Jamari R. Douthit, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] At his girlfriend's trial on drug charges, Jamari Douthit admitted under oath that he stashed approximately 20 grams of methamphetamine in his girlfriend's purse after a car accident. After the State charged him based on that same methamphetamine, Douthit recanted and claimed he had lied to help Glass avoid conviction. Unconvinced by his new version of events, the trial court convicted Douthit of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and Level 3 felony possession of the same methamphetamine.

[2] Douthit appeals, arguing the trial court should have excluded the methamphetamine because it was recovered through an unconstitutional warrantless search and that his two convictions violated double jeopardy principles. The State concedes the double jeopardy claim but contends Douthit has no standing to challenge the search of the car and his girlfriend's purse. Based on the parties’ concessions, we remand with instructions to vacate the lesser conviction—Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine—and affirm his remaining conviction for Level 2 dealing in methamphetamine.

Facts

[3] In June 2023, a Noblesville police officer responded to a vehicle accident between a tanker truck and a four-door passenger car in front of a police substation. When the officer arrived, two adult women—Jasmine Glass and Wyneke Williams—were present at the scene along with several children. A third occupant—Douthit, who was then Glass's boyfriend—had left the scene before police arrived.

[4] During the accident investigation, Williams told the officer that she was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Williams gave the officer documentation showing that she had rented the car from a car rental company. Glass also told the officer that Williams had rented the car and was driving it. But the driver of the truck involved in the collision reported that a Black male had been driving the vehicle and left the scene before police arrived. Upon hearing that, Glass alleged racial profiling.

[5] The officer detected the odor of marijuana emanating from Glass's purse inside the car. When the officer told Glass about the smell, she admitted she had a “THC vape” in her purse. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 12-13. The officer then searched Glass's purse, which contained more than 20 grams of methamphetamine packaged in 19 individual bags stored within a single larger bag.

[6] Glass was arrested and charged with drug offenses arising from her possession of the methamphetamine. At Glass's jury trial, Douthit testified under oath that he was not the driver of the car but that the drugs were his. He testified that he had packaged the drugs in small bags to sell them and that he had placed the bags in Glass's purse before leaving the accident scene to attend a criminal court hearing at the nearby Hamilton County Courthouse. Afterward, the jury acquitted Glass.

[7] The State immediately charged Douthit with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine in connection with the same incident. The State also alleged that Douthit was a habitual offender.

[8] Prior to his bench trial, Douthit moved to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing that the warrantless search of the vehicle violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He raised no state constitutional claim and concedes on appeal that any such argument is waived.

[9] The State responded with a motion to dismiss Douthit's suppression motion based on Douthit's alleged lack of standing to challenge the search of the vehicle and the purse within. At the pretrial suppression hearing a week before trial, the State again contested Douthit's standing to challenge the search, contending that he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in either the vehicle or Glass's purse. The State introduced evidence showing that Williams had rented the vehicle but that the identity of the driver was disputed at the accident scene, with Williams and Glass claiming that Williams had been driving and the truck driver reporting that the driver was the man who left the scene. The State also introduced Douthit's testimony in Glass's trial in which Douthit denied he was driving the rental vehicle.

[10] The trial court denied Douthit's motion to suppress based on his lack of standing. The court found Douthit's sworn testimony at Glass's trial that he was not the driver defeated any claim to a privacy interest in the rental vehicle. The court also concluded that Douthit had not established any legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse. At trial, the court admitted, over Douthit's objection, the evidence of the methamphetamine seized from Glass's purse.

[11] The trial court found Douthit guilty of both charges and determined that he was a habitual offender. At sentencing, the parties agreed that Douthit could not be convicted and sentenced for both dealing in and possession of the same methamphetamine. Notwithstanding this agreement, the trial court entered judgment of conviction on both charges. It then sentenced Douthit to 20 years imprisonment, with 3 years suspended to probation, for dealing in methamphetamine, enhanced by 10 years by the habitual offender finding. As to the possession of methamphetamine conviction, the court sentenced Douthit to a concurrent sentence of 3 years imprisonment. Douthit appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Douthit raises two issues on appeal. First, he claims the trial court erroneously admitted the methamphetamine because it was the product of an illegal search. Second, he argues that his separate convictions for dealing in methamphetamine and possession of the same methamphetamine constituted double jeopardy.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting the Methamphetamine

[13] Given that this case proceeded to trial after the trial court's denial of Douthit's motion to suppress, the issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged methamphetamine evidence. See Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013) (finding that direct review of an adverse ruling on a defendant's pretrial motion to suppress is only appropriate when the defendant files an interlocutory appeal). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Cook v. State, 220 N.E.3d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). But we review an alleged constitutional violation, like any pure issue of law, de novo. Id.

[14] Douthit contends the trial court erred in admitting the methamphetamine because the warrantless search of the vehicle and the purse violated the Fourth Amendment. This federal constitutional provision specifies, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation ․” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Douthit raises no claim under the Indiana Constitution and concedes that any such argument was waived by his failure to raise it below.

[15] “Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted.” Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001). “[T]o challenge a search as unconstitutional [under the Fourth Amendment], a defendant must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that which is searched.” Livingston v. State, 542 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind. 1989) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)). “In reviewing whether a privacy expectation exists under a Fourth Amendment analysis, this Court also looks to whether the defendant has control over or ownership in the premises searched.” Harris v. State, 156 N.E.3d 728, 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[16] Passengers in a car driven by its owner cannot make this showing and therefore “do not have standing to challenge a search of the car.” Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 598 (Ind. 2008). In addition, a driver who is not the owner has no standing if the owner is also in the car. Id. But when the owner is absent, “a driver with permission of the owner may have standing.” Id. at 599. When the owner is absent, the driver who “ ‘offers sufficient evidence indicating that he has permission of the owner to use the vehicle ․ plainly has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and standing to challenge’ ” its search. Id. (quoting United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 1990)).

[17] Douthit does not argue he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle or in Glass's purse. Instead, he essentially contends that the State waived any standing challenge by not reasserting it at trial. Douthit also argues that the State's failure at trial to identify the vehicle's driver and renter means the factual basis for the trial court's suppression ruling evaporated. In Douthit's view, the trial court therefore was required to treat the search as presumptively unlawful. His argument misapprehends where the burden lies.

[18] A defendant challenging the validity of a search under the Fourth Amendment bears the burden of demonstrating that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Harris, 156 N.E.3d at 732. “The defendant must show a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the premises.” Campos, 885 N.E.2d at 598 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). A defendant who does not meet this burden cannot invoke Fourth Amendment protection. State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). This is the defendant's burden and not an affirmative defense that the State must plead or forfeit. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.1. A defendant's Fourth Amendment rights “are not implicated simply because a search of a third party led to evidence which incriminates the defendant.” Allen, 187 N.E.3d at 228.

[19] Douthit did not meet this burden. He presented no evidence at the suppression hearing or at trial establishing a subjective or objective expectation of privacy in Glass's purse or in the car. He owned neither the car nor the purse. The State presented evidence at the suppression hearing that the car was a rental. Although the State did not prove at trial who rented the car, such evidence was presented at the suppression hearing. It showed that Williams, not Douthit, was the renter—evidence that Douthit did not refute—and that both Glass and Williams told the investigating officer that Williams was the driver. Douthit also had left the scene of the vehicle accident before the search, abandoning the damaged rental—conduct inconsistent with any claim of responsibility for, or privacy interest in, the vehicle. And Douthit's own sworn testimony at Glass's trial, admitted into evidence at both the suppression hearing and at trial, established he was not the driver.

[20] To the extent the foundational evidence at trial differed from that at the suppression hearing, it did not undermine the trial court's ruling. “[T]he trial court may reflect upon the foundational evidence from the motion to suppress hearing when that evidence is not in direct conflict with the evidence introduced at trial.” Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), cited with approval by Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 259 n.9. The court also “should consider evidence from the motion to suppress hearing which is favorable to the defendant and which has not been countered or contradicted by foundational evidence offered at trial.” Id.

[21] The State's evidence at Douthit's suppression hearing was more expansive but was consistent with that offered at trial except on one point. At the suppression hearing, the State introduced evidence that Williams rented the car. At trial, the State established that the car was a rental, but the trial court sustained the defense's objections to evidence of the rental contract and of other evidence showing that Williams rented the car. Therefore, pursuant to Kelley and Clark, the trial court, when determining the admissibility of the methamphetamine, could consider all the evidence admitted at the suppression hearing except for that establishing Williams rented the car.

[22] The State's failure to prove Williams rented the vehicle is irrelevant under these circumstances because Douthit neither claimed nor produced evidence that he was the renter or the driver. In addition, the bulk of the evidence at both the suppression hearing and at trial supported a finding that Douthit was not driving the vehicle. If Douthit was neither the driver nor the renter, under these circumstances he lacked the legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle necessary to establish his standing to challenge the search. See generally Campos, 885 N.E.2d at 598-99 (discussing when occupants of a vehicle have standing to challenge a search of it). Thus, the small disparity between the evidence at the suppression hearing and at trial did not impugn the trial court's determination that Douthit lacked standing.

[23] Douthit never established that he had an expectation of privacy in either the vehicle or Glass's purse. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting the methamphetamine seized during the search of the rental car.

II. Convictions for Dealing and Possession of the Same Drugs Violate Double Jeopardy Principles

[24] Douthit claims that his convictions for dealing and possessing the same methamphetamine placed him in jeopardy twice for the same offense. “ ‘[T]he substantive bar to double jeopardy restrains the courts’ power to impose multiple punishments for the same offense[.]’ ” Easter v. State, No. 25A-CR-1229, 2026 WL 1205892, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. May 4, 2026) (quoting A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024)). “Whether multiple convictions place a defendant in substantive double jeopardy presents a question of law that we review de novo.” Id.

[25] The State concedes that Douthit's dual convictions cannot stand. We agree. Possession of methamphetamine is a lesser-included offense of dealing in methamphetamine when, as here, both charges rest on the defendant's possession of the identical batch of drugs. Gabbard v. State, No. 23A-CR-1301, 2024 WL 2131716, at *5-*6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Entry of judgment for both the offense and an included offense is prohibited. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-6 (“Whenever: (1) a defendant is charged with an offense and an included offense in separate counts; and (2) the defendant is found guilty of both counts; judgment and sentence may not be entered against the defendant for the included offense.”).

[26] “Where a defendant is found guilty of both the greater offense and the lesser-included offense, the proper procedure is to vacate the conviction for the lesser-included offense and enter a judgment of conviction and sentence only upon the greater offense.” Demby v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1035, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). We therefore reverse Douthit's conviction for possession of methamphetamine.

Conclusion

[27] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the methamphetamine. Accordingly, we affirm Douthit's conviction for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. We reverse Douthit's conviction for possession of methamphetamine because it violated double jeopardy principles, and we remand with instructions to the trial court to vacate that conviction.

[28] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.