TKG LLC v. MBG LLC MBG LLC MBG LLC MBG MKE LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] TKG Associates, LLC (“Buyer”) appeals and MBG Monmouth, LLC; MBG Aurora, LLC; MBG Joliet, LLC; and MBG MKE, LLC (collectively, “Seller”) cross-appeals the trial court's determination of damages and attorneys’ fees in this breach-of-contract action. Buyer raises two issues on appeal,¹ and Seller raises two issues on cross-appeal. We consolidate and restate the parties’ issues as whether the trial court erred in its determination of damages.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] We set out the facts underlying the parties’ contract in a prior appeal:

Buyer is a limited liability company operated by Ajay Keshap and his family. Seller consists of several limited liability companies that own four Sky Zone franchises in Monmouth, New Jersey; Aurora, Illinois; Joliet, Illinois; and Greenfield, Wisconsin, and are operated by Barbara Glazer (“Glazer”) and Mark Glazer.

On January 19, 2022, Buyer and Seller entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement (“Agreement”) for the sale of the four Sky Zone franchise assets for a purchase price of $6,500,000. The purchase price was determined by the Seller's Earnings Before Interest Taxes Deductions and Appreciation (“EBITDA”) multiplied by a valuation factor of 3.5 plus $800,000 for the sale of certain equipment. In negotiating the Agreement, Seller provided two spreadsheets, which represented an annualized EBITDA of $1,600,000. Buyer relied upon this data when entering into the Agreement.

The Agreement was drafted by Buyer and provided in relevant part:

1. Upon execution of this Agreement, Buyer shall deposit $25,000.00 (the “Deposit”) with First American Title Insurance Company ․ The Deposit shall be held in escrow and applied to the Purchase Price, in accordance with and subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.

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4. Buyer shall assume all obligations under the Leases related thereto; and, in the event that the lessor thereunder does not release all personal guarantees related thereto, Buyer shall work to indemnify the individual(s) that have provided guarantees to support the lease obligations on a best effort basis only. Buyer shall assume all obligations under the Sky Zone franchise agreements related thereto.

5. Due Diligence. Buyer shall have forty-five (45) days (the “Investigation Period”) beginning on the date that it receives notice of Franchisor's waiver of the right of first refusal (as set forth in Paragraph 7.M) to conduct any due diligence activities and investigations. Seller shall supply all requested due diligence materials requested by Buyer within ten (10) days of execution of this Agreement.

a. Financial Investigation. The Buyer will be given the right to examine all records of income and expenses of the business (“Financial Investigation”), and this Agreement is subject to the Buyer's approval thereof. Buyer shall conduct its Financial Investigation during the Investigation Period. If Buyer, in its reasonable discretion, is not satisfied with the results of its Financial Investigation, Buyer shall have the right to terminate this Agreement by providing written notice to Seller.

b. Lease Review. Buyer shall have the right to review the Leases. This Agreement is subject to the Buyer's approval of such Leases within 30 days of receipt of such Leases and all addendums. These leases will still need to be assigned to Buyer. The parties shall cooperate in obtaining the written consent of the landlord for each Lease prior to expiration of the Investigation Period. With respect to Buyer, Buyer shall present to lessor a commercially reasonable financial statement which demonstrates its capacity to fulfill the obligations under the Leases. With respect to Seller, Seller shall attempt to obtain the release of each person currently guaranteeing Seller's obligations under the Leases. In the event that one or more lessors will not release such persons, then Seller shall fairly evaluate the prospects of Buyer fulfilling the obligations under the lease for the purpose of assuring and indemnifying the current guarantors with respect to such lease(s). Assignment expenses charged by each lessor in accordance with the terms of each lease shall be paid by the Seller.

6. Closing. Buyer is to take possession at the time that ownership is transferred to Buyer (“Closing”). Closing shall occur on or before March 31, 2022, on a best effort basis, as determined in the parties’ reasonable discretion following completion of Buyer's investigation of the Business. Buyer shall diligently investigate all matters relevant to its satisfaction of the conditions herein for Buyer's benefit and shall complete such investigation on or before February 28, 2022 (“Investigation period”). Within five (5) days following the expiration of the Investigation Period, Buyer shall notify Seller and Escrow Agent in writing that all conditions for Buyer's benefit herein have been satisfied or waived. Failure by Buyer to provide such notice, shall be deemed a default under this Agreement, and this transaction shall be automatically cancelled and Seller shall have the right to pursue any damages pursuant to Paragraph 10 of this Agreement. Personal property taxes, real property taxes, CAM (if applicable), utilities, and rent are to be prorated to the Closing date.

7. Conditions to Closing. THIS AGREEMENT IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS and in the event either (a) the Seller does not complete the following conditions or (b) Buyer timely disapproves any of the following conditions for which Buyer is granted approval rights and Seller fails to cure such conditions, this offer is shall [sic] terminate, and the Deposit shall be returned to Buyer less escrow fees (if any).

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S. Closing shall occur not later than March 31, 2022, on a best effort basis.

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10. Default. If Buyer breaches this Agreement, Seller's sole and exclusive remedy shall be to terminate this Agreement and receive the Deposit as liquidated damages.

In the event of default by Seller under the terms of this Agreement, at Buyer's option, Buyer may either (i) terminate this Agreement by delivery of written notice of termination to Seller, whereupon Buyer and Seller shall each be released from all liability hereunder (except for those provisions which recite that they survive termination) and the Deposit shall be returned to Buyer and Seller shall reimburse Buyer for all of Buyer's reasonable out of pocket expenses incurred in connection with this Agreement and Buyer's due diligence and reasonable attorneys’ fees, to the maximum extent of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) or (ii) Buyer shall have the right to specific performance and may close the transaction and/or pursue Seller for its damages resulting from Seller's breach.

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12. Miscellaneous.

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C. In any action or proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

This document contains the entire agreement between the Buyer and the Seller herein and there are no oral agreements or understandings not herein contained. Any modification hereof must be in writing and signed by both Buyer and Seller.

Ex. Vol. I pp. 5-9.

Buyer received the notice of the Franchisor's waiver of [its] right of first refusal on January 19, 2022. Under Paragraph 5 of the Agreement, the forty-five day Investigation Period, thus, was set to expire on March 5, 2022. Under Paragraph 6, however, the Investigation Period was set to expire on February 28, 2022, with the Buyer having five additional days (March 5, 2022) to “notify Seller and Escrow Agent in writing that all conditions for Buyer's benefit herein have been satisfied or waived.” Id. at 6.

On January 26, 2022, Buyer gave Seller an initial due diligence list, and Glazer began uploading the documents into a shared Google drive created by Buyer. Glazer was asked to provide information on “leases, assignments, amendments, guarantees, franchise agreements, park improvement” and other information. Tr. Vol. II p. 54; Ex. Vol. I p. 11. In response, Glazer uploaded documents to the Google drive. Regarding lease “[a]ddendums per location,” Glazer responded, “N/A.” Ex. Vol. I p. 13. Regarding a “[b]reakdown of any rent abatements or deferments per location per month 2020-present,” Glazer responded, “N/A.” Id.

The parties continued performing due diligence, and Buyer and Seller together visited all of the parks from February 22 to February 24, 2022. During the visit, Buyer realized that Seller received rent abatements, extensions, and deferments due to the C[OVID]-19 pandemic, which resulted in an inflated EBITDA and inflated business valuation.

On February 28, 2022, Buyer asked for additional data, including information on the rent abatements and deferments for each park. Later that day, Seller provided Buyer with a document entitled “Lease Amendment Agreements.” Id. at 69. The one-page document summarized rent abatements and deferments for each of the four parks and outstanding rents that were still due. In the document, Seller stated that it would either “take on the debt in the close of the sale” or “pay all outstanding rent at the close of the sale.” Ex. Vol. I p. 69. On March 1, 2022, Buyer asked Seller to confirm “which of these rent abatement/ deferments were formalized in an amendment versus verbal.” Id. at 71. Seller then informed Buyer that the Aurora and Greenfield locations had “[f]ormal legal agreement[s]” and that the Joliet and Ocean locations had “[e]mail/handshake correspondence.” Id. at 70.

On March 2, 2022, Seller sent an email to Buyer as follows:

The 45 day due diligence period ․ will expire on Monday March 7th according to our contract. I hope we can provide all your answers by then so that you can make a decision and we can move forward. Let me know as soon as possible your other questions and I will expedite the answers so you have all the information you need.

Id. at 19. Buyer, however, continued to ask for clarification and documentation of several items, and Seller continued to respond with clarifications.

On March 7, 2022, Buyer sent Seller a written request of due diligence extension. When Seller questioned the request, Buyer informed Seller that the visit to the parks “brought up a lot of new questions,” Buyer needed to “dive deep into the data again,” and Buyer needed “more time to review.” Id. at 22.

After a meeting between the parties, on March 11, Seller sent an email to Buyer as follows:

Thank you for the conversation. We understand your point of view better now and will work to making [sic] the agreement happen on both our timelines ․ We look forward to a productive conversation next Wednesday March 16th ․ If you are interested in proceeding, we would like to establish a realistic timeline to close and understand the remaining open items to achieve that timeline.

Id. at 79.

The parties then met on March 16 to discuss “outstanding questions about the financials” among other items. Id. at 25. The parties, however, disagree as to the substance and outcome of this conversation. Buyer claims that it was still interested in moving forward with the purchase but on different terms given new information Seller had provided. Seller claims that Buyer was unwilling to move forward with closing. The parties had no conversations between March 16 and March 25, 2022. On March 25, 2022, Seller's attorney sent Buyer a letter asserting that the Agreement “has terminated” because Buyer did not provide the notice required by Section 6 of the Agreement. Id. at 27. Seller also claimed that it was entitled to the $25,000 deposit. Seller later sold the businesses to other buyers for a total of $8.2 million.

TKG Assocs., LLC v. MBG Monmouth, LLC, 259 N.E.3d 306, 309-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citation modified; emphases added) (“TKG I”); see also Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 79. Thereafter, the parties sued each other for breach of the Agreement, with both sides seeking to recover the $25,000 deposit. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment for Seller.

[4] Buyer appealed, and, in TKG I, we concluded that the trial court's judgment for Seller was clearly erroneous. As we explained:

Seller ․ did not provide Buyer with the requested due diligence materials within ten days as required by the Agreement, and Seller affirmatively denied the existence of documents that, in fact, did exist. Although Seller did provide information on the lease addendums on February 28, 2022, Buyer did not receive thirty days to review the lease addendums as required by the Agreement.

The trial court's findings on this issue are conflicting. Finding No. 20 detailed that Buyer did not learn of the lease amendments, lease abatements, and lease deferrals until February 28, 2022, and that the financial records provided to Buyer understated the actual operating costs and debts and overstated the EBITDA. In Finding No. 54, however, the trial court found that Seller “supplied all requested due diligence documents,” that Buyer “did not present any evidence of due diligence materials that it requested and did not receive,” and that “all requested due diligence documents were uploaded to the shared Google Drive within ten (10) days of its request.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28-29. Given the undisputed evidence, the trial court's finding that Seller supplied all requested due diligence materials in a timely manner is clearly erroneous.

The rent abatements/deferments resulted in an inflated EBITDA and inflated business valuation. The leases and EBITDA calculations went to the heart of the Agreement, and we conclude that Seller's breach was material. Although the Agreement required Buyer to provide a notice “in writing that all conditions for Buyer's benefit herein have been satisfied or waived” and failure to provide the notice was a default, Seller had already materially breached the Agreement. Ex. Vol. I p. 6. As first to breach the Agreement, Seller could not seek to enforce the provisions of the contract against Buyer if Buyer breached the contract at a later date. Buyer's failure to provide the notice after the Investigation Period does not excuse Seller's earlier material breach.

259 N.E.3d at 317-18 (citation modified). Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's judgment for Seller and remanded with instructions for the court to enter judgment for Buyer and to “hold a hearing to determine Buyer's damages in a manner consistent with this opinion.” Id. at 318.

[5] On remand, the parties presented arguments to the court based on the record of the bench trial; the court did not receive new evidence or hold a new fact-finding hearing. Thereafter, the court concluded in relevant part that Buyer's damages were controlled by section 10(ii) of the Agreement. Under that provision, Buyer, for the first time on remand, sought $1.7 million—the difference between the eventual $8.2 million sale price obtained by Seller and the $6.5 million price under the Agreement.

[6] The trial court rejected Buyer's argument in part because Buyer presented no evidence that the $8.2 million sale price was credible evidence of the value of the assets underlying the Agreement. Indeed, the court recognized that Buyer's theories at trial included the argument that the $6.5 million Agreement price appeared to have been inflated by Seller's initially omitted data to Buyer. The court further concluded that Buyer had presented “no evidence or argument ․ that any other amount of damages actually flowed from [Seller's] breach.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 67. The court thus limited Buyer's damages to the $25,000 deposit amount along with $165,441.26 in attorneys’ fees.

[7] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[8] Both Buyer and Seller appeal the trial court's determination of damages and attorneys’ fees. As the trial court did not hold a fact-finding hearing on remand, our standard of review in this appeal is for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., Fischer v. Heymann, 12 N.E.3d 867, 870 (Ind. 2014) (“the computation of damages is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court”) (quotation marks omitted); see also Nardi v. King, 253 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. 2025) (attorneys’ fees). Although the determination of damages and fees “falls squarely within the trial court's discretion,” they “may not be based on mere conjecture, speculation, or guesswork.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

[9] An abuse of discretion occurs when “the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ind. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And we review the interpretation of a contract de novo. Ind. Comp. Rating Bureau v. Tech. Ins. Co., 277 N.E.3d 16, 25 (Ind. 2026).

1. The trial court did not fail to apply our remand instructions, and it did not enter a facially inconsistent judgment.

[10] On appeal, Buyer first argues that the trial court “disobeyed” our mandate to determine Buyer's damages on remand. Appellant's Br. at 21 (reformatted). In particular, Buyer asserts that, because the court on remand concluded that Buyer was not entitled to the $1.7 million, it failed to follow our instructions in TKG I.

[11] Buyer is mistaken. We instructed the trial court to determine Buyer's damages on remand, and the trial court did so. That Buyer is dissatisfied with the trial court's determination is not demonstrative of Buyer's claim that the trial court “disobeyed” our instructions. Buyer's first argument fails.

[12] Buyer next argues that the court's calculation of damages is erroneous. Here, Buyer says that the trial court's calculation is “internally contradictory” in four different ways. Id. at 24 (reformatted). Buyer's first two theories for the trial court's allegedly contradictory judgment assert that the court's reasoning for awarding Buyer the $25,000 deposit but denying Buyer the $1.7 million difference is inconsistent. We see no inconsistency. The trial court determined that Buyer had in fact been harmed by the lost deposit amount and not by the later sale amount. These two arguments fail.

[13] Buyer's third and fourth purported trial-court inconsistencies are not inconsistencies at all (and, indeed, Buyer reiterates these arguments elsewhere in its brief).² Rather, Buyer's third position is that the trial court's decision to not award Buyer the $1.7 million on the theory that the $8.2 million sale price was not credible evidence of fair market value is contrary to law. Insofar as Buyer's argument is that the trial court could have relied on the $8.2 million sale price, that is fair enough. See, e.g., Showalter, Inc. v. Smith, 629 N.E.2d 272, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“The price voluntarily paid by a purchaser is admissible as evidence of the property's fair market value.”), trans. denied, abrogated on other grounds by Mitchell v. Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d 920, 922-23 (Ind. 1998). But that does not mean that the trial court was obliged to credit the sale price as evidence of Buyer's damages, and we conclude that Buyer's argument here impermissibly seeks to have our Court reweigh that evidence.

[14] Relatedly, Buyer's fourth purported inconsistency accuses the trial court of mischaracterizing Buyer's position at trial regarding the $6.5 million figure. According to Buyer, its position was not that the $6.5 million figure was inflated but simply that Buyer had not yet verified it. But Buyer is the one mischaracterizing the record; Buyer's evidence at trial was that it had doubts about the $6.5 million figure because Seller's initial omission of key data appeared to result in that figure being “overstated.” Appellant's App. Vol. 4, pp. 28, 31. Thus, the trial court did not err in how it understood Buyer's trial theory or in relying on Buyer's original evidence regarding an inflated $6.5 million price to conclude that the $8.2 million price was not credible evidence of the fair market value of the assets underlying the Agreement.

[15] We agree with Seller and the trial court that Buyer's position prior to TKG I was simply to have the $25,000 deposit refunded to it, to be refunded for employee-related due-diligence costs incurred in performing its end of the Agreement, and to have its attorneys’ fees awarded to it. Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 36-37 (Buyer's relief sought on summary judgment); Appellant's App. Vol. 4, pp. 26 (testimony seeking the deposit), 156-57 (testimony regarding employee costs), 213 (Buyer's closing statement to the court seeking deposit, employee costs, and attorneys’ fees). The trial court did not abuse its discretion on remand when it held Buyer to the relief Buyer had consistently sought prior to the proceedings on remand.

2. The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Buyer's due-diligence costs as part of Buyer's damages.

[16] Buyer's remaining argument is that the trial court erred when it denied Buyer damages relating to Buyer's expenditures for employee time and resources in performing its due-diligence obligations under the Agreement, which amount Buyer valued at $80,000. The trial court rejected Buyer's argument on the ground that those damages could only be recovered under section 10(i) of the Agreement, which the court concluded to be inapplicable.

[17] Section 10 of the Agreement provides as follows in the event of a breach by Seller:

In the event of default by Seller under the terms of this Agreement, at Buyer's option, Buyer may either (i) terminate this Agreement by delivery of written notice of termination to Seller, whereupon Buyer and Seller shall each be released from all liability hereunder (except for those provisions which recite that they survive termination) and the Deposit shall be returned to Buyer and Seller shall reimburse Buyer for all of Buyer's reasonable out of pocket expenses incurred in connection with this Agreement and Buyer's due diligence and reasonable attorneys’ fees, to the maximum extent of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) or (ii) Buyer shall have the right to specific performance and may close the transaction and/or pursue Seller for its damages resulting from Seller's breach.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 79.

[18] We agree with the trial court's analysis that section 10(i) is not applicable here, as Buyer never took the prerequisite step of terminating the agreement in writing following Seller's breach. And we agree with the trial court that Buyer did not seek specific performance under section 10(ii). But we disagree with the trial court that Buyer's due-diligence costs may only be recovered under section 10(i). Section 10(ii) expressly allows Buyer to pursue any and all “damages resulting from Seller's breach” of the Agreement. Id. Thus, the question is whether Buyer's due-diligence costs are “damages resulting from Seller's breach.” Id.

[19] We agree with Buyer that its expenditures made in performing its end of the Agreement are recoverable as a result of Seller's breach. Had the parties gone to closing, Buyer's due-diligence costs would have been remedied in the final sale price for the assets. However, as Seller's breach prevented the parties from closing, Buyer has not been able to recover the costs it incurred in fulfilling its obligations under the Agreement.

[20] Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that Buyer's due-diligence costs were not recoverable under section 10(ii) is erroneous. Further, the trial court's statement that Buyer's evidence of those costs was not “sufficient” is also erroneous; Buyer's evidence, if credited, could well be sufficient evidence to support its costs. Id. at 68. However, we reject Buyer's position that we should just add his alleged $80,000 in due-diligence costs to his damage award; rather, we conclude that an assessment of the credibility of Buyer's evidence on these costs remains open for the trial court to further determine, and we remand for the trial court to reassess Buyer's due-diligence costs and total damage award accordingly.³

3. Seller's cross-appeal arguments fail.

[21] On cross-appeal, Seller asserts that the Buyer's true argument for damages throughout the trial proceedings has been under section 10(i) of the Agreement, which comes with a $10,000 cap on fees, rather than section 10(ii). Seller is incorrect. At no point in the record did Buyer state that it was seeking recovery for damages under section 10(i). This argument fails.

[22] Seller also argues that, even if section 10(i) does not apply, the trial court's determination of Buyer's attorneys’ fees is nonetheless erroneous for two other reasons. First, Seller argues that Buyer's evidence for its fees did not delineate between its successful breach-of-contract claim and its related, but unsuccessful, claims of fraud and constructive fraud. But we understand the trial court's rejection of Seller's argument on this issue to have been based on the substantial factual and legal overlap between the successful and unsuccessful claims. We conclude that the trial court's decision here was within the court's discretion. See, e.g., Nardi, 253 N.E.3d at 1107-08.

[23] Second, Seller argues that the trial court erroneously awarded Buyer $41,537.26 in costs billed to Buyer's own in-house counsel. In support of its position that this is erroneous, Seller cites only a 2003 opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in a patent case. See Appellees’ Br. at 48-49. But Indiana law is focused on the trial court's discretion, and, here, the trial court found that the $41,537.26 in the fees to Buyer's in-house counsel were specially invoiced for working on this action and above-and-beyond counsel's salary. Seller does not dispute that evidence on appeal. We therefore cannot say that the trial court's decision to award Buyer these fees was an abuse of the court's discretion.

Conclusion

[24] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's determination of damages and attorneys’ fees, except for the court's conclusion that Buyer's due-diligence costs are not recoverable. As to that limited issue, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for the trial court to assess Buyer's evidence of those costs and, if appropriate, modify Buyer's total award. We express no opinion on whether an adjustment to Buyer's award of attorneys’ fees for this appeal and further proceedings on remand is appropriate.

[25] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Buyer submitted its original brief to the Clerk of our Court on June 25, 2026. Our Clerk declined to show the original brief as filed, however, and instead issued a Notice of Defect to Buyer regarding the brief. The Notice of Defect informed Buyer that its brief had failed to include the appealed order and a certificate of service, as required under Indiana Appellate Rules 24, 46, and 68. The Notice of Defect provided that Buyer would still have its brief considered timely submitted if Buyer corrected its defects within ten days of the Notice. And the Notice of Defect informed Buyer that the Notice provided for only “the opportunity to correct the defect(s) identified above. You may not make substantive changes or changes that are not responsive to the defect(s) noted above to your document.” June 26, 2026, Notice of Defect, at 2 (emphasis in original).On June 29, Buyer refiled its brief and corrected the defects identified in the Notice of Defect. But Buyer did more: Buyer added at least 405 words to the refiled brief and made numerous other changes to the text of the document. Accordingly, Seller moved to strike Buyer's refiled brief.By separate order and along with this decision, we grant Seller's motion to strike Buyer's refiled brief. Buyer's refiled brief attempted to take advantage of Buyer's own defects in the original brief and made changes to the brief that were unrelated to the Notice of Defect and were thus impermissible. We do not appreciate Buyer's substantive changes to its brief.However, as Buyer's refiling also included the appealed order and the certificate of service, we consider Buyer's originally filed brief to have been properly submitted in accordance with the Notice of Defect. Thus, we strike Buyer's refiled brief but continue to consider the merits of this appeal using Buyer's originally filed brief, and our citations to Buyer's brief in this decision are to the brief as originally filed.

2.   We agree with Seller that Buyer's arguments on appeal regarding disgorgement and fair rental value were not presented to the trial court and are therefore not properly before us.

3.   Because Buyer's due-diligence costs are, if worthy of credit, includable in Buyer's damage award, we agree with Seller that Buyer is not entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of Indiana law. See, e.g., Song v. Iatarola, 76 N.E.3d 926, 939 (Ind. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh'g, No. 64A03-1609-PL-2094 (Ind. Ct. App. July 6, 2017) (mem.), trans. denied.

Mathias, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.