Eugene W. Ford, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Eugene W. Ford, pro se, appeals his convictions on eight counts including four counts of domestic battery as level 6 felonies, two counts of strangulation as level 6 felonies, and two counts of theft as class A misdemeanors. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August 2025, E.J. (“Victim”) and Ford, who was married to someone else, were involved in a “sexual romance” that “was in an ending situation.” Transcript Volume II at 136. On August 12, 2025, Ford and Victim were at Victim's residence when Ford started making “a lot of accusations ․ things that weren't true ․ a lot of like paranoid accusations of like [Victim] being unfaithful to him.” Id. The accusations “escalated” into an “attack.” Id. Ford pushed Victim and slapped her in the face. At the time, minor children were present in the residence. Ford left the residence, returning around 12:30 or 1:00 a.m. on August 13, 2025. Victim and “[her] kids were sound asleep” when Ford entered the residence and “started like making noise and kicking stuff over, and then punching, and hitting, and kicking and stomping [Victim] and the kids.” Id. at 137. Victim awoke to Ford hitting her on the head, “stomping” on her legs and torso, and choking her. Id. at 138. Victim's oldest son (“Minor”) tried to draw “attention away from” Victim, which resulted in Ford hitting Minor in the head and grabbing him by the neck. Id. Ford punched Minor in the face and tried to punch him in the ribs, and the two fell over. Ford began throwing and smashing things before taking Victim's car keys and leaving. Police responded to the scene and took Victim's statement.

[3] Ford returned to Victim's residence later in the afternoon on August 13, 2025. He used the keys he had taken from Victim to open the doors to her vehicle and look through her mail. Ford returned again around 10:00 p.m. that night. He “showed up ․ came inside and ․ took the air conditioner [Victim and her kids] were using, ripped it from where it was ․ loaded it up in a vehicle and left.” Victim watched as Ford did these things but did not “engage” with him. Id. at 141.

[4] At approximately 4:00 a.m. on August 14, 2025, Ford returned to Victim's residence. Victim's dogs were barking so she “opened up the door to look out” and Ford “kicked the door in and hit [her] with the door.” Id. at 142. He hit Victim, pushed her against the wall, and was “punching” her. Id. When Victim was against the wall, Ford placed his hands around her neck. Minor again intervened on behalf of his mother, and Ford put his arm around Minor's neck to choke him and was “trying to kill” him. Id. at 100. Victim tried to use her phone to contact police but Ford “took [her] phone and pushed [her] ․ and he left.” Id. at 143. Because Ford had taken her phone with him, Victim went to a neighbor's house and called police. Police arrived and took Victim's statement. Ford “came back after the police left and ․ was circling the block in a different vehicle.” Id. He used the car keys he had taken from Victim to set off the alarm in her car “until the battery died” just “kind of letting [her] know that he was still there.” Id.

[5] On August 15, 2025, the State charged Ford with twenty-one counts including five counts of domestic battery with prior conviction for battery or strangulation as level 6 felonies, three counts of strangulation as level 6 felonies, four counts of battery resulting in bodily injury as class A misdemeanors, five counts of domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen years old as level 6 felonies, two counts of theft as class A misdemeanors, one count of criminal recklessness as a class A misdemeanor, and one count of interference with reporting of a crime as a class A misdemeanor.

[6] On December 4, 2025, the trial court held an initial hearing on the State's allegation that Ford had violated the terms of his pretrial release, resulting in a new criminal charge for invasion of privacy in another case. Ford was arrested on a warrant and held without bond based on the alleged violation. The court held a combined pretrial release and bond review hearing for both cases on December 9, 2025. The prosecutor indicated that Victim “had sent [her] screenshots” of Ford's electronic communications with Victim underlying the invasion of privacy allegations but that the prosecutor “totally blanked on sending that over to defense's office.” Id. at 32. Victim testified regarding Ford's communications with her in September 2025 after charges were filed in the current case. During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Victim regarding the validity of her fear of Ford and asked if Ford being released with “a GPS monitor” would alleviate those fears. Id. at 35. Victim responded, “No.” Id. Defense counsel pointed out he had only briefly reviewed the electronic communications because “discovery is kind of you know, by the seat of our pants this morning.” Id. at 35. At the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel asked for Ford “to be released today” and placed on home detention. Id. at 37. The court denied Ford's request.

[7] On February 20, 2026, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss two of the battery charges, two of the charges for domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen years old, one of the charges for domestic battery with prior conviction, and the charges for criminal recklessness and interference with reporting of a crime.

[8] On February 23, 2026, the court held a jury trial. The jury found Ford not guilty of one count of strangulation but guilty of the other two strangulation counts. It found him guilty of all three remaining felony counts of domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen years old as well as the remaining two counts of battery resulting in bodily injury and both counts of theft. The jury found Ford guilty of four counts of misdemeanor domestic battery, and Ford admitted to having a prior conviction which elevated those offenses to level 6 felonies.

[9] On March 16, 2026, the court held a sentencing hearing. It vacated three counts of felony domestic battery with prior conviction and both counts of battery resulting in bodily injury due to double jeopardy concerns. On the eight counts that remained, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of four years. After the court imposed sentence, Ford stated that he wished to represent himself in any future proceedings. On March 23, 2026, Ford's counsel withdrew.

[10] On April 9, 2026, Ford filed a pro se Motion to Correct Error, which the court denied. On April 25, 2026, Ford filed a pro se Motion to Reconsider, which the court also denied.

Discussion and Decision

[11] We begin by observing that Ford has chosen to proceed pro se in this appeal. A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status. Sidener v. State, 446 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 1983). Rather, “[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted), reh'g denied. “We will not become a party's advocate, nor will we address arguments that are inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood.” Barrett v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

I.

[12] Ford first asserts the “trial court committed reversible constitutional errors under the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution by admitting testimonial hearsay from non-testifying officers.” Appellant's Brief at 18 (capitalization and emphasis omitted). The State responds that Ford waived this claim because he did not raise the issue at trial and he does not assert fundamental error.

[13] The record reveals that during trial, a redacted version of a body-camera video taken by one of the responding officers to Victim's residence was admitted as State's Exhibit 6 and a segment of the video was played for the jury. The video contains conversation and statements by police officers who did not testify at trial. Ford did not object to the admission of the video or any statements therein. Indeed, when the exhibit was offered into evidence, Ford's counsel affirmatively stated that he had no objection. It is well settled that “[t]o preserve a claim of error regarding the admission of evidence, the trial objection must include the specific ground for the exclusion of the evidence.” Gayden v. State, 863 N.E.2d 1193, 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted), trans. denied. A failure to timely object to the erroneous admission of evidence at trial will procedurally foreclose the raising of such error on appeal unless the admission constitutes fundamental error. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 118 (Ind. 2015). Ford failed to object to the admission of the exhibit and did not allege fundamental error in his principal appellate brief. Accordingly, his claim of error is waived on appeal. See Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011) (observing that because defendant “failed to allege fundamental error in his principal appellate brief, this issue is waived”).

II.

[14] Ford next points to his December 9, 2025, bond review hearing and accuses the State of “prejudicial delayed disclosure of pretrial discovery material.” Appellant's Brief at 16 (capitalization and emphasis omitted). Specifically, he asserts that the “[S]tate's delayed disclosure of critical electronic data—including social media profiles, communications, and third-party text messages—until the morning of an evidentiary hearing violated [his] due process rights to a fair trial and the preparation of a complete defense.” Id. He concedes that a trial court's rulings on discovery matters are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Plouch v. State, 222 N.E.3d 357, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).¹ However, he cites Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), for the proposition that the court's “discovery failure” here implicated his “constitutional right to fair trial.” Appellant's Brief at 16.

[15] The electronic data to which Ford refers is evidence of his social media and text communications to Victim that were not “handed ․ over” until “the morning of” the bond review hearing on December 9, 2025. Id. at 22. The State asserts that it “inadvertently neglected to send Ford's counsel a copy of these communications” but they “were made available” to Ford “at or close in time to the December 9, 2025 bond-review hearing.” Appellee's Brief at 19. The State acknowledges that this evidence led to the trial court's decision to revoke Ford's pretrial release and provided evidence for a new criminal case involving invasion of privacy.

[16] First, we agree with the State that Ford's reliance on Brady is misplaced. It is well established that to prevail on a Brady claim, “a defendant must establish: (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.” Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 755 (Ind. 1998). The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that under Brady, “the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or punishment violates the Due Process Clause.” Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 592 (Ind. 2022). But “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one ․ because Brady is a ‘disclosure rule, not a discovery rule.’ ” Id. (citations omitted).

[17] At most, this is a case of late disclosure of evidence, not suppression. Additionally, there is no indication that the challenged electronic data was favorable to the defense. Therefore, Brady is not implicated.

[18] As a general proposition, the proper remedy for a discovery violation is a continuance. Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000). “Failure to alternatively request a continuance upon moving to exclude evidence, where a continuance may be an appropriate remedy, constitutes a waiver of any alleged error pertaining to noncompliance with the court's discovery order.” Id. (citing Martin v. State, 535 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ind. 1989)). Ford failed to request a continuance or adjournment of the bond review hearing and he makes no fundamental error claim in his principal appellate brief. The issue is waived.

III.

[19] Ford contends that his convictions for two counts of domestic battery committed in the presence of a minor and two counts of strangulation violate double jeopardy principles because “the allegations arose from a single, continuous episode of conduct on a single calendar date.” Appellant's Brief at 22. He cites Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), in support of his claim.

[20] However, Ford has failed to provide an adequate record for appellate review. A party “who alleges error has the duty to provide a proper record on appeal so that an intelligent review of the issues may be made.” Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1080 (Ind. 2015). Although the table of contents for the Appellant's Appendix states that the “State's Charging Information (Counts I-XXI) (Filed August 18, 2025)” is contained on page twenty-five of Appellant's Appendix Volume II, our review of the Appendix reveals a document titled “Initial Hearing Rights” consisting of a mere list of the charges accompanied by statutory citation. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 25. The charging instruments are nowhere to be found in the record provided on appeal.

[21] It is well established that, for a claimed double jeopardy violation, the Wadle framework proceeds in three steps. First, a court examines the statutory language to determine whether either statute clearly permits multiple punishments; if so, the inquiry ends and there is no double jeopardy violation. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. Second, if the statutory language is unclear, we consider the subject offenses to determine if one is either inherently or factually included in another. Id. The charging information is the source for this second step of the analysis and, as the Indiana Supreme Court clarified in A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1067 (Ind. 2024), in Step Two's factually included analysis, courts “may examine only the facts as presented on the face of the charging instrument.” Ambiguity as to one charged crime's factual inclusion in another leads to Step Three of the Wadle analysis in which we consider the facts underlying the charged offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial, to determine whether the defendant's actions were so compressed in time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249. In short, the charging instruments are the cornerstone of a double jeopardy analysis under Wadle.

[22] Ford's failure to include the relevant charging instruments in the record on appeal results in waiver of his claim. See Martinez v. State, 82 N.E.3d 261, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“It is well settled that it is the appellant's burden to provide us with an adequate record to permit meaningful appellate review” and defendant's failure to do so resulted in “waive[r] [of] his claims of error on appeal”), trans. denied. We observe that meaningful appellate review is further impeded due to Ford's failure to provide cogent argument on this issue. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires the Appellant to support his argument with “cogent reasoning.” “Failure to present a cogent argument results in waiver of the issue on appeal.” Martin v. Brown, 129 N.E.3d 283, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[23] Ford makes bald reference to “Counts II, V, VI, and VII” as the convictions at issue without any accompanying explanation or argument as to the details or facts underlying those counts. Appellant's Brief at 22. As noted by the State, the record reveals that the original charges were renumbered for trial, while at the sentencing hearing the trial court permitted the State to refer to the original count numbers when discussing which convictions should be vacated. Based upon the court's renumbering, Counts II and V were committed against Victim, and Counts VI and VII were committed against Minor. In his Reply Brief, Ford contends that the challenged counts involve incidents that “occurred over a continuous two-day period, ․ at a single location, ․ involving the same complaining witness, [Victim].” Appellant's Reply Brief at 9. However, that is simply not the case as two offenses involved Victim and two involved Minor. He then states, “[t]he charging information does not identify separate, distinct acts for Counts II and V or for Counts VI and VII with the specificity required to establish that they were truly separate offenses rather than multiple charges arising from a single course of conduct.” Id. Again, absent further explanation supported by cogent reasoning, we decline to address this argument as we will not become an advocate for either party.² See Barrett, 837 N.E.2d at 1030.

IV.

[24] Ford next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing by “failing to recognize or evaluate significant mitigating factors established by the record, including the hardship a lengthy incarceration would impose on [his] minor child who was in his sole custody.” Appellant's Brief at 24. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. As long as a defendant's sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement, identifying aggravators and mitigators that are unsupported by the record, omitting reasons from the sentencing statement that are clearly supported by the record, or entering reasons in the sentencing statement that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-491.

[25] “When a defendant offers evidence of mitigators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are mitigating, and it is not required to explain why it does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating.” Johnson v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor and is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as the defendant does. Healey v. State, 969 N.E.2d 607, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. A defendant who alleges that the trial court failed to identify a mitigating factor has the burden to establish that the proffered factor is both significant and “clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.

[26] Ford claims the court abused its discretion in ignoring the “compelling, uncontradicted testimony” from his wife that “established prior to his arrest, [he] held full-time, physical custody of his minor daughter” and that his imprisonment caused “immediate, severe hardship imposed upon the child, who was forced to uproot her life and relocate to Crimora, Virginia, to reside with aging, vulnerable grandparents.” Appellant's Brief at 25. However, our review of the page in the trial transcript specifically cited by Ford to support his claim reveals that his wife, Tiffany Alsabrooks, testified that Ford “has a fourteen-year-old daughter who lived with me until this happened and I had to take her back to Virginia which ․ is not as good of an education that she was having here.” Transcript Volume II at 193. There is no mention by Alsabrooks that Ford held full-time physical custody of his daughter or that severe hardship was imposed due to her relocation and residing with aging and vulnerable grandparents. Rather, the only hardship mentioned was regarding differing educational opportunities.

[27] In any event, it is well understood that “[m]any persons convicted of serious crimes have one or more children and, absent special circumstances, trial courts are not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.” Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). Ford has advanced no special circumstances to demonstrate that the hardship to his family would be any worse than that normally suffered by a family whose relative is imprisoned. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to identify this factor as a significant mitigating circumstance.³

V.

[28] Finally, we address Ford's assertion that the trial judge “committed structural judicial misconduct and violated [his] constitutional right to due process by openly declaring on the record an intent to summarily deny all future motions submitted by the defense regardless of their substantive legal merit.” Appellant's Brief at 26. The State responds that Ford “misstates the record” in making such a claim. Appellee's Brief at 27.

[29] The law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 610 (Ind. 2001). Judges require broad latitude to run their courtrooms and to maintain discipline and control. Brown v. State, 746 N.E.2d 63, 70-71 (Ind. 2001). A defendant asserting judicial bias must show that the trial judge's actions and demeanor showed partiality and prejudiced the case. Id. at 71. “Even where the court's remarks display a degree of impatience, if in the context of a particular trial they do not impart an appearance of partiality, they may be permissible to promote an orderly progression of events at trial.” Rowe v. State, 539 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ind. 1989).

[30] Ford directs us to the transcript of the sentencing hearing claiming that, after the court imposed sentence, the trial judge “explicitly declared on the official record that she anticipated [he] would file future legal motions and openly stated that she intended to deny them regardless of their legal validity or procedural merit.” Appellant's Brief at 27. A review of the transcript reveals that defense counsel asked whether the court, in the event Ford “makes it six ․ months” in jail “without any sort of violations or write-ups,” would “be willing to perhaps” consider a modification of his sentence. Transcript Volume II at 209. The trial judge, who had already been informed that Ford would be representing himself moving forward, simply stated, “I'm sure he'll write and I can always deny it or write granted if I feel like it's worthy of doing so. But I'm not going to put anything on the record today or make any promises.” Id. We agree with the State that Ford mischaracterizes the judge's statement, and we cannot say that the statement imparts any appearance of partiality or that Ford has shown how his case was prejudiced.⁴

[31] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ford's convictions and sentences.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ford cites legal authority for this general statement regarding our standard of review that we have replaced with a different citation as Ford's citation is inaccurate. Although the legal statement cited by Ford is correct, in this instance, as with several other instances in his principal brief, the citations appear to be the product of hallucinations produced by artificial intelligence as neither the case names nor corresponding citations match the purported legal authority.

2.   Ford also mentions double jeopardy in the context of Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020), for the first time in his Reply Brief. An argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived. Dunn v. State, 202 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

3.   In a single sentence at the conclusion of his principal brief, Ford requests this Court to find “that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to issue a detailed sentencing statement justifying consecutive sentences” and asks that we exercise our “independent constitutional authority under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) to revise all remaining valid counts to run concurrently ․ reducing [his] executed sentence.” Appellant's Brief at 29. Regarding the trial court's alleged abuse of discretion for failing to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences, this is Ford's first and only mention of consecutive sentences and he develops no argument or citation to authority to support any such claim. Accordingly, the claim is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). As for his request for Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) review, the Indiana Supreme Court has made clear that “inappropriate sentence and abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). Accordingly, “an inappropriate sentence analysis does not involve an argument that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant.” Id. As Ford fails to develop cogent argument pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B), this claim is also waived.

4.   To the extent Ford suggests that subsequent rulings of the court summarily denying certain motions demonstrate bias, it is well settled that bias is not proven from judicial rulings alone. Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 433 (Ind. 2003).

Brown, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur.