IN RE: A.L. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] E.P. (“Father”) appeals the order adjudicating his daughter, A.L. (“Child”), a child in need of services (“CHINS”), claiming there was insufficient evidence that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] As of March 2025, Child was fifteen years old and living in Indianapolis with her mother (“Mother”)¹ and Mother's boyfriend (“Boyfriend”). Child also resided with two half-sisters—twelve-year-old N.R.L. (“Sister”) and six-year-old N.M.L.—and Boyfriend's two daughters. Child was especially close with Sister. Father lived in San Francisco, California, with his wife, their four-year-old child, his mother-in-law, and his teenaged stepson. He and Child would periodically communicate, but they had not seen one another in person since May 2012, which was shortly before Child turned three. At that time, Father, Mother, and Child were living in Honduras, and Father was about to leave and move to the United States. Child later moved to Indiana with Mother.

[3] At some point, Child disclosed to Mother that she had been sexually abused. Child also disclosed the sexual abuse to Father. On March 19, 2025, Mother and Boyfriend were arrested, leaving Child without a caregiver. Before long, Mother was deported to Honduras. Child and Sister were also subject to deportation orders. The Marion County Department of Child Services (“DCS”) intervened and placed Child and Sister in a foster home together. On March 21, 2025, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 due to neglect. At that time, Father's whereabouts were unknown. Before long, DCS located Father, who was living in California, had a work permit, and was trying to obtain a visa to stay in the United States. By all accounts, he had a safe home and a stable income.

[4] Child suffered from emotional and mental health issues. Specifically, Child exhibited symptoms of depression, with suicidal ideation and self-harm. Child also exhibited disordered eating. Child's foster mother (“Foster Mother”) sought emergency care for Child on two occasions due to concerns related to suicide and there was a plan to get Child into an eating disorder clinic. In May 2025, Child started working with a home-based therapist, Andrea Russell-Cruz (“Therapist”), meeting once per week for at least two hours. Sister was part of Child's emotional support system and would sometimes participate in Child's therapy sessions. The treatment goals included building self-agency skills and learning to cope when confronting events in her life that she could not control.

[5] Once Father was located, DCS arranged for virtual visits between Father and Child. Because of concerns that the visits were negatively impacting Child's emotional and mental health, the visitation arrangement was changed to therapeutically supervised virtual visits. Therapist supervised the visits.

[6] The CHINS fact-finding hearing was held in July 2025. Initially, the plan was to address the instant CHINS petition as well as CHINS petitions that concerned Child's half-sisters. However, Mother stipulated to the consideration of certain written evidence without a hearing, which resulted in fact-finding being conducted only as to Child. At the hearing, Child testified, and there was remote testimony from Father and Mother.² There was also testimony from Foster Mother, Therapist, Child's guardian ad litem (“the GAL”), and the DCS family case manager (“the FCM”). Child testified about her depression and self-harming behaviors and said that therapy had “honestly helped.” Tr. Vol. II. p. 58. Child thought she needed ongoing therapy to help with those issues. Child said she wanted to remain in Indiana with Foster Mother and she was concerned about depression if she moved to California, away from Sister.

[7] Father wanted Child to live with him in California and was opposed to having a transition period in place to develop a relationship before the change. When asked if he knew why Child was receiving therapy, Father said: “Supposedly what I understand is that she had a feeling that she was hurting herself and she wanted to commit suicide.” Id. at 17. When asked if he believed that Child needed mental health treatment to help with those thoughts and behaviors, Father said: “I think not. What I think is that she's confused because of the situation we're going through. I mean, her mother's in another country and her sisters too are separated from her.” Id. Father also said that he “wonder[ed] if [Child] would think differently if she would be in a home like [his],” as he suspected that “because of the problem, that's why she's like that.” Id. at 18.

[8] Father was asked if he would maintain therapy for Child if there was a recommendation to do so from Therapist. He responded: “I think so, I think so. But they're the experts and if they think that she needs it, then I would do it for her own good.” Id. Therapist testified that “a lot of work ․ still need[ed] to be done” to develop the relationship between Father and Child. Id. at 64. Therapist stated that Child needed ongoing therapy. She also expressed “concerns” about an immediate move to California, noting that Father and Child “would have a lot of issues with communication [and] trust” that could cause Child to regress in therapy. Id. Therapist further testified that she was “not a hundred percent sure that [Father] would [maintain] therapeutic services” noting that therapeutic services were “really important” for Child. Id. Therapist said: “[F]ather hasn't said that he wouldn't [maintain] therapy․ [B]ut from what my understanding of how he wants to move forward, it seems to me like moving forward means not talking about the past ․” Id.

[9] The GAL testified that Child “ha[d] voiced to many team members that she is considering if she is forced to go with [Father] that she would run away.” Id. at 76–77. Child was directly asked if she would run away if required to live with Father right away. Child said: “Yes. I don't feel so confident of that situation. I want to stay here and move along here. I wouldn't feel good with him.” Id. at 50. The FCM expressed concerns about an immediate transition, stating:

My visit with [Child] on July 3rd, she ․ told me she has not seen [Father] in over 10 years. When asked about if she would want to reunify with him, she told me no and my concern would be if she were to be placed back with him, she would run away because that's what she told me. That if DCS were to place her in the care of [Father], she will run away in California.

Id. at 87.

[10] The trial court issued an order adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 due to neglect. The court included written findings and conclusions, among them, that Child “does not want to go live with ․ Father and has voiced to many team members that she will run away if she is sent to live with him.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 184–85. The court specifically found that DCS “proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [Child] has and continues to suffer[ ] severe emotional trauma, as demonstrated by her self-harming, depressive symptoms, suicidal ideation, and eating disorders,” and “[a]s a result, [Child] needs ongoing therapy.” Id. at 187. It found that “[m]oving to live with [Father] today could drastically negatively impact [Child's] mental health according to [Child] herself, [the] GAL, [the FCM], Foster Mom, and [ ] Therapist.” Id. The trial court pointed out that “Father disputed [ ] Therapist's recommendation that [Child] stay here and develop her relationship” with him before moving to California “to prevent or minimize any potential trauma the move could cause.” Id. It determined that “[r]efusing to accept therapeutic recommendations for [Child] could seriously endanger her, given the harmful behaviors she displays.” Id. at 187–88. It further determined that “DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [Child's] parents cannot provide her the[ ] necessary services, including therapy and interventions to prevent her from hurting herself or running away.” Id. at 187.

[11] In August 2025, the trial court held the dispositional hearing and entered a decree requiring Father's participation in services. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 due to neglect. To establish that a child is a CHINS under this statute, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child met the statutory definition. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. A preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of the evidence presented. Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[13] In a CHINS case, the trial court is generally not obligated to enter special findings supporting its decision. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). However, where—as here—the trial court entered sua sponte findings, those findings control only as to the issues or matters they cover, with a general judgment standard applicable to any other issue or matter. Ind. Trial Rule 52(D). Under a general judgment standard, a reviewing court will affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). When the findings control, we look to whether the evidence supported the findings and the findings supported the judgment, reversing only if the judgment was clearly erroneous. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). A judgment is clearly erroneous if the evidence did not support the findings or the court applied the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. In conducting our review, “we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility.” Id. at 577. Rather, we consider the evidence that supported the judgment, together with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. at 577–78.

[14] Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that a minor child is a CHINS if:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[15] Our Supreme Court has synthesized this statute, explaining that DCS is required to prove three elements: “that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child,” “that the child's needs are unmet,” and “that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. Notably, the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect a child, not to punish a parent. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010). In other words, a CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault. Id. at 103. Rather, it reflects that a child currently needs services and is unlikely to receive those services without court intervention. Id. at 106. Further, “the conduct of one parent can be enough for a child to be adjudicated a CHINS.” Id. (“[T]o adjudicate culpability on the part of each individual parent in a CHINS proceeding would be at variance with the purpose of the CHINS inquiry: determining whether a child's circumstances necessitate services that are unlikely to be provided without the coercive intervention of the court.”).

[16] Father challenges certain findings as unsupported by the evidence. In reviewing the trial court's findings, an appellate court may disregard any erroneous finding as surplusage where the unchallenged findings provide ample support for the trial court's decision. Matter of T.F., 272 N.E.3d 1025, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025); In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In this case, it is generally undisputed that Child exhibited symptoms of severe depression—including suicidal ideation and self-harming behaviors—and was regularly receiving home-based therapy to help address these mental health concerns. The CHINS adjudication turned on the trial court's determination that a sudden transition to Father's care could “drastically negatively impact [Child's] mental health ․” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 187. This flowed from a determination that Child needed “therapy and interventions” as part of a transition period “to prevent [Child] from hurting herself or running away.” Id.

[17] As of the fact-finding hearing, Child was sixteen years old. The last time Child saw Father in person was before her third birthday. Therapist thought that “a lot of work ․ still needs to be done” to develop the parent-child relationship. Tr. Vol. II p. 64. Child was participating in therapeutically supervised visits with Father. However, Child was concerned that she would struggle with depression if she had to move to California and live away from Sister. Child testified that she might run away if required to immediately transition to living in California with Father. Multiple service providers were concerned that Child would run away if placed with Father without a transition period. In the months preceding the evidentiary hearing, Child received emergency services on two occasions due to suicidal thoughts. She had previously engaged in self-harm and was diagnosed with an eating disorder, which necessitated treatment. Although Father indicated that he would secure therapy for Child in California consistent with Therapist's recommendations, he independently questioned whether Child was in need of services related to suicidal ideation and self-harm.

[18] On appeal, Father emphasizes that there is a constitutional dimension to his parental rights; he claims the case involved improper burden shifting because he was “entitled to a presumption that he is a fit caretaker.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. In general, Father challenges the propriety of the CHINS adjudication in light of evidence indicating that he was a willing and able caretaker. Father directs us to evidence favorable to his position, including evidence indicating that he had a safe home and a stable income, wanted Child to live with him, and was willing to maintain some degree of therapy for Child in California. To the extent Father asks us to reweigh the evidence, we must decline. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578–78. We also note that “parental interests are not absolute.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2009). Rather, parental interests “must be subordinated to the child's interests” and rights are subject to termination when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. Id.

[19] Collectively, the unchallenged findings supported the trial court's order adjudicating Child a CHINS. Specifically, there was clear and convincing evidence that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously endangered due to Father's refusal to supply Child with necessary services—namely, a therapeutically supported transition period—before Child left foster care and moved to California. The trial court relied on evidence that Child struggled with substantial mental and emotional health issues and, as of the fact-finding hearing, had only a limited relationship with Father. The hearing included evidence that, to protect Child, it was necessary to arrange for a transition period to mitigate risk that Child would engage in dangerous behaviors, such as running away, if she were required to immediately move to California. Father was opposed to this type of transition period, claiming he would secure therapy for Child in California. But Father's plan was inconsistent with Child's needs, meaning that, without the court's coercive intervention, Father was unlikely to secure the services that Child needed to ensure a safe transition into his care.

[20] At times, Father argues that Mother thwarted his relationship with Child, resulting in the limited parental relationship. However, for over a decade, he failed to take action to compel his relationship with Child. At best, Father passively acquiesced to the situation and, therefore, contributed to the result, which was a minimal-to-nonexistent relationship with Child. He suggests the CHINS decision was improper because Mother, rather than Father, was neglectful and otherwise to blame. However, as earlier noted, the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect a child, not to punish a parent. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. In other words, a CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault. Id. at 103. Rather, it reflects that a child needs services and is unlikely to receive them without court intervention. Id. at 103, 106. In this case, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported the CHINS adjudication. We, therefore, affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate on appeal.

2.   Although Mother testified at the hearing, she did not examine witnesses or present argument.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.