IN RE: J.K. (A Child in Need of Services) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judges Brown and Altice concur.

Case Summary

[1] C.E. (Mother) appeals the trial court's determination that her child, J.K. (Child), is a child in need of services (CHINS). Because we conclude the trial court did not clearly err in its determination, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and D.K. are the parents of Child (born October 2021). As of March 2025, Father had been Child's primary physical custodian for a few years while Mother exercised parenting time in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Child had been the subject of a previous CHINS case, which had been initiated due to domestic violence. Mother also had been convicted of battery and possession of methamphetamine in 2020.¹

[3] On March 21, 2025 at around 3:00 a.m., Madison County Sheriff's Deputy Samir Kahn responded to a reported theft of a motor vehicle. Deputy Kahn spoke with Mother's boyfriend (Boyfriend), who told him that he and Mother had gotten “into a domestic” after she alleged he had cheated on her. Transcript at 87. Their argument turned physical, and Mother “shoved [him] to the ground and struck [him] in the back of the head” before leaving in a car. Id. Boyfriend told Deputy Kahn that Child was present during the incident. When Deputy Kahn spoke with Mother a few days later, “she denied th[e] whole altercation.” Id. at 33. The State charged Mother with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery related to these events.²

[4] Shortly after the domestic dispute, DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) Jared Beabout investigated a report indicating Child was suffering from abuse or neglect. He spoke with Boyfriend, who told him that Child had been present during the physical altercation. Mother and Father also brought Child into the DCS office and spoke with FCM Beabout. The FCM did not observe any injuries to Child and Mother continued to deny the allegations in the report.

[5] Because Child was primarily living with Father, and Mother had stopped living with Boyfriend, DCS declined to remove Child from her parents’ care on an emergency basis. See id. at 41, 44 (FCM Beabout agreeing Child seemed “safe and secure” in Father's care and testifying that this “was a protective factor” which negated the need for removal). However, DCS substantiated the allegations against Mother and on May 1, 2025, petitioned to adjudicate Child a CHINS based on the March 21 domestic violence incident, Mother's criminal history, and the fact Child had previously been the subject of a CHINS case.

[6] At an initial hearing on May 12, Mother and Father denied that Child was a CHINS. It came to light that Mother and Father had begun living together, so DCS asked the court to order family preservation services, which it did. The court also scheduled a fact-finding hearing for June 30.

[7] On June 10, DCS moved to amend the CHINS petition to add Boyfriend as a necessary party because it had learned that he and Mother were living together again. The court granted the motion.³ At the June 30 fact-finding hearing, Deputy Kahn, FCM Beabout, and Father provided testimony consistent with the above information. Additionally, Father testified that he did not believe Child was a CHINS and said he could provide for her needs. He explained that DCS had not referred any services for Child since their involvement began, and Mother was still exercising “regular parenting time[.]” Id. at 55. Though the court had entered an order exempting Father from family preservation services after Mother stopped living with him, Father acknowledged the order did not eliminate the possibility that Child and Mother would have to participate in services.

[8] In her testimony, Mother confirmed she had a pending charge for domestic battery. She asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to questions about the May 21 incident and whether child was present for it. The trial court indicated it would make a negative inference from Mother's decision to plead the Fifth. Mother did acknowledge she had a prior conviction for battery and that Child had been through CHINS proceedings in the past. She testified that she had started family preservation services the week before the fact-finding hearing. DCS had not offered her other services up to that point in time, and she had not sought out therapy or domestic violence services on her own. Mother explained that she had been having unsupervised visits with Child at least twice per week throughout the proceedings. She felt she was providing for all of Child's needs and that Father was “a great dad.” Id. at 64. Mother testified that she did not believe DCS needed to be involved in her family's life.

[9] Elizabeth Bond, the permanency FCM at the time of Mother's fact-finding hearing, testified that she determined family preservation services were necessary when she became involved with the family. She described family preservation services as “an all-encompassing service that can provide ․ parenting education, domestic violence services, [and] therapy” among other things. Id. at 68. FCM Bond explained that family preservation services would involve Child. A few weeks before the hearing—after Mother resolved complications related to housing—FCM Bond referred Mother's household for family preservation services, and she testified that Mother had demonstrated “a willingness to complete any service deemed necessary by [DCS].” Id. at 68.

[10] FCM Bond testified that Child's safety was at risk because this was not her first CHINS case, Mother had a pending domestic battery charge, and “services ha[dn't] been completed ․ to remedy the situation ․” Id. at 71. She also agreed that exposure to a single incident of domestic violence can harm a child. Her areas of concern were domestic violence and housing instability. When asked why the court's intervention was required, she reiterated that the “services ․ needed to address the initial concerns of the case ha[d] not been completed.” Id. at 72.

[11] On cross-examination, FCM Bond testified that she had visited Child at Father's home and had no safety concerns for her there. When asked whether she believed any child exposed to domestic violence is a CHINS, FCM Bond responded that “every case ․ is different [and] with [Child] being so young we don't know what the ․ outcome of potential exposure to domestic violence could be ․” Id. at 75. Although she had not seen Child demonstrate symptoms indicating she needed services, FCM Bond said there is evidence showing young children “who are exposed to domestic violence can benefit from services[,]” and opined that Child “could benefit potentially from a play therapy referral.” Id. at 78.

[12] By the time of Boyfriend's fact-finding hearing on August 18, Brandon Moore had started managing the family's case. FCM Moore testified that Mother's household continued to participate in family preservation services and had recently started domestic violence services. For similar reasons as FCM Bond, he believed the court needed to intervene to protect Child's safety. At the hearing, Boyfriend confirmed that he and Mother were still living together as a couple.

[13] On the record, the trial court determined that Child was a CHINS. It observed that domestic violence issues were “clearly present in the household” and that the testimony showed an incident “took place in front of the [Child] ․” Id. at 95. On the same day of the hearing, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the CHINS adjudication.

[14] At the September 9 dispositional hearing, Mother testified that she was participating in services but objected to DCS's involvement in her family's life. She confirmed she was still receiving unsupervised parenting time as Child's non-custodial parent. The court's dispositional order kept Child placed with Father and ordered all three adults to comply with standard dispositional requirements. Mother and Boyfriend were specifically ordered to participate in home-based therapy and services and assessments as recommended by the family preservation service provider. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[15] In a CHINS proceeding, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)). When we review a CHINS determination, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). “Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and [the] reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. at 578 (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied) (alteration in original).

[16] Where, as here, a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon, “we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. If the appellant does not challenge specific findings of fact, “[w]e accept [the] unchallenged findings as true.” In re W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). Moreover, when the findings do not reach certain issues, we review those issues under the general judgment standard, meaning we will affirm the judgment “if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). Ultimately, we will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or ‘if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.’ ” D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578 (quoting Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262).

[17] Here, DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, under which it was required to prove:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent ․ is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

At its core, “[t]he statute contains three basic elements: (1) the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child; (2) the child's needs are unmet; and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The statute “does not require that a court wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene.” In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[18] At the outset, we agree with the State that Mother challenges one specific finding of fact. In its order, the court found “convincing” various testimony indicating Child was present during the domestic violence incident that led to DCS's petition. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 47-48. This amounted to a finding that “[Child] was present when the domestic battery incident occurred.” Id. at 48. But according to Mother, “[t]here was no evidence below that the child witnessed the domestic battery.” Appellant's Brief at 7. She notes that Deputy Kahn did not see Child and that she was not charged with domestic battery committed in the presence of a child under Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2). These arguments amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Deputy Kahn testified that when he came to the scene, Boyfriend said Mother had shoved him and hit him in the back of the head. Tr. at 31-32. Boyfriend also told the deputy that Child was present during the altercation. Id. at 33, 87-88. FCM Beabout testified that Boyfriend told him the same. See id. at 40. This evidence amply supports the court's finding.⁴

[19] Next, Mother argues DCS failed to prove any of the required elements of a CHINS adjudication. We address the issues of serious impairment or endangerment and Child's needs together before considering whether the court's intervention was required.

[20] It is well established that “a child's exposure to domestic violence can support a CHINS finding.” In re D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting K.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)). Indeed, “a single incident of domestic violence in a child's presence may support a CHINS finding, and it need not necessarily be repetitive.” Id. Even children who witness domestic violence at a very young age can suffer psychological harm. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 644-645 (Ind. 2014) (discussing research on the impact of domestic violence on infants and toddlers).

[21] Nevertheless, Mother argues that “this case is controlled by [In re] D.P.” Appellant's Br. at 7 (capitalization omitted). We disagree. In that case, a panel of this Court reversed a CHINS adjudication where the only admissible evidence of endangerment or impairment was that the father had been charged with domestic violence. D.P., 72 N.E.3d at 984. There was no evidence “domestic violence ever occurred in D.P.’s presence.” Id. Nor was there “evidence as to the impact of the incident upon D.P.” Id.

[22] In contrast, here there was ample evidence that Mother pushed and hit Boyfriend in Child's presence during the incident that prompted the CHINS petition. Child had also been the subject of a previous CHINS case for domestic violence—showing there was a history of domestic violence in this family. Further, we are not persuaded that the court was precluded from concluding that Child needed services simply because FCM Bond testified that she had not shown symptoms indicating such a need. Consistent with E.M., the FCM testified it would be difficult to anticipate the outcome of Child's exposure to domestic violence, but evidence shows young children “who are exposed to domestic violence can benefit from services.” Tr. at 78. She also testified that family preservation services included Child and that Child might benefit from play therapy. Based on these facts, we conclude that the court did not clearly err in concluding that Child's mental or physical condition was seriously impaired or endangered and that she needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation she was not receiving. See In re A.B., 245 N.E.3d 644, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“By failing to provide their children with a home free from domestic violence, Parents have not provided the children with an appropriate, safe home.”). We now turn to whether the coercive intervention of the court was required.

[23] The coercive intervention requirement “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families where parents lack the ability to provide for their children, not merely where they encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.” In re S.V., 276 N.E.3d 652, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580). The relevant inquiry “is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” In re E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. The necessity of the court's intervention “is a separate and distinct element of a CHINS action” and cannot be inferred from the fact that a child is seriously endangered or impaired and needs services. D.P., 72 N.E.3d at 985. Because the goal of a CHINS proceeding is to protect the child rather than to punish parents for past mistakes, “courts ‘should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.’ ” D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580 (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290).

[24] Here, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that Child's needs were unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court. Although the evidence showed that Mother participated in services and was willing to complete services deemed necessary by DCS, throughout these proceedings, she never acknowledged she had engaged in domestic violence or exposed Child to it, and she opposed DCS's involvement in her family's life. These two factors indicate she was unlikely to seek necessary care for Child unless compelled to do so. See A.B., 245 N.E.3d at 651 (finding coercive intervention necessary where the mother denied domestic violence between the parents despite evidence and her own initial allegations to the contrary). Indeed, Child had been the subject of prior CHINS proceedings related to domestic violence, yet such issues had recurred. Moreover, by the time of the fact-finding hearings, Mother had only just begun to participate in services—having only started family preservation services mere days before her fact-finding hearing—and she needed more time to complete them to achieve the intended results. FCM Bond testified that “services ha[dn't] been completed” to an extent that remedied DCS's concerns related to domestic violence in Child's household. Tr. at 71.⁵

[25] We also acknowledge that during the proceedings, DCS never requested to alter Child's placement from Father's care or restrict Mother's unsupervised parenting time as Child's non-custodial parent. But FCM Beabout characterized Father's involvement and the parents’ custody arrangement as a “protective factor” negating the need for removal rather than negating the need for services or the CHINS proceedings entirely. Tr. at 41. And FCM Bond's testimony, coupled with the trial court's unchallenged finding that Father was “unable to ensure the safety of his child while in the care of [Mother][,]” was sufficient to show the court's intervention was necessary. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 48.

Conclusion

[26] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment that Child was a CHINS. [27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(b)(5), a court may take judicial notice of “records of a court of this state[.]” When taking judicial notice of court records, we are limited to noticing the fact of the record's existence unless the record contains facts that are accurately and readily ascertainable and the source cannot be reasonably questioned. In re E.K., 271 N.E.3d 578, 584-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Accordingly, we take judicial notice of Mother's battery case, Cause No. 34D04-1903-F5-698, and possession of methamphetamine case, Cause No. 34D04-2001-F6-86, both of which resulted in convictions for Level 6 felonies in June 2020.

2.   At the fact-finding hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of Mother's domestic battery case, Cause No. 48H02-2504-CM-1110. We observe that Mother pled guilty to Class A misdemeanor domestic battery in September 2025 after the dispositional order was entered in this case.

3.   Boyfriend's initial hearing was held in conjunction with Mother and Father's fact-finding hearing. At the beginning of the June 30 hearing, the parties and the trial court discussed whether Boyfriend “would be ․ included in this Fact-Finding Hearing today or” whether he'd have a separate fact-finding “down the road.” Tr. at 28. Neither Mother nor Boyfriend objected to the court's decision to hold a fact-finding hearing for Boyfriend at a later date.

4.   Mother was asked at the fact-finding hearing whether the incident occurred and if it happened in front of Child, and she asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to both questions. The trial court did not compel her to answer those questions, but it did tell her it would make a negative inference from her decision to assert the right. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 46-47 (Ind. 2019) (outlining when “a court may not compel a parent's admission to a crime” in CHINS proceedings, but noting that “in civil proceedings, a court can draw a negative inference from a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination”), cert. denied, reh'g denied. A generous construction of Mother's argument on appeal would be that the court was not permitted to make such an inference concerning the circumstances attendant to the alleged crime—here, whether Child was present. However, even if there is any merit to this argument, the error is harmless because the finding is supported elsewhere in the record.

5.   While Mother continued to participate in family preservation services and had started domestic violence services by the time of Boyfriend's fact-finding hearing, FCM Moore still believed at that time that the court's intervention was necessary to ensure Child's safety.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.