Marquiz J. Vaughn, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After a violent attack on a stranger, Marquiz Vaughn was convicted of attempted rape, a Level 3 felony; criminal confinement, a Level 4 felony; battery, a Level 6 felony; and theft, a Class A misdemeanor. Vaughn appeals and argues that his convictions for attempted rape and criminal confinement violate the prohibition on substantive double jeopardy and that his twenty-year sentence is inappropriate. We conclude that Vaughn's convictions for both attempted rape and criminal confinement violate substantive double jeopardy as outlined by our Supreme Court, and we, therefore, need not address Vaughn's argument that his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm Vaughn's convictions for attempted rape, battery, and theft, reverse his conviction for criminal confinement, and remand for the trial court to vacate Vaughn's conviction for criminal confinement and resentence Vaughn.

Issue

[2] Vaughn raises two issues, but we address only the following dispositive issue: whether Vaughn's convictions for both attempted rape and criminal confinement violate the prohibition against substantive double jeopardy.

Facts

[3] In 2022, M.J. was living in Elkhart with her sisters, stepmother, and nieces. M.J. and her sister worked at a nearby McDonald's and often walked to the restaurant. Vaughn repeatedly followed M.J., yelled at her, and asked her if she needed money. M.J. would ignore Vaughn and continue walking. M.J. moved to Michigan in 2023, but she later returned to Elkhart and lived with her family again.

[4] In 2024, Vaughn began following M.J. again. In the summer of 2024, Vaughn was following M.J. as she walked home and forcefully hit her buttocks. M.J. took a photograph of Vaughn, and Vaughn unsuccessfully tried to take her phone. Vaughn then followed M.J. home, and M.J. warned her family of Vaughn's behavior.

[5] On the evening of September 3, 2024, M.J. decided to walk to McDonald's to get food while her sister was working. On her way home, Vaughn started following M.J. In a parking lot, Vaughn grabbed M.J. from behind, knocked her phone out of her hand, and started hitting her. M.J. fell to the ground, and Vaughn grabbed her arm and dragged her across the ground a couple of feet to a cupcake store. M.J. fought back and screamed, and Vaughn covered M.J.’s mouth with his hand. Vaughn held M.J. down and hit her on the head. Vaughn then pulled down M.J.’s pants and underwear. Vaughn unbuckled his belt and was attempting to take his pants down when Jerry Bottorff interrupted the assault.

[6] Bottorff was homeless and sheltering in a nearby recycling bin when he heard a woman screaming in distress. Bottorff left the recycling bin and found Vaughn standing over M.J. Vaughn punched M.J. on her right eye, and Bottorff confronted Vaughn. Vaughn then picked up M.J.’s phone and walked away. Bottorff assisted M.J. and went to McDonald's to ask M.J.’s sister for help. M.J.’s sister then walked M.J. home. The next morning, M.J. went to the hospital for treatment. M.J. had a “goose egg” knot on her head, bruising to her face, a headache, and scrapes on her forearm and buttocks. Tr. Vol. II p. 186.

[7] On November 4, 2024, the State charged Vaughn with attempted rape, a Level 3 felony; criminal confinement, a Level 4 felony; battery, a Level 6 felony; and theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The charging information for attempted rape provided:

[Vaughn] did attempt to commit the crime of Rape, that is to knowingly have sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with [M.J.], when such person was compelled by force or the imminent threat of force, and [Vaughn] did engage in conduct which constituted a substantial step toward the commission of said Rape[.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 13. The charging information for criminal confinement provided: “[Vaughn] did knowingly confine [M.J.], without the consent of Victim l, and with said act resulting in moderate bodily injury to Victim 1, to wit: substantial pain[.]” Id.

[8] A jury found Vaughn guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Vaughn as follows: sixteen years for attempted rape; four years for criminal confinement to be served consecutive to the sentence for attempted rape; two years for battery to be served concurrent with the other sentences; and one year for theft to be served concurrent with the other sentences, for an aggregate sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. Vaughn now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Vaughn claims that his convictions for attempted rape and criminal confinement constitute double jeopardy under Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), and A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024). Whether multiple convictions constitute double jeopardy is a question of law that we review de novo. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1064. Our Supreme Court has identified two types of double jeopardy: the first type occurs where “a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims,” and Wadle governs such claims. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247. The second type occurs when “a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but harms multiple victims,” and Powell governs such claims. Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 263 (Ind. 2020). Vaughn's double jeopardy claim implicates Wadle.

[10] Under the three-step Wadle test, we first determine whether the statutes at issue clearly permit “multiple punishment, whether expressly or by unmistakable implication[.]” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 253. Unless the statutes so permit, we proceed to the second step, which asks whether the offenses are included, “either inherently or as charged[.]” Id. If the offenses are not included, there is no double jeopardy violation. But if the offenses are included, we proceed to the third and final step, in which we “examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial.” Id. If the facts demonstrate that the defendant's actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction,” we will find that the defendant's convictions constitute double jeopardy. Id.

Wadle Step 1

[11] Applying the first step of the Wadle test, the parties concede that neither the attempted rape statute nor the criminal confinement statute clearly permits multiple punishment. We, therefore, proceed to the second step of the Wadle test.

Wadle Step 2

[12] Under Wadle step two, we determine whether the two offenses for which the defendant was convicted constitute included offenses. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. Included offenses come in two varieties: (1) “inherently” included offenses; and (2) offenses that are included “as charged” or “factually included.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067. Offenses are included “as charged” when “the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.” Id. In A.W., our Supreme Court clarified Wadle’s “perhaps misunderstood directions, while adding a modification at Step 2.” Specifically, A.W. held that:

[W]here ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another, courts must construe those ambiguities in the defendant's favor, and thus find a presumptive double jeopardy violation at Step 2. In this event, the State can later rebut this presumption at Step 3.

229 N.E.3d at 1069.

[13] The State concedes that the charging informations are ambiguous “as to whether the criminal confinement is an included offense of the attempted rape.” Appellee's Br. p. 18; see, e.g., Zamilpa v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1079, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“While the rape statute does not explicitly recite confinement as an element of the offense, the act of forcible rape necessarily entails some degree of confinement.”) (citing Griffin v. State, 583 N.E.2d 191, 194-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“If a person is forcibly raped, or raped by the threat of force—the element of force—whether actual, threatened, or constructive, constitutes the crime of confinement defined as a substantial interference with a person's liberty.”)). Accordingly, we proceed to Step 3.

Wadle Step 3

[14] At the third step of the Wadle analysis, the State bears the burden of rebutting the presumptive double jeopardy violation by using the facts presented at trial to demonstrate a “distinction between what would otherwise be two of the ‘same’ offenses.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 n.27). We “probe the underlying facts—as presented in the charging instrument and adduced at trial—to determine whether a defendant's actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’ ” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). “If the underlying facts reveal the two offenses are indeed ‘separate,’ ” there is no double jeopardy violation. Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). If, however, the “facts show only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other,” the multiple convictions constitute double jeopardy. Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249).

[15] The State argues that Vaughn's criminal confinement of M.J. was complete before he attempted to rape her. The evidence adduced at trial, however, demonstrated that Vaughn's actions occurred in a short amount of time, in the same place, and amounted to one single, continuous incident. The evidence showed that Vaughn grabbed M.J. from behind, knocked her phone out of her hand, and started hitting her. M.J. fell to the ground, and Vaughn dragged her a couple of feet by her arm. Vaughn covered M.J.’s mouth, held her down, and hit her on the head. Vaughn then pulled down M.J.’s pants and underwear and attempted to take his own pants down before he was interrupted by Bottorff. Further, during closing arguments, the State did not differentiate between the force necessary to effectuate the attempted rape and the criminal confinement. See Tr. Vol. III pp. 156, 171.

[16] Because Vaughn's acts constituted a single continuous transaction, we conclude that, pursuant to Wadle and A.W., Vaughn's convictions for both attempted rape and criminal confinement constitute a substantive double jeopardy violation. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 276 N.E.3d 675, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (“The facts presented at trial—and as summarized by the State in closing—do not demonstrate a distinction between the rape and criminal confinement charges.”); Zamilpa, 229 N.E.3d at 1086 (“Because neither the charging information nor the way the State presented the charges to the jury differentiated between the force Zamilpa used in raping C.M. and the additional degree of force meant to support the criminal confinement conviction, we hold the trial court erred in entering convictions of both rape and criminal confinement.”). Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to vacate Vaughn's criminal confinement conviction. Because the sentence for criminal confinement was consecutive to the sentence for attempted rape, we also remand for the trial court to resentence Vaughn.¹

Conclusion

[17] Given our Supreme Court's decisions in Wadle and A.W., we must conclude that Vaughn's convictions for attempted rape and criminal confinement violate the prohibition against substantive double jeopardy. Accordingly, we affirm Vaughn's convictions for attempted rape, battery, and theft; reverse his conviction for criminal confinement; and remand for the trial court to vacate Vaughn's conviction for criminal confinement and resentence Vaughn.

[18] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because we vacate Vaughn's conviction for criminal confinement and remand for resentencing, we need not address Vaughn's argument that his sentence is inappropriate.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.