Sondra Lynn Harold, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Lafayette police conducted a warrantless search of Sondra Lynn Harold's vehicle after a canine officer had alerted to the presence of narcotics during a traffic stop. The search uncovered methamphetamine, marijuana, paraphernalia, and a handgun. Harold was subsequently charged with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony dealing in marijuana, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without ever having received a license with a prior conviction, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Harold moved to suppress evidence that was discovered during the warrantless search of her vehicle, which motion the trial court denied.

[2] A bench trial commenced after Harold waived her right to trial by jury. Lafayette Police Detective Ronald Dombkowski, a member of the Lafayette drug task force (“the DTF”), testified to the factors officers typically consider when determining whether an individual qualifies as a drug dealer as opposed to simply a drug user. Detective Dombkowski's testimony was admitted over Harold's objection. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court entered judgment of conviction against Harold for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 6 felony dealing in marijuana, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class C misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without ever having received a license, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced Harold to an aggregate sentence of seventeen and one-half years, with ten years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), three and one-half years on Tippecanoe County Community Corrections (“TCCC”), and four years suspended to probation.

[3] Harold contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence recovered during the search of her vehicle. She also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Detective Dombkowski's testimony. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either regard, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] On April 3, 2024, at around 6:45 p.m., Lafayette Police Officer Collin Haag was on patrol with his canine partner, Cygan, in an area where police had “been investigating multiple meth dealers within that neighborhood.” Tr. Vol. II p. 31. Cygan had previously been trained to detect the odor of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine. Officer Haag observed a maroon SUV and, upon running the SUV's license plate through the police database, determined that the vehicle's “registration was valid, but that the registered owner[, Harold,] was not a valid driver.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32. Officer Haag believed that the driver of the vehicle was trying to evade him because he observed the vehicle make several turns, including a turn back in the direction from which the vehicle had just come. At some point the SUV passed Officer Haag's patrol vehicle, with each traveling in the opposite direction, allowing Officer Haag the opportunity to see that “it was [Harold] in the driver's seat.” Tr. Vol. II p. 34.

[5] Officer Haag “did a u-turn ․ to get back behind the [SUV]” and initiated a traffic stop. Tr. Vol. II p. 34. Officer Haag approached Harold's vehicle to ask for her license and registration. Harold did not provide Officer Haag with a driver's license, only an identification card. Officer Haag observed what he described as “nervous behavior” from Harold, observing that “her voice was trembling and when [Officer Haag had] asked for documentation[, he] could see her hands trembling[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 35.

[6] Officer Haag went back to his patrol vehicle and called for backup because he “had suspicions that there was drug activity involved and so [he] was going to utilize [his] canine partner[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Officer Haag explained that he would not use Cygan without backup “because it involves me removing an occupant from the car and then them standing away from the car while I would be at the car and that's, one, a safety hazard for me, and two, I can't see what they're doing[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Officer Alejandro Ramirez responded to Officer Haag's request for assistance.

[7] Once Officer Ramirez had arrived, Officer Haag approached Harold's vehicle and asked her “to step out” of the vehicle. Tr. Vol. II p. 95. As she walked away from her vehicle, Harold told Officer Haag that she was having someone come retrieve her vehicle. Officer Haag and Cygan walked around Harold's vehicle and Cygan alerted near “the front left quarter panel of the vehicle in the front driver's wheel well.” Tr. Vol. II p. 115.

[8] Officer Haag advised Harold that he “was going to be searching the car, given the canine alert and asked her if there was anything illegal in the vehicle.” Tr. Vol. II p. 95. Harold initially responded no but later indicated that officers would find marijuana in the vehicle. Officer Haag indicated that when he went to

search the car, the vehicle was locked so I went back and asked [Harold] for the keys because I knew that she had them on her person, because she had consented to the search of her person. I had put them back in her pocket. I had asked for them, for her to unlock the car and she began arguing with me that she didn't want me searching the vehicle and that she wasn't going to unlock the car. So I told her that she can unlock the car or I would take the keys so I didn't have to forcibly enter the vehicle.

Tr. Vol. II p. 96.

[9] After Officer Haag removed the keys from Harold's person, he

turned, began walking back to the vehicle. I heard Officer Ramirez say hey stop or words to that affect, and turned around and noticed that she was walking after me. So at that time, she began [(sic)] more agitated and at that time I decided that I was just going to detain her in handcuffs, you know, for my own safety, for Officer Ramirez's safety. So I went to go put her in handcuffs. She again argued with me, was more agitated, forcibly resisted, pulling her arms to the front. I pulled them back. Eventually I had to perform a take down, lower to the ground and we were eventually able to get her into handcuffs and then into a patrol vehicle.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 96–97. Before being placed in the patrol vehicle, Harold offered the statement “along the lines of you might also find some meth in there, or words to that affect.” Tr. Vol. II p. 97.

[10] Officers Haag and Ryan Shaak searched the vehicle and found 19.01 grams of methamphetamine, 26.45 grams of marijuana in multiple jars, other marijuana in baggies packaged in a manner consistent with being sold, a digital scale with methamphetamine residue, $511.00 in cash combined between the vehicle and Harold's person, unused small plastic baggies, drug paraphernalia including pipes that had methamphetamine residue and a grinder, three cellular telephones, and a handgun.¹ When analyzed for DNA, one of the bags contained a mixture of three persons that was “at least one trillion times more likely” to have originated from Harold and two unknown persons than it was to have come from three unknown persons. Tr. Vol. II p. 152. One of Harold's cellular telephones was later analyzed and contained messages about drug use and sales.

[11] On April 2, 2024, the State charged Harold with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony dealing in marijuana, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license with a prior conviction, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On January 24, 2025, Harold moved to suppress the evidence seized from her vehicle. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Harold's motion.² The State amended the methamphetamine-possession count to elevate it to a Level 3 felony due to the possession of a firearm. Harold subsequently waived her right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial.

[12] At the start of trial, Harold renewed her motion to suppress, and the trial court reaffirmed its prior ruling.³ In addition to Officers Haag, Ramirez, and Shaak, Detective Dombkowski testified that he had been a member of the DTF for eight years, had completed “quite of bit of training” in those eight years, and had been involved with “thousands” of drug-dealing investigations as part of his work on the DTF. Tr. Vol. II p. 160. During Detective Dombkowski's testimony, the following exchange occurred:

[The State:] Based on your training and experience, are there certain factors that you look at to determine whether someone is a drug dealer versus a user?

[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Calls for the ultimate conclusion.

[Trial Court]: He's not being asked to make any recommendation---or make any opinions in this case yet, just as to what he looks at generally speaking. I'll allow it. Go ahead.

Tr. Vol. II p. 162. Detective Dombkowski responded that, in his experience, there are “several factors that [police] look at during [an] investigation to determine whether somebody is classified as a dealer or user.” Tr. Vol. II p. 162. Detective Dombkowski explained that

[t]he biggest factor in our eyes is basically the weight that's involved. Depending on what the substance is that is in question. Different, different drugs are packaged differently. Different drugs are packaged in different amounts, differently. An example would be something like spice or marijuana, sometimes you get a bigger amount for not as much money and other substances, such as heroin, meth or cocaine, a little bit of that would be pricier out on the street. So we're looking at quantities, we're looking at packaging. In my experience both dealers and users carry scales on them. Both in their homes as well as when they're out and about. So just having a scale alone doesn't really classify you as a user or a dealer. Typically, the way items are packaged, like I said, sometimes they're, they're bought in bulk and then they are redistributed in smaller packages. Other times they're not. So it depends on the substance. Depends on the circumstances. Other, other areas that we look at is if somebody is a user or dealer, we're looking at signs that somebody is a user, whether they have syringe marks on their arms or on their body, whether they're impaired, whether they have burn marks on their hands or on their lips from pipes. Whether they're intoxicated or impaired during the time that we talked to them. Things of that nature.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 162–63.

[13] Detective Dombkowski further testified that in his experience,

typically, people don't have large amounts of drugs, accompanying with large amounts of money. It's quite the opposite. If somebody has large amounts of money, they typically have small, a small amount of supply on hand because they've pretty much sold out of their supply and they're getting ready to re-up, and the reverse to that is sometimes they have a lot of supply on, on hand and very little money because they're getting ready to sell their supply.

Tr. Vol. II p. 163. Detective Dombkowski indicated that, again in his experience, drug users do not typically

have a lot of supply on hand because they're typically using the amount that they have, and then not stockpiling amounts for later use[ ]. They're trying to get from one high to the next high and typically that does not translate into having a large supply on hand or a large supply for later use. The users that we deal with are, you know, are sometimes strung out, sometimes, they don't have a lot of money on hand, because they're either trying to steal or scrounge up money to buy little amounts for their use. They don't buy in big bulk.

Tr. Vol. II p. 164.

[14] Detective Dombkowski indicated that to qualify as a user of methamphetamine,

[t]ypically, it's been our experience, anything below, anything at 3.5 grams which is an eighth of an ounce or an eight ball, anything at 3.5 grams or less than that we classify as a user. Just based on the weights. It doesn't take very much to, for one use of methamphetamine, anywhere from depending on the persons tolerance and how they're utilizing it, typically it's being smoked. Any use between .1 grams all the way up to a gram, could be used for a single use.

Tr. Vol. II p. 165. Detective Dombkowski indicated that with regard to marijuana, “we classify basically anything below an ounce” as a user and “[a]nything over an ounce we typically classify that, as that person being a dealer.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 165, 166. Detective Dombkowski further indicated that, in his experience, it “happens quite often” that a person could be both a drug dealer and a drug user. Tr. Vol. II p. 167. Detective Dombkowski testified that “people that [police] see on the street during narcotics investigations typically have at least two phones.” Tr. Vol. II p. 169. He further testified that in his years of experience on the DTF, he had only come across an individual in possession of more than fifteen grams of methamphetamine for personal use “[o]ne time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 169.

[15] Following trial, the trial court found Harold guilty of all counts, except for Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without ever having received a license with a prior conviction, instead finding her guilty of the lesser-included charge of Class C misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without ever having received a license. The trial court did not enter convictions on either of the possession charges, “solely due to double jeopardy concerns.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 78 (emphasis omitted). On September 4, 2025, the trial court sentenced Harold to an aggregate sentence of seventeen and one-half years, with ten years executed in the DOC, three and one-half years on TCCC, and four years suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[16] Harold contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the evidence recovered from her vehicle. However, because Harold's case proceeded to trial where she renewed her objection to the admission of that evidence, her argument on appeal “is better framed as a request to review the trial court's ruling on its admissibility.” Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014).

[17] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. “We will not reweigh the evidence and will resolve all conflicts in favor of the trial court's ruling.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Furthermore, “we will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Admitting the Evidence Recovered from Harold's Vehicle

[18] Harold argues that the evidence recovered from her vehicle should have been excluded under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the “Fourth Amendment”) and Article I, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution (“Article I, Section 11”).

A. The Fourth Amendment

[19] The Fourth Amendment provides as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

“Accordingly, a warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, and the State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.” M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[20] One of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception.

The automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows police to search a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle. This doctrine is grounded in two notions: 1) a vehicle is readily moved and therefore the evidence may disappear while a warrant is being obtained, and 2) citizens have lower expectations of privacy in their vehicles than in their homes. One reason for this diminished expectation of privacy in a car and its contents is that cars travel along public highways and are subject to pervasive government regulation. Most cases addressing the automobile exception arise in the context of an arrest or an investigatory stop of a motorist that gives rise to probable cause, but the exception is grounded in the mobility of the vehicle and its location in a public area, not on whether the issue arises in the context of an arrest or a traffic stop.

State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).

[21] A search falls within the automobile exception “when a vehicle is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 878–79 (Ind. 2010).

Where there is probable cause to search a vehicle, a search is not unreasonable if it is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been obtained. The United States Supreme Court has stated that when there is probable cause that a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, a warrantless search of the vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment because of the existence of exigent circumstances arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle. Moreover, if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more.

Id. at 879 (internal brackets, citations, and quotation omitted).

[22] “Facts necessary to demonstrate the existence of probable cause for a warrantless search are not materially different from those which would authorize the issuance of a warrant if presented to a magistrate.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists where the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search would uncover evidence of a crime.” Id. We have little trouble concluding that probable cause existed here, as Cygan had alerted to the presence of narcotics and Harold had indicated that officers may find both marijuana and methamphetamine in the vehicle. See Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d at 1286 (providing that a positive indication from a “dog sniff” provides probable cause that the vehicle contained illicit drugs).

[23] Harold does not dispute that Officer Haag had probable cause to search her vehicle. Rather she argues that her vehicle was not mobile because it “was lawfully parked next to a curb in a residential area.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. In support, Harold cites Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. In Scott, a panel of this court concluded that a car was not inherently mobile once it was legally parked and the driver was detained because there was “neither a shortage of time, nor an emergency situation for the officers to deal with. No weapons were discovered at the scene, and there was no threat that the car might disappear and become lost to the police.” 775 N.E.2d at 1210–11. Harold's reliance on Scott is misplaced, however, because the relevant portion of Scott was overruled by the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 2005).⁴

[24] In Myers, with respect to the mobility requirement, the Indiana Supreme Court held that

In light of the [United States] Supreme Court's recent emphatic statement in [Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)], we conclude that this exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment does not require any additional consideration of the likelihood, under the circumstances, of a vehicle being driven away. Rather, we understand the “ready mobility” requirement of the automobile exception to mean that all operational, or potentially operational, motor vehicles are inherently mobile, and thus a vehicle that is temporarily in police control or otherwise confined is generally considered to be readily mobile and subject to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement if probable cause is present. This broad understanding of “readily mobile” is also consistent with the recognition that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an individual is deemed to have a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile.

839 N.E.2d at 1152.

[25] Applying Myers, we conclude that Harold's vehicle was readily mobile and was therefore eligible for the automobile exception regardless of Officers Haag, Ramirez, Shaak's presence near the vehicle and the fact that Officer Haag had removed the vehicle's keys from Harold's person. The vehicle's mobility is further evidenced by Harold's claim that she had arranged for someone to come and drive the vehicle away. The warrantless search of Harold's vehicle was justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. See Myers, 839 N.E.2d at 1152.

B. Article I, Section 11

[26] Article I, Section 11, provides that

[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

“While almost identical in wording to the federal Fourth Amendment, the Indiana Constitution's Search and Seizure clause is given an independent interpretation and application.” Myers, 839 N.E.2d at 1153.

[27] “To determine whether a search or seizure violates the Indiana Constitution, courts must evaluate the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “We believe that the totality of the circumstances requires consideration of both the degree of intrusion into the subject's ordinary activities and the basis upon which the officer selected the subject of the search or seizure.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

[A]lthough we recognize there may well be other relevant considerations under the circumstances, we have explained reasonableness of a search or seizure as turning on a balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.

Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).

[28] The record demonstrates that Officer Haag's degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred was high. In Ramsey v. State, 222 N.E.3d 1038, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied, we concluded that the first Litchfield factor weighed heavily in favor of the State where the officer had observed a traffic infraction and had reason to believe that Ramsey had been driving on a suspended license. In this case, Officer Haag had reason to believe that Harold was not a licensed driver at the time he initiated the traffic stop. Officer Haag's suspicions were further heightened after his canine partner had alerted to the presence of narcotics. See Dunem v. State, 254 N.E.3d 559, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (finding that the officer's degree of confidence of the presence of narcotics had increased after the officer's canine partner had alerted to the presence of narcotics), trans. denied. This factor weighs heavily in favor of the State.

[29] As for the degree of intrusion of the search,

[w]e measure the degree of intrusion from the defendant's point of view, considering the intrusion into both the citizen's physical movements and the citizen's privacy. Additionally, we focus on the degree of intrusion caused by the method of search or seizure. That is, how officers conduct a search or seizure matters.

Id. at 571 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The dog sniff itself was not a search and, especially because it occurred shortly after the bus was stopped, the resulting intrusion was minimal.” Id.; see also Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d at 1286 (“It is well settled that a dog sniff is not a search ․ [and a]ccordingly, no degree of suspicion is required to summon the canine unit to the scene to conduct an exterior sniff of the car or to conduct the sniff itself.”). “Likewise, a traffic stop typically amounts to a small intrusion on a citizen's ordinary activities.” Dunem, 254 N.E.3d at 571.

[30] The search did not result in an unreasonably extended detainment as it began about fifteen minutes after Officer Haag had initiated the traffic stop. During those fifteen minutes, Officer Haag had interacted with Harold, and his canine partner had completed a dog sniff and alerted to the presence of narcotics. Harold had also indicated that there were illicit drugs in the vehicle. In addition, Officer Haag had reason to believe that Harold had committed the crime of operating a vehicle without ever having received a license. See Cleveland v. State, 129 N.E.3d 227, 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding that the degree of intrusion of a warrantless search was low as the defendant had already been detained as a result of the initial traffic stop), trans. denied. This factor also weighs in favor of the State.

[31] Finally, while there were three officers on the scene, the needs of law enforcement were high. Harold had indicated that someone was coming to retrieve the car. We agree with the State that this fact increased the need to conduct the warrantless search because of “the possible soon arrival of someone who might try to drive the car away[.]” Appellee's Br. p. 19. In addition, the Indiana Supreme Court has “recognized that law-enforcement needs in combating drug trafficking—from individual operators to large-scale, corporate-like organizations—are great.” Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 947 (Ind. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). Officer Haag was patrolling an area where police had “been investigating multiple meth dealers[,]” Cygan had alerted to the presence of narcotics, and Harold had indicated that marijuana and methamphetamine were present in the vehicle. Given that Officer Haag had reason to believe the search would uncover illicit drugs, combined with the possibility that a cohort of Harold's would attempt to remove the vehicle, law enforcement needs to search and secure the vehicle were high. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of the State.

[32] Harold cites the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Brown, 653 N.E.2d at 81, in support of her claim that the search of her vehicle was unreasonable under Article I, Section 11. Initially, we note that Brown predates Litchfield, which controls, and also applied the mobility rule that was overturned by Myers. Both of these facts limit Brown’s applicability to the instant matter. In any event, the facts of Brown are also distinguishable from those in this case. In Brown, police received a description of a vehicle following a robbery. 653 N.E.2d at 78–79. The next day, a vehicle matching the description of the vehicle associated with the robbery was found parked near Brown's residence. Id. at 79. Officers “impounded and inventory-searched” the vehicle, finding incriminating evidence linking Brown to the robbery. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[33] In this case, Officer Haag observed Harold driving the vehicle and had reason to believe that she did not have a valid driver's license. Harold had been driving in a suspicious manner and appeared nervous during her initial interaction with Officer Haag. Within a few minutes after Officer Haag had initiated the traffic stop, Cygan alerted to the presence of narcotics and Harold indicated that officers may find marijuana and methamphetamine in the vehicle. Officer Haag's level of suspicion surrounding Harold's vehicle was based on his observations at the time of and shortly after his initial interactions with Harold and was directly connected to the vehicle itself. Applying the three-factor Litchfield test, we conclude that the warrantless search of Harold's vehicle was reasonable under Article I, Section 11.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Admitting Detective Dombkowski's Testimony

[34] “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Ind. Evidence Rule 704(a). However, “[w]itnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case[.]” Evid. R. 704(b). This is because the factfinder, “not the witness, is responsible for deciding the ultimate issues in a trial, and opinion testimony concerning guilt invades the province of the [factfinder] in determining what weight to place on a witness’ testimony.” Williams v. State, 43 N.E.3d 578, 581 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). “[O]pinion testimony may include evidence that leads to an incriminating inference, even if no witness could state an opinion with respect to that inference.” Id. (internal brackets and quotation omitted). “But an opinion must stop short of the question of guilt—because under Rule 704(b) and our constitution, that is one ‘ultimate issue’ that the [factfinder] alone must resolve.” Id.

[35] In Davis v. State, 791 N.E.2d 266, 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, we concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the investigating officer's testimony, which had been based on the officer's personal experience, that “drug users generally do not have large amounts of drugs on them” and, conversely, that “drug dealers generally carry larger amounts” of drugs on them. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the testimony “was helpful in determining the issue of intent to deliver because [the witness] established the distinct characteristics that differentiate between a drug user and a drug dealer.” Id. We reached the similar conclusion in Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, concluding that the trooper's testimony regarding the amount of drugs generally possessed for personal use was admissible as it was helpful to the determination of a fact at issue. We have also concluded that a police officer

may offer testimony as to whether particular facts tend to be more or less consistent with dealing in drugs. However, the [officer] may not make conclusions as to whether the defendant is a dealer or whether the defendant had the intent to deal or deliver. Similarly, the [officer] may not be presented with a hypothetical set of facts which reflect the facts of the case and be asked to conclude whether a hypothetical individual is more likely a dealer or user. In essence, the [officer] may comment on the facts of the case, but must refrain from making any conclusions as to the defendant's intent, guilt, or innocence.

Scisney v. State, 690 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 701 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ind. 1998).

[36] Harold contends “that the trial court erroneously permitted [Detective] Dombkowski to give an opinion as to the ultimate conclusion that Harold possessed with intent to deliver, and that admission of this evidence was prejudicial and did not constitute harmless error.”⁵ Appellant's Br. p. 18. Specifically, Harold asserts that Detective Dombkowski's testimony was “not merely generalized statements, which would provide the fact finder with attributes of dealers so that an informed decision could be made.” Appellant's Br. p. 21. We disagree.

[37] Upon review of Detective Dombkowski's testimony, which is detailed in the facts above, we conclude that rather than giving an ultimate opinion on Harold's guilt or innocence, Detective Dombkowski's testimony outlined general facts used by DTF members to determine intent, including the amounts of drugs possessed by a drug user as opposed to a drug dealer. However, Detective Dombkowski acknowledged that, on at least one occasion, he had encountered an individual who had possessed an amount of drugs for personal use that had been well over the general amounts to which he had testified. Detective Dombkowski's testimony was based on his experience as a member of the DTF and did not include an opinion as to whether Harold possessed the drugs in question with an intent to deliver or an intent to use the drugs herself. As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Detective Dombkowski's testimony at trial.

[38] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “[M]agazines and ammunition [were] located in the box with the handgun.” Tr. Vol. II p. 132.

2.   The trial court suppressed Harold's statements that resulted from her police interrogation but ruled that “any voluntary statements, not resulting from police interrogation, are not suppressed.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 63.

3.   Harold preserved her challenge to the admissibility of the evidence at issue by objecting when the evidence was admitted at trial.

4.   Harold also cites Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995) and Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied, in support of her argument. However, both Brown and Shepherd were decided before Myers was decided and, to the extent that these cases conflict with Myers, are unavailing.

5.   The State argues that Harold has waived this contention because she did not request a continuing objection or specifically object to the challenged testimony. Potential waiver notwithstanding, we choose to address the merits of Harold's argument.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.