John Serwatka, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] John Serwatka appeals the denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Following a 1975 jury trial, Serwatka was found guilty of two counts of felony murder in the first degree and two counts of murder in the perpetration of a robbery. See Cause No. 2CR-111-575-408; Cause No. 2CR-112-575-409. For the two counts of murder in the first degree, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment.¹ The court withheld sentencing on the remaining counts.

[3] Over fifty years later, Serwatka filed a pro se motion to correct erroneous sentence, alleging in part that the court erred in withholding his sentences for the two counts of murder in the perpetration of a robbery. In support, he attached his commitment order to the Department of Correction (DOC). After the State objected, Serwatka obtained counsel and filed a reply brief along with his sentencing order and the minutes sheet from his sentencing. The trial court ultimately denied Serwatka's motion to correct sentence. Serwatka now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct sentence only for an abuse of discretion. Woodcox v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). An abuse of discretion will be found when the ruling is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. “While we defer to the trial court's factual determinations, we review legal conclusions de novo.” Id.

[5] Serwatka filed his motion under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15, which provides:

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

This statutory remedy is intended to “provide prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence” and is available only where a sentence is erroneous on its face. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). “A sentence is defective on its face ‘if it violates express statutory authority at the time the sentence is pronounced, as when the sentence falls outside the statutory parameters for the particular offense or is based on an erroneous interpretation of a penalty provision.’ ” Woodcox, 30 N.E.3d at 751 (quoting Pettiford v. State, 808 N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Where a claimed sentencing error is not facially apparent—“clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority”—it may be raised only via direct appeal or, where appropriate, post-conviction relief. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. A motion to correct an erroneous sentence may arise only from information contained on the formal judgment of conviction. Woodcox, 30 N.E.3d at 751.

[6] Serwatka argues his sentence is erroneous because the sentencing court withheld sentencing on both counts of murder in perpetration of a robbery. A court erroneously subjects a defendant to double punishment by entering judgment and withholding sentence on an offense. Cummings v. State, 434 N.E.2d 90 (Ind. 1982). However, the State contends that Serwatka has failed to show the sentence is erroneous on its face. Specifically, the State argues, and the trial court found, that Serwatka has failed to show that the sentencing court both entered judgment of conviction and withheld sentencing. We agree.

[7] As noted above, under section 35-38-1-15, the sentencing error must be apparent on the face of the judgment of conviction. Serwatka did not provide the judgment of conviction in this case. He did provide the sentencing order, and “a sentencing order can qualify as a judgment of conviction if it includes all the necessary information required by [Indiana Code section] 35-38-3-2(b).” Gordy v. State, 281 N.E.3d 612, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (citing Woodcox, 30 N.E.3d at 751). This information includes “(1) the crime and the classification of the offense; (2) the amount of the fines or costs assessed; and (3) the amount of credit time earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing.” Id.

[8] But Serwatka's sentencing order does not meet these requirements. Specifically, it does not list the crime or classification for either count of murder in perpetration of a robbery—the counts for which Serwatka contends he was erroneously sentenced. See App. Vol. II pp. 80-81. Nor does it indicate whether the court entered judgment of conviction on those counts. Without this information, we cannot say the sentence is erroneous on its face. We thus agree with the trial court that any alleged error in Serwatka's sentence cannot be remedied under section 35-38-1-15.

[9] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record is unclear about which counts Serwatka was sentenced on. The sentencing order reflects that Serwatka was sentenced to life imprisonment on “Murder First Degree, Count I[.]” App. Vol. II p. 80, but see App. Vol. II p. 146 (Serwatka's DOC commitment order indicating he was sentenced to life imprisonment on “Ct. I Murder in Perp. of a Robbery”). We assume for purposes of this appeal that the sentencing order is correct and note the discrepancy does not change the outcome.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.