Amber Bentley, Appellant v. 21 1994 (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 1994, Robert Bentley executed the Robert L. Bentley Sr. Trust Dated September 21, 1994 (“the Trust”). The Trust provided income for life for Robert's wife, Mary Bentley, and contained several other provisions involving Robert's grandson, Brian Bentley, and Robert's great-grandchildren. In December of 2024, after Robert's only great-grandchild, Amber Bentley, had turned thirty, Greenfield Banking Company, the Successor Trustee of the Trust (“Trustee”),¹ filed a petition requesting clarification on the Trust's termination clause, which provided that the Trust would terminate when the last of Robert's great-grandchildren turned thirty. Brian, who is still alive, argued that it was Robert's intent that the Trust provide income to him for life.

[2] After the trial court entered its order agreeing with Brian, Amber filed a motion to intervene, to correct error, to reconsider, and for relief. The trial court held a hearing on these issues, granted Amber's motion to intervene, and denied Amber's remaining motions. Amber contends that the trial court erred in denying her motions. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In September of 1994, Robert Bentley executed the Trust, in which his property was held for the purposes of and in accordance with the Trust. At the time, Robert was married to Mary Carolyn Bentley. At the time the Trust was established, Robert named National City Bank of Indiana as Trustee. National City Bank was subsequently replaced by Greenfield Banking Company, who currently serves as Trustee.

[4] The Trust included the following relevant terms:

Income

(a) The income during his lifetime shall be paid to my wife, Mary Carolyn Bentley, quarterly or at such other times as my husband [(sic)] and Trustee agree.

(b) Upon the death of my wife the income of the trust shall be paid to my grandson, Brian Sims Bentley, if he survives my wife. The income shall be paid quarterly or at such other times as my grandson and Trustee agree.

(c) Upon the death of both my wife and my grandson the income shall be used for the support, maintenance, and education of the children of my grandson, Brian Sims Bentley.

[․]

Termination of Trust

This Trust shall terminate when the last of my great-grandchildren becomes thirty (30) years of age.

Distribution of Corpus

Upon the first of my great-grandchildren reaching 30 years of age my Trustee shall divide the principal and income of this Trust on hand into equal parts and each part shall be considered as a separate trust subject to the terms, conditions, remedies and uses of this trust.

Upon each of my great-grandchildren becoming 30 years of age my Trustee shall pay and distribute to each great-grandchild his or her portion of the principal and income in said trust at that time.

Emergencies

My Trustee is directed in its uncontrolled discretion to pay from either income or corpus for the benefit of my grandchild and great-grandchildren such amounts as may be required by reason of maintenance, education, illness or any other emergency. [․]

Funeral Expense:

The Trustee is further empowered, in its discretion, to pay the funeral and burial costs of any beneficiary of this Trust, who shall have been entitled to share in the income.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 20–22.

[5] Robert and Mary are now deceased. Brian is the only living grandchild of Robert and Mary. Brian had two children, twins Amber Bentley and Cody Austin Bentley. Cody passed away in 2017, leaving Amber as the only living great-grandchild of Robert and Mary.

[6] On December 4, 2024, Trustee filed a verified petition for instructions, requesting clarification on the Trust's termination clause after Amber turned thirty. Trustee requested that the trial court “issue instructions to clarify whether the Trust entitles Brian to receive income distributions from the Trust for the remainder of his lifetime or whether the Trust should now terminate and distribute its remaining assets to the Grantor's great-granddaughter, Amber, as she is now 30 years of age.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17.

[7] On December 5, 2024, the trial court ordered a hearing on the petition for March 3, 2025. The order was distributed to Brian, Amber, and Trustee's counsel. On February 28, 2025, Trustee moved for Amber to appear at the hearing remotely. The trial court denied the motion on March 3, 2025. At the hearing, Trustee's counsel argued that it was “more likely than not since Amber was a [․] month old at that time that this was created, that the intent was that at the time that she reached thirty that this or any other grandchildren reached thirty this should be terminated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 5. Brian testified to what he believed to be Robert's intent for the Trust.

[8] On March 14, 2025, the trial court issued its order (“Order”), finding that (1) the Trust “is interpreted to provide income of the trust for life to Brian” and (2) “[u]pon the death of Brian[,] the Trust shall terminate and the balance of the trust property shall be distributed to Amber[,] the Grantor's great granddaughter, as she is already the age of 30.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8.

[9] On April 14, 2025, Amber moved to intervene, to correct error, to reconsider, and for relief. In her motion, Amber argued that the trial court “should set aside the Order because the Order fails to instruct Trustee that the Trust is now terminated and shall distribute its remaining assets to Amber.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 36. Amber argued that the Trust's termination clause was “clear and unambiguous” in requiring immediate termination of the trust and was not conditioned on Brian's death. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 37. Amber argued that the terms of the trust did not render Brian a “life income beneficiary.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 36. Amber also argued that if the trial court concluded that there was an ambiguity in the Trust, the matter should be set for an additional hearing.

[10] Trustee responded to Amber's motion, in which it “reiterate[d] its belief that the Court must interpret the Trust based on the language in the trust document itself” and concluded, “if the Court is going to hear evidence from the beneficiaries to interpret the provisions of the Trust, the Petitioner believes this matter should be reset for hearing to permit all beneficiaries whose interests are affected to give testimony.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 47. Brian also responded to Amber's motion, arguing that in November of 2019, Trustee filed a petition to docket and amend the trust under another Cause Number 30C01-1911-TR-150, (“Cause No. 150”), and Brian and Amber joined the petition and signed a verified consent. Brian contended that it was “clear from the language used in the petition, consents and waivers, and the Agreed Trust Amendment there were ‘living beneficiaries’ and ‘remainder beneficiaries’ involved” in the Trust. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 61. Brian also argued that Amber was “not permitted to raise an argument for the first time in a motion to correct error[,]” that she did not need to “intervene” in the matter, and that her motion for relief under Trial Rule 60 was inapplicable. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 62.

[11] Brian further argued that Trustee “will not know when the ‘last’ great grandchild will reach 30 until after Brian passes away [because] Brian can always have more children, and he could also adopt one or more children resulting in an additional remainder beneficiary.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 63–64. Brian argued that the “Emergencies” and “Funeral Expense” sections of the Trust further supported his argument that the Trust did not terminate when Amber turned thirty years old.

[12] On June 16, 2025, Amber replied, arguing that the language of the Trust clearly and unambiguously required termination. Amber argued that the “Income” section of the Trust supported her argument, and that Brian's argument regarding having more children was unreasonable and contrary to common law. Amber argued that she had not received notice of the March 3rd hearing and had not had time to make travel arrangements upon learning about the hearing, Brian “should not have been allowed to testify about his opinion on Grantor's intent[,]” and “Brian cannot assail Amber for not responding to the Petition since he failed to respond and since there was no requirement for a response under the statute.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 76. Amber also filed an affidavit and two exhibits.

[13] On August 13, 2025, the trial court held another hearing on all pending issues. At the hearing, Trustee, Amber, and Brian were each represented by counsel. On August 25, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting Amber's motion to intervene but denied her remaining motions. The trial court determined that “it is not possible to know whether Amber is the youngest great grandchild to turn thirty until it is not possible for Brian Bentley to have any additional natural or adopted children under the age of thirty.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 94. Based on the Trust's language that the income of the Trust “shall be paid to [Brian] if he survives [Mary]” the trial court concluded that “[n]othing in this language restricts income distribution to [Brian] until his youngest child reaches thirty years of age.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 95.

[14] The trial court concluded that the Trust's language indicates that Robert “intended the income to be paid to his wife and grandson until their ‘death’.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 95. The trial court further concluded that the “Trust contains language which gives Trustee discretion, which only exists if the Trust does not terminate when [Amber] turns thirty years of age.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 96.

Discussion and Decision 2

[15] We generally review the trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. However, where the issue raised in the motion to correct is a question of law, the standard of review is de novo. Wilson v. Wilson, 181 N.E.3d 417, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). This case comes to us following the denial of Amber's motions to correct error, to reconsider, and for relief. Because the interpretation of trusts presents questions of law, our standard of review is de novo. Id. While Brian contends that Amber has waived all of her arguments by raising them for the first time in her motion to correct error, we choose to address the merits of this case.

[16] Amber argues that the trial court erred in determining that the Trust provided income to Brian for life and does not terminate until Brian's death.³

Our primary purpose in construing a trust instrument is to ascertain and give effect to the settlor's intention. We look at the trust as a whole and cannot take individual clauses out of context. If the trust is capable of clear and unambiguous construction, we must give effect to the trust's clear meaning. Finally, after interpreting the terms of the Trust, we must ensure that its application does not violate the Trust Code.

Fulp v. Gilliland, 998 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2013).

[17] Amber contends that Robert's intent to terminate the Trust when she turned thirty was “apparent” and the “language of the Trust, its Sub-Trust Clause, and its Termination Clause were clear and unambiguous.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. The “Sub-Trust” Clause which Amber refers to provides as follows:

Distribution of Corpus

Upon the first of my great-grandchildren reaching 30 years of age my Trustee shall divide the principal and income of this Trust on hand into equal parts and each part shall be considered as a separate trust subject to the terms, conditions, remedies and uses of this trust.

Upon each of my great-grandchildren becoming 30 years of age my Trustee shall pay and distribute to each great-grandchild his or her portion of the principal and income in said trust at that time.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21.

[18] The termination clause provides that the “Trust shall terminate when the last of my great-grandchildren becomes thirty (30) years of age.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. Amber contends that “[a]s there is no dispute that Amber was Robert's only living great-grandchild and she turned thirty (30) on August 18, 2024, the Trust required that her sub-trust be created, the Trust terminate its income and the principal be paid to her on August 18, 2024.” Appellant's Br. p. 15 (footnote omitted). Amber also contends that the plain and unambiguous language of the Trust shows that Robert did not intend to make Brian a lifetime income beneficiary of the Trust. Specifically, she argues that “[t]here is no language in the Trust to support the Trial Court's conclusion that the Trust provided income to Brian for life and would only terminate upon his death.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. She argues that “Robert conditioned multiple other provisions in the Trust on lifetime and death[,]” but did not do so in providing income to Brian in “Item I(b)[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 16.

[19] Item I(b) of the Trust provides, “Upon the death of my wife the income of the trust shall be paid to my grandson, Brian Sims Bentley, if he survives my wife. The income shall be paid quarterly or at such other times as my grandson and Trustee agree.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20. Brian points to Item I(c) for support for his argument that Robert contemplated a consistent distribution of the Trust income to Brian for life. We agree with Brian's assertion that giving the termination clause “superior effect” over the other terms of the Trust would contradict the other Trust provisions and the overall structure of the Trust. Appellee's Br. p. 19.

[20] Item I(c), provides that “[u]pon the death of both my wife and my grandson the income shall be used for the support, maintenance, and education of the children of my grandson, Brian Sims Bentley.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. Amber contends that this language indicates that Robert intended to “provide financially for Brian during the pendency of the Trust, and [․] put an end date on those entitlements by requiring the sub-trusts be created when the oldest great-grandchild turns thirty[.]” Appellant's Br. p 19. We disagree. The language in Item I(c) specifically requires the death of both Mary and Brian, indicating that Robert intended the Trust to continue to distribute income to Brian until his death. See In re Estate of Stayback, 38 N.E.3d 705, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (providing that “[i]t is well settled that the use of the term ‘life estate’ is not necessary to create a life estate where [․] the intention of the grantor to create a life estate is expressed by equivalent and appropriate language.”).

[21] Furthermore, the Trust provides that “Trustee is directed in its uncontrolled discretion to pay from either income or corpus for the benefit of my grandchild and great-grandchildren such amounts as may be required by reason of maintenance, education, illness or any other emergency[,]” and “to pay the funeral and burial costs of any beneficiary of this Trust, who shall have been entitled to share in the income.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 22. Amber's interpretation of the Trust would render these provisions of the Trust meaningless, as the Trust would be terminated before these expenses could be contemplated. Again, our primary purpose in construing the Trust is to “ascertain and give effect to” Robert's intention, and we do so by reading the Trust as a whole, not by taking individual clauses out of context. Fulp, 998 N.E.2d at 207. As such, we agree with Brian that construing the Trust to provide for him for life and then to terminate so long as the youngest great-grandchild has attained thirty years old harmonizes all of the provisions of the Trust at issue.

[22] When a trust instrument must be construed, we attempt to discern the settlor's intent in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the trust was executed. Malachowski v. Bank One, 590 N.E.2d 559, 566 (Ind. 1992). It appears that the Trust was executed approximately one month after Amber and her twin brother were born. Amber contends that Brian's argument that he could have more children was meritless and argues that “[t]here was and is also certainly no reason to wait until the day Brian passes away to achieve complete certainty as that could delay Amber's entitlement to her sub-trust distribution for another ten, twenty, or even thirty or more years.” Appellant's Br. p. 18.

[23] Brian argues that, at the time the Trust was executed, Robert “likely expected his grandson to have more children[.]” Appellee's Br. p. 18. Judging by the language of the Trust and the circumstances existing at the time the Trust was executed, we agree with Brian's assessment. At the time Robert executed the Trust, Amber and her twin were one month old. The Trust refers to the “first” and the “last” of Robert's great-grandchildren, which would have been unnecessary had Robert anticipated that only Amber and her twin, presumably born on the same date, would be beneficiaries. Again, reading the Trust as a whole, without taking the Termination Clause out of context, the purpose of the Trust, and Robert's intent, appears to be to provide for Brian for his life. The trial court's order interpreting the Trust accordingly, therefore, was not in error.⁴

[24] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Trustee does not participate in this appeal.

3.   Amber also argues that the trial court should not have allowed Brian to testify about his opinion on Robert's intent at the first hearing. However, given that Amber also agrees that “this error does not appear to have impacted the Instruction Order or the Motion to Correct Error Order,” Appellant's Br. p. 20, we conclude that any error in allowing Brian to testify was harmless. See B.N. v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 199 N.E.3d 360, 365 (Ind. 2022).

4.   Brian also argues that Amber agreed in Cause No. 150 that he was a “lifetime beneficiary.” Appellee's Br. p. 15. Because we conclude that the trial court's denial of Amber's motion to correct error was not in error, we need not decide this question.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur