: (1) enter findings under Indiana Code section 31-17-4-1 to support such a restriction; (2) award Mother parenting time consistent with the Parenting Time Guidelines; or (3) award Mother reasonable parenting time that deviates from the Parenting Time Guidelines and explain why the deviation is appropriate.

[23] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.