Foua J. Tofiga, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After he was charged with rape and multiple other offenses, Foua Tofiga waived his right to counsel and represented himself at his jury trial. The jury found Tofiga guilty on all charges, and Tofiga appeals, contending that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself. We conclude that Tofiga was not severely mentally ill, and the trial court's decision to allow him to proceed pro se is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm Tofiga's convictions.

Issue

[2] Tofiga raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court clearly erred by allowing Tofiga to represent himself.

Facts

[3] Tofiga and K.M. met in November 2021 through their employment and started a relationship. On a visit to Tofiga's apartment in January 2022, K.M. stayed overnight. When K.M. woke up, she discovered padlocks on the doors, and Tofiga refused to let her leave. K.M. jumped out of a second-story window and broke her hip, leaving her unable to walk. Tofiga discovered K.M. outside and carried her back upstairs. Tofiga then confined K.M. to the apartment for several weeks.

[4] During the confinement, Tofiga repeatedly sexually and physically abused K.M. Tofiga used a torch to burn K.M.’s cheek; hit her with a hammer, breaking her finger and leaving gouges on her hip; repeatedly stabbed her; repeatedly bit her; and kicked her in the chest, which broke several ribs. Tofiga duct-taped K.M. to a chair when he left the apartment. Much of the abuse was recorded on surveillance cameras that Tofiga had placed around the apartment.

[5] Eventually, in April 2022, K.M. was able to escape and called her mother. K.M. hid at her mother's house for two days, and her mother convinced K.M. to go to the hospital on April 14, 2022. Medical staff at the hospital observed that K.M. had bruises and bite marks all over her body; burns on her face; multiple lacerations; sagging skin consistent with recent starvation; and multiple broken bones, including multiple fractures of her ribs and pelvis, a crush injury to her finger, and a radius fracture of her hand. The emergency room physician described this as the “wors[t] case [she had] ever seen in the emergency department for an abuse case.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 42.

[6] Ultimately, the State charged Tofiga with: (1) rape, a Level 1 felony; (2) aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; (3) criminal confinement, a Level 3 felony; (4) intimidation, a Level 5 felony; (5) strangulation, a Level 6 felony; (6) aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; (7) aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; (8) aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; (9) aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; (10) aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; (11) criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony; (12) criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony; (13) criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony; (14) domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor; (15) domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor; (16) domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor; and (17) domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. The State also alleged that Tofiga was an habitual offender. The State later dismissed Counts 2, 3, and 12.

[7] Tofiga was initially represented by an attorney appointed by the trial court. In September 2022, Tofiga's counsel filed a motion for a mental health assessment, and the trial court granted the motion. In October 2022, however, Tofiga informed the trial court that he wished to proceed pro se. The trial court granted Tofiga's request, removed his appointed counsel, and appointed standby counsel. In October 2022, the State filed a motion for a competency evaluation. The trial court granted the State's motion and ordered Dr. James Cates and Dr. David Lombard to perform competency evaluations of Tofiga.

[8] Dr. Lombard attempted to perform an evaluation of Tofiga in November 2022, but Tofiga was uncooperative and declined to complete the assessment. Dr. Cates, however, was able to perform an evaluation of Tofiga. Dr. Cates found that Tofiga's “probable current intellectual functioning [was] in the Average range.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 200. One assessment measured Tofiga's understanding, reasoning, and appreciation. Dr. Cates found:

[Tofiga] demonstrated an awareness of the roles of court officers, the jury, the consequences of conviction and pleading, and the rights waived in making a guilty plea. He understood the elements of an offense, and a lesser included offense. He demonstrated no impairment. The percentile ranks indicate that his score was better than 92.5 percent of persons deemed competent; 97.5 percent of persons deemed incompetent; and 98.5 percent of persons confirmed incompetent during a hospital stay for restoration.

Reasoning assesses the capacity to recognize relevance and assess alternatives, an essential aspect of assisting counsel. [Tofiga] was consistently able to choose a relevant alternative, and was able to demonstrate a logical and rational reason for each choice. He demonstrated no impairment.

Appreciation assesses the capacity to appreciate his own legal situation and circumstances. He was able to accurately convey the risks and potential outcomes of his situation. His discomfort with the legal system strained his ability to rationally defend some of his beliefs, and does indicate a mild impairment in this area.

Id. at 201. Regarding Tofiga's competency, Dr. Cates found:

While he demonstrates a need for control, that need does not appear to interfere with his competence. He demonstrates Average intelligence, at a minimum. And he is cognizant of the adjudicative process, and demonstrates the ability to assist counsel in the preparation of a defense. There is a mild impairment in the appreciation of his own legal circumstances, but that does not negate his strengths in other areas.

It is the opinion of this examiner that Mr. Tofiga is competent to stand trial.

Id.

[9] In April 2024, the trial court set the matter for a hearing on a number of issues, including disposition or action on: (1) the motion for a mental health assessment; (2) the motion for a competency evaluation; and (3) whether Tofiga “should be permitted to continue to represent himself or with standby counsel.” Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 186. At that hearing, the trial court ¹ advised Tofiga of the dangers of self-representation. Tr. Vol. II pp. 8-14. Tofiga again indicated that he wanted to represent himself.

[10] After the hearing, the trial court reappointed Dr. Lombard to conduct a competency evaluation of Tofiga and set the matter for hearing. Further, the trial court found:

The Defendant was advised of the potential disadvantages of self-representation. He was advised that the new trial judge in this matter does not consider legal research, discovery, and /or investigation to be part of the responsibilities of standby counsel. Rather, standby counsel is responsible only for advising the Defendant relating to courtroom procedure. Standby counsel should also be prepared to stand in and replace the Defendant if called upon should self-representation terminate. The Defendant was further advised that he needed to choose between the full representation of an attorney or self-representation with this very limited standby counsel. The Defendant chose to proceed with self-representation.

Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 206.

[11] In June 2024, Dr. Lombard completed his competency evaluation of Tofiga. Dr. Lombard noted that Tofiga “has never received any mental health counseling or been prescribed any psychiatric medications” and that he “has never been psychiatrically hospitalized.” Appellant's App. Vol. IV p. 79. The results of Tofiga's personality testing “indicate that his personality is such that he enjoys being at the center of attention, and he has a habit of having volatile and unpredictable relationships. The personality scales also indicate that he is temperamental, fickle, expressively impetuous, and cognitively expansive.” Id. at 82. Competency testing indicated the following:

His responses indicate that he understands the basic roles of the individuals who participate in criminal court proceedings. However, multiple times, his responses contained significant paranoid content - that all parties in the courtroom work against him (even his own defense attorney) and confusion regarding who controls the courtroom process (believing that the bailiff has the true power in the courtroom). Overall, his responses indicate that although he has factual knowledge of the basic criminal process and participants, he lacks a rational ability to interact effectively in that setting due to significant paranoia.

Id. Dr. Lombard diagnosed Tofiga with a delusional disorder and opined that Tofiga was “incapable of fully understanding the nature and objectives of the legal proceedings against him.” Id. Dr. Lombard believed that Tofiga's “mental health (and legal competencies) will very likely significantly improve after he receives proper care and treatment at a psychiatric facility.” Id. at 83.

[12] After a hearing, the trial court agreed with Dr. Lombard's assessment and found that Tofiga was not competent to stand trial. On July 16, 2024, the trial court committed Tofiga for competency restoration services, and Tofiga was admitted to Logansport State Hospital. In October 2024, Logansport State Hospital informed the trial court that Tofiga had attained the ability to understand the proceedings and assist with his defense. Dr. Danny Meadows noted that Tofiga was not taking medications; did not have delusions or paranoia; presented with “potential elevated personality traits” but no formal diagnosis of mental illness; and had no “cognitive issue or psychiatric issue that would interfere” with his “ability to proceed with trial.” Appellant's App. Vol. IV pp. 197-98. Dr. Meadows opined:

[Tofiga] was able to state his charges without difficulty. He was also able to name the basic rights that a criminal defendant has under the US Constitution. He stated that he plans to defend himself during his criminal trial but was able to discuss the basic role that a defense attorney has in which he stated, “could advise me if needed.” He stated that the prosecutor, “brings charges to prove that I am guilty.” Regarding the judge he stated, “The judge is neutral and brings order to the court.” [Tofiga] was asked about the jury. He stated, “There are 6-12 people who listen to my case. All of them have to agree on whether I'm guilty or not.” [Tofiga] was asked about appropriate behavior in the court and what would happen if his behavior was not appropriate. He stated that he could be found in contempt of court. He was able to give a basic definition of the role that witnesses, and evidence play in criminal proceedings. He was able to identify what a plea bargain is and was able to give details regarding the process of a plea bargain. He stated, “You say your guilty to get less time and get the case over with.” He was able to state that by accepting the plea deal he would give up his right to proceed to trial. Therefore, it is my opinion that [Tofiga] is currently capable of understanding the nature and objectives of the legal proceedings against him.

Id. at 197.

[13] Tofiga was then transported back to the jail, and the trial court held a hearing. At the hearing, the trial court again reviewed Tofiga's constitutional rights, the charges, and possible penalties with Tofiga. Tofiga again confirmed that he wished to “move forward pro se with standby counsel.” Tr. Vol. II p. 37. After the hearing, the trial court noted in its order that Tofiga “desires to represent himself in this matter and continues to waive his right to counsel.” Appellant's App. Vol. IV p. 201. The trial court permitted Tofiga to represent himself and appointed standby counsel.

[14] Tofiga conducted depositions and filed motions, and a jury trial was held in March 2025. During the trial, Tofiga participated in voir dire, made an opening statement, cross-examined witnesses, including K.M., made objections based upon the Rules of Evidence, explained the relevancy and admissibility of his exhibits to the trial court, called witnesses and presented evidence, testified in his own defense, pointed out inconsistencies in the State's evidence, and gave a closing argument. Tofiga argued that K.M. consented to the sexual activity and requested the physical violence.

[15] The jury found Tofiga guilty of the charges presented to the jury and found him to be an habitual offender. After the trial, Tofiga requested counsel for the sentencing hearing. The trial court sentenced Tofiga to an aggregate sentence of ninety-five years in the Department of Correction. Tofiga now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[16] On appeal, Tofiga argues that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself.² The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to self-representation is a “ ‘fundamental’ right, implicit in the structure of the Sixth Amendment and supported by a long history of customary practice and legal protections.” Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 256 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817, 818, 831-32 (1975)). “But, while deeply rooted in our legal culture, the right to self-representation is not absolute.” Id.

[17] “[A] trial court may deny a defendant's request to act pro se when the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial but suffers from severe mental illness to the point where he is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself.” Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 2009) (citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008)). This determination “involve[s] a fact-sensitive evaluation of the defendant's capabilities that the trial court is best-situated to make.” Id. The trial judge “will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178).

[18] A trial court's “determination of competence to act pro se will be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.” Edwards, 902 N.E.2d at 824. Clear error is that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1040 (Ind. 2013). We neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses. Id. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Id.

[19] Tofiga does not challenge the adequacy of the trial court's advisements regarding the dangers of self-representation and the benefits of counsel.³ Nor does he deny that he consistently indicated to the trial court that he understood its advisements. Rather, Tofiga contends that the trial court erred because he was found incompetent earlier in the proceedings and he filed lengthy motions that were “devoid of cogent arguments and were often rambling gibberish.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. Tofiga contends that “his filings before commitment and incompetency are essentially the same caliber as his filings after.” Id. at 20.

[20] The State argues that the record does not indicate Tofiga was severely mentally ill.⁴ The State notes that Tofiga was not diagnosed with multiple mental illnesses, did not have a long-standing history of mental illness, and made cogent arguments to the jury.

[21] Here, Tofiga earned his GED and had completed approximately forty-eight credits toward his associate's degree. In June 2024, Dr. Lombard noted that Tofiga had “never received any mental health counseling or been prescribed any psychiatric medications” and that he had “never been psychiatrically hospitalized.” Appellant's App. Vol. IV p. 79. Although Dr. Lombard diagnosed Tofiga with a delusional disorder, he believed that Tofiga's “mental health (and legal competencies) will very likely significantly improve after he receive[d] proper care and treatment at a psychiatric facility.” Id. at 83.

[22] Tofiga was then committed for competency restoration services, and in October 2024, Logansport State Hospital informed the trial court that Tofiga had attained the ability to understand the proceedings and assist with his defense. Dr. Meadows noted that Tofiga was not taking medications; did not have delusions or paranoia; presented with “potential elevated personality traits” but had no formal diagnosis of mental illness; and had no “cognitive issue or psychiatric issue that would interfere” with his “ability to proceed with trial.” Appellant's App. Vol. IV pp. 197-98.

[23] After his competency was restored, Tofiga actively participated in the litigation, including during all aspects of the jury trial. Tofiga presented a defense by arguing that K.M. consented to the sexual activity and requested the physical violence, pointed out inconsistencies in the State's evidence, and presented his own evidence. Further, Tofiga concedes that he was “generally respectful and accepted direction from the trial court without complaint.” Appellant's Br. p. 22.

[24] The State argues that this case is unlike Edwards, in which our Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the defendant suffered from “severe and pervasive mental illness.” Edwards, 902 N.E.2d at 828. The Court noted:

Edwards was evaluated by several mental health professionals from 1999 through 2004 and was diagnosed at various points in time with schizophrenia of an undifferentiated type, disorganized type schizophrenia, a delusional disorder, and a personality disorder. Edwards's psychiatric evaluations reveal that he experienced hallucinations and delusions, and that he manifested disorganized thought processes and impaired verbal communication. Several psychiatric reports concluded that Edwards was not competent to stand trial in the first instance, let alone represent himself. And as the trial court pointed out, Edwards produced a litany of disorganized and incoherent motions that support the physicians’ observations as well as the conclusion that Edwards was not competent to conduct trial proceedings on his own. The court's ruling was thus based on an extensive record of psychiatric evaluations that were already produced in connection with Edwards's competency proceedings, as well as a number of self-authored motions that Edwards submitted to the trial court in the course of these proceedings. The trial court was also in a position to observe Edwards's behavior and demeanor in the first trial, the two pretrial pro se request arguments, and Edwards's 2002 competency hearing.

Id. at 827.

[25] We agree with the State. We find this case to be more like Sturdivant v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1219, 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. There, we held: “While some of Sturdivant's statements were undeniably strange, and she clearly lacked the legal skills of an experienced criminal defense attorney, this is not the stuff of ‘severe mental illness’ under Indiana v. Edwards.” Id. There was no evidence the defendant had “ever been evaluated by a mental-health professional, let alone diagnosed with a mental illness.” Id. “And to the extent that there were some indicators of mental illness, they certainly were not sufficient to outweigh Sturdivant's explicit and repeated requests to waive counsel and represent herself.” Id.

[26] Similarly, here, while there were some indicators of mental illness, those indicators were not sufficient to outweigh Tofiga's insistence upon representing himself. Although some of Tofiga's filings were “undeniably strange,” “this is not the stuff of ‘severe mental illness.’ ” Id. Despite the earlier competency finding, Tofiga was able to clearly articulate a defense to the jury and present evidence, and Dr. Meadows noted that Tofiga was not taking medications and had no formal diagnosis of mental illness. The trial court was in the best position to assess Tofiga's individualized circumstances. We conclude that the trial court's decision to allow Tofiga to proceed pro se is not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., id.; cf. Ricketts v. State, 108 N.E.3d 416, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's request to proceed pro se where the defendant “had been discharged from the military for his mental health issues; was suffering from depression, personality disorder, PTSD, and anxiety; and had been receiving psychiatric care for twenty years with regular care for the past six”), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[27] The trial court's decision to allow Tofiga to proceed pro se is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A special judge had recently been appointed to preside over the matter.

2.   Tofiga also argues: “The trial court erred in allowing [Tofiga] to represent himself as well as sanction actions taken while incompetent.” Appellant's Br. p. 12 (emphasis added). Tofiga, however, does not further explain how the trial court sanctioned Tofiga's actions taken while incompetent, and thus, this argument is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8); Finnegan v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1265, 1269 n.1 (Ind. 2024) (noting that the failure to present a cogent argument waives the issue for appellate review).

3.   Our Supreme Court has held:A defendant who is competent to stand trial and who knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily makes a timely and unequivocal waiver of counsel is entitled to exercise the right of self-representation, even in a capital case. When deciding whether a defendant meets these standards, a trial court should inquire, on the record, whether the defendant clearly understands (1) the nature of the charges against her, including any possible defenses; (2) the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se and the fact that she's held to the same standards as a professional attorney; and (3) that a trained attorney possesses the necessary skills for preparing for and presenting a defense.Wright, 168 N.E.3d at 263-64 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

4.   The State also argues that Edwards permits, but does not require, a trial court to deny pro se representation if the defendant is severely mentally ill. We need not address this argument because we conclude that Tofiga was not severely mentally ill, and the trial court's decision to allow Tofiga to represent himself is not clearly erroneous.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J, and Foley, J., concur.