Kaneisha Renee Kennedy, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In March 2026, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Kaneisha Renee Kennedy pled guilty to Level 5 felony intimidation with a deadly weapon. Kennedy appeals, arguing her four-year executed sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In June 2025, Kennedy rode her bicycle to a Waffle House where she and her husband were employed. When she arrived, Kennedy threw down her bike and “came walking fast” into the restaurant. Tr. Vol. II p. 11. Kennedy and her husband went out the back door, and an argument ensued.

[3] Kennedy then re-entered the restaurant, grabbed a steak knife, and approached Heather Betz, another employee. While brandishing the knife, Kennedy yelled at Betz and threatened to “gut [her] for sleeping with” Kennedy's husband. Id. During the encounter, Kennedy “placed the knife to [Betz's] neck for a few seconds[.]” App. Vol. II p. 14. Kennedy eventually pushed past Betz, took money from the cash register, and left the restaurant. Betz later said that she was scared for her life during the encounter.

[4] The State charged Kennedy with Level 5 felony intimidation with a deadly weapon and Class A misdemeanor theft. Kennedy raised an insanity defense, and the trial court ordered an evaluation. Clinical Psychologist Sean Samuels completed Kennedy's evaluation. Dr. Samuels reported that “Ms. Kennedy stated she was identified as meeting diagnostic criteria for Schizophrenia, Major Depressive Disorder, and a Personality Disorder” when she was only thirteen years old. Id. at 41. She also reported a history of child sexual abuse and neglect and that she was prescribed anti-psychotic medications. Kennedy further disclosed that she began abusing illegal substances at age thirteen, starting with marijuana and later including alcohol and crack cocaine.

[5] Kennedy told Dr. Samuels that her insurance lapsed in the period leading up to the instant offense, leaving her unable to pay for her medications. She indicated she had experienced increased “auditory hallucinations, visual hallucinations, and paranoid ideations[,]” including on the day of the instant offense. Id. at 42. She reported that she did not recall any of the events that happened at the Waffle House, although she had “[n]ever before” been unable to recall events in her life. Id. at 43. She also disclosed that she smoked THC on the day of the offense.

[6] After conducting further testing, Dr. Samuels found that although “Kennedy did endorse the presence of both hallucinations and delusions[,]” she was “feigning the presence of such symptoms.” Id. at 46. He further found that her results indicated “malingering, voluntary intoxication, limited impact of psychological symptoms, and an awareness of the wrongfulness of her behavior[.]” Id. at 48. Dr. Samuels concluded Kennedy did not meet criteria for mental disease or defect under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-6 or for the guilty but mentally ill standard.

[7] Thereafter, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Kennedy pled guilty to Level 5 felony intimidation. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss her theft charge and to cap her sentence at four years. The court accepted her plea and proceeded to sentencing in April 2026. The court reviewed Kennedy's presentence investigation (PSI) report, which revealed a juvenile adjudication for battery and six adult convictions including two for possession of paraphernalia and one for criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon. Betz testified that she was traumatized by the events and that she ultimately had to quit her job as a result. Kennedy apologized, stated that she took accountability for her actions, and again indicated she had worked on her mental health and substance use issues while incarcerated.

[8] The trial court sentenced Kennedy to the maximum four years executed permitted by her plea agreement. The court noted, however, that Kennedy was eligible for therapeutic programming while incarcerated and indicated she could petition for sentence modification upon completion of that programming. Kennedy now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Kennedy argues her sentence is inappropriate and seeks revision pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We give “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision and attempt only to “leaven the outliers” rather than achieve the “perceived ‘correct’ result” in every case. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Indeed, Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a “rare” avenue for appellate relief that is reserved “for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612-13 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Our deference to the trial court prevails unless we are “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). A defendant bears the burden of persuading us that her sentence is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

[10] When reviewing whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge the advisory sentence is the starting point. Horns v. State, 218 N.E.3d 591, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2014). The trial court sentenced Kennedy to four years executed, the maximum amount of executed time Kennedy could receive pursuant to her plea agreement. She thus received the benefit of her agreement by receiving two years less than the maximum she could have received by statute. A defendant's “ ‘conscious choice to enter a plea agreement that limits the trial court's discretion to a sentence less than the statutory maximum should usually be understood as strong and persuasive evidence of sentence reasonableness and appropriateness’ and appellate relief should be granted ‘only in the most rare, exceptional cases.’ ” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006) (Dickson, J., concurring)).

[11] Regarding the nature of the offense, we consider “the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense[ ].” Id. at 1286 (citation omitted). Kennedy attempts to excuse the nature of the offense by emphasizing that it was driven by a severe mental health episode. Nevertheless, while under the influence of THC, Kennedy rode her bike to the Waffle House and quickly entered the building. After arguing with her husband, Kennedy brandished a steak knife and threatened that she would “gut [Betz] for sleeping with” her husband. Tr. Vol. II p. 11. During the encounter, Kennedy held the knife to Betz's neck, and Betz feared for her life. Betz has been so traumatized by Kennedy's offense that she quit her job and has sought counseling. Kennedy has failed to paint a picture of her offense in a positive light.

[12] When we look to a defendant's character, we engage in “a broad analysis of the defendant's ‘qualities, life, and conduct.’ ” Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied). Kennedy argues that her sentence should be revised because she has a well-documented history of mental illness and that her failure to take her medication was due to a lapse in insurance coverage, not due to willful disregard. She also notes her remorse and efforts to engage in treatment while incarcerated. We acknowledge that Kennedy apologized for her actions and sought treatment for her mental health needs while in jail. However, that does not offset her violent criminal history or substance use.

[13] “A defendant's criminal history is one relevant factor in analyzing character, the significance of which varies based on the ‘gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.’ ” Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). It is appropriate to consider a defendant's criminal record “as a poor reflection on the defendant's character, because it may reveal that he or she has not been deterred even after having been subjected to the police authority of the State.” Rutherford, 866 N.E.2d at 874. “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[14] Kennedy's PSI reveals one adjudication as a juvenile for assault and six convictions as an adult. Among those is an “eerily similar” conviction for Level 6 felony criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon, involving a handgun and Kennedy's accusation that her husband was involved with another woman. Tr. Vol. II p. 22. In addition, Kennedy has two prior convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia, and she was admittedly under the influence of THC on the date of the instant offense. Kennedy's history demonstrates that she has not been deterred from committing crimes, even after being subjected to the State's police authority, which reflects poorly on her character. See Rutherford, 866 N.E.2d at 874.

[15] Kennedy has failed to persuade us that her sentence is a rare and exceptional case in need of revision. Her sentence is not inappropriate.

[16] Affirmed.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur