Ashley M. Carter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Ashley Carter (“Carter”) was convicted of possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony. The trial court sentenced Carter to 910 days, with 545 days executed in the Decatur County Jail and 365 days suspended to supervised probation. Carter appeals the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction and the inappropriateness of her sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We, however, disagree with Carter's arguments and affirm.

Issues

[2] Carter raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Carter's conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony.

II. Whether Carter's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

Facts

[3] On May 23, 2024, Decatur County Court Services Compliance Officers Dustin Barkdull and Curtis Keppel conducted compliance checks at an apartment complex located in Greensburg. Law enforcement informally referred to the apartment complex as “Crack Alley” due to its reputation for heavy drug use. Tr. Vol. II pp. 175, 190. Officers Barkdull and Keppel were assigned to monitor individuals under court supervision; Carter was a person on their caseload and was subject to the search of her person, property, and residence. Officers Barkdull and Keppel observed Carter exit an apartment. Carter knew both officers. When the officers approached Carter, she “appeared nervous.” Id. at 166. After initially appearing reluctant to cooperate, Carter complied with the officers’ announced intent to search her and her purse, and the parties later stipulated that the search was lawful.

[4] Carter placed her purse on the hood of a nearby vehicle. While Officer Keppel spoke with Carter, Officer Barkdull searched the purse. Inside the larger purse, Officer Barkdull found a smaller wristlet. Inside the wristlet was “a stack of cash with a crystal-like substance.” Tr. Vol. II p. 179. The wristlet also contained Carter's identification and credit cards, as well as a casino voucher. The crystal-like substance was loose; it was not contained in a baggie or any packaging.

[5] Officer Keppel conducted a field test on the crystal-like substance, which tested positive for methamphetamine. Officer Keppel then contacted Decatur County Central Dispatch to request an agency assist. At the conclusion of the search, while photographing and bagging the evidence from the wristlet, Officer Barkdull noticed a second crystal-like substance on the ground in the immediate area. Officer Barkdull had stepped on the substance, crushing it, before he realized it was there. Officer Barkdull believed the substance had fallen from Carter's purse, but he did not observe it fall and did not investigate how it came to be on the ground.

[6] Sergeant Thomas Tuttle of the Greensburg Police Department responded to the agency assist call. Upon arrival, Sergeant Tuttle was informed that a crystal-like substance had been located during the compliance search of Carter's purse and that a field test had indicated the presence of methamphetamine. Sergeant Tuttle collected both the crystal-like substance from the wristlet and the crushed substance from the ground, placing them together into a single evidence bag.

[7] Sergeant Tuttle spoke with Carter at the scene, and Carter admitted the purse belonged to her but stated she “did not know how [the crystal-like substance] got in her purse.” Tr. Vol. II p. 203. Carter indicated that several people at the apartment where she had spent the night had access to her purse, but she did not provide the names of those individuals. Sergeant Tuttle secured the evidence and thereafter submitted it to the Indiana State Police Laboratory. Forensic Scientist Gozel Berkeliyeva conducted the analysis and confirmed the presence of methamphetamine, which totaled 0.72 grams.

[8] On May 24, 2024, the State charged Carter with possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony. On August 25, 2025, a jury found Carter guilty of possession of methamphetamine as charged.

[9] On November 17, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court found Carter's prior criminal history and her commission of the offense while on probation to be significant aggravating circumstances. The trial court did not find Carter's mental health disclosures or the hardship to her daughter to carry significant mitigating weight and found that Carter had not made any meaningful effort toward sobriety until after her arrest. The trial court sentenced Carter to 910 days, with 545 days executed in the Decatur County Jail and 365 days suspended to supervised probation. Carter now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Carter's conviction.

[10] Carter argues that the State presented insufficient evidence for her possession of methamphetamine conviction. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is, therefore, not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[11] The statute defining the crime of possession of methamphetamine, Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6.1(a), provides: “A person who, without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner's professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses methamphetamine (pure or adulterated) commits possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, except as provided in subsections (b) through (d).” Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-2(a) provides: “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” And, subsection (b) provides, “[a] person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” The State, in general, must only prove that the defendant possessed an identifiable amount of methamphetamine. See Beeler v. State, 807 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[12] Carter first contends that the State failed to prove that the substance found in her purse was methamphetamine because the lab analyzed a sample from two locations from the scene, one from Carter's purse and the other from the ground. We disagree.

[13] Officer Keppel testified that Officer Barkdull directed him to perform a field test on the substance found in Carter's wristlet, and Officer Tuttle testified that, upon arriving to assist, he learned the substance had tested positive for methamphetamine. It happened before Officer Barkdull noticed another crystal-like substance on the ground. Berkeliyeva testified that she generally takes a representative sample of “what's inside the plastic bag,” and that if the samples had any inconsistency in colors, she would “take a portion of both pieces to make sure that it's representing the item correctly.” Tr. Vol. II p. 219. Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to find that the substance retrieved from Carter's purse was methamphetamine.

[14] Carter next argues that the State failed to prove that she had the requisite mens rea to “knowingly or intentionally” possess the drug found in her wristlet. Appellant's Br. p. 9. Carter argues that she did not know the drug was in her purse and that she was in an apartment where many people had access to her purse. Additionally, she contends that no paraphernalia or other tools typically associated with drug use were found in her purse. We again disagree.

[15] Here, Carter did not dispute that the wristlet belonged to her. The methamphetamine was found and concealed within the wristlet and intermixed with a stack of cash and Carter's identifying documents. When Officers Barkdull and Keppel approached Carter and announced their intent to search her, Carter appeared nervous and was initially reluctant to cooperate.

[16] The jury was entitled to consider Carter's nervous demeanor, initial reluctance, and mingling of the methamphetamine with her identifying documents as circumstantial evidence of guilt. Carter's argument merely invites us to reweigh the evidence against the jury's verdict and in favor of her reinterpretation, which we cannot do. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Carter knowingly or intentionally possessed methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony.

II. Carter's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

[17] Carter argues her sentence was inappropriate in light of nature of the offense and her character. The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; however, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[18] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[19] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025). In the case at hand, the jury convicted Carter of possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(b) provides that “[a] person who commits a Level 6 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (21/212) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” The trial court found that Carter's extensive prior criminal history and commission of the offense while on probation substantially outweighed any mitigating circumstances and, thus, sentenced her to a near-maximum sentence of 910 days.

A. Nature of the Offense

[20] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). “And given that sentencing ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference[,]’ a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).’ ” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[21] Carter argues that her offense involved a very small amount of methamphetamine, she harmed no one, no paraphernalia was found, and her conduct was no more egregious than a typical possession case warranting no more than the advisory sentence. Carter possessed methamphetamine while serving a term of probation. And she admitted that she was actively using methamphetamine at the time of her arrest. She had been ordered to complete substance abuse treatment as a condition of probation and failed to complete the required assessment. The trial court found that Carter had made no serious effort to address her addiction until after her arrest. Thus, Carter has failed to demonstrate that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of her offense.

B. Character of the Offender

[22] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character varies based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[23] Carter's criminal history, which spans twenty years, is a poor reflection of her character. Carter's criminal history began with a marijuana possession offense as a juvenile. As an adult, Carter accumulated convictions for maintaining a common nuisance, operating while intoxicated, leaving the scene of an accident, operating without financial responsibility, theft, and nonsupport of a dependent child. And Carter committed the instant offense while on probation.

[24] Carter's claim that she has made positive steps toward addressing her addiction is not supported by the record. Carter admitted that she had never successfully completed a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program. Although Carter had previously achieved approximately seven years of sobriety while living in Florida, she returned to Indiana and resumed using methamphetamine. She admitted at the sentencing hearing that she was actively using methamphetamine at the time of her arrest. The trial court, thus, found that Carter had made no serious effort to address her addiction until after she was arrested and her trial was scheduled.

[25] Carter also accumulated a child support arrearage exceeding $28,000 over a period of more than ten years. Although Carter testified that she had begun paying her child support obligation, the child support office confirmed that she paid only forty dollars in August 2025, immediately preceding her trial in this matter. Thus, Carter has failed to demonstrate that her character warrants a reduction in her sentence.

Conclusion

[26] The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Carter of possession of methamphetamine, and Carter's sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

[27] Affirmed.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.