R.P. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Kids’ Voice of Indiana Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] R.P. (Father) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to H.B. (Child). Father asserts two issues on appeal, which we restate as: (1) whether the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Child; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to terminate his parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and A.B. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) are the parents of Child, born in December 2022.¹ Child was born exposed to fentanyl and placed in intensive care to treat withdrawal symptoms. At the time of Child's birth, Father was incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC).

[3] On December 15, 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) because Child was exposed to drugs at birth, Mother failed to provide a home free of substance abuse, Father had not demonstrated an ability or willingness to appropriately parent Child due to his incarceration, and Parents had a history of domestic violence. DCS placed Child in foster care, where he remained throughout the proceedings. The court adjudicated Child a CHINS on April 14, 2023. On May 12, the court ordered Father to submit to random drug and alcohol screens, participate in domestic violence services and a father engagement program, and complete parenting and substance abuse assessments. The court also ordered Father to contact DCS within seventy-two hours of his release from incarceration.²

[4] When Father was released to probation in November 2023, he failed to contact DCS within seventy-two hours of his release. While Father later contacted DCS to inquire about visitation, he did not engage with DCS or make any effort to initiate services, complete assessments, submit to drug and alcohol screens, or otherwise comply with the dispositional decree. In January 2024, Father was arrested and charged with Level 6 felony intimidation and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy after he violated a no-contact order prohibiting his contact with Mother by threatening to “burn [her] house down[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 117. He pled guilty to Level 6 felony intimidation and returned to the DOC in March.

[5] DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ relationship with Child on April 30, 2024. The court held a factfinding hearing on DCS's petition on September 4, 2025. At the time of the factfinding, Father was still incarcerated, and he admitted he had been “locked up for all but about a period of 43 days of [Child's] life[.]” Id. at 107. Father testified he expected to be released in September 2026 but acknowledged he had other pending criminal cases that may result in further incarceration.

[6] Former Family Case Manager (FCM) Klida Neufville testified that DCS completed referrals for services, assessments, random screens, and visitation. FCM Neufville tried to involve Father in Child and Family Team Meetings (CFTM's) and get him to participate in visitation. While Father could not participate in services during his periods of incarceration, DCS was looking for service providers that could work with incarcerated individuals. When asked on cross-examination if he completed any services while released, Father stated “I didn't complete anything.” Id. at 121.

[7] On October 15, 2025, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court made the following relevant conclusions of law:

a. One (1) or more of the circumstances described in I.C. 31-35-2-4 (d) exists, to wit: That the child has been removed from the parents and has been under the supervision of the local office for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months.

b. That despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied[.]

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c. That the parents failed to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve (12) months following the child's removal from the parent's home under IC 31-34-2 or the child's adjudication as a Child in Need of Services, whichever occurred earlier, or the parent is unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree[.]

App. Vol. II pp. 144-45 (formatting altered). Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[8] We recognize “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. Of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied. Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[9] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted). Any unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true by this Court. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[10] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege, in relevant part, the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

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(7) That the parent:

(A) failed to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve (12) months following the child's:

(i) removal from the parent's home under IC 31-34-2; or

(ii) adjudication as a child in need of services;

whichever occurred earlier, unless the parent's failure to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree was due to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5; or

(B) is unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)-(3), (7) (2024).³ In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3).

[11] DCS must prove each element by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).

II. Termination of Parental Rights

[12] Father does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so we accept them as true. See S.S., 120 N.E.3d at 609 n.2. He challenges whether DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Child and whether the evidence was sufficient to terminate his parental rights.

A. Reasonable Efforts

[13] First, Father argues the court erred in terminating his parental rights because “DCS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it had made reasonable efforts to reunify [Child] with his biological father[.]” Appellant's Br. pp. 16-17. Under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.5, DCS is required to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families in CHINS proceedings unless certain exceptions apply. However, this requirement “is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute, and a failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Still, “[w]hen the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). A parent's due process rights encompass DCS's responsibility to make “reasonable efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit[.]” In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “What constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ will vary by case[.]” Id.

[14] Father argues that because DCS was unable to provide him with services while he was incarcerated, it failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve his relationship with Child. However, Father does not argue that his due process rights were violated as a result. It is well established “that a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim.” McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. Of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Because Father cannot attack the termination order on the basis that DCS failed to provide services and he makes no due process argument, Father's argument regarding DCS's reasonable efforts is waived.⁴ See H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 148 n.3.

[15] Even so, the evidence presented at the factfinding hearing and the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact clearly show DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Father and Child or preserve their relationship. FCM Neufville testified that DCS completed referrals for Father to participate in services, attend visitation, complete ordered assessments, and submit to random alcohol and drug screens. Although Father was unable to participate in services while he was incarcerated, DCS searched for service providers that could work with incarcerated individuals, and FCM Neufville also tried to involve Father in CFTM's. Father, on the other hand, did not contact DCS within seventy-two hours of his release and he acknowledged he “didn't complete anything.” Tr. Vol. II p. 121. Rather than initiate services, Father committed a new offense approximately forty-three days after his release and was reincarcerated. The fact that services became unavailable to Father in January is the result of Father's unabated criminal conduct, not any failing by DCS. Father has not shown that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with Child or preserve their relationship.

B. Sufficiency of Evidence

[16] Next, Father challenges the trial court's conclusion that “despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under [Indiana Code section] 31-34-21-5.5, there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied[.]”⁵ App. Vol. II p. 144. However, Father does not challenge the trial court's conclusion under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(7) that Father failed to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve (12) months following the child's removal or that Father is unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive and Father does not challenge the court's conclusion under subsection (d)(7), we need not address Father's argument under subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3). See In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We affirm.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   The court reissued its order on May 23 to correct the spelling of Father's first name.

3.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025. The relevant portions of the statute remain unchanged.

4.   To the extent Father argues DCS was required to show it made reasonable efforts under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(2)(B), and thus the evidence is insufficient to terminate his rights under that subsection, we note, as explained fully below, the trial court also concluded Father's rights should be terminated under subsection (d)(7)(B), which makes no mention of a reasonable efforts finding.

5.   The trial court's conclusion conflates language in both subsections (d)(2)(B) and (d)(3) of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.