IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.D. (Minor Child) and (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.D. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights over her minor child, T.D. (“Child”). Mother argues that her procedural due process rights were violated and that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] Our factual and procedural recitation is based primarily on the trial court's unchallenged findings. Mother gave birth to Child on September 30, 2023. At that time, J.M., Child's alleged father (“Father”), resided with Mother. He has never established paternity. Child was born premature and spent approximately three months in the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit (“NICU”). On December 11, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a referral alleging that Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”), “that Mother had abused methamphetamine and heroin during her pregnancy[,] and that the parents were sporadic in visiting with Child while he was hospitalized in the NICU.” Appealed Order at 6.² On December 18, a DCS assessor spoke with Mother, who “admitted to using heroin daily during her pregnancy. Mother was given a drug screen which returned positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl.” Id. Hospital officials “had to restrict visitors to the hospital out of concern that Father would bring illegal substances into the hospital for Mother.” Id. At that time, Mother had two criminal cases pending in Starke County, one for possession of a narcotic drug, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of paraphernalia, and another for possession of a controlled substance, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia.

[3] On December 20, the trial court held a CHINS initial/detention hearing, at which both Mother and Father appeared. Child was ordered to be removed from their care, and he “would never return to the care of either parent following this detention.” Id. at 7. Child was placed with his maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). The trial court “also entered a series of interim orders for Mother and Father including orders for the parents to submit to random drug screens, have supervised visitation, have a substance abuse assessment, and receive home-based casework services. Both parents were also appointed counsel at that proceeding.” Id.

[4] “Neither parent would ever participate in random drug screens as ordered by the Court.” Id. “Father failed to participate in a single drug screen during the entirety of the CHINS case. Mother refused to participate in random drug screens through Cordant, however, she would participate in a handful of screens provided by DCS personnel.” Id. “Two of those screens were provided early in the CHINS matter; Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl on December 18, 2023 and for methamphetamine, THC, and fentanyl on January 25, 2024.” Id.

[5] The trial court held a CHINS fact-finding hearing on March 25, 2024. Both Mother and Father appeared with counsel. Mother admitted, among other things, that Child was a victim of neglect and that she had used methamphetamine and heroin throughout her pregnancy; that she had told the DCS assessor that she had used “heroin once a day prior to giving birth”; that she submitted to a drug screen that was “positive for illicit substances”; that Father “has an extensive criminal history” consisting of charges for domestic battery, carrying a handgun without a license, and multiple drug-related offenses; and that she had “two pending cases involving substance abuse.” Id. at 8. Father admitted to his criminal history and that he had not established paternity and could not prevent Mother from retaking custody of Child. “Immediately following the parents’ admissions, the CHINS matter proceeded to disposition and the parents were ordered to participate in a series of services aimed at reunification.” Id. at 9. “Mother and Father were ordered to participate in clinical and substance abuse assessments and follow any recommendations, to participate in random drug screening, to have casework services and parenting education, and to have supervised visitation. Father was also ordered to establish paternity.” Id.

[6] “During the early portions of the CHINS case, the parents were minimally compliant with services. Neither parent participated in random drug screens as ordered. Neither parent completed the Court-ordered assessments.” Id. Mother told a DCS family case manager (“FCM”) that “she wished to leave Father's residence due to issues with domestic violence.” Id. Mother asked if she could move in with Grandmother. “Mother was informed that she would need to submit three consecutive clean drug screens. Mother never participated in, let alone provided, three consecutive negative drug screens.” Id. “On March 28, 2024, Mother took another FCM-administered drug screen which returned positive for methamphetamine.” Id. at 10.

[7] On May 22, the trial court held a CHINS review hearing. Both Mother and Father failed to appear. “The Court found both Mother and Father to be noncompliant with the case plan, noting that neither parent had participated in random drug screens or their Court-ordered assessments. Father also had not taken steps to establish paternity and had outrightly refused to participate in drug screening.” Id. “Mother and Father would eventually complete parenting education and would be discharged from that service.” Id. “The parents’ refusal to participate in a random drug screening as ordered by the Court was a recurring and foundational issue in the underlying CHINS case.” Id. “Mother was repeatedly provided with instructions as to how to engage in random drug screening. Those instructions were provided orally, in writing, via email, through her attorney, and during CFTMs [Child and Family Team Meetings].” Id. “Accommodations were made on several occasions to engage Mother in drug screening. Mother steadfastly refused to participate. Mother, at times, refused direct requests from DCS personnel to participate in a drug screen. Father, for his part, refused all drug screening.” Id.

[8] In July 2024, Father was arrested after an incident of domestic violence and was criminally charged. “Mother was the victim of that incident and a no-contact order was issued prohibiting contact between Mother and Father. Nevertheless, Mother continued to reside with Father for the remainder of the case. DCS offered to assist Mother with entering a shelter for victims of domestic violence, however, Mother refused.” Id.

[9] In August 2024, the trial court held a review hearing. The court ordered Mother and Father to begin supervised visits with Child at Grandmother's home. Both Mother and Father “challenged whether DCS had made reasonable efforts to provide services aimed at reunification. DCS filed a Supplemental Report to Court on Reasonable Efforts which outlined in great detail, the efforts DCS made to engage Mother and Father in services.” Id. The court later entered an order finding that DCS had made reasonable efforts to provide the family with services. During the hearing, the court ordered Mother and Father to submit to a drug screen immediately after the conclusion of the hearing. “Both parents failed to submit to that drug screen as ordered. Mother would not participate in another drug screen until October 10, 2024. That screen returned positive for methamphetamine.” Id. at 11.

[10] In November 2024, Mother was arrested in Benton County “and was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, operating a vehicle with a controlled substance, and criminal[ ] recklessness[.]” Id. According to the arresting officer, “he stopped Mother as she was driving the wrong way on US 41[,]” and she “failed a field sobriety test during her traffic stop.” Id. “Mother admitted to using methamphetamine several days earlier[,]” and “a screen provided to her during the incident returned positive for methamphetamine.” Id.

[11] “In the fall of 2024, Mother began to claim that she was receiving substance abuse services through Northshore and/or Porter-Starke. DCS made multiple efforts to obtain records from Northshore and DCS was repeatedly told that Mother had failed to execute a release of information.” Id. “Eventually, in early 2025, a release was executed and DCS was able to get records from Northshore. Those records indicated that Mother completed a needs assessment and some substance-abuse related services.” Id. DCS made efforts to obtain records from Porter-Starke “and was told that Mother had been barred from receiving treatment through” that entity. Id. at 12.

[12] “Late in 2024, DCS modified the [parents’] visitation schedule to be supervised by a third party, rather than [Grandmother]. The parents stopped visiting after visitation was modified.” Id. “In November 2024, Mother filed a Motion to Dismiss the CHINS matter.” Id. “On February 7, 2025, a Permanency Plan Hearing was held. Evidence was presented on Mother's Motion to Dismiss and DCS's Response and Mother's Motion to Dismiss was denied.” Id. Both parents appeared at the hearing, but “Father left in the middle of the hearing with no explanation.” Id. “[T]he Court ordered ‘Mother to submit to a drug screen immediately following the hearing[.]’ ” Id. After the hearing, “DCS personnel attempted to provide Mother with a drug screen outside of the courtroom. Mother refused to take a screen and fled the courthouse.” Id. “Father's visitation was ordered [to] remain supervised outside of [Grandmother's] home. Father would cease visiting altogether.” Id. “Mother's visitation was allowed to remain in [Grandmother's] home, however [it] was to continue to be supervised by a third party. Mother failed to communicate with visitation coordinators and did not visit with Child until approximately June.” Id. A concurrent permanency plan was adopted for Child that included a plan of adoption. “Neither Mother nor Father became more engaged in the case plan following the change in the permanency plan.” Id. at 13.

[13] On February 24, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother's and Father's relationship with Child. On March 26, “a Status of Counsel Hearing was held after Mother stated she wished to fire her public defender.” Id. “The Court affirmed its previous order that ‘Mother immediately submit a drug screen, and admonishe[d] Mother that failure to submit a drug screen immediately following today's hearing may result in contempt of Court. Mother acknowledge[d] her understanding of the same.’ ” Id. “Immediately after the hearing, DCS attempted to provide Mother with a screen right outside the courtroom. Mother again fled the courthouse in defiance of the Court's order.” Id. The court then scheduled a show-cause hearing for April 2, which was delayed until May 28. On that date, “Mother appeared and was ordered to take a drug screen while sitting in open Court. Mother complied and that drug screen returned positive for THC.” Id. “Mother had been ordered to screen after the previous three hearings and it is likely that she anticipated that she would be ordered to be screened at the May 28th hearing. Nevertheless, Mother still tested positive for THC.” Id.

[14] The trial court also ordered Mother to submit to a hair follicle screen, “as hair follicle screens can detect the presence of illicit substances for a much greater period of time than oral drug screens.” Id. “DCS referred the hair follicle screen to a provider who was unable to make contact with Mother. That [referral was] closed for noncompliance. DCS then put in a second referral. Mother again failed to communicate with the provider or schedule the screen. That referral was likewise closed for noncompliance.” Id.

[15] On July 7, the trial court held a review hearing at which both Mother and Father failed to appear. “Both parents were found to be noncompliant with the case plan. The Court then suspended reunification efforts for both Mother and Father as neither parent had substantially complied with the case plan and with Court-ordered services during the 19 months that the CHINS case had been open.” Id. at 13-14.

[16] On August 15, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the termination petition. Mother appeared in person and by counsel. Father appeared by counsel, who made a request to withdraw, which was granted. The court took the matter under advisement and ordered the parties to submit proposed findings and conclusions.

[17] On August 25, the trial court issued an order that recited the foregoing facts and further provided in pertinent part as follows:

35. Mother and Father have made little progress toward reunification during the life of the CHINS case. Child was removed from the care of his parents due in large part to concerns with substance abuse. Mother admitted to using heroin daily during her pregnancy. While Child was hospitalized, Father's access to the hospital was restricted due to fears that he would bring drugs in for Mother. Both parents had recent criminal charges related to substance abuse. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl on two drug screens taken at the outset of the CHINS case. Mother and Father failed to address their issues with substance abuse and openly defied Court orders for drug screens. Father failed to take a single drug screen during the entirety of the case.

36. Mother participated in some limited substance abuse related services during the CHINS case. These services were unsuccessful. Mother refused DCS's efforts to refer substance abuse services and instead sought out services on her own at Northshore. Mother took a needs assessment which recommended intensive outpatient treatment, but then failed to attend an intensive program. Mother self-reported a history with opiate abuse but failed to disclose ongoing methamphetamine abuse. Mother averaged one substance abuse counseling session per month, approximately thirty minutes to an hour, but then stopped in April 2025. There is no indication that Mother did any substance abuse services in May, June, July, or August of 2025. The only rational interpretation of Mother's constant, open defiance of Court orders for drug screens is that Mother continued to abuse illegal substances during the life of the CHINS case.

37. Domestic violence between Mother and Father also emerged as an issue following Child's removal. Mother reported domestic violence in the home to FCM Madisson Westlund. Father was eventually charged with domestic battery following an altercation with Mother. Neither parent ever made themselves available for services related to domestic violence. Mother and Father are believed to still reside together in violation of a no-contact order.

38. Father has ceased all communication with DCS. He has failed to participate in the case plan in any capacity in months. Father has reported to DCS that he no longer wants anything to do with DCS.

39. The Court finds that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of Child. There is no indication that either Mother or Father will make efforts to participate in the case plan. Child deserves permanency and a safe, drug-free environment capable of meeting his needs. Mother and Father have not exhibited the ability to provide that to the child and have made little effort to do so. Child has never resided with either Mother or Father outside of the hospital. He has resided with his grandmother for the entirety of his life. Termination of parental rights will free Child for adoption so that he may find a family that is willing to provide him with a safe, drug-free home that is free from domestic violence.

․.

Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at trial as enumerated in the above Findings of Fact, the Court concludes that DCS has met its burden of proof, proving its petitions to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the child's parents, Mother and Father by clear and convincing evidence.

TO WIT:

1. There exists a reasonable probability that the conditions which led to and continue to require the child's removal will not be remedied; or

2. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child; or

3. The parent failed to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve (12) months following the child's removal from the parent's home under I.C. 31-34-2 or the child's adjudication as a child in need of services, whichever occurred earlier, or the parent is unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree; and

4. Termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests; and

5. There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment for the child, namely adoption.

The Court now ORDERS that the parent-child relationship between Child and his parents Mother and Father, be involuntarily terminated and all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations, including the right to consent to adoption, pertaining to that relationship are hereby permanently terminated.

Id. at 14-16. Only Mother appeals the trial court's order.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Due Process Claim

[18] Mother first asserts, “Procedural difficulties early in the CHINS case, including the turn-over of numerous personnel at DCS, lack of communication, incorrect referral and other information and long wait lists violated [her] fundamental due process rights in this case and as a result this Court should reverse the trial court's Order[.]” Appellant's Br. at 25. Mother did not raise this claim below. Our Supreme Court has stated that “a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016). As did the court in N.G., which involved the termination of parental rights, we “decline to consider” Mother's due process claim, id., primarily because the difficulties were ironed out and Mother continued to use illegal drugs and live with her abusive partner in violation of a no-contact order.

Issue Two: Termination of Parental Rights

[19] Next, Mother contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to protect their children.” Id. at 836. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[20] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[21] In terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support them.” Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. v. LaPorte Cir. Ct. (In re T.S.), 906 N.E.2d 801, 804 (Ind. 2009). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. Z.G. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re C.G.), 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011). When, as here, the findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[22] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove that there is a satisfactory plan for the child's care and treatment and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2), (3) (Feb. 2025).³ DCS is also required to allege and prove “the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)” of the statute, including:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

․.

(7) That the parent:

(A) failed to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve (12) months following the child's:

(i) removal from the parent's home under IC 31-34-2; or

(ii) adjudication as a child in need of services;

whichever occurred earlier, unless the parent's failure to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree was due to the failure of [DCS] to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5; or

(B) is unlikely or unable to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[23] Mother argues that “the continuation of the parent-child relationship does not pose a threat to the child and termination of the parent-child relationship is not in the best interests of the child.” Appellant's Br. at 33. We need not address Mother's “threat” argument because she does not challenge the trial court's findings that DCS proved the existence of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)(3) and (7). See In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“Due to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) being written in the disjunctive, the trial court need only find that one requirement of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.”).

[24] As for Mother's “best interests” argument, we note that in determining what is in a child's best interests, a court must consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). A central consideration in a best interests determination is the child's need for permanency. In re T.S., 267 N.E.3d 6, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d at 236.

[25] Here, Mother admitted to using illegal drugs throughout her pregnancy with Child, and she continued to use them throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings. Less than a year before the fact-finding hearing, Mother was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, possibly on methamphetamine, after she drove the wrong way down US 41. Mother also refused to submit to court-ordered post-hearing drug screens on three separate occasions. Furthermore, Mother continued to live with Father in violation of a no-contact order, which was issued after he was charged with battering her.

[26] Although Mother complied with some services, she has shown no signs of being able to provide Child with a safe, stable home free from illegal drug use and domestic violence. Mother states that “Grandmother was willing to do a guardianship of [Child] rather than adoption so that [Child] could eventually be reunited with Mother, even if years down the road.” Appellant's Br. at 33. As was the trial court, “[w]e are unwilling to put [Child] on a shelf until [Mother is] capable of caring for [him] appropriately.” In re Campbell, 534 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).⁴ In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. Therefore, we affirm.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   In quoting from the trial court's order, we have replaced references to the parties’ names with the foregoing designations.

3.   We rely on the version of the statute that was in effect when DCS filed its termination petition. In her brief, Mother relies on the prior version of the statute. Appellant's Br. at 31-32.

4.   DCS observes that FCM Gabrielle Winslett testified that “guardianships are subject to motions to modify or dismiss and each time a Parent might do that, Child would be subjected to uncertainty.” Appellee's Br. at 28 (citing Tr. Vol. 2 at 171-72).

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.