Shane L. Frost, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Shane Frost was around forty years old when he arranged by text message to pick up a fourteen-year-old girl (Victim) who lived two hours away, take her to a motel, and have sexual intercourse with her. Fifteen years later, Frost faced a jury tasked with deciding whether he had committed several child sex crimes associated with that motel stay. The jury found Frost guilty of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and Class D felony child solicitation, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years imprisonment.

[2] Frost appeals, claiming his sentence is inappropriate and that it should not exceed ten years imprisonment. Because Frost has not met his burden of showing that sentencing revision is merited, we affirm.

Facts

[3] Thirteen-year-old Victim spent most of the summer of 2010 in Elkhart. She lived with adults she knew well, including Witness 1, who worked with Frost. Victim accompanied Witness 1 to work each day, spending time in a small building while Witness 1 was in meetings elsewhere on the workplace's grounds. Witness 1 thought of Frost as a role model for Victim. Frost sometimes gave small tasks to Victim, who told him her age.

[4] During that summer, Frost kissed and touched Victim sexually both in his office and in his car. He also engaged in sexual intercourse with Victim at a motel and at his home after taking her to those locations.¹

[5] Victim returned home to Allen County toward the end of the summer, after her fourteenth birthday. She and Frost stayed in contact through text messages. Victim testified that they planned for Frost to visit her “to have sex” at a motel. Tr. Vol. II, p. 111. On a school day that fall before Thanksgiving, Frost drove about two hours from Elkhart to Allen County and picked up Victim either at her school or at her home. He then drove her from that location to a motel about thirty minutes away. Once at the motel, Frost engaged in sexual intercourse with Victim. Their contact thereafter decreased and soon ended altogether.

[6] More than a dozen years later, in 2023, Victim, then twenty-seven, observed that Frost was listed on her Facebook account as someone she might know and messaged him. Noting that she was only a child in 2010, Victim stated that Frost “ruined [her] life and took [her] innocence away and changed the way [she] grew up.” Exhs., p. 4. Frost repeatedly apologized to Victim in return messages. Among other things, in response to her statement that what he did was “considered rape,” Frost wrote that he was “so very sorry for hurting [Victim].” Id. at 10. He explained that he “[w]as losing [his] home and family during that time” and was using drugs and alcohol. Id. at 5.

[7] When Victim messaged Frost again two months later and asked whether “the first touch happen[ed] in your office or on a drive to” Frost's workplace, Frost replied that he was “not sure [he] remember[ed] any of that.” Id. at 40. Soon thereafter, Victim reported Frost's sexual misconduct to the Fort Wayne Police Department.

[8] Frost was charged with various child sex crimes in Allen County. Frost testified in his own defense at his three-day jury trial in March 2026. He described his 2023 messages to Victim as his expression of empathy to her, as she was experiencing financial and family-related stress at the time. Frost conceded that he had fabricated his references to alcohol and drugs. Although the jury acquitted him of one count of Class B felony sexual misconduct (digital penetration), it convicted him of three counts: Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor (sexual intercourse); Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor (touching or fondling); and Class D felony child solicitation.

[9] At his sentencing hearing, Frost's wife and three adult children described his role in caring for aging relatives, his volunteer work, and what they viewed as his good character. Other individuals submitted letters of support portraying Frost, then fifty-five, as a devoted family man, business owner, and community volunteer. Victim's mother and a woman Victim considered a second mother gave impact statements describing the lasting emotional harm Frost's offenses caused Victim, including their effects on her ability to trust others, her sense of safety, and her anxiety. Both requested the maximum sentence. Victim said she blamed herself for years and kept the sexual abuse secret out of shame. She also stated that Frost's offenses changed how she views life.

[10] The State argued for consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling twenty-six years. Frost sought concurrent advisory sentences and merger of the Class C count into the Class B count. The presentence investigation report showed that Frost's score on the Indiana Risk Assessment System (IRAS) suggested he was at low risk to reoffend.

[11] When imposing sentence, the trial court initially stated that it was tasked with imposing an appropriate sentence “under the law.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 156. The court then stated: “[I]t's the old law because these crimes are so old, to consider [sic] what the sentencing range should be based on aggravators and mitigators.” Id.

[12] The court rejected Frost's proffered mitigating circumstances: (1) his limited criminal history (consisting of a 1992 misdemeanor conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated); (2) his likelihood of responding to probation or short-term imprisonment; and (3) his good character and attitude. The court found four aggravating circumstances: (1) Frost's criminal history, which it accorded little weight; (2) victim impact, which it accorded “great weight”; (3) Frost's breach of a position of trust; and (4) the nature and circumstances of the offenses, which included premeditation. Tr. Vol. III, pp. 156-57.

[13] The trial court denied the merger request and imposed consecutive executed terms of fifteen years on the Class B felony, six years on the Class C felony, and two years on the Class D felony for an aggregate sentence of twenty-three years, with credit for thirty-seven days. Frost appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Frost contends his aggregate sentence of twenty-three years is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). This rule permits us to revise a statutorily authorized sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision,” we find it “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B). Our role is “to attempt to leaven the outliers,” not “to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id.

[15] In applying this standard, we afford “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222). But such deference may be “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Id. Frost bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 946 (Ind. 2014).

I. Initial Observations

[16] Frost asks us to reduce his sentence “to an advisory sentence for each count” and then order the sentences to be served concurrently for a total sentence of ten years imprisonment. Appellant's Br., p. 15. In support of his argument, he relies on Walker v. State, 747 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 2001), Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), and Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2003). Citing Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919 (Ind. 1999), he argues that a court “must consider the gravity, the nature and number of prior offenses” before aggravating a sentence based on criminal history. Appellant's Br., p. 12. He also challenges the victim-impact aggravator based on Simmons v. State, 746 N.E.2d 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

[17] All these decisions predate 2005, when Indiana replaced presumptive sentencing with an advisory sentencing scheme. As we recently noted in Crossley v. State, No. 26A-CR-644, 2026 WL 2508133, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2026), under the presumptive scheme, a trial court “could deviate from the fixed presumptive term only by identifying the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and articulating its evaluation and balancing of them.” Frost was sentenced under the advisory system because his offenses occurred five years after the presumptive scheme ceased. Id.; Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 487-88 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218.

[18] At sentencing, the trial court referred to “the old law” when discussing the applicable sentencing ranges and aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Tr. Vol. III, p. 156. Although the trial court's reference to “the old law” lacks clarity, we interpret this comment as recognition that the felony classes and sentencing ranges in effect on the 2010 offense dates apply—not that the old presumptive sentencing scheme applied here. Under the advisory system in effect since 2005 and applicable here, “a trial court may impose any sentence within the statutory range.” Crossley, 2026 WL 2508133, at *5. In addition, “[t]he relative weight or value assignable to” the reasons for a sentence “is not subject to review for abuse of discretion” under the advisory system. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.

[19] Under these principles, much of Frost's appellate arguments miss the mark. They largely incorporate sentencing principles that do not apply at all under the advisory sentencing scheme or, at the least, do not apply to Rule 7(B) review. For instance, Frost cites numerous appellate decisions involving sentences imposed under the presumptive sentencing scheme. Although such decisions remain valid precedent in the proper context, Frost relies on them to challenge aspects of sentencing that are no longer reviewable in the same way under the advisory sentencing scheme. He attacks the trial court's weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and its failure to recognize certain mitigating circumstances he proposed. Appellant's Br., pp. 13-15 (arguing that the trial court “fail[ed] to even acknowledge [certain proffered] mitigators, let alone balance them” and that the court's “reliance upon [a] position of trust as an aggravator is also inappropriate”).

[20] Even though Frost cites Anglemyer and acknowledges that the weight assigned to aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not reviewable for abuse of discretion, he fails to apply the case properly. Although Anglemyer permits a defendant to challenge a trial court's failure to recognize mitigating circumstances supported by the record, 868 N.E.2d at 491, Frost expressly states that he “does not challenge his sentence under the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard.” Appellant's Br., p. 11. Despite these acknowledgments, Frost relies on arguments directed principally at the trial court's treatment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances rather than the appropriateness of his sentence under Rule 7(B).

[21] Rule 7(B) review is distinct from abuse-of-discretion review. Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1285 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Although abuse-of-discretion review examines the trial court's reasons for imposing a particular sentence, Rule 7(B) review focuses on whether the resulting sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. A defendant cannot obtain review of an abuse-of-discretion claim simply by presenting it as a Rule 7(B) challenge. See Guerra v. State, 284 N.E.3d 1094, 1109 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[22] Rather than reaching any finding of waiver, we choose to evaluate the nature of the offense and the character of the offender separately as Rule 7(B) normally requires. See Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (noting that a court must consider both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender when analyzing a Rule 7(B) claim, although the defendant need not prove the sentence is inappropriate under both prongs). We conclude that Frost's sentence is not inappropriate in light of either the nature of Frost's offenses or his character.

II. Nature of the Offense

[23] In determining the appropriateness of a sentence in light of the nature of the offense, we first look to the statutory sentencing range for that class of offense. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 487. For offenses committed in 2010, a Class B felony carried a term of six to twenty years, with an advisory sentence of ten years imprisonment. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5 (2010). The sentence for a Class C felony ranged from two to eight years, with an advisory sentence of four years imprisonment. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2010). For a Class D felony, the sentencing range was six months to three years, with an advisory sentence of one and one-half years imprisonment. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (2010).

[24] The sentences that the court imposed for each of Frost's offenses—fifteen years for the Class B felony, six years for the Class C felony, and two years for the Class D felony—each exceeded the advisory sentence but fell below the statutory maximum sentence. The court also ordered that these individual sentences be served consecutively. The resulting aggregate twenty-three-year term is eight years less than the maximum aggregate sentence of thirty-one years imprisonment.

[25] Frost acknowledges that his offenses are “serious.” Appellant's Br., p. 10. But he claims that the offenses arose from one “isolated incident” with one victim. Id. at 15-16. He also argues that premeditation, victim impact, and breach of a position of trust do not justify consecutive, above-advisory-level sentences. Frost's arguments fail to recognize the broader context of his offenses, as the following evidence shows.

[26] Victim was fourteen at the time of the Allen County offenses. Frost was around forty and knew Victim's age. He had met her through Witness 1, a co-worker. Victim accompanied Witness 1 to work daily and at times was left alone with Frost. Victim reported that Frost used their time alone to initiate sexual misconduct for which he was ultimately prosecuted in Elkhart County.

[27] Frost kept in contact with Victim after she went home to Allen County, planned a new encounter, drove roughly two hours to reach her, and took her to a motel—conduct that the trial court called “premeditated.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 157. Contrary to Frost's assertion, his Allen County offenses were not an isolated incident.

[28] In light of this evidence, we are unpersuaded that the nature of Frost's offenses renders his sentence inappropriate.

III. Character of the Offender

[29] Frost offers three reasons why his character does not support his twenty-three-year sentence: (1) his limited criminal history; (2) his support from family and community; and (3) his likelihood of responding to probation or short-term imprisonment, especially given his low-risk IRAS score. We are unpersuaded.

[30] Character is a multifaceted consideration. It is the sum of what the record shows about the person, including the choices they made in committing the offenses and how they acted afterward. See Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224 (considering “a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case”).

[31] Frost's criminal history, consisting of a misdemeanor operating-while-intoxicated conviction in 1992, is minor, given its chronological remoteness and lack of relation to the present offenses. But even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on the defendant's character. Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The trial court viewed Frost's criminal history as an aggravator but did not “give a whole lot of weight to it.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 157. On the other hand, Frost's IRAS score suggesting he was at low risk to reoffend positively reflects on his character.

[32] At the time of the offenses, Frost was a husband, the father of three children, and a co-worker of Witness 1, who respected Frost. Witness 1, with whom Victim was living, entrusted Victim to Frost at times when Witness 1 was elsewhere on the workplace grounds. The evidence at trial showed that Frost ultimately used those moments to begin a sexual relationship with Victim in Elkhart County that eventually culminated in Frost taking her at age fourteen to an Allen County motel to have sex with her. At some point after the offenses, Frost owned a business and established a positive reputation among his family and friends.

[33] Years later, Frost offered Victim a false explanation for his actions and purported not to remember key details of his offenses. Such evidence bears on his character as much as his record and his reputation do, and we weigh these factors together.

[34] Because the nature of the offenses weighs against relief, Frost's showing on character “must be all the stronger.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127. Frost's character does not support sentencing revision. We therefore conclude that Frost's sentence is not inappropriate under Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of the offenses or his character.²

Conclusion

[35] Because Frost has not met his burden of showing that his twenty-three-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Frost was separately charged with child sex crimes in Elkhart County in connection with his sexual contact with Victim there. In September 2026, after sentencing in the Allen County case, the State and Frost entered into a plea agreement in the Elkhart County case under which he would plead guilty to one count of Class A felony child molesting and be sentenced to no more than 20 years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to Frost's sentence in the Allen County case. As of the date of this opinion, the CCS does not reflect Frost's conviction or sentencing in Elkhart County.This appeal arises solely from the charges and ultimate convictions in Allen County, although Victim testified to the events in Elkhart County during Frost's trial on the Allen County charges.

2.   In light of this conclusion, we would not need to address any abuse-of-discretion argument even if it had been properly preserved. See Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d 124, 134 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that any error in failing to consider the defendant's guilty plea as a mitigating factor is harmless if the sentence is not inappropriate); Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d 546, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that, “even if the trial court is found to have abused its discretion in the process it used to sentence the defendant, the error is harmless if the sentence imposed was not inappropriate”).

Weissmann, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.