Charles Robinson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Charles Robinson appeals following his convictions of murder ¹ and Level 5 felony robbery.² Robinson raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Robinson's request for the identity of a confidential informant; and

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the jury to view photographs of him in jail attire.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Robinson was a friend and customer of Gene White, a “small-scale” drug dealer. (Tr. Vol. II at 158.) Beginning around 1:15 a.m. on August 21, 2022, Robinson and White exchanged text messages to arrange a drug transaction. White borrowed his mother's car, a Chevrolet Traverse, and drove to Robinson's apartment to deliver the drugs. The vehicle had sustained front end damage in an accident, and White planned to have the car repaired later that day. White kept the cash proceeds from the insurance claim related to the car in the pocket of a pair of basketball shorts that he wore under a pair of sweatpants. Robinson and White met inside the Traverse for the ostensible purpose of conducting the drug transaction. Robinson then repeatedly stabbed White and took White's cell phone and the cash from him. Robinson later left his apartment complex and went to his girlfriend's sister's apartment.

[3] Later that morning at around 5:00 a.m., an individual discovered White lying on the ground near the Traverse. The Traverse's engine was running, and White had sustained twenty-seven stab wounds. The individual called 911, and the responding Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) officers found White deceased and lying in a pool of blood. White's sweatpants were pulled down and the pockets of his basketball shorts were pulled inside out. The officers did not find White's cell phone or the cash on him. The officers found a size fifteen sandal on the floorboard of the front passenger seat of the Traverse and a large footprint on the pavement outside the Traverse. They also found a knife handle and a baggie inside the Traverse. Robinson's DNA was present on those items. In addition, Robinson's DNA was present in blood found on the ground outside of the Traverse and in blood smeared on money that was also found on the ground. The officers obtained White's cell phone records and the location data indicated that during the early morning hours of August 21, 2022, White's cell phone traveled from Robinson's apartment complex to a gas station near the apartment complex where Robinson's girlfriend's sister lived. The police found White's cell phone inside a trash can at the gas station, and Robinson's DNA was present on the cell phone.

[4] On December 18, 2023, the State charged Robinson with murder, felony murder,³ and Level 2 felony robbery.⁴ On April 2, 2025, five days before his trial, Robinson filed a motion seeking to compel the State to produce “for an informal conversation with defense counsel and potentially testimony at trial” a confidential informant who had given a statement to IMPD Detective Michael Condon. (App. Vol. 2 at 161.) Alternatively, the motion asked that Robinson be allowed to question Detective Condon about the confidential informant. The motion asserted that the State had produced “a heavily redacted statement from a confidential informant who appears to have been reasonably close with the decedent, Gene White, and also appears to have confidence as to the identity of the murder suspect in Robinson's case.” (Id. at 159.) Robinson alleged that details the confidential informant relayed to Detective Condon about the murderer did not match Robinson. The State filed a response opposing Robinson's motion. The State asserted:

3. The informant provided information based on speculation, hunches and hearsay from sources not present when the charged crime occurred.

4. Additionally, the informant did not witness the charged crime and there is no information that supports the informant being involved in any manner when the charged crime occurred.

* * * * *

8. The informant actively works with law enforcement and disclosing the informant's identity would pose an unwarranted risk to the informant's life. Additionally, nondisclosure would further and protect the public's interest in law and order.

(Id. at 163.)

[5] The trial court held Robinson's jury trial beginning on April 7, 2025. Immediately prior to the start of trial, the trial court addressed Robinson's motion seeking disclosure of the confidential informant and denied the motion. During the trial, the State sought to introduce four photographs Detective Condon took of Robinson after Robinson's arrest. The photographs depicted Robinson shackled, dressed in jail attire, and wearing socks and sandals. The first photograph was a full body photograph of Robinson. The second photograph depicted the bottom of a sandal on Robinson's left foot. The third photograph was a picture of the top of Robinson's left foot next to a ruler, and the fourth was a photograph of the top of Robinson's right foot next to a ruler. The markings on the ruler are indecipherable in the photographs. Robinson objected on the basis that he “has a right not to appear in [a] jail jumpsuit ․ handcuffed in front of the jury” and that the photographs were not “probative of anything.” (Tr. Vol. III at 15-16.) The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the photographs. The trial court also admonished the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, as stated in the testimony, these photographs were taken following the defendant's arrest. So he is in a red-issued jumpsuit. The fact that the defendant was arrested in this case raises no presumption against him of any kind. And the fact that these photos were taken of him while he was arrested is not to be commented by [sic] you, referred to at all during your deliberations, and cannot be considered by you on the issue of whether or not the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crimes charged in this case. Do you understand that? All heads shaking in the affirmative.

(Id. at 16.) Detective Condon testified that the sandals Robinson wore in the photographs were size “XXL” or “13-14.” (Id. at 17.) Robinson testified that he met White outside of his apartment in the early morning hours of August 21, 2022, but he denied killing White or stealing from him. The jury found Robinson guilty on all counts. To avoid double jeopardy, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on murder and the lesser included offense of Level 5 felony robbery. The trial court sentenced Robinson to terms of sixty-four years for his murder conviction and five years for his Level 5 felony robbery conviction. The trial court ordered Robinson to serve the sentences concurrently for an aggregate sentence of sixty-four years.

Discussion and Decision

1. Confidential Informant

[6] Robinson first challenges the trial court's denial of the motion he filed five days before trial asking that the State be compelled to produce the confidential informant that spoke with Detective Condon. “A trial court has broad discretion with regard to rulings on discovery matters based upon its duties to promote discovery of the truth and to guide and control the proceedings.” Moore v. State, 839 N.E.2d 178, 182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “Therefore, such rulings will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Miller v. State, 825 N.E.2d 884, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (internal citation omitted), trans. denied. “This deferential standard, however, gives way to de novo review when it comes to questions of law, such as interpreting trial rules or statutes.” Sanchez v. State, 264 N.E.3d 1223, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “[W]e may affirm the trial court's ruling on any basis the record supports, even if that theory was not relied upon by the court below.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021).

[7] Marion County Local Rule LR49-CR00-107 provides that discovery “shall be completed by the omnibus date unless extended for good cause shown.” The confidential informant's interview with Detective Condon occurred on August 27, 2022, and the State provided Robinson with a redacted transcript of that interview on April 15, 2024. While the State's production of the redacted interview occurred six days after the omnibus date, Robinson waited nearly a year to request additional discovery related to the confidential informant. Robinson did not advance any reason for this significant delay, and during the trial court's hearing on the motion, he acknowledged the request should have been made earlier. (See Tr. Vol. II at 26 (“Judge, I—well, in candor, you know, I should have filed this fight [sic] sooner. I should have filed the motion to try to compel this person's identity sooner.”).) Because Robinson failed to show good cause for the delay in filing his request and the request was made shortly before trial, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the request. See, e.g., Harvey v. State, 621 N.E.2d 362, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking defendant's late-filed notice of alibi defense because the defendant failed to show good cause for the late filing of the notice).

[8] Robinson also requested the opportunity to cross-examine Detective Condon about the statements the confidential informant made to him, but this request would not have led to admissible testimony.

The constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense․ Nevertheless, the right to present a defense is not absolute. The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. Thus, both a defendant and the prosecutor must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.

Schermerhorn v. State, 61 N.E.3d 375, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. Robinson acknowledged that allowing Detective Condon to testify regarding the confidential informant's statements to him was inconsistent with the Indiana Rules of Evidence.⁵ (See Tr. Vol. II at 26 (“At this point, I think that the rules – I'm asking that the rules bend to the interests of justice and fairness․ So, I'm asking that I be allowed to elicit it over the hearsay objections.”).) Because the questions would not have led to admissible testimony, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Robinson's alternative request to question Detective Condon regarding the confidential informant's statements to him. See, e.g., Minor v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1065, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit hearsay testimony that did not fall into an exception to the rule against hearsay), trans. denied.

2. Admission of Photographs

[9] Robinson also challenges the trial court's admission of the four photographs depicting him in jail attire. He asserts the photographs violated his due process right not to appear in jail clothes before the jury, were irrelevant, and were unfairly prejudicial. Trial courts enjoy broad discretion when ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we review a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Hines v. State, 981 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[10] In Ritchie v. State, Ritchie petitioned for post-conviction relief on the basis that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because the attorney did not object during his criminal trial when the State introduced a video of a media interview Ritchie gave while shackled and dressed in jail clothing. 875 N.E.2d 706, 716 (Ind. 2007). Our Indiana Supreme Court explained that under both federal and Indiana law, “a criminal defendant cannot be forced to appear in either jail clothing or shackles during the guilt or penalty phase of trial without an individualized finding that the defendant presents a risk of escape, violence, or disruption of the trial.” Id. at 718. The Court explained this prohibition exists for three reasons: “(1) the risk of diluting the presumption of innocence, (2) the risk that the jury might find guilt based on these extraneous influential factors rather than probative evidence subject to the rigors of cross-examination, and (3) the shackles could hinder the right to participate with counsel.” Id. However, the Court noted Ritchie's appearance in jail clothes and shackles in the video was “one step removed” from having to appear in jail attire and shackles in the courtroom and that step eliminated most of the risks present when a defendant appears in jail clothing and shackles in the courtroom. Id. The Court explained the appearance did not implicate Ritchie's right to participate with his counsel at trial. Id. In addition, the Court noted “the risk of diluting the presumption of innocence or guilt being established by an extraneous influential factor is minuscule” because Ritchie presented no evidence his appearance in jail attire had any bearing on the guilty verdict and “[a]ny reasonable juror would have expected Ritchie to be dressed in jail clothing and shackled when meeting with members of the public outside the security of a jail cell.” Id. Therefore, our Indiana Supreme Court held Ritchie's trial counsel's failure to object did not fall below the reasonable standard of care because such an objection would have been overruled. Id. at 718-19.

[11] Robinson acknowledges that, like in Ritchie, his appearance in jail attire in the photographs was “one step removed” from appearing in jail attire in the courtroom, but he asserts “the trial court nevertheless committed reversible error in admitting the irrelevant and prejudicial photographs.” (Appellant's Br. at 22.) “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evid. R. 401. The pictures demonstrated that Robinson had large feet and that fact was relevant because a size fifteen sandal and a large footprint were found at the scene.

[12] Evidence Rule 403 provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice ․ or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Robinson argues the photographs “were cumulative of other evidence and unfairly prejudiced Robinson by depicting his [sic] as dangerous in front of the jury.” (Appellant's Br. at 12.) However, we presume jurors listen to and obey the instructions of the trial court. See Webster v. State, 413 N.E.2d 898, 901 (Ind. 1980) (“On appeal, this Court must presume that the jury obeyed the trial court's instructions in reaching its verdict.”). The trial court instructed the jury that the “photographs were taken following the defendant's arrest” and “[t]he fact that the defendant was arrested in this case raises no presumption against him of any kind.” (Tr. Vol. III at 16.) The trial court further instructed the jury not to comment on, refer to, or consider that the photographs were taken after his arrest when determining whether Robinson was guilty. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury in both the preliminary and final jury instructions not to consider Robinson's arrest as evidence of his guilt. (See Tr. Vol. II at 125 (“The filing of a charge or the defendant's arrest is not to be considered by you as evidence of guilt”) & Tr. Vol. III at 189.) Consequently, any danger of unfair prejudice that came from showing Robinson dressed in jail attire was mitigated by the jury instructions not to consider the evidence of Robinson's arrest as evidence of his guilt. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding evidence of rap song describing a murder scene was highly probative and the danger of unfair prejudice from its admission was mitigated by the trial court's jury instruction). In addition, while Robinson notes that Detective Condon testified Robinson wore extra-large jail sandals from which the jurors could infer that he had large feet, the photographs gave the jurors additional context to understand the actual size of his feet and were not needlessly cumulative. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 730 N.E.2d 713, 720 (Ind. 2000) (holding photographs did not constitute needlessly cumulative evidence when each photograph depicted a different view of the crime scene or the victim's injuries). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the photographs.

Conclusion

[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Robinson's request to conduct additional discovery related to a confidential informant because Robinson's request was made shortly before trial and Robinson had known about the confidential informant for approximately one year before making the request. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when it admitted photographs depicting Robinson in jail attire because the photographs were relevant, not cumulative of other evidence, and any risk of unfair prejudice was mitigated by the trial court's jury instructions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1.

5.   See Ind. Evid. R. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible unless these rules or other law provides otherwise.”).

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.