IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: T.K. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.K. (“Child”) was found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) in November of 2023, after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that Child lacked a sober and appropriate caregiver. K.M. (“Mother”) and J.K., III, (“Father) (collectively, “Parents”) were ordered to complete certain services. Parents did not comply with the case plan, and neither made meaningful progress towards reunification with Child. On March 20, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child.¹ Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to Child. Father contends that the juvenile court's findings are insufficient to sustain its order terminating his parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Parents on September 23, 2015. DCS became involved with Child after being notified of the poor condition of Parents’ home and allegations of “domestic violence and substance use” in the home. Tr. Vol. II p. 46. DCS was also concerned by the fact that Parents had attempted to avoid DCS engagement by trying “to abscond from Owen County into Greene County.” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Child was removed from Parents’ care on October 6, 2023, after DCS alleged that “Child [did] not have a sober and appropriate caregiver ․ and his needs [were] not being consistently met.” Ex. Vol. p. 20. Child was placed with Father's brother (“Uncle”) and Uncle's wife (“Aunt”), where he remained throughout the underlying proceedings.

[3] Child was found to be a CHINS on November 30, 2023. In its order finding Child to be a CHINS, the juvenile court noted that

[Parents] were not cooperative with DCS initially and avoided meeting with DCS, and [Child] was initially reluctant to speak to the [family case manager (“FCM”)] because of [Parents’] dislike for DCS. [Child] described in detail [Father's] substance abuse, [Father] dealing drugs, and was specific in his description of drugs he has seen in the home. [Mother] acknowledged domestic violence in the home that [Child] has been exposed to and she acknowledged [Father's] substance abuse. Both parents acknowledged using illegal drugs within a couple days prior to this fact-finding hearing. [Parents] are transient and do not have a stable or appropriate home, or a home that is free of domestic violence or substance abuse.

Ex. Vol. p. 27. A dispositional order was entered on December 28, 2023, which ordered Father, inter alia, to maintain contact with the FCM; maintain safe, suitable, and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income; refrain from using or consuming any illegal controlled substances; obey the law; refrain from engaging in domestic violence; and complete parenting and substance-abuse assessments and successfully complete all recommended services.

[4] Father has had a substance-abuse issue since he was in high school. Throughout the pendency of the underlying proceedings, Father has been charged with drug-related crimes in at least two different counties. He was also charged with unlawful residential entry in a third county. Father's criminal history includes a pattern of failing to appear for scheduled court hearings, a pattern which continued in this case. During multiple review hearings in the CHINS case, the juvenile court found that Father had not cooperated with DCS and was not in compliance with the case plan. The juvenile court further determined that Father had not enhanced his ability to fulfil his parental obligations.

[5] On March 20, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on September 10, 2025. Father failed to appear for the evidentiary hearing, despite having been given “clear notice” of the hearing. Tr. Vol. II p. 28.

[6] The juvenile court heard testimony that Father had failed to remedy the conditions that had led to Child's removal from his care. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Father had reported “that he was having suicidal ideation issues prior to enrolling in” an in-patient drug-treatment program. Tr. Vol. II p. 50. Father had multiple criminal cases pending, “which [were for] significant felony charges and would require some sort of incarceration or something that would inhibit his ability to care for” Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 51. Uncle testified that a few months before the evidentiary hearing, Father had shown up at Uncle's home, “smelling like booze[,]” and had requested to see Child, a request which Uncle denied. Tr. Vol. II p. 43. Uncle and Aunt plan to adopt Child.

[7] FCM Andrea Mason testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests, stating that, as of the date of the evidentiary hearing, it would not be safe to return Child to Father's care and that Child had “found a great deal of stability with his uncle and aunt and they are taking care of all of his needs.” Tr. Vol. II p. 52. Child's court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”), Blake Burch, also testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests, stating that Uncle and Aunt “are very loving and supportive of [Child].” Tr. Vol. II p. 54. Uncle and Aunt have obtained needed medical treatment and services for Child and, while in their care, Child's behavior and emotional well-being have improved. On December 4, 2025, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Father's parental rights to Child.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[9] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[10] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[11] In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3). DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d), including that the conditions that led to the child's removal from his parents’ care would not likely to be remedied. In this case, the juvenile court found that the conditions that led to Child's removal from Father's care were not likely to be remedied, DCS had a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment, and termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. In challenging the sufficiency of the juvenile court's order, Father argues that the juvenile court failed to make adequate findings relating to Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(2) and (c)(3).

I. The Juvenile Court's Findings are Sufficient to Support its Conclusion that DCS Sufficiently Proved Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(2)

[12] Father challenges the sufficiency of the juvenile court's order to demonstrate that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child's continued care and treatment.

Indiana courts have traditionally held that for a plan to be satisfactory, for the purposes of the termination statute, it need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated. A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the children. In other words, there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent. Accordingly, a plan is not unsatisfactory if DCS has not identified a specific family to adopt the children. Part of the reason for this is that it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate.

In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[13] Father asserts that the juvenile court failed to make any findings regarding DCS's plan for Child's care and treatment. Contrary to Father's argument, however, the juvenile court found that

[t]he plan for the care and treatment of [Child] is adoption by the current pre-adoptive kinship placement. CASA and FCM both believe that this is a satisfactory plan for [Child] and [Child] is thriving in the current placement. The Court concludes this is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of [Child].

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 37. Father does not challenge this finding, which we accept as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as correct). The juvenile court explicitly concluded that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment, and the evidence is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion. Father's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

II. The Juvenile Court's Findings are Sufficient to Support its Conclusion that DCS Sufficiently Proved Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[14] Father also challenges the sufficiency of the juvenile court's order to demonstrate that termination of his parental rights is in Child's best interests. We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child].” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[15] The juvenile court's findings relevant to its conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests are as follows:

11. FCM Mason has been involved with the family for the majority of the CHINS case.․ She described [Father] as taking one-step forward and two-steps back and opined that she has not observed any positive progress from [Father] on any issues during the life of the CHINS case. [Father] has not maintained regular contact or visits with [Child]. FCM Mason made extensive efforts to make contact with [Father] without success and he has not attended the majority of the [scheduled meetings discussing Child's care].

12. At the time of this fact-finding hearing, [Father] had 3 outstanding arrest warrants, has been in and out of treatment programs, has not been able to maintain housing, has no independent transportation, has not maintained employment though he was employed at the time of this fact-finding hearing through his rehab. program. [Father] had just recently completed a 30-day treatment program and he was experiencing suicidal ideation when he began the rehab. program, and when FCM Mason saw the father approximately one week prior to this fact-finding hearing he told FCM Mason that he is in a very shaky place in his recovery.

13. FCM Mason is aware that [Father] has a long history of substance abuse dating back many years and he continues to struggle with the same issues and has not made substantial positive progress on his issues. FCM Mason believes that terminating the parent-child relationship between [Child] and [Father] is in the best interest of [Child], and the placement provides stability for [Child] and meets all of his needs.

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16. Blake Burch is the appointed CASA for [Child]. Mr. Burch has observed that [Child's] negative behaviors have greatly improved since placement with [Uncle and Aunt], and he has observed the placement to be loving and supportive. Mr. Burch opined that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of [Child].

17. Melissa Lawson is a school-based therapist and provides services to [Child]. She previously observed [Child] had difficulty regulating behaviors and emotions in class and had a lot of anxiety. Since [Child] has been placed with [Uncle and Aunt], she has observed that [Child] has made significant positive progress and now displays very few negative behaviors and is doing very well. She described that the placement is very involved in [Child's] care and they provide a stable home and meet [Child's] needs.

18. Allyson LaFon is a school[-]based therapist that also provides services for [Child] since November 2023. She has also observed a lot of positive progress with [Child's] issues and she observes that placement is very supportive and meets [Child's] needs.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 37–39 (emphases added).

[16] In arguing that the juvenile court's findings are insufficient, Father asserts that Finding Numbers 13 and 16 “are summaries of witness positions, and not findings of fact from the juvenile court.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. We disagree with Father's description of these findings as mere summaries rather than the juvenile court's findings.²

[17] Both FCM Mason and CASA Burch opined that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. The testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374. The other quoted findings detail Father's lack of progress and stability throughout the underlying CHINS and termination proceedings. The findings also demonstrate Child's progress since being removed from Father's care and that Child's pre-adoptive placement meets his needs and provides Child with safety and stability. “Permanency is a central consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). Father does not argue that the juvenile court's findings are inaccurate or unsupported by the record, and we therefore accept them as true. See Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687. The findings are sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. Father's challenge to the contrary effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[18] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to Child. She does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Father cites Matter of G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001–02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), in which we cautioned against the verbatim adoption of a party's proposed findings of fact and noted that the juvenile court's findings, which we deemed insufficient to support the juvenile court's CHINS determination, merely recited hearing testimony. While the juvenile court's findings in this case reference witness testimony, the findings do so in a manner that demonstrates that the juvenile court considered how the testimony related to the statutory requirements for the termination of Father's parental rights. The juvenile court's findings detail the facts supporting its conclusion that DCS had sufficiently proven the statutory requirements. We have no issue with the juvenile court's presentation of its findings and conclusions in this case.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.