Justin L. Moody, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Justin L. Moody pleaded guilty to Level 1 felony child molesting.¹ He raises several issues for appellate review, which we consolidate and restate as:

1. Did the trial court err by denying Moody's motion to compel documents from his defense attorney?

2. Did Moody waive his appellate rights in the plea agreement?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In April 2022, the State charged Moody with two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting. About four months later, Moody gave up his right to trial and signed a plea agreement with the State. He pleaded guilty to one count of Level 1 felony child molesting, and in exchange, the State agreed to move to dismiss the second charge.

[4] Moody's plea agreement included terms applicable to his appellate rights. The agreement with the State stated, in pertinent part:

I understand that I may, if I so choose, plead NOT GUILTY, to any charge against me and that if I choose to plead NOT GUILTY, the Constitution guarantees me:

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g) the right, in the event that I should be found guilty of the charge against me, to appeal my conviction on such charge to a higher court.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 43–44. In addition, the plea agreement explicitly stated Moody waived “the right to a speedy public trial by jury and all of the attendant [c]onstitutional [r]ights” by pleading guilty. Id. at 44. The agreement concluded with language bearing on the question of Moody's sentence:

The Defendant has been advised and understands that the possible penalty for ․ Level 1 felony [child molesting] is imprisonment between twenty (20) and [fifty] (50) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years. I understand the advisory sentence is the sentence that a judge may voluntarily consider as the starting point when determining my sentence․

I understand that I have a right to appeal my sentence if there is an open plea. An open plea is an agreement which leaves my sentence to the Judge's discretion. I hereby waive my right to appeal my sentence ․ so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my plea agreement.

Id. at 44–45.

[5] Moody and his counsel signed the plea agreement, which the trial court accepted. The court found Moody to be a credit restricted felon, and sentenced him to forty years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”), with five years suspended to probation following his release.

[6] Sometime in August 2023, Moody allegedly sent a request to his former defense attorney—Sean P. Hilgendorf—for a copy of his client file. Then, on October 4, Moody filed a motion with the trial court to compel production of a “complete and accurate” copy of his “client file” from Hilgendorf. Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 3. Pursuant to the court's order, Hilgendorf filed a response on October 30, in which he attested to having “copied all physical documents in his file and mailed them” to Moody at the DOC. Id. at 8. Over the next several months, Moody made multiple requests for transcripts of his plea and sentencing proceedings with the court reporter. In October 2024, he sent another request for documents to Hilgendorf directly, this time asking for all discovery papers; electronic correspondence between Hilgendorf and the prosecution; and “[a]ny documents of Plea Agreement offers[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32. Hilgendorf replied that the complete file had already been sent. About two months later, Moody filed a second motion to compel documents with the trial court, alleging Hilgendorf failed to satisfy his request as statute required. On January 28, 2025—once again pursuant to court order—Hilgendorf reported to the court he had previously sent all contents of Moody's file to him.

[7] Before the trial court ruled on Moody's second motion to compel documents, Moody filed a petition seeking permission to file a belated notice of appeal. In September, the trial court issued an order. The court denied Moody's motion to compel documents, finding Hilgendorf “has repeatedly affirmed that he has responded to [Moody's] requests.” Id. at 17. As for his petition to file a belated notice of appeal, the court concluded Moody's guilty plea foreclosed the possibility of challenging his conviction on direct appeal.

The trial court did not err by denying Moody's motion to compel documents.

[8] Moody, pro se, first argues the trial court erred when it denied his second motion to compel attorney-client files. He alleges Hilgendorf never “relinquished” files associated with his criminal conviction and should be held in contempt “as prescribed by Indiana law.” Appellant's Br. at 8.

[9] In support of his motion to compel, Moody relied on Indiana Code Section 33-43-1-9 (2004), which states:

If, on request, an attorney refuses to deliver over money or papers to a person from whom or for whom the attorney has received them, in the course of the attorney's professional employment, the attorney may be required, after reasonable notice, on motion of any party aggrieved, by an order of the court in which an action, if any, was prosecuted or if an action was not prosecuted, by the order of any court of record, to deliver the money or papers within a specified time, or show cause why the attorney should not be punished for contempt.

[10] Section 33-43-1-9 “protects the property rights of clients[,]” such as the “papers” produced during an attorney's representation. Pigg v. State, 929 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Following a motion by the represented party, “the trial court shall require an attorney to deliver all papers he obtained pertaining to the representation to which the client is entitled.” Johnson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 222, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(d) (obligating an attorney to surrender “papers and property” a client is owed following the termination of representation). The trial court need not hold a hearing to decide on the motion. See Pigg, 929 N.E.2d at 802–03. A denial of a motion to compel documents is a final appealable order. See Smith v. State, 426 N.E.2d 402, 404 (Ind. 1981). Where, as here, “the trial court has ruled on a paper record, we owe the trial court's findings and judgment no deference and review the decision de novo.” Pigg, 929 N.E.2d at 804–05.

[11] Moody filed his initial motion to compel on October 4, 2023, seeking all documents related to his conviction for child molesting. Pursuant to the trial court's order, Hilgendorf responded that he had “copied all physical documents” and “mailed them” to Moody at the DOC. Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 8. About a year later, Moody contacted Hilgendorf directly, seeking all discovery documents; correspondence between Hilgendorf and the prosecutor; and all plea offers Hilgendorf had received. Moody followed his letter to Hilgendorf by filing a second motion to compel documentation with the trial court. He reiterated demands for discovery papers, correspondence, and plea offers, and accused Hilgendorf of violating his professional duties under Section 33-43-1-9. After the trial court ordered a response, Hilgendorf reported again to the court “the contents of [Moody's file]” had already been sent. Id. at 14. The court denied Moody's second motion.

[12] Hilgendorf declared to the trial court on multiple occasions he sent all files related to Moody's representation to Moody at the DOC. He replied to Moody directly stating the same. The court found Hilgendorf “repeatedly affirmed he [had] responded” to Moody's requests. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 17. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by denying Moody's motion to compel documents.

Moody waived his appellate rights.

[13] Moody raises two distinct arguments related to his appellate rights. First, he alleges the trial court erred by denying his motion to file a belated notice of appeal. Second, Moody claims he retains the right to challenge his sentence. We address each argument in turn.

Waiver of right to appeal conviction

[14] According to Moody, he is entitled to file a belated notice of appeal under the applicable post-conviction remedies. See Appellant's Br. at 9–10.

[15] “We have long recognized that a defendant may forgo a trial and plead guilty.” Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind. 1996). Plea agreements are contracts between the defendant and the State, “and once the trial court approves the agreements, they are binding on the defendant, the State, and the trial court.” Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1232 (Ind. 2023). “Because plea agreements are contracts, contract law principles generally apply.” Id. (citing Berry v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1243, 1247 (Ind. 2014)).

[16] A conviction based on a guilty plea may not typically be challenged on direct appeal. Yost v. State, 150 N.E.3d 610, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). That said, under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(a), an “eligible defendant” may move to file belated notice of appeal if “(1) the defendant failed to file a timely appeal; (2) the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not due to the fault of the defendant; and (3) the defendant has been diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal under this rule.” An eligible defendant is “a defendant who, but for the defendant's failure to do so timely, would have the right to challenge on direct appeal a conviction or sentence after a trial or plea of guilty by filing a notice of appeal, filing a motion to correct error, or pursuing an appeal.” Haddock v. State, 112 N.E.3d 763, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(a)), trans. denied.

[17] A trial court's decision whether to grant permission to file a belated notice of appeal is typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but when, as here, “the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion to file a belated notice of appeal, we are reviewing the same information available to the trial court,” so we apply de novo review. Leshore v. State, 203 N.E.3d 474, 477 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

[18] In this case, the State charged Moody with two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting. In exchange for pleading guilty to one count of child molesting, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining count. Both Moody and his defense attorney signed the plea agreement, which the trial court accepted. Under the terms of the agreement, Moody waived his “right to a speedy public trial by jury” and all “attendant” constitutional rights. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 44. He similarly acknowledged he was giving up the right—in the event of being found guilty at trial—to “appeal [his] conviction” to a higher court. Id. Moody does not argue the agreement he signed was ambiguous, see Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1232–33, or somehow involuntary, see Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. 2008). And based on the record below, we see no reason why he should not be bound by the contract he signed. See Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1232.

Waiver of right to appeal sentence

[19] Along similar lines, Moody argues because he signed an open plea agreement, he retains the right to have this Court determine whether his sentence is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the [o]ffender.” Appellant's Br. at 10–11.

[20] A person who commits Level 1 felony child molesting faces a term of imprisonment of between twenty and fifty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-4(c) (2014).

[21] A defendant “who pleads guilty is entitled to contest on direct appeal the merits of a trial court's sentencing decision where the trial court has exercised sentencing discretion, i.e., where the sentence is not fixed by the plea agreement.” Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004); see also Kling v. State, 837 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2005) (describing an “open plea” as one where the trial court has discretion regarding the sentence imposed). Even so, a defendant may choose to waive the right of appellate review of his sentence as part of a plea agreement. Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 75.

[22] In Creech, the defendant argued the waiver he signed was not enforceable. 887 N.E.2d at 74. At issue was the following language found in the defendant's plea agreement:

I understand that I have a right to appeal my sentence if there is an open plea. An open plea is an agreement which leaves my sentence to the Judge's discretion. I hereby waive my right to appeal my sentence so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my plea agreement.

Id. The Creech Court held the agreement was valid, explaining a defendant may elect to waive the right to appellate review of a discretionary sentencing decision as part of a written plea, so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary. 887 N.E.2d at 74–75.

[23] Like the defendant in Creech, Moody knowingly and voluntarily signed a written plea where he agreed to “waive [his] right to appeal [his] sentence” so long as the trial court sentenced him “within the terms of [his] plea agreement.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 44–45. The trial court sentenced Moody to forty years in the DOC, with five years suspended to probation after release from custody. As the State contends, his “sentence is within the limits of the relevant statute[ ],” which means it “is within the terms of the plea agreement.” Appellee's Br. at 15. For his plea agreement to be unenforceable, Moody must show his sentence is outside the bounds of the sentencing range or unconstitutional, see Anderson v. State, 269 N.E.3d 817, 822 (Ind. 2025), which he cannot do. Moody waived the right to appeal his sentence.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court did not err by denying Moody's motion to compel attorney-client files, and Moody waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2021).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.