IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: R.A.P-S. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] R.A.P-S. (“Child”) was found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) in November of 2023, after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that K.P. (“Mother”) had been arrested shortly after Child's birth and R.S. (“Father”) was incarcerated. Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) were ordered to complete certain services. While Parents participated in services at varying levels, neither made meaningful progress towards reunification with Child. On July 24, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child. Parents contend, for the first time on appeal, that their respective due-process rights were violated and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Prior to Child's birth, Parents had engaged in illegal drugs and criminal behavior, and DCS had been involved with each parent “for their prior born children that they had with other partners.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 30. Child was born to Parents on July 23, 2023, while those other DCS cases were still open.¹ Mother tested positive for THC at the time of Child's birth and was arrested for an active warrant. Father was incarcerated at the time of Child's birth. Child was removed from Parents’ care upon being released from the hospital following his birth and placed with A.W. (“Foster Mother”), who happened to be the mother of Father's other children.

[3] On July 26, 2023, DCS filed a verified petition alleging that Child was a CHINS. Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS after Parents admitted the allegations set forth in the CHINS petition. Mother additionally admitted that Child had “tested positive for THC at birth, that she had [pled] guilty to [criminal c]onversion for a charge that was pending at the time of Child's birth, and that [she] had a substance[-]abuse issue.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 31. Father admitted that he “was then incarcerated and unable to care for” Child. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 31. On January 4, 2024, the juvenile court entered a dispositional order, which ordered Parents, inter alia, to maintain contact with the Family Case Manager (“FCM”) and notify the FCM of any arrests, changes in address, household composition, employment or telephone number within five (5) days of said change; enroll and participate in all programs recommended by the FCM or other service providers; obtain all required assessments; keep all appointments with service providers; maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income; refrain from consuming any illegal drugs; obey the law; complete parenting, domestic-violence, and substance-abuse assessments and successfully complete all recommendations; submit to random drug screening; refrain from engaging in any acts of domestic violence; attend all scheduled visitations with Child; provide Child with a safe, secure, and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and neglect; and work with homebased case management to increase parenting skills, gain assistance in obtaining housing and stable income, and increase parenting knowledge.

[4] Mother failed to fully engage in services and continued to test positive for illegal drugs. Mother completed a substance-use-disorder assessment in January 2024, after which it was recommended that she participate in a substance-abuse program at the Hamilton Center, but Mother never followed through. DCS also referred Mother to Ireland Home Based Services for homebased case management, but Ireland closed Mother's services due to her lack of compliance. In January of 2025, DCS sent new referrals for Mother to participate in substance-abuse and domestic-violence services at the Hamilton Center, but the Hamilton Center again discharged her from services after Mother had failed to appear for two appointments. Mother was also required to submit to drug screens through Cordant. Mother tested positive for both methamphetamine and amphetamine fourteen times between December 13, 2023 and March 21, 2025. Mother stopped submitting to drug screens after March of 2025.

[5] Mother was also “[m]inimally compliant” with her visitation with Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 52. DCS had referred Mother for visitation with Child in September of 2023, but that referral was closed due to Mother's noncompliance. Two additional referrals for visitation with Child were closed due to Mother's noncompliance. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, Mother had visited Child only twice since February of 2024, with one of those visits occurring the week prior to the evidentiary hearing.

[6] Father was incarcerated for all but eight months during the underlying CHINS case and failed to progress toward reunification when he was not incarcerated. Father was in prison until May of 2024. After his release, DCS referred him to visitation with Child where he received visits twice a week and was compliant with visits. DCS also referred him to homebased case management, but the referral was closed after a few months because Father “had stated that he didn't feel the services were necessary and became noncompliant.” Tr. Vol. II p. 58. Between August 6 and October 2, 2024, Father tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine six times. Father was briefly incarcerated in October of 2024, after the State petitioned to revoke his probation due to his positive drug screens. Father has not seen Child since he went to jail in October of 2024.

[7] As a condition of Father's release while the petition to revoke was pending, Father was required to complete a ninety-day substance-abuse treatment program at Next Steps. DCS began the process of resuming visitation while Father was participating in substance-abuse treatment and living at Next Steps. Father “got kicked out of” Next Steps because, according to Father, he had failed to report that his “roommate was sneaking in and out past curfew so he could be with the girl next door.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 170, 171. Two weeks later, Father's probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve 350 days in jail. Father was released from incarceration the week before to the evidentiary hearing. Upon his release, Father had reached out to DCS to resume visits, but DCS had not been able to arrange for a visit in the short time between his release and the evidentiary hearing.

[8] On July 24, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. At the time of the evidentiary hearing on September 22, and October 14, 2025, Father was on parole for a Level 5 felony burglary conviction, and Mother was facing a pending drug charge out of Vigo County. While Mother and Father had each secured housing, Child remained placed with Foster Mother, with whom he had been placed since he was two days old. Child's two half-siblings, i.e., Father's other children, also lived in the home. The plan for Child's continued care was adoption by Foster Mother and her fiancé. Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) Keela Ellis opined that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests, citing Child's need for permanency, Mother's failure to consistently visit with Child, and Parents’ overall lack of compliance. FCM Bryce Bement also opined that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests. The juvenile court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights on October 14, 2025.²

Discussion and Decision

[9] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

I. Parents Have Waived Their Due-Process Arguments

[10] Parents contend that they were denied due process, claiming that DCS had failed to make reasonable efforts to provide each of them with necessary services towards reunification. “Due process requires ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). In the context of termination proceedings, “DCS must also have made reasonable efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit in the CHINS case[.]” In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[11] While there was discussion during the evidentiary hearing about the services offered to Parents and DCS's alleged failure to schedule team meetings, neither Mother nor Father raised a due-process argument below. “[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016).

At a minimum, a party must show that it gave the trial court a bona fide opportunity to pass upon the merits of the claim before seeking an opinion on appeal. The policy reasons behind this requirement—preservation of judicial resources, opportunity for full development of the record, utilization of trial court fact-finding expertise, and assurance of a claim being tested by the adversary process—apply with particular force where, as here, the claim is a constitutional one.

Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004). “On rare occasions, appellate courts may analyze an issue under the fundamental error doctrine to examine an otherwise procedurally defaulted claim.” Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1214 (Ind. 2019). “However, this review is extremely narrow and available only when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Id. at 1214–15 (internal quotation omitted).

[12] Parents do not argue that the alleged violation of their respective due-process rights resulted in fundamental error. Parents, therefore, have waived any claim of fundamental error by not arguing it in their respective appellate briefs. See Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 264 (Ind. 2023). Because Parents did not give the juvenile court a bona fide opportunity to address their due-process claims below, they have waived appellate review of these claims.

II. The Evidence is Sufficient to Sustain the Juvenile Court's Order Terminating Parents’ Parental Rights to Child

[13] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[14] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[15] Parents contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of their parental rights to the Child. In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3). As is relevant to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of their parental rights to Child, Mother argues that DCS failed to prove Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and (c)(3) and Father argues that DCS failed to prove Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and (c)(2).

A. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[16] In this case, DCS alleged that termination of Parents’ parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing a prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.

[17] Pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal from and the reasons for his continued placement outside of Parents’ homes would not be remedied.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[18] The juvenile court concluded that DCS had “shown by clear and convincing evidence [that Parents] are unlikely to remedy the reasons for removal[,]” finding that “the time has passed for [Parents] to show [that] they are going to engage in services and remedy the reasons for removal.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 39. In reaching this conclusion, the juvenile court evaluated the evidence relating to this conclusion for Mother and Father separately. We will do the same.

1. Mother

[19] With regard to Mother, the juvenile court found as follows:

3. Throughout this case, DCS has offered services and visitation to Mother.

4. Mother was incarcerated for a brief period of time for a couple of months at the beginning of this case, but otherwise was available.

5. The testimony of [FCM Bement] and providers [establishes that] Mother was offered Home Base Case Management, Visitation, and provided services for substance abuse.

6. Based on their testimony, Mother was minimally compliant, if not outright non-compliant for much of that time.

7. Notably, Mother failed to visit with the Child for over a year prior to a visit that occurred less than a month before this hearing. It was disputed at the hearing whether Mother last visited the Child in February 2024 or June 2024. Even taking the evidence most favorable to Mother, failing to attend a visit from June 2024 to September 2025 shows a lack of willingness to comply with services.

8. It was testified to by DCS that visits were “suspended” at the beginning of 2025 due to Mother having an outstanding warrant, as DCS did not want Mother to be arrested at a visit in front of the Child.

9. While the Court understands why it may have classified this as [DCS] stopping visits, it is more accurate to say that it was on Mother's actions that visits could not occur.

10. It was testified that the warrant was on a failure to appear and was resolved by Mother without needing to be incarcerated.

11. However, this took a couple of months, as testified to by the parties. If Mother had either not failed to appear or had resolved the warrant immediately, as it appears could have been done, DCS would not have needed to suspend visitation. Therefore, the Court cannot attribute those missed visits to the actions of DCS.

12. Mother also failed to complete any kind of substance abuse treatment during the pendency of the CHINS case, which is notable as one of the main reasons for DCS involvement was substance use on the part of Mother.

13. Mother, for much of the case, was not consistent with submitting to random drug screens. At the beginning of 2025, Mother made an effort to comply more with DCS and began screening more frequently. However, these screens returned positive for very high levels of methamphetamine, and by April 2025 she stopped screening regularly. DCS EXHIBIT B.

14. Mother testified in Court that she is now sober[.] Her testimony was that she was able to obtain sobriety on her own.

15. The Court cannot give much weight to Mother's testimony.

16. First, Mother failed to screen for DCS since April. Mother tried to put her failure to screen onto DCS and a lack of communication. While the Court may have concerns with some of the efforts to communicate with Mother, as recently as 6 months prior to hearing she was able to contact DCS and submit to drug screens. Mother has failed to provide a compelling reason why she could not have continued to screen to demonstrate her sobriety.

17. Second, the Court finds that Mother's testimony is mostly self-serving and that Mother failed to take responsibility and account for her behavior. Most notably, during her testimony, Mother testified she had not received any criminal charges since the birth of this Child. Even considering that she was charged for a crime 3 months prior to giving birth to the Child, she currently has criminal charges pending related to illegal substances pending in another County. Even upon cross examination she refused to acknowledge them until the Court took judicial notice of those proceedings.

18. Mother's testimony in court shows someone who has not fully addressed or acknowledged her substance use that has caused DCS to intervene in her and her Child's life. As she has also not provided concrete evidence either through screens or showing participation in some kind of drug treatment, the Court cannot find that Mother is currently sober and therefore remedied that reason for DCS involvement.

19. The Court will note that the testimony by both parties indicated that Mother currently has housing and income, and that, while at times inconsistent, she has managed to maintain those throughout the case.

20. Housing and income alone are not enough to overcome the reasons for DCS removal.

21. Mother has not visited with [Child] for over a year. She failed to attend court hearings where issues could have been addressed. She is currently facing criminal charges, which while only pending demonstrate a pattern of behavior with a prior criminal charge that partially led to DCS involvement. Adding to this an addiction that has not been addressed shows that the Mother is not able to provide a safe and stable home for this Child, and that Mother is unlikely to remedy the reasons for removal.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 34–36 (emphasis in original). Mother does not specifically challenge any of these findings, which we therefore accept as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as correct).

[20] In challenging the juvenile court's determination that she was unlikely to remedy the situation that had led to Child's continued placement outside her home, Mother points to In re A.W., 62 N.E.3d 1267, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), in which a panel of this court stated that there was “ ‘seemingly nothing else’ that [the m]other could have done to demonstrate her commitment to becoming a better person and better parent, and obtaining reunification with her children[,]” noting that at the time of the evidentiary hearing, the mother had made significant progress in dealing with her addiction and had participated in and completed services while incarcerated that were “almost identical to the services” ordered. Given the mother's progress and other evidence indicating her apparent stability, the panel concluded that DCS had failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal would not be remedied. Id. In comparing herself to the mother in A.W., Mother claims that she had made significant progress in remedying the conditions that had led to Child's removal from her care, pointing to her self-serving testimony that she had obtained suitable housing and employment and had established sobriety.³

[21] Mother, however, did not provide any evidentiary support beyond her self-serving testimony to prove her sobriety, which the juvenile court found to be not credible. Additionally, Mother continued to blame DCS and service providers for her failure to complete services and did not appear to have accepted responsibility for her actions. To the extent she has made some progress towards establishing stability, Mother has failed to prove that she can sustain her claimed improved circumstances. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that Mother was unlikely to remedy the circumstances leading to Child's removal and continued placement outside of her care. Mother's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

2. Father

[22] With regard to Father, the juvenile court found as follows

23. Father's case is complicated by the fact that, for all but approximately 9 months of the CHINS case that opened in July 2023, the Father has been incarcerated either in a local facility or in the Indiana Department of Corrections [(“DOC”)].

24. Father was not incarcerated from May 2024 until October 2024, was briefly incarcerated for a month, then was released from November 2024 until February 2025. He was recently released approximately a week and a half prior to this hearing.

25. The conviction for which Father was serving time was for Burglary committed in April 2023. DCS EXHIBIT J.

26. As stated before, DCS was already involved with [Father] at that time for his other Children.

27. Father was incarcerated, unable to make bond, when this Child was born and the CHINS case was opened.

28. While the criminal case that lead [(sic)] to Father's incarceration occurred prior to the birth of [Child], the Court cannot merely just waive [(sic)] it away in this circumstance.

29. The criminal case also involved Mother. DCS EXHIBIT D.

30. At the time, Mother was pregnant with [Child].

31. Also at the time of the charge, Father had other children that were already subject to a CHINS petition by DCS.

32. It would be expected that the Father would be aware that criminal activity would result in DCS involvement and that removal of the Child from his care due to incarceration was a possibility.

33. Father would be placed on probation. However, he violated the terms of his probation when he tested positive for methamphetamine as part of this DCS case. DCS EXHIBIT[S] C & J.

34. He would be allowed to attend Next Steps, which he did from the period of November 2024 until February 2025.

35. He was then violated again on his probation and was subsequently sent to the [DOC] to serve the remainer [(sic)] of his sentence.

36. During his period of release, Father did have housing, as he would marry during that time. It was reported that he did work.

37. Father did have a brief period of sobriety outside of incarceration and/or a sober living facility from his release in May 2024 until August 2024, when he first tested positive again for methamphetamine. DCS EXHIBIT C pg 3.

38. He would frequently test positive in September 2024, and once again in October 2024, for methamphetamine. DCS EXHIBIT C.

39. While the criminal record submitted does not contain the alleged reason for Father being discharged from Next Steps, by Father's testimony it was due to violating the rules of the facility when he failed to report a roommate who was breaking a rule.

40. Father's situation puts this Court in a difficult position, where this Court must make a decision as to whether Father has had adequate time to participate in services due to his unavailability, or whether the circumstances show that the Father is unlikely to remedy the reasons for removal even if given more time.

41. The Court does grant to Father that he has been incarcerated for much of the case, and that during times he was not incarcerated, he was engaging with DCS, was regularly visiting the Child, and did appear to have indications of stability.

42. The Court finds, however that the evidence presented outweighs these factors and shows by clear and convincing evidence Father is unlikely to remedy the reasons for removal.

43. As to his compliance while not incarcerated, he was compliant with visits and some services, he did back out on home-based case work, and did begin testing positive in August 2024.

44. Then during his other period of release, he was in a sober living facility. While commendable that he was in a program, the concern is whether Father can maintain sobriety outside of any facility. The evidence showed that he only had about three months of sobriety while on his own, even under the supervision of probation.

45. The Court will not credit Father with sobriety for the periods of time where he was incarcerated.

46. Looking at his time at Next Steps, the Court does not find Father's given reason for being removed from their program convincing. In his testimony, Father did not appear to take responsibility for his removal from the program but rather seemed to believe that the problem was the rule itself.

47. This reaction does not give the Court confidence that [Father] has or will accept responsibility for his actions.

48. Father also has an extensive criminal history, including for domestic violence. [Foster Mother], Father's former partner, mother to his other children, and current Placement for [C]hild, testified that there was previously domestic violence between her and [Father]. During that charge, Father would pick up other charges that we ultimately all resolved through a plea deal on the domestic violence charge. DCS EXHIBITS E – I[.]

49. Once [(sic)] charge included Escape from Lawful Detention. DCS EXHIBIT I.

50. Father also presently does not have a driver's license. He testified that he has several thousands of dollars in fees that both him and his home[-]based case worker testified he was unable to pay down.

51. Father testified that he has at least 5 prior convictions for driving while suspended.

52. It does not appear to this Court that Father intends to try to obtain a license or to stop driving.

53. With the information provided to the Court, it does not appear [Father] would be likely to remedy the reasons for removal.

54. Father's actions show someone who engages in criminal activity, has not fully addressed their sobriety and substance use, and does not appear willing to follow rules when presented with them.

55. The Child is currently placed with the mother of his other children, who is pre-adoptive placement.

56. The Court acknowledges that this also complicates its analysis as the Child is in a placement, with the Father's other children who he also still has rights to.

57. If this case were one where Father merely needed to establish stability after incarceration and show he was capable of caring for the Child, the Court would weigh the current placement differently.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 36–39 (emphases in original). Father does not challenge all of the juvenile court's findings, only arguing that some of the findings are not supported by the evidence. We accept the unchallenged findings as true. See Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687 (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as correct).

[23] In challenging the juvenile court's determination that he was unlikely to remedy the circumstances leading to Child's continued removal from his care, Father appears to challenge Finding Numbers 32, 34, 39, and 46. Finding Number 32 provides that “[i]t would be expected that the Father would be aware that criminal activity would result in DCS involvement and that removal of the Child from his care due to incarceration was a possibility.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 37. While Father argues that there is no evidence to support this finding, the record establishes Father was incarcerated at the time of Child's birth and was therefore unable to care for Child. We have recognized that “[i]ndividuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children.” Matter of A.C.B., 598 N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). We cannot say that the juvenile court erred in finding that Father should recognize the effect that his incarceration would have on his ability to establish a relationship with and to provide care for Child.

[24] Father also challenges the juvenile court's findings relating to his participation in Next Steps, i.e., Finding Numbers 34, 39, and 46, which provide that

34. He would be allowed to attend Next Steps, which he did from the period of November 2024 until February 2025.

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39. While the criminal record submitted does not contain the alleged reason for Father being discharged from Next Steps, by Father's testimony it was due to violating the rules of the facility when he failed to report a roommate who was breaking a rule.

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46. Looking at his time at Next Steps, the Court does not find Father's given reason for being removed from their program convincing. In his testimony, Father did not appear to take responsibility for his removal from the program but rather seemed to believe that the problem was the rule itself.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 37–38. Father does not dispute the timeline provided in Finding Number 34 for his participation in Next Steps. Father merely argues that his “termination resulted from his failure to report the wrongdoing of his roommate and a female resident of which he was aware. Father himself had no write-ups or rule violation except for the one which he was terminated.” Appellant R.S.’s Br. p. 20. Finding Numbers 39 and 46 acknowledge Father's claimed reason for his removal from Next Steps, with Finding Number 46 indicating that the juvenile court did not find Father's explanation to be convincing. The juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was in the best position to judge Father's credibility. See Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (providing that the trier-of-fact is best positioned to judge the credibility of the witnesses, is free to discredit testimony, and weigh conflicting evidence).

[25] Father also challenges the juvenile court's statement that it

very much doubts that Father will comply with the services of DCS if given more time as he failed to comply with probation during the pendency of the CHINS case, failed to follow the rules at Next Steps, [and] has a history of criminal behavior and driving violations that show a pattern of non-compliance with adhering to the rules of a court.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 42. Father claims that the evidence demonstrates that he had complied with services while not incarcerated. While the record indicates, and the juvenile court found, that Father had demonstrated an ability to make temporary progress towards stability and sobriety, the evidence also supports the juvenile court's determination that Father had not demonstrated an ability to maintain his temporary periods of sobriety, calling into question his ability to maintain long-term stability. In considering whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation, the juvenile court was tasked with balancing Father's claimed improvements against his habitual patterns of conduct. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). The juvenile court did just this, balancing Father's claimed progress against his historical pattern of drug use, criminal conduct, and driving-related violations. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that Father was unlikely to remedy the circumstances leading to Child's removal and continued placement outside of his care. Father's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do.⁴ See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(2)

[26] Father argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment.

Indiana courts have traditionally held that for a plan to be satisfactory, for the purposes of the termination statute, it need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated. A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the children. In other words, there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent. Accordingly, a plan is not unsatisfactory if DCS has not identified a specific family to adopt the children. Part of the reason for this is that it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate.

In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[27] Father acknowledges that “DCS's plan for [Child] is adoption by current placement[.]” Appellant R.S.’s Br. p. 21. Father argues, however, that DCS's plan is not detailed and “is tentative at best” and that “[t]here is no evidence in this record regarding the safety or stability of the pre-adoptive placement, save opinion testimony from various sources, all of which advocated for termination against Father.” Appellant R.S.’s Br. p. 21 (emphasis added). FCM Bement testified that DCS's plan for Child's continued care is adoption by Foster Mother. Foster Mother testified that Child has been placed with her since he was two days old and is bonded with members of her household, that her two oldest children are Child's half-siblings, and that if Parents’ parental rights were terminated, she and her fiancé planned to adopt Child. Foster Mother indicated that while she had not yet filed an adoption petition, she and her fiancé planned to do so “[a]fter [the] TPR hearing.” Tr. Vol. II p. 136. Foster Mother also indicated that although she and her fiancé had not yet set a date to get married, they planned to adopt Child together. The evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment, with that plan being adoption by Foster Mother and her fiancé.

C. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[28] Mother challenges the juvenile court's conclusion that the termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests. We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child].” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[29] FCM Bement and CASA Ellis both opined that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child's best interests. The testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the child's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the child's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374. In addition, the evidence demonstrates that Mother had failed to comply with services or complete the required services. Mother has continued to blame DCS and service providers for her failure to make progress towards reunification. For instance, in arguing that the termination of her parental rights was not in Child's best interests, Mother points to her self-serving testimony that she had secured housing and employment and testimony that a recent visit between her and Child had gone “pretty fine.” Tr. Vol. II p. 104. While Mother may have participated in one recent positive visit with Child and secured housing and employment, she had failed to complete any of the services aimed at helping her achieve and maintain long-term sobriety and stability.

[30] In addition to its extensive findings relating to Parents’ failure to successfully complete services, the juvenile court noted Child's need for permanency. “Permanency is a central consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). Child is well-bonded in a pre-adoptive home, which is the only home that he has ever known. Despite the opportunities presented to them, Parents have failed to make lasting progress towards reunification. As such, we conclude that Mother's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's best-interests conclusion again effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[31] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The other DCS cases involving Parents had been initiated “due to the actions of Mother and Father[ ]” and “closed without the need for termination of parental rights.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 30.

2.   Father initiated the instant appeal on November 12, 2025. Mother did not initiate the appeal, as it relates to her, until November 25, 2025, when she filed a joint notice of appeal with Father. We note that the State argues that Mother has forfeited her right to appeal by failing to initiate her appeal in a timely fashion. While it appears that Mother failed to timely initiate her appeal, we choose to address the merits of her appellate claims.

3.   Mother also likens her situation to that described in In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d at 616, in which the case worker, despite having telephone contact information for the father and knowing that he was homeless, had only sent information regarding drug screening to an old address that had previously been supplied by the father. A panel of this court concluded that it was unreasonable that the case worker had not called the father to inform him of his drug screens. In this case, Mother had been aware of her drug screens and merely stopped showing up for screens after she had provided twelve consecutive positive tests. Mother's situation is not the same as that presented in T.W.

4.   Father also argues that the juvenile court's citation to Prince v. Department of Child Services, 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), is misplaced. In Prince, we rejected “counsel's suggestion [that] the responsibility for his client's failure to achieve and maintain sobriety in a timely fashion belonged to either the trial court or the DCS.” 861 N.E.2d at 1231. We went on to state thatFrom one parent to the next, the DCS and trial court have no way to know whether addictions treatment is failing because the treatment is not the most appropriate for the parent or because the parent simply does not care enough about reunification to maintain sobriety under any form of treatment. Accordingly, we will not place a burden on either the DCS or the trial court to monitor treatment and to continually modify the requirements for drug and alcohol treatment until a parent achieves sobriety. Rather, the responsibility to make positive changes will stay where it must, on the parent. If the parent feels the services ordered by the court are inadequate to facilitate the changes required for reunification, then the onus is on the parent to request additional assistance from the court or DCS.Id. In this case, the juvenile court issued a single order, which applied to both Parents. While Father argues that the juvenile court's citation to Prince is misplaced as it was not relevant to his arguments below, Prince is relevant to Mother's arguments before the juvenile court. As such, we cannot say that the juvenile court's citation to Prince is misplaced.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.