H.H., Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] H.H. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor child, K.H. (Child).¹ Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Mother has six other prior born children and an extensive history with the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS). Three of those children sustained injuries as infants while still in Mother's custody, and her parental rights to all six have been terminated at various times, some involuntarily and others voluntarily.

[4] Mother's first child, N.H., suffered fractures to his ribs at only a few months old in early 2018. Mother lived in Illinois at the time, and the child welfare system there became involved. Mother's sister obtained a legal guardianship over N.H. and later adopted him.

[5] DCS became involved in October 2019, after Mother's second child, P.T., at the age of five months, sustained significant head trauma while in Mother's care. P.T. was removed from her care, placed with his paternal aunt, and adjudicated a child in need of services (CHINS). Despite services, Mother was unable to demonstrate an ability to safely care for P.T. and to reunify. After a termination petition was filed, Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to P.T. in March 2021. Mother was also criminally charged in January 2021 with neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony, based on the injuries sustained by P.T. She later pleaded guilty to that charge and, after failed attempts in the Mental Health Court Program, she was sentenced in July 2023 to 365 days in jail followed by 365 days on home detention.

[6] In the meantime, Mother had a third child, J.T., in June 2020. Shortly thereafter, the same paternal aunt took custody of J.T., initially through a legal guardianship and then through adoption. Ki.H., a fourth child, was born to Mother in July 2021 and removed by DCS the next day. Ki.H.’s CHINS case was closed due to the establishment of a guardianship. Ki.H. was eventually adopted by the same paternal aunt as P.T. and J.T.

[7] In November 2022, Mother next gave birth to twin girls, A.H. and E.H. (the Twins). DCS became involved the next month, after a report was made that Mother had threatened to kill herself and that there was domestic violence in the home. In January 2023, DCS opened an informal adjustment to address concerns with Mother's mental health, inconsistent housing, deficient parenting, and unstable relationships.

[8] The informal adjustment ended unsuccessfully in March 2023, after an incident of domestic violence in the home between Mother and her then partner and the discovery of injuries to A.H. The DCS family case manager (FCM) expressed concerns that A.H. displayed symptoms consistent with being shaken, and a subsequent examination at the hospital showed that A.H. had both new and healing rib fractures. The Twins were removed from Mother's care and then adjudicated CHINS in May 2023. Mother was also criminally charged in May 2023 with neglect of a dependent resulting in injuries, a Level 5 felony, relating to A.H.’s injuries.²

[9] While the CHINS cases involving the Twins, which had moved toward termination of parental rights, and the criminal case remained pending, Mother gave birth to Child on August 21, 2024. The next day, DCS received a report detailing concerns by hospital staff for Child's safety due to “Mother's emotional instability and her aggressive behaviors towards [Child] following childbirth.” Appendix Vol. 2 at 89. DCS removed Child from Mother's custody on August 23, and Child was adjudicated a CHINS on October 16, 2024. The day before that adjudication, Mother's parental rights with respect to the Twins were involuntarily terminated.

[10] At the dispositional hearing in December 2024 for Child's CHINS case, the trial court ordered Mother to comply with certain obligations and services to reunify with Child. Mother was ordered to, among other things: attend all scheduled visits with Child; meet all personal and mental health needs; maintain suitable and stable housing; complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations; and enroll and participate in any programs recommended by the FCM, such as home based case management. These services and expectations largely mirrored those ordered by the trial court in the CHINS cases involving the Twins.

[11] At the time of Child's removal by DCS, Mother had already had fifteen months of services offered in the Twins’ CHINS cases. She was never reunified with the Twins, having “failed to address the issues that made maintaining the parent-child relationship unsafe and untenable for [them].” Id. at 90. In terminating Mother's parental rights to the Twins in October 2024, the trial court found that Mother continued to exhibit chronic housing instability and failed to demonstrate an ability to supervise the Twins consistently and safely, with visitation facilitators needing to intervene multiple times at every visit. Following termination of Mother's rights as to the Twins, services remained in place for Mother to “continue addressing ongoing issues with child safety, mental health, parenting, housing, and overall stability in the context of [Child's] CHINS matter.” Id.

[12] Mother completed a parenting assessment in November 2024, which resulted in the following specific recommendations:

1. Follow all court orders and treatment recommendations.

2. Continue to participate in ongoing individual therapy services. Therapy services should include but not be limited to: stress in relation to the parenting role, healthy relationships, childhood trauma, to learn coping skills for PTSD symptoms, as well as whatever other goals are deemed necessary.

3. Home-based case management to assist her in obtaining and maintaining stable housing, as well as assistance in running said household.

4. Parenting time should remain fully supervised.

5. Demonstrate an understanding of, and follow through on all medical, educational, and recommendations for the care of herself and her children.

Exhibits Vol. 3 at 7.

[13] Throughout Child's CHINS case, “housing and relationships remained persistent issues that [Mother] never resolved.” Appendix Vol. 2 at 90. Between October 2024 and October 2025, she resided in multiple locations with different people, lived in a hotel or her car at times, and never obtained her own independent housing. She regularly depended on unstable relationships with others to sustain her housing needs. And there were safety issues and domestic violence in some of the homes where she stayed. After an incident of domestic violence in July 2025, FCM Macey Cox attempted to help Mother establish herself in a shelter while home based case management services could work with her in finding independent, long-term housing, but Mother refused. Instead, she relied on a new friend, Taylor Nice, to pay for Mother to stay in a hotel.

[14] On August 8, 2025, DCS filed the instant petition to terminate Mother's parental rights with respect to Child. By the time of the termination factfinding hearing on October 27, 2025, Mother was living in a trailer with Nice. Mother was not on the lease but rather relying on the goodwill of Nice. Further, their relationship had come under stress, as Nice had a boyfriend, Matthew Melton, who stayed there at times. Melton drank heavily in the home and on at least one occasion struck Nice while intoxicated. Melton also faced warrants for open criminal matters involving burglary and leaving the scene of an accident, and before turning himself in, Nice had Melton over to “get drunk one last time.” Id. at 92. The relationship between Mother and Nice became strained over these issues and “recently deteriorated to the point that [ ] Nice threatened to leave [Mother] to deal with the residence and its bills on her own.” Id.

[15] Despite the “substantial issues implicating the home's stability for [Mother], and the overall safety of any young child in such a residence,” Mother testified that her plan was to work on becoming a co-lessee of the trailer while she and Nice worked through their issues. Id. at 93. That is, at the time of the termination hearing, “[Mother] ha[d] not begun working with service providers to pursue her own housing, and she ha[d] not prioritized creating a stable home environment for [Child] that is free from substance abuse, deleterious characters, domestic violence, and general instability.” Id.

[16] Mother had previously participated in home based case management services in the Twins’ cases to assist her with a variety of issues, including parenting education, employment, budgeting, and housing. But she “did not put in the independent work necessary for the service[s] to make a substantial difference in stabilizing her life” and she continued to experience the same instability in housing, parenting, and independence in this case. Id. Further, early in Child's CHINS case, Mother opted to stop participating in home based case management altogether notwithstanding multiple providers expressing to her the critical nature of these services. Mother “repeatedly insisted that she did not need or want the service[s]” and only “half-heartedly acquiesced” to starting back up with these services right before the termination hearing. Id. at 93, 94. The trial court found that Mother's “very recent acceptance” of these services did not “encourage or convince [the court] that she has now turned a new leaf and is now ready to work diligently on the core issues of parenting, housing, and stability.” Id. at 94.

[17] During visits with Child, Mother struggled to ensure Child's safety and overall well-being, and she was never able to progress to unsupervised or even semi-supervised visits. Bianca Shindledecker, the current visit facilitator, testified that visits had not been going very well and that Mother was not attentive to Child's safety. For example, Shindledecker testified that Mother would regularly walk out of the room without Child and that Child had experienced choking incidents during visits.³ In the weeks leading up to the termination hearing, Mother still required multiple safety prompts per visit. As summarized by the trial court, “[Mother] remain[ed] unable to independently identify threats to [Child's] safety in her current home, and she repeatedly place[d] [him] in significant danger even while closely watched by parenting professionals.” Appendix Vol. 2 at 94.

[18] Mother also continued to struggle with effectively stabilizing her mental health during Child's CHINS case. She has been diagnosed with PTSD, anxiety, persistent depressive disorder, and borderline personality disorder. FCM Elizabeth Sparks, who was involved in the Twins’ cases, as well as Child's case through July 2025, testified that Mother's mental health was “a major contributor to her lack of progress” in all three cases. Transcript at 35. Mother was consistent with medical management but “often times inconsistent with her therapist,” which was vital to maintaining her mental health. Id. FCM Sparks testified that Mother was not very consistent in her ability to self-regulate her emotions and anger.

[19] Further, in the weeks leading up to the termination hearing, Mother was still experiencing mental health crises causing her to cancel visits with Child. FCM Cox reported that Mother had canceled three out of eight visits in October 2025, Mother was “kind of hit or miss” with therapy, and she appeared to have made no progress regulating her emotions or obtaining mental health stability. Id. at 50. The week prior to the hearing, by Mother's own account, she canceled a visit because she was experiencing a serious mental health crisis and was close to “going and admitting” herself.⁴ Id. at 17-18.

[20] At the time of the termination hearing, Mother remained unable to “demonstrate a healthy temperament and stable mental faculties” or to “describe with any clarity what she would do if she experience[d] another mental health episode while acting as the sole caregiver for [Child].” Appendix Vol. 2 at 97.

[21] In its termination order issued November 17, 2025, the trial court entered detailed findings of fact, consistent with the facts set out above, and then summarized Mother's progress, or lack thereof, as follows:

After multiple CHINS interventions over multiple years, [Mother] remains caught in the same patterns and faces the same problems that have prevented reunification with any of her children. She has made little to no progress in developing safe parenting, suitable and stable housing, mature relationships, or healthy emotional regulation. Stability continues to elude her.

Id. at 97. The trial court also made extensive conclusions, many of which further summarized the facts presented at the hearing.

[22] Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to Child. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review

[23] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and thus we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[24] Our review for clear error is confined to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours). Further, we must accept any unchallenged findings as true.⁵ See Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

Discussion & Decision

[25] Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In re J.W., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[26] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the existence of one or more of the circumstances described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (Subsection (d)); (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and (3) termination is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c); Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[27] On appeal, Mother challenges only the trial court's determinations regarding Subsection (d). That is, she does not challenge the determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of Child or that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment.

[28] Subsection (d) contains thirteen circumstances supporting termination, of which the following two were alleged by DCS:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d). The trial court found both circumstances to have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. If we affirm one of these, we need not address the other. See J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1047 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[29] Thus, we turn to Mother's contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied. In making such a determination, a trial court engages in a two-step analysis: (1) ascertaining what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home and (2) determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. The latter step requires the trial court to “judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1045 (quoting In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied).

In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through DCS. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.

Id. (brackets omitted). Further, it is within the trial court's discretion to disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and to weigh more heavily the parent's history of conduct prior to those efforts. P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799.

[30] The trial court explained its determination regarding the likelihood of Mother remedying the conditions:

47. The Court finds that there is now a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal and the reasons for his placement outside the home of the parent will not be remedied. At the start of this CHINS case, [Mother] already faced ongoing court intervention with regard to her two older daughters for her failure to provide them with physical safety and a stable home. [A.H.] sustained dangerous injuries while under [Mother's] care. By the time [Child] was removed, [Mother] had already received extensive services aimed at remedying the reasons why it remained unsafe for young children to be under her direct supervision. The present CHINS case began while [Mother's] ability to ensure the safety of any child left in her care long term remained in serious doubt.

48. As [Child's] case began and progressed, [Mother] remained unwilling to work diligently with DCS and its providers towards consistent safe parenting. She remained unwilling to implement real change in her parenting techniques and unable to demonstrate any understanding of child safety in real time during her joint visits with all three of her removed children. Even after her rights to her older daughters were terminated, and the visits involved only [Child], [Mother] still struggles to focus her attention and energy on [Child's] safety and well-being during her time with him. As a result, [Child] has been repeatedly placed in harm's way by [Mother] and her inability to safely supervise her young child. Throughout [Child's] underlying CHINS case, it was too often necessary that visit facilitators, FCM Cox, and other team members intervened during Mother's visits to stop a pending disaster or to literally save [Child] from his Mother's inaction, disinterest, or inattentiveness.

49. Prior to [Child's] birth, Mother lived a transient lifestyle, bouncing from location to location, and she did little to stabilize her own living situations for the sake of her older daughters. After [Child's] birth, [Mother's] housing arrangements remained similarly inconsistent and unstable. Throughout [this] case, [Mother] never acquired her own home, instead preferring to live in total reliance on other people in her orbit to provide her with a place to stay. As a result, [she] has never shown an ability to maintain consistent housing conducive to reunification with her children, including [Child]. In fact, [Mother's] willingness to resolve her housing instability seems to have ebbed since [Child's] birth. Over the past year, [Mother] repeatedly refused the very services meant to aid her in acquiring her own residence. She instead followed the same well-trodden path in her previous cases, a path that has led her to the same, predictable outcomes: homelessness and housing instability.

50. Today, [Mother] finds herself living in a tenuous situation in a home owned and controlled by another person. She lacks control over the individuals and activities brought into her home. Her roommate has allowed deleterious characters, substance abuse, and physical violence into the same residence that [Mother] hopes to bring [Child] into permanently. While Ms. Nice remains in control of the home itself, [Mother's] current friction with this roommate puts her long-term status in this particular residence in doubt. As of today, [Mother] has chosen not to engage in the hard work necessary to stabilize her life and to acquire independent housing that would provide [Child] with a safe and loving home.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 98-100. In the threat context, the trial court observed that Mother had not shown “consistent progress through her services towards achieving the stability in her mental health, safety in her home environment, or maturity in her relationships that will allow her to prioritize [Child's] needs moving forward.” Id. at 100.

[31] Mother's challenge on appeal is short. Noting that there were no allegations that she had physically abused Child, Mother claims that she is “seemingly being punished for other cases involving other children.” Appellant's Brief at 10. Further, she directs us to her own testimony that allegedly showed “she has adapted well to [Child] during visitations and feeds him, supervises him while he plays and gets him ready for his naps.” Id. She also notes one favorable visitation report from February 2025. Finally, Mother complains: “The termination order spends a significant amount of time addressing [Mother's] past cases as well as the boyfriend of Nice. None of those things are reasons [Child] was removed from [Mother's] care.” Id. at 11.

[32] We reject Mother's invitation to reweigh the evidence regarding how visits have gone or the stability of her living situation. Further, contrary to her assertions on appeal, Mother is not being punished for her past cases involving neglect of her other children. But those cases are relevant because they show a steady history of instability and inability to safely parent. See Matter of D.G., 702 N.E.2d 777, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that evidence regarding a previous termination of parental rights is admissible character evidence in a subsequent termination proceeding). For two and one-half years leading up to the termination hearing, DCS had been consistently offering Mother services meant to help stabilize her life and create a safe home for the Twins and/or Child. Mother did not take full advantage of these services and thus failed to make significant progress toward maintaining housing or mental health stability or improving her parenting abilities, particularly her ability to keep a young child safe. At the time of the hearing, she was in no better position to parent and care for Child than when he was removed.

[33] Mother has failed to establish clear error regarding the trial court's conclusion that the conditions keeping Child out of Mother's home were unlikely to be remedied. Accordingly, we affirm the termination order.

[34] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   D.T. (Father) voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and thus does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother pleaded guilty just before the termination hearing in Child's case but was still awaiting sentencing.

3.   On one occasion, Child began choking on a ball of lint and hair, requiring intervention by Shindledecker, as Mother “appeared unconcerned and unaware of what steps she needed to take[.]” Id. at 95. Another time, Mother provided Child with an ice cube and rebuffed safety warnings from Shindledecker that such was a choking hazard. Thereafter, at a child and family team meeting in September 2025, Mother provided Child with a large chunk of cantaloupe, which he choked on. Although Mother completed an online CPR course a week before the termination hearing, Mother could not testify as to the proper procedure to do CPR on a one-year-old child. She responded, “I honestly can't tell you right now. I forget.” Transcript at 72.

4.   Mother had a similar incident in August 2025 where she canceled a visit and expressed a desire to admit herself for in-patient treatment due to mental health issues.

5.   Mother does not directly challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.