IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of N.K. (Mother) and D.H. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] N.K. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to one of her children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother gave birth to D.H. (“Child”) in December 2023. Child's father is Du.H. (“Father”), who does not participate in this appeal. Child was born with fentanyl, norfentanyl, and benzoylecgonine (the main metabolite of cocaine) in his system and had to be treated in the NICU for withdrawal. The hospital reported to the Department of Child Services (DCS) that Child was a drug-exposed infant. DCS went to the hospital to speak with Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) on January 3, 2024. Father admitted to using fentanyl the previous day, and Mother reported that she'd last used fentanyl the day before Child was born, six hours before his birth.

[3] The following day, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was in need of services (CHINS). Child spent two weeks in the NICU, and after his discharge, DCS placed him in foster care, where he has since remained. The trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS in February 2024. In its dispositional order, the court ordered Parents to, among other things, maintain contact with DCS, submit to a diagnostic assessment, participate in drug-and-alcohol counseling, enroll in home-based services, submit to random drug screens, and attend all case conferences and visitation with Child.

[4] At first, Parents enrolled in some services and had supervised visits with Child. But by July 2024, when Child was six months old, they'd stopped attending visitation. Around that time, Parents moved to Ohio, but they didn't notify DCS within 48 hours of moving as required by the dispositional order. Parents missed the case conferences in July, August, and September because they were “having either car issues” or “sick and not feeling well.” Tr. p. 55. They attended the October case conference virtually, which was the last time DCS had any contact with Father. Despite referrals by DCS, Parents never underwent diagnostic assessments, participated in drug-and-alcohol counseling, or enrolled in home-based services. They submitted to only a few drug screens, all of which were positive.

[5] DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child in January 2025. The trial court scheduled the fact-finding hearing for June. Parents failed to appear because “their car broke down on the way to the hearing,” so the court continued it to July 17. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 74. Two weeks before the hearing, Mother completed an initial assessment for a drug-and-alcohol-treatment program in Ohio.

[6] Mother appeared for the fact-finding hearing by phone, but Father failed to appear. Mother admitted that she'd used fentanyl regularly over the last year, most recently a week before the hearing, and she and Father had used fentanyl together three weeks before. She testified that she was supposed to start her treatment program the following week. Mother acknowledged that she'd participated in treatment programs a couple of times before but had relapsed. She said that Father was participating in a telehealth drug-treatment program. Mother also testified that she'd been charged in Ohio with possession of methamphetamine in May or June 2024, and the case was still pending. DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) Andrea Caldwell said that DCS “found out today” about Mother's arrest in Ohio. Tr. p. 54. Additionally, Mother hadn't informed DCS about her planned drug-and-alcohol treatment program in Ohio or signed any releases so that DCS could receive information from her treatment provider.

[7] Due to time constraints, the remainder of the fact-finding hearing was held in August. Parents again weren't present due to reported car issues, although Mother appeared by phone for part of the hearing. FCM Caldwell opined that termination and adoption by Child's current foster placement would be in Child's best interests because Parents hadn't participated in services, achieved sobriety, or maintained a relationship with Child. FCM Caldwell testified that she hadn't received any information since the last hearing date that Mother had in fact started drug-and-alcohol treatment.

[8] In November, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[9] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[11] Here, DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024).¹ As to the first requirement, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, the existence of the following circumstances in subsection (d):

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 25, 88.

[12] Mother's only challenge is to the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. Because Mother doesn't challenge the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life, and Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) requires the existence of only one of the circumstances in subsection (d), Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) is satisfied even without the court's conditions-remedied conclusion. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied; In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“Standing alone, the finding that the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the children satisfies the requirement ․”), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Thus, Mother's challenge to this conclusion is inconsequential.

[13] Even so, there is sufficient evidence to support the court's conclusion that there is reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. In making this determination, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: first, the court identifies what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. This second step requires the court to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, considering evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id.

[14] Here, DCS removed Child shortly after his birth because he was a drug-exposed infant, and Parents had admitted to recently using fentanyl (Mother used six hours before Child was born). After Child spent two weeks in the NICU being treated for withdrawal symptoms, DCS placed him in foster care, so he has never lived with Parents. Although Parents attended supervised visitation at first, they stopped attending after they moved to Ohio in July 2024, so they haven't seen Child since then. As the trial court noted, Parents experienced transportation issues throughout the proceedings—they missed CHINS case conferences and two settings of the termination fact-finding hearing due to car trouble—and the home-based services for which DCS referred them could have helped alleviate these challenges. But Parents refused to engage in home-based services. DCS also referred Parents for diagnostic assessments and drug-and-alcohol counseling, both of which were required by the dispositional order, but Parents failed to participate. They submitted to only a few drug screens, and those they did submit to were positive. Although Mother claimed on the first day of the fact-finding hearing that she planned to start drug-and-alcohol treatment the following week, there is no evidence that she did. And she testified that she'd used fentanyl regularly over the last year (most recently a week before the hearing) and that she had a pending case in Ohio for possession of methamphetamine. Parents have not even begun to remedy the reasons for Child's removal and continued placement outside of their care.

[15] The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025, see Pub. L. No. 179-2025, § 25, after DCS filed its termination petition but before the termination order was issued. Neither party argues that this amendment has any bearing on the proceedings.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.