J.T., Appellant-Respondent, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] J.T. appeals the juvenile court's modified dispositional order awarding wardship of her to the Department of Correction (DOC). J.T. raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it modified her placement to the DOC. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 2, 2025, J.T. left home without permission and did not return. An incident report from the Gary Police Department shows that on January 15, J.T. turned up at school. Appellant's App. Vol. Two, p. 18. An officer was dispatched to the school and, when confronted, J.T. attempted to run. Id. As the police officer was apprehending her, J.T. grabbed for the officer's gun, pulled on it, and stated that she was going to kill all of them. Id. The officer called for back-up, and J.T. was placed into custody. Id. She continued to struggle and kick one of the officers, and, when placed in the police cruiser, was positioned on her stomach to stop her from kicking the back of the driver's seat. Id. at 19. J.T. was transported to the juvenile detention center.

[3] The State filed a petition alleging J.T. was a delinquent child due to committing acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute battery against a public safety official, a Level 6 felony; intimidation, a Level 6 felony; and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor. Id. at 41. At the initial hearing, the court entered a denial on behalf of J.T. and found that J.T. should continue to be detained at the juvenile center. Id. at 50. J.T.’s mother, Snow White, advised the court that J.T. had been hospitalized numerous times for mental health issues, and the court ordered an updated psychological evaluation of J.T. Id. While in detention, J.T. was involved in several incidents in which staff members were injured, refused to go to her room, and engaged in disruptive behavior in the classroom. Id. at 103.

[4] The parties subsequently reached a plea agreement in which J.T. admitted to the charge of intimidation. Id. at 87. In exchange, the State dismissed the battery and resisting charges. Id. at 88. In April, the court adjudicated J.T. a delinquent and placed her on intensive probation with a monitor, ordered her to participate in anger management counseling, take her prescribed medication, and participate in individual, family, and substance abuse counseling. Id. at 108-09.

[5] In June the probation office filed a notice of violation, alleging that J.T. violated the rules of her probation by cutting off her ankle monitor. Id. at 111. It was reported that, at some point prior to disabling her monitor, J.T. attempted suicide. Id. at 119. Based on these events, the State moved the court to modify its prior disposition order. It was further reported that, while in detention, J.T. attempted to flood her room and was placed on suicide watch for self-harming and combative behavior. Id. at 135.

[6] At the disposition hearing in August, J.T.’s probation officer recommended that J.T. be placed at DOC based on (1) her response to home-based services; (2) the lack of potential residential placements; and (3) the lack of response from the Indiana State Hospital. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 4. When asked by the court to expound on J.T.’s response to in-home services, the probation officer stated:

[J.T.] was placed on intensive probation in April of 2025. While she did abide by the restrictions of the house arrest of intensive probation, and she was present, and available for services, her lack of progress in them and resulting in her eventual removal of her GPS monitor, indicates to Probation that she is not amenable to home-based services.

Id. at 4-5.

[7] The court then inquired about the lack of residential placements and asked if there were any facilities that could meet J.T.’s needs. There were at least ten facilities to which the probation officer sent packets, but many of the facilities indicated that, given the level of aggression J.T. had demonstrated while in detention and at home, she would not fit in their environments. Id. at 5. And although two facilities put J.T. on their wait list, the wait was six to eight months in duration. Id. at 6. Probation thus concluded that there was no residential facility within the state that could accommodate J.T.’s needs. Id.

[8] As to placement outside of the State, probation explained the placement team did not send inquiries to facilities out of state primarily because they are merely satellite locations of the in-state facilities that had already rejected J.T. from their programs and thus would not accept her into their out-of-state programs. Id.

[9] Finally, the court inquired about placement at the state hospital. The probation officer informed the court that over the past thirty days his office had provided the state hospital with numerous records, including immunization records, school records, psychological evaluations, and discharge summaries from acute stays. Id. at 7. He had not yet received an acceptance or denial from the state hospital but had recently received a request for a physical examination of J.T. Id. The court inquired about a different contact at the state hospital to expedite the process and expressed its frustration with the challenges in securing mental health services for youth in crisis, stating: “This process has proven to be a colossal waste of time. Because while the gatekeeper has been asking for various and sundry things to make a determination about the need for mental health aid, this young lady has been languishing in secure detention.” Id. at 8, 9.

[10] The court indicated it was “not fully convinced that the mental hospital is what's best for [J.T.] because I've read enough information to suggest that she exhibits behaviors that are consistent with a diagnosis of conduct disorder.” Id. at 9. Nevertheless, before addressing the State's recommendation for placement at the DOC, the court called a fifteen minute recess and asked the probation officer to speak with the chief probation officer about whether there was any other avenue for obtaining admission to the state hospital. Id. at 10.

[11] When the court went back on the record, the probation officers advised the court that there was not another process available for admitting J.T. to the state hospital and that in a previous case the wait for a bed was about five months once the hospital accepted the juvenile. Id. at 12. The court and the probation officers discussed that the only option available is to house a juvenile indefinitely in secure detention while awaiting acceptance and a bed in a facility, which everyone agreed was an unacceptable option as J.T. would not receive services during that time. Id. at 13. The court then asked J.T.’s probation officer if he had anything else concerning his recommendation for placement at the DOC, and the officer informed the court that J.T. had just undergone a short-term acute stay at St. Francis Hospital. Id. The officer explained that this fact reinforced his recommendation for placement at DOC, which offers mental health services, because J.T.’s ongoing detention at the juvenile facility without services “is a continued detriment to her mental health.” Id. at 14.

[12] Concluding that the probation department had exhausted its resources on detention alternatives, that J.T. was a flight risk and a danger to herself, and that services provided at the DOC would be beneficial to J.T., the court awarded wardship of J.T. to the DOC. Appellant's App. Vol. Two, p. 152. J.T. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] J.T. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it modified its dispositional order and placed her at the DOC rather than a less restrictive setting. This Court has explained the way in which we review a juvenile court's disposition as follows:

The choice of a specific disposition for a delinquent child is within the discretion of the trial court, subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and a statutory policy of favoring the least harsh disposition. We may overturn the trial court's disposition order only if we find that it has abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.

J.J. v. State, 925 N.E.2d 796, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting A.M.R. v. State, 741 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)), trans. denied.

[14] Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6 provides as follows:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

[15] Here, in support of her contention on appeal, J.T. asserts that her probation officer had “given up on the placement choices” for her, that two facilities had accepted her and the state hospital had not responded as of the time of the hearing, and that her probation officer should have made the court aware of the lengthiness of the state hospital process so that the court could set a hearing date further out on its calendar. Appellant's Br. pp. 11, 12.

[16] We disagree. As shown by the discussions between the court and the probation officer at the disposition hearing, the probation officer worked diligently on behalf of J.T. and exhausted all available alternatives. Moreover, while it is true that J.T. was wait-listed at two facilities, the wait was six to eight months long. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 6. Likewise, even if J.T. was eventually accepted by the state hospital, the waiting period thereafter for a bed was estimated to be five months. Id. at 12. And putting off the disposition hearing until a future date was not a reasonable solution as the court and J.T.’s probation officer made clear. Even J.T.’s attorney acknowledged the negative impact a prolonged stay at the juvenile detention center would have on J.T.:

Respectfully, I am well aware, as I believe we all are, of the mental health needs of [J.T.] and I can presume in talking to [J.T.] that, of course, she would rather be anywhere but here in the detention center. And I agree with everybody wholeheartedly that to keep her in detention without any mental health services is not doing her any good. In fact, it's probably doing more harm. Unfortunately, at the same time I had spoken to mother and mother is of the opinion that it wouldn't be appropriate for [J.T.] to return home. And that she feels that the best means can be met by her being in the Department of Correction[ ].

Id. at 14-15.

[17] Before awarding wardship of J.T. to the DOC, the court explained the rationale for its decision and expressed its concern and compassion for J.T.:

I'm especially challenged because I genuinely do not want her to go to the Department of Correction[ ]. However, I am tremendously afraid for her and for her safety. Some of the most compelling things that I read in the Probation Officer's predispositional report were her behaviors on social media.

․.

So I have concern that even if I did just find that the time that she has been with us is sufficient, I have great concern that she wouldn't be in your home very long. I have great concern that if she were to return to your home, that she would soon return to the conduct and behavior that brought her to the Court's attention first and foremost. I really feel like I am without any other recourse to protect her safety, as well as the safety of your home and the safety of the community. [J.T.], I've made every attempt since my first time meeting you to connect with you in some meaningful way. I tried very, very hard to see beyond what's present to me on paper. I've tried very, very hard to look deep into you as an individual to gauge what are your needs. But I'm not able to get very much from you.

․.

And right now what I'm hearing from you, from your mom, from Probation, that your home is not the best place for you to be right now. I agree. I don't believe that staying in secured detention is best for you. But I need to have you somewhere that you can be safe and where you can continue to improve for yourself.

․.

․. I feel compelled still to commit you to the Department of Correction[ ]. One thing is I feel that you are a flight risk. Your mother has refused to have you return home and I do believe that you are a danger to yourself. Until you can get more help, I do believe that you pose a danger to yourself. I believe that the Probation Department has exhausted its resources on detention alternatives. The home isn't working. Services in the home isn't working. Probation isn't working. Placements aren't ready to receive you. We cannot house you here indefinitely. So I believe that the services that may be afforded to you at the Department of Correction[ ], will be beneficial to you.

Id. at 17, 18, 22, 23.

[18] Based on the evidence and the trial court's ardent endeavor to place J.T. in the most beneficial facility for her circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in ordering J.T. to be placed in the DOC where she could immediately begin programs that probation and the court believed will benefit her. See R.G. v. State, 212 N.E.3d 720, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (affirming trial court's modified dispositional decree placing juvenile in DOC where he could immediately begin beneficial programs, even though State and probation recommended residential placement; juvenile had violated terms of probation following adjudication of delinquency, engaged in physical altercations while in detention, and wait time at only facility that accepted him would be at least six to eight weeks).

Conclusion

[19] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded wardship of J.T. to the DOC based on J.T.’s mental health issues, conduct disorder, flight risk, and dangerous behavior toward herself and others, and placement at facilities where she had been wait-listed or not yet accepted had wait times ranging from five to eight months. Accordingly, we affirm.

[20] Affirmed.

Najam, Senior Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.