Stephen Wooden Wieland, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Stephen Wieland was convicted, following a jury trial, of attempted murder stemming from an incident in which he shot his girlfriend in the head. Wieland appeals and asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in the manner it instructed the jury about inferring intent, claiming that the instruction given improperly included appellate sufficiency review language and relieved the State of its burden to prove specific intent.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In February 2023, Wieland and K.M. lived together in a duplex in Indianapolis and were the parents of one infant child, M.M. In addition, K.M. and Wieland each had a child from a prior relationship, both of whom were about age five at the time of the incident.

[4] On the evening of February 18, 2023, K.M., who was ten weeks pregnant, was at home with the three children, while Wieland was out drinking with friends. K.M. called Wieland several times between 9:20 to 10:30 p.m. but he did not answer; Wieland later called K.M. several times around 2:30 a.m., but those calls were unanswered as well. At 2:27 a.m., Wieland and K.M. began arguing through text messages. K.M. expressed her frustration about Wieland being “gone all hours through out [sic] the night,” and she told him that she was “tired of [him] being there for everyone but [his] own family[.]” Exhibit Vol. 1 at 114, 115. Among other things, Wieland replied “f*ck u” to K.M., told her that she “never listen[s]” and was “talk[ing] sh*t,” and told her that he was not going to come home because he did not want to argue with her. Id. at 111, 112, 115. Around the same time, Wieland texted his brother, stating that he was “dropping this b*tch[’s] car off” at the duplex and was going to walk somewhere. Id. at 123. K.M.’s last text to Wieland was at 2:59 a.m., which went unread.

[5] Lindsey and Josh (Neighbors), who lived in the other half of the duplex – and whose unit shared a bedroom wall with Wieland and K.M. – were awakened at 3:07 a.m. to the sounds of a male and female arguing. Shortly thereafter, Neighbors heard a gunshot. Immediately after hearing the shot, they heard the male, determined to be Wieland, saying “No, baby. No.” and then running down the hallway. Transcript Vol. 2 at 169, 173. Wieland had shot K.M. in the head.

[6] Neighbors then heard K.M.’s vehicle, which was identifiably loud and had been parked in front of the house, being driven away, and, a few minutes later, they heard Wieland back in the house. Josh heard Wieland say, in a “very panicked” voice, “Come on. We have to get out of here. Come on, baby. I have – we have to go to the hospital. I'm going to jail.” Id. at 174. Lindsey heard him state, “We have to go to the hospital. If we go to the hospital, I go to jail. The cops are coming.” Id. at 169.

[7] Meanwhile, Gabriel Sarfaty, who lived across the street and was outside in his yard, also heard the yelling and arguing between a male and female. Sarfaty saw Wieland exit the duplex and begin searching through a parked car, while “hollering” and appearing “pissed off.” Id. at 179-180. Sarfaty watched as Wieland appeared to find what he was looking for, kick the car door shut, and go back inside the residence. Sarfaty heard yelling again and saw Wieland look out of an upstairs window before shutting the blinds. Sarfaty then heard one to three gunshots.

[8] At 3:10 a.m., Wieland called 911 but the call did not connect. Less than a minute later, Wieland called 911 again and spoke to a dispatcher for over three minutes, stating that he had just arrived home and found his girlfriend bleeding. Wieland told the dispatcher that he did not know what happened to her and offered, “I think somebody broke in.” Exhibit Vol. 1 at 19 (CD of 911 call). About thirty seconds before the first 911 call, Wieland texted his brother, stating, “Bro hel”. Id. at 127 (verbatim).

[9] Police were dispatched, and upon their arrival at 3:21 a.m., Wieland's side of the duplex was dark. After several minutes, a child answered the door. Wieland, with blood on his face, hands, and shirt, was in the living room, along with another child. Based on information from Wieland, police conducted a protective sweep of the home but found only K.M. and M.M. upstairs in a bedroom. M.M. was unharmed but with blood splatter on her face. K.M., still conscious, was transported to the hospital.

[10] When officers returned downstairs, Wieland had removed his shirt. Wieland was described as “very nervous” and would not make eye contact with the officers. Transcript Vol. 2 at 200. Wieland initially told police that he “just found” K.M. upon arriving home and called 911. Id. at 242.

[11] While at the residence, officers found blood and a bullet fragment on the bed. On the bedroom floor, they found a 10-millimeter fired shell casing and Wieland's shattered phone. In the living room, officers noticed a magazine, later determined to contain live rounds, laying on top of contents in an open diaper bag. In the bag, officers discovered the 10-millimeter semi-automatic firearm used in the shooting, along with a fired cartridge casing.

[12] Neighbors reported to police at the scene that they heard K.M.’s loud car being driven away after hearing a gunshot, and police looked in the immediate area but did not find it. When a detective suggested to Wieland that doorbell cameras may have captured footage, Wieland admitted that he had moved the car and parked it about four houses away. Officers found the car key in Wieland's pocket, along with three live 10-millmeter bullets.

[13] On February 23, 2023, the State charged Wieland with six counts: Count I, Level 1 felony attempted murder; Count II, Level 3 felony aggravated battery; Count III, Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon; Count IV, Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman; Count V, Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, and Count VI, Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman. Before trial, the State dismissed Counts V and VI.

[14] In the incident, K.M. suffered a gunshot wound to her forehead and two gunshot wounds behind the ear, resulting in traumatic brain injury. When investigators interviewed K.M. approximately two months after the incident, she had difficulty forming words and maintaining a train of thought, and she could not remember the events of the night in question. Due to necessary medical treatment for her injuries, K.M.’s pregnancy had to be terminated. At some point prior to trial, Wieland admitted to shooting K.M. but maintained that the shooting was accidental.

[15] A two-day jury trial was held March 2025, at which the State presented the testimony of sixteen witnesses, including a firearms examiner with the Marion County Forensic Services Agency. He testified that the firearm in question was functioning properly and had three safety mechanisms that must be disengaged to pull the trigger and fire the gun: a thumb safety, a quarter cock, and a grip safety.

[16] K.M. testified but her ability to convey her words was impeded. She expressed that when Wieland got home on the night in question, she was upset at him for doing “whatever [he] want[ed]” and not being “a daddy [ ] with the kids” and that he then “probably started being mean” to her. Transcript Vol. 3 at 80, 82. As to what occurred next, she explained, “I just know that a gun to me.” Id. at 82 (verbatim). She did not remember going to the hospital.

[17] At trial, Wieland acknowledged that he shot K.M. but argued that he did not have the specific intent to kill her. The State tendered Final Instruction 7 (Instruction 7), which read:

Intent to kill can be found from acts, declarations, and the conduct of the defendant at or just immediately before the commission of the offense, from the character of the weapon used and from the part of the body on which the wound was inflicted.

Appendix Vol. III at 32.

[18] Wieland objected to the instruction for multiple reasons, arguing that it referred to an appellate standard of reviewing sufficiency of the evidence; guided the jury to particular parts of evidence; and “stands out from” the rest of the court's instructions because the other instructions were “very general in nature” while this one “talks about a narrow sliver of the evidence in this case.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 156. The court overruled Wieland's objection. Wieland requested that that “or after” language be added to Instruction 7, for it to read “immediately before or after the commission of the offense,” and the trial court granted the request. Id. at 162.

[19] The jury found Wieland guilty of all counts. Following conviction, the trial court vacated the convictions on Counts II, III, and IV on double jeopardy grounds, leaving only the attempted murder conviction. The trial court later sentenced Wieland to thirty-seven years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Wieland now appeals.

Standard of Review

[20] “The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Birk v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1090, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The manner of instructing a jury lies largely within the discretion of the trial court and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Id. For a trial court to have abused its discretion, “the instructions given must be erroneous, and the instructions taken as a whole must misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury.” Id. (quoting Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)).

[21] When reviewing a trial court's decision to give or refuse a tendered jury instruction, we consider: (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions which are given. Id.; Albert v. State, 193 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. We consider jury instructions not in isolation, but as a whole, with reference to each other. Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Error in a particular instruction will not result in reversal unless the entire jury charge misleads the jury as to the law in the case. Albert, 193 N.E.3d at 1042.

Discussion & Decision

[22] In Indiana, attempted murder requires proof of specific intent to kill. Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948, 949 (Ind. 1991). Wieland challenges Instruction 7 on inferring intent, which read in full:

Intent to kill can be found from acts, declarations, and the conduct of the defendant at or just immediately before or after the commission of the offense, from the character of the weapon used and from the part of the body on which the wound was inflicted.

Appendix Vol. III at 44 (emphasis added). Wieland contends that Instruction 7 improperly used appellate sufficiency-review language and relieved the State of its burden to prove specific intent to kill. Wieland argues that the instruction allowed the jury to convict “for ambiguous conduct evidence and mere proof that his use of a deadly weapon caused a gunshot wound to K.M.’s head” and “did not require the jury to find that he deliberately used the gun in a way calculated to cause K.M.’s death.” Appellant's Brief at 9-10.

[23] In Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. 1995), our Supreme Court addressed an instruction with almost the same language as Instruction 7. The language of the challenged instruction read: The intent to kill can be found from acts, declarations, and conduct of the defendant at or just immediately before the commission of the offense, from the character of the weapon used, and from the part of the body on which the wound was inflicted.¹ After noting that Barany had failed to object at trial, the Court recognized the instruction “is a correct statement of the law in Indiana.” Id. at 65. It explained, “We have repeatedly held that the intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon; the nature, duration, or brutality of the attack; and the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Id.

[24] Wieland acknowledges Barany but argues that “the Indiana Supreme Court has since moved away from allowing appellate sufficiency standards in jury instructions” because appellate review of a verdict differs from the jury's function in reaching one. Reply Brief at 4. In support, he refers us to our Supreme Court's observation in Keller v. State that language from an appellate case reviewing sufficiency of the evidence “will ‘rarely, if ever,’ be an appropriate basis for a jury instruction, because the determination is fundamentally different.” 47 N.E.3d 1205, 1209 (Ind. 2016) (holding that instruction in burglary trial defining “dwelling” was misleading and invaded province of jury where it identified a set of facts that would satisfy the statutory definition, thereby restricting the jury's discretion). While the general premise pronounced in Keller holds true, we find no instructional error here.

[25] In Birk, this court has recently addressed and rejected a challenge to an intent instruction, given over the defendant's objection, identical to that given in Barany: “Intent to kill can be found from acts, declarations, and the conduct of the defendant at or just immediately before the commission of the offense, from the character of the weapon used and from the part of the body on which the wound was inflicted.” 215 N.E.3d at 1097-98. Birk asked the trial court to amend the instruction to include “or after the commission of the alleged offense.” Id. The trial court denied the request.

[26] Birk argued on appeal that the instruction was confusing, misleading, and relieved the State of its burden of proof, as it “improperly confined the jury's consideration of evidence of intent to those acts and circumstances at or immediately preceding the shooting and excluded those acts or circumstances that occurred immediately after the shooting.” Id. at 1098. We affirmed, finding that “the given instruction was a correct statement of the law.” Id. (citing to Barany, 658 N.E.2d at 65); see also Cohen v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1168, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that the following jury instruction was a correct statement of law: “The intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon used in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death and from the nature, duration, or brutality of the attack. An intention to kill may also be found from acts, declarations, and conduct of the defendant's at or just immediately before the commission of the offense, and from noting the part of the body on which the wound was inflicted.”), trans. denied.

[27] Subsequent to Birk, in Hamilton v. State, 233 N.E.3d 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied, we reaffirmed the validity of Barany. In Hamilton, this court addressed an intent instruction in the context of an appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief. The instruction read, in part:

The intent to kill can be found from the acts, declaration and conduct of the Defendant at or just immediately before the commission of the offense and/or from the nature of the weapon used.

On appeal, the defendant asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for not making certain objections to the instruction.

[28] In finding no error, the Hamilton court recognized that both the Indiana Supreme Court in Barany and this court in Birk had determined that a jury instruction – substantially similar to the one being challenged in Hamilton – which instructed that intent “can be found” from acts/declaration/conduct and/or the nature of the weapon used “was a correct statement of the law.” Id. at 479. The Hamilton court noted that the instruction at issue did not emphasize particular evidence or invite the jury to consider less than all the evidence.

[29] We recognize that intent instructions that single out specific evidence or tell jurors how much weight to give certain evidence have been found to be improper. For instance, in McDowell v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (Ind. 2008), our Supreme Court reversed a voluntary manslaughter conviction where the jury was instructed that “intent to kill may be inferred from evidence that a mortal wound was inflicted upon an unarmed person with a deadly weapon in the hands of the accused,” finding that the instruction “expressly directed the jury that it could find the intent element proven merely by evidence that the mortal wound resulted from the defendant's use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed person” and operated to relieve the State from proving the requisite intent element.² And in McQuinn v. State, 197 N.E.3d 348, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), this court reversed attempted murder convictions where the jury was instructed that “[d]ischarging a weapon in the direction of a victim can be substantial evidence from which the jury could infer intent to kill,” finding that the instruction improperly derived from appellate sufficiency review and unduly emphasized a single evidentiary fact by characterizing it as “substantial,” thus invading the province of the jury.

[30] Unlike the problematic instructions in McQuinn and McDowell, Instruction 7 did not authorize a conviction based merely on the result of the actor's use of a deadly weapon, nor did the instruction assign weight to any specific fact. Rather, it invited the jury to consider a range of circumstances – including acts, declarations, conduct, before and after the offense.

[31] Further, the jury here was instructed to consider all of the instruction together and not “single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore others.” Appendix Vol. III at 7. And it received other instructions pertaining to intent, including that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wieland acted with specific intent to kill K.M., that a person engages in conduct “intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so, and that if a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, the State must prove it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct but also to cause the result. Id. at 15.

[32] In sum, we find that Instruction 7 was a proper statement of the law, did not relieve the State of its burden to prove specific intent, and did not mislead the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury.

[33] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Thus, the language of the Barany instruction was the same as Instruction 7 other than it did not include “and after,” as added by the trial court at Wieland's request.

2.   To the extent that Wieland argues that, as in McDowell, Instruction 7 “similarly states that intent to kill ‘can be found from’ the ‘weapon used’ and the ‘part of the body on which the wound was inflicted,’ ” Appellant's Brief at 17, this argument ignores the remainder of Instruction 7 pertaining to “acts, declarations, and the conduct of the defendant at or just immediately before or after the commission of the offense.” That is, Instruction 7 was broader and did not rely only on weapon type and wound location.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.