Ladarius Talon-Kashon Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Ladarius Talon-Kashon Smith appeals his convictions, following a bench trial, for Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon and Level 6 felony pointing a firearm, asserting that the evidence was insufficient. Specifically, Smith contends that the State failed to prove that the type of firearm used in the offenses was a handgun as alleged in the charging information.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In June 2024, Smith and T.S. were married, but not living together, and were the parents of a three-year-old son. On June 21, 2024, T.S. was at Smith's apartment. Shortly after midnight on June 22, T.S. was awakened to Smith yelling at her, “b*itch get the f*ck up.” Transcript at 29. T.S. got up, saw Smith in the kitchen doing dishes and could tell he was upset with her, so she went outside to the parking lot for thirty minutes or so, during which time they exchanged phone calls with each other.

[4] T.S. started to drive away in her car but saw Smith standing by his car, and she stopped to speak to him through her window. They exchanged words, with Smith telling T.S., “you're just a nothing-ass wife, mother.” Id. at 31. Still confused about why he was so upset with her, T.S. parked and got out of her car to talk to Smith. After a time, they began “to walk and talk” back toward Smith's apartment. Id. at 33.

[5] While standing on the sidewalk by the door to the apartment building, T.S. touched or tugged at the side of Smith's waist, at which time he pulled a gun out of the pocket of his shorts, pointed it at T.S.’s face, and said, “bitch, I ought to shoot you right now.” Id. at 59. Then, with the gun in his right hand, Smith “smacked [her] in the face with it,” causing a deep wound in the middle of her forehead. Id. at 34. Smith then ran into the apartment building. T.S. drove herself to the hospital, where she received stitches. Registered nurse Grace Huang completed a medical forensic examination, which included collecting T.S.’s account of how she was injured.

[6] A few days later, an Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department domestic violence detective took a telephonic recorded statement from T.S., who identified Smith as having hit her in the forehead with a firearm. As part of her investigation, the detective also reviewed T.S.’s hospital records.

[7] On July 9, 2024,¹ the State charged Smith with three counts: Count I, Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, “that is, a handgun”; Count II, Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, “a handgun”; and Count III, Level 6 felony pointing a firearm “to-wit: handgun at [T.S.].” Appendix at 21, 36. Smith waived his right to a jury trial.

[8] A two-day bench trial was held in September and October 2025. T.S. recalled that she had seen Smith with that gun on one or more prior occasions. She described it as black and that it could be used with one hand, but she did not otherwise provide a physical description of it. T.S.’s deposition, taken in January 2025, was admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibit A. In it, T.S. testified that Smith pulled “a pistol out of his pocket,” pointed it at her, and smacked her with it. Exhibits Vol. at 22.

[9] Huang testified that, in her role as a forensic nurse, she collects medical, surgical, and social history from the patient, along with the patient's narrative of the event precipitating the hospital visit, which is relevant to any needed safety plan. Specified pages of Huang's chart of her examination of T.S. were admitted as State's Exhibits 5 and 6. Those records reflected that T.S. reported to Huang at the hospital that Smith had pointed a “black hand gun” at her face and struck her forehead with it. Id. at 8, 10; see also id. at 12 (Huang's handwritten notation to a face diagram indicating that T.S. reported being “pistol whipped” by Smith).

[10] After the State rested, Smith moved for judgment on the evidence pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 41(B) as to all three counts, arguing that the State had failed to present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that a gun existed, given that no gun was recovered, there were no purchase records, no photos of a weapon, and Huang acknowledged that any number of things could have caused the large laceration to T.S.’s forehead. Smith argued that there was “no evidence that a gun existed outside of the testimony of the alleged victim.” Transcript at 109. The court denied the motion.

[11] Thereafter, Smith testified that on June 21, 2024, he had followed his normal routine of taking and then later picking up their son from daycare, going to work, and feeding and putting his son to bed. Smith testified that T.S. was not at his apartment on the night in question, he did not see her at all during that time, and he went to bed and did not make or receive phone calls with T.S. He testified that he has never owned a firearm of any kind and did not have one on the night in question. He testified that he was not part of and knew nothing about the alleged incident that resulted in the head injury to T.S.

[12] The court found Smith guilty as charged and entered judgment of conviction on Counts I and III. The court sentenced Smith, on Count I, to a term of five years, with three years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation. On Count III, the court imposed a concurrent one-year executed sentence. Smith now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[13] Smith contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon and of Level 6 felony pointing a firearm. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the conviction and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. Laney v. State, 868 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed. Id. A conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when the witness is the victim. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).

[14] Here, Smith's contention is that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he committed the domestic battery by means of a handgun and that the firearm he pointed at T.S. was a handgun, as charged. We disagree.

[15] T.S. testified that Smith suddenly pulled a black gun from the pocket of his shorts – unseen to her until that moment – and that, using one hand, he pointed it at her before backhanding her in the face with it. The ability to conceal a firearm in a pocket and wield it single-handedly are characteristics consistent with a handgun and from which the trial court reasonably could have inferred that the firearm Smith used was a handgun.

[16] Furthermore, the hospital medical records admitted into evidence reflected that T.S. had described the gun to Huang as being a “handgun” and a “pistol.” Exhibits Vol. at 8, 10, 12. And in her deposition, also admitted into evidence, T.S. stated that Smith had smacked her in the face with a “pistol.” Id. at 22. The State presented sufficient evidence that the type of gun used by Smith to inflict injury on T.S. was a handgun.

[17] Even if we were to find that the evidence was not sufficient, Smith has not established error. The domestic battery statute, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(c)(2), elevates the offense to a Level 5 felony when it “is committed with a deadly weapon” against a family or household member. Pointing a firearm under Ind. Code § 35-47-4-3 requires the State to prove that (1) the defendant knowingly or intentionally (2) pointed a firearm (3) at another person. One offense requires use of a deadly weapon; the other requires proof of a firearm.² Neither statute requires proof of a handgun as a necessary element of the offense.³

[18] Our Supreme Court has recognized that allegations that are not essential – that is, can be omitted without affecting the sufficiency of the charge against the defendant – “are considered as mere surplusage and may be disregarded.” Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671, 676 (Ind. 1997) (allegation in the charging information that the defendant used “a handgun and a shotgun” in committing attempted murders was surplusage because the specific weapon type is not an element of attempted murder). Such unnecessary descriptive material “need not be established in the proof” at trial. Id.; see also Bonner v. State, 789 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that nonessential facts included in charging information “do not need to be proved”). Here, since use of a “handgun” is not an element of either pointing a firearm or domestic battery with a deadly weapon, the handgun specification in the charging information is surplusage and was not required to be proven by the State at trial.

[19] Furthermore, our courts have clarified any variance between the charging information and the proof at trial is reversible error only if it rises to the level of a fatal variance. Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014). Relief is required only if the variance: (1) misled the defendant in preparing a defense, resulting in prejudice; or (2) leaves the defendant vulnerable to future prosecution under the same evidence. Id.; Jones v. State, 810 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Smith has not established, or even argued, that he was misled and prejudiced in the preparation of his defense – which was that no gun existed at all and that T.S. was fabricating the incident – or that he would face the risk of double jeopardy in a future proceeding.

[20] Finding both that the evidence was sufficient to convict Smith and that any variance between the charging information and the proof at trial was immaterial, we affirm.

[21] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State amended the charging information on July 15, 2024, to correct a typographical error in the spelling of T.S.’s last name.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-86(a)(1) defines a “deadly weapon” to include, as relevant here, a loaded or unloaded firearm. I.C. 35-47-1-5 defines a “firearm” as any weapon (1) that is capable of expelling or designed to expel, or (2) that may readily be converted to expel, a projectile by means of an explosion.

3.   I.C. § 35-47-1-6 defines “handgun” as any firearm (1) designed or adapted so as to be aimed and fired from one hand, regardless of barrel length, or (2) any firearm with a barrel less than sixteen inches in length or an overall length of less than twenty-six inches.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.