Britni Taylor, Appellant-Plaintiff v. LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Britni Taylor appeals the trial court's decision to set aside default judgment, raising two issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive: whether the trial court abused its discretion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2024, Taylor purchased a home in Indianapolis from Andreatta and his company, Andreatta and McCoy, LLC (A&M). On October 8, 2024, Taylor filed a complaint against Andreatta and A&M, alleging several counts of fraud, criminal fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.¹ Taylor alleged Andreatta made false statements about the home in various sale-related documents regarding the updates, improvements, and integrity of the home's systems and appliances. However, Taylor did not attach to her complaint the purchase agreement that Andreatta and/or A&M allegedly breached.

[3] Neither Andreatta nor A&M answered the complaint. On December 6, Taylor moved for a default judgment, and the trial court scheduled a hearing. On December 18, after receiving notice of the motion for default, Andreatta texted Taylor and emailed Taylor's attorney, indicating that he never received service of a summons or complaint. Andreatta then contacted his attorney. On December 27, Andreatta's counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion to dismiss, alleging Andreatta was never served and seeking relief for Taylor's failure to attach the contract to the complaint.

[4] On March 14, 2025, the court held a hearing on Taylor's motion for default judgment and Andreatta's motion to dismiss. The process server testified that he personally served Andreatta at 8:52 p.m. on October 28, 2024, at Andreatta's Carmel residence. Conversely, Andreatta testified that he was “[p]robably at a bar/restaurant” or with his son for travel baseball activities on October 28 and was not home that evening. Tr. Vol. II p. 19.

[5] Andreatta's counsel also argued the case should be dismissed because Taylor failed to attach the contract to the complaint, thus Andreatta was still unaware of the “basis” of the complaint. Id. at 55. Taylor's counsel responded that Andreatta's motion should be stricken as untimely and that the proper remedy for that issue would be to order Taylor to amend her complaint, not dismissal. Taylor's counsel also noted that Taylor “did attach several documents that underly [sic] her basis for fraud,” which was one of the other claims. Id. at 56. The court questioned whether “the fact that the complaint doesn't have the contract make it really impossible to default?” Id. at 57. But Taylor's counsel argued that was irrelevant because even if the complaint was defective, Andreatta was served with the necessary documents to perfect service, i.e., the summons and the complaint. Thus, on March 17, the court entered default judgment against Andreatta and A&M, finding the process server's testimony was credible, and scheduled a hearing on damages for June 6.

[6] The next day, March 18, Andreatta obtained additional evidence to demonstrate that he was not home on the evening of October 28, 2024. On April 17, 2025, Andreatta filed a motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(2) and 60(B)(8), alleging he had obtained new evidence to prove he was not served.² He also re-raised his argument that he was unable to fully comprehend the nature of the complaint because “Taylor has failed and refused to attach a copy of the contract to her Complaint.” App. Vol. II p. 96.

[7] In July 2025, the court held a hearing on Andreatta's motion. Andreatta testified about his alleged newly discovered evidence. In closing, his counsel again argued he had been unable to answer the complaint, in part, because the purchase agreement alleging the basis of Taylor's breach claim was not attached and never provided. After taking the matter under advisement, on July 14, the court issued an order setting aside its default judgment. Taylor now appeals. Additional facts are provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Taylor contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting Andreatta's Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.³ “A decision whether to set aside a default judgment is entitled to deference and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Fields v. Safway Grp. Holdings, LLC, 118 N.E.3d 804, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or where the court has erred on a matter of law.” Wilkerson v. Egan, 253 N.E.3d 1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “ ‘[A] motion made under T.R. 60(B) is addressed to the equitable discretion of the trial court[.]” Id. (citing Bello v. Bello, 102 N.E.3d 891, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). “[S]uch discretion should be exercised in light of the disfavor in which default judgments are held[,]” and “any doubt of its propriety must be resolved in favor of the defaulted party.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 747 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Ind. 2001). “Furthermore, reviewing the decision of the trial court, we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Huntington Nat. Bank v. Car-X Assoc. Corp., 39 N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. 2015) (citation omitted). “The movant bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief under Rule 60(B).” Wilkerson, 253 N.E.3d at 1151.

I. Trial Rule 60(B)(8)

[9] Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8) allows a court to relieve a party from default judgment for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).” Trial Rule 60(B)(1)-(4) governs instances of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; any ground for a motion to correct error under T.R. 59, including newly discovered evidence; fraud; and default against a party only served by publication and without actual knowledge. In addition to filing a 60(B)(8) motion in a reasonable time and alleging a meritorious defense, the movant must “allege sufficient grounds showing exceptional circumstances justify relief” from the judgment. Dalton Corp. v. Myers, 65 N.E.3d 1142, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “In determining whether exceptional circumstances warrant setting aside a default judgment, the trial court may also consider the equitable considerations set forth by each party.” Id.

[10] Taylor contends that alleged newly discovered evidence was the only ground upon which Andreatta sought relief from judgment and that Andreatta failed to raise any other ground pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(8). However, Andreatta consistently raised another issue throughout the proceedings: that Taylor failed to attach to her complaint the written contract to support her breach of contract claim. Andreatta first raised this issue in his December 2024 motion to dismiss, where he alleged he was not served with Taylor's complaint and that, once his counsel obtained a copy of the complaint, the complaint was noncompliant with Indiana Trial Rule 9.2(A) for failure to attach the written contract.⁴ At the hearing on Taylor's default motion and Andreatta's motion to dismiss, Andreatta cited the absence of a purchase agreement as prohibitive of his ability to respond to Taylor's complaint. See Tr. Vol. II p. 55. Nevertheless, the court entered default judgment for Taylor and scheduled a hearing on damages.

[11] In his memorandum supporting his motion to set aside default judgment, Andreatta indicated he was “seeking to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Trial Rules 55(C) and 60(B)(2) and (8).” App. Vol. II p. 93. In addition to his 60(B)(2) claims regarding new evidence, Andreatta alleged he still

d[id] not fully comprehend ․ the amounts being asserted due by Taylor; how the amount of the claim accrued; or how the dollar amount of Taylor's judgment will be calculated. Taylor's underlying claims are for breach of contract; however, Taylor has failed and refused to attach a copy of the contract to her Complaint.

Id. at 96. Andreatta sought remedial relief from this deficiency “[i]n conjunction with” his request that the court set aside Taylor's default judgment. Id. And at the hearing on his motion to set aside, after presenting his newly discovered evidence claim, Andreatta argued he “[wasn't] able to even provide an answer or seek leave of court to provide an answer because no copy of any purchase agreement was ever attached to the complaint.” Tr. Vol. II p. 115.

[12] After taking Andreatta's motion under advisement, the court set aside its entry of default without written findings and ordered Taylor to “amend her complaint and include a copy of the contract[.]” App. Vol. II p. 112. Where a court does not enter written findings, we apply the general judgment standard and will affirm “on any theory supported by the evidence adduced at trial.” Groomingdale's Pet Styling, Inc. v. Neuberg, 267 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. A default judgment is an “extreme remedy and is available only where [a] party fails to defend ․ a suit.” Allstate, 747 N.E.2d at 547. In deciding whether to set aside a default judgment, the trial court should “do what is ‘just’ in light of the unique facts of each case.” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Ransom, 531 N.E.2d 1171, 1172 (Ind. 1988)).

[13] It is undisputed that Taylor did not attach a purchase agreement to her complaint to support her breach of contract claim. Although there are no written findings to demonstrate that the court granted Andreatta relief on this ground, it is evident from the record that the deficiency of Taylor's complaint was a ground upon which Andreatta sought relief from default judgment. Thus, the court's decision to set aside default is sustainable on this record. Given this and our substantial deference to trial courts on such issues, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside its default judgment or that the court failed to consider the equitable reasons for doing so. See id. (reemphasizing “the overriding considerations of confidence in our judicial system and the interest of resolving disputes on their merits”). Because the court did not abuse its discretion to set aside the judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), we do not reach Taylor's arguments regarding the court's decision on Trial Rule 60(B)(2) grounds.

II. Meritorious Defense

[14] When a party seeks relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), he “must allege a meritorious claim or defense.”

“This requires a showing that vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise.” Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 73 (Ind. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). The requirement to allege a meritorious defense “merely requires a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense, that is, a showing that will prevail until contradicted and overcome by other evidence.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “The movant need only present evidence that, if credited, demonstrates that a different result would be reached if the case were retried on the merits and that it is unjust to allow the judgment to stand.” Id. at 73–74 (internal quotation omitted, emphasis in original).

Groomingdale's, 267 N.E.3d at 4.

[15] Taylor argues Andreatta “failed to present any evidence showing [he] had a meritorious defense[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 33. She asserts that Andreatta's meritorious claims or defenses fail because she “alleged [Andreatta] committed fraud[.]” Id. at 32. But, in addition to her fraud claims, Taylor asserted breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims in her complaint.

[16] In Andreatta's motion to set aside default judgment and his supporting memorandum, he asserts the following “valid defenses and non-party defenses ․”:

the Plaintiff reserved the opportunity to inspect the residential real estate she purchased from the Defendant, Andreatta & McCoy, LLC; the Plaintiff had the property professionally inspected prior to the closin[g]; the parties negotiated all of the repairs to the property; the Defendant, Andreatta & McCoy, LLC, made the repairs; the Plaintiff confirmed that all of the agreed repairs were made; and the Plaintiff closed on her purchase of the property; and accepted the repairs she requested and made by the Defendant, Andreatta & McCoy, LLC.

App. Vol. II pp. 82-83. In support of his motion, Andreatta submitted an affidavit alleging, in relevant part, that Taylor “accepted the residential real estate and the repairs requested” and “closed on her purchase of the residential real estate.” Id. at 88. If this evidence is credited, it is possible that it would form the basis for a different outcome on at least Taylor's breach of contract claim; specifically, on Taylor's claim that Andreatta failed to tender to Taylor “the real property agreed upon.” Id. at 21. However minimal, we cannot conclude this evidence—that is, Andreatta's affidavit—would fail to support an outcome other than judgment in Taylor's favor. As such, Andreatta did not wholly fail to allege meritorious defenses to Taylor's claims.

Conclusion

[17] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside its default judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Taylor also named Vernon McCoy, the co-owner of A&M, as a defendant. The Chronological Case Summary reflects that McCoy was never served, and he does not participate in this appeal or the proceedings below. See App. Vol. II p. 3. All references to the complaint and its remaining defendants refer to Andreatta and A&M collectively.

2.   Andreatta's motion pleads Trial Rule 60(B)(2) alone, but he requested relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(2) and (8) in his memorandum supporting his motion.

3.   The motion for relief from judgment was filed on behalf of Andreatta and A&M; all further references to “Andreatta” or “Andreatta's” motion for relief from judgment refer to Andreatta and A&M.

4.   We note Taylor's trial court arguments that Andreatta's motion to dismiss was an improper remedy for Trial Rule 9.2 noncompliance. See App. Vol. II pp. 61-63. However, the denial of Andreatta's motion to dismiss is not before us on appeal, and the propriety of that motion is thus not at issue here.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.