Norman Lee Craft, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Norman Craft was convicted of Level 6 felony attempted battery on a public safety official, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class A misdemeanor cruelty to an animal, his appellate counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Appellate counsel's subsequent request for permission to file a belated notice of appeal was denied by the trial court. The State concedes, and we agree, that Craft had been diligent in expressing his desire to appeal and was not at fault for his appellate counsel's failure to timely initiate a direct appeal on his behalf. Consequently, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Craft permission to file a belated notice of appeal pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 18, 2023, Vermillion County Sheriff's Deputy Keith Warner received a report that Craft “had hanged one of his three dogs in the garage[ ]” of his residence in Cayuga. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23. When Deputy Warner and Reserve Town Marshal Roger Lewis arrived at Craft's residence, Officer Warner observed a deceased “dog hanging from a leash on the garage door rail.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23. Craft “was sitting at the kitchen table and yelling at Marshal Lewis” that he was angry about having previously received a citation from another officer “for [his] dogs running loose in the area.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 23, 24. Craft “became aggressive and noncompliant[,]” attempted to batter Deputy Warner, and resisted arrest. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. The State charged Craft with Level 6 felony torturing/mutilating a vertebrate animal, Level 6 felony attempted battery on a public safety official, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class A misdemeanor cruelty to an animal.

[3] Trial commenced in October of 2025, at the conclusion of which the jury found Craft guilty of Level 6 felony attempted battery on a public safety official, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class A misdemeanor cruelty to an animal, but not guilty of Level 6 felony torturing/mutilating a vertebrate animal. On November 26, 2025, the trial court sentenced Craft to an aggregate 1275-day sentence. The trial court advised Craft of his right to appeal, and Craft indicated that he “wishe[d] to appeal[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 93. Appellate counsel was appointed on December 5, 2025, and the trial court confirmed that appointment on December 8, 2025.

[4] Appellate counsel did not file a timely notice of appeal. In February of 2026, Craft, by appellate counsel, petitioned for permission to file a belated notice of appeal. In the petition, appellate counsel admitted that “[c]andidly, this appeal fell through the cracks through no fault of” Craft. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 103. The trial court summarily denied Craft's petition.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Generally, “[t]he decision whether to grant permission to file a belated notice of appeal is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and therefore faces abuse of discretion review.” Leshore v. State, 203 N.E.3d 474, 477 (Ind. 2023) (quotation omitted). “But when, as here, the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion to file a belated notice of appeal, we are reviewing the same information available to the trial court, so we review these unique petitions de novo.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We therefore afford no deference to the trial court's determination.” Id.

[6] Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(a) provides that

An eligible defendant convicted after a trial or plea of guilty may petition the trial court for permission to file a belated notice of appeal of the conviction or sentence if;

(1) the defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal;

(2) the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not due to the fault of the defendant; and

(3) the defendant has been diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal under this rule.

“Under this Rule, the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was without fault in the delay of filing and was diligent in pursuing permission to file a belated motion to appeal.” Leshore, 203 N.E.3d at 477 (quotations and brackets omitted).

These inquiries are fact-sensitive because there is substantial room for debate as to what constitutes diligence and lack of fault on the part of the defendant. And since each case is shaped by its own circumstances, there are no assigned standards of fault or diligence. Instead, courts examine a range of factors, including the defendant's level of awareness of his procedural remedy, age, education, familiarity with the legal system, whether the defendant was informed of his appellate rights, and whether he committed an act or omission which contributed to the delay.

Id. (internal quotations and brackets omitted).

[7] Applying Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(a) to the instant case, the State notes that “[t]he passage of time here was 48 days between when the notice of appeal was due, and the petition [to file a belated appeal] was filed[.]” Appellee's Br. p. 9. The State further notes that “[n]othing in the record indicates that [Craft] himself was aware of the delay in taking any action[.]” Appellee's Br. p. 9. Thus, the State agrees with Craft that “the delay was attributable to appellate counsel, who was duly appointed to represent him.” Appellee's Br. p. 9.

[8] The State contends that we “should reverse the denial of [Craft's] petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal.” Appellee's Br. p. 9. We agree. Because Craft had been diligent in expressing his desire to appeal and was not at fault for the failure to initiate a timely appeal—with fault being solely attributable to appellate counsel—the trial court erred in denying Craft's request for permission to file a belated notice of appeal. See generally Russell v. State, 970 N.E.2d 156, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding no error in the trial court's decision to allow the defendant to file a belated notice of appeal when the fault for defendant's failure to timely initiate an appeal was attributable to the public defender's office, rather than to defendant, after defendant had indicated a desire to appeal and the trial court had appointed the public defender's office), trans. denied; Williams v. State, 873 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (denying the State's request to dismiss the defendant's appeal as untimely because defendant was not at fault for the failure to file a timely notice of appeal when defendant had indicated a desire to appeal and the trial court had appointed counsel, but counsel failed to timely initiate an appeal).

[9] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and we remand with instructions to grant Craft permission to file a belated notice of appeal.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.