Dalton Garrett Rowe, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, the trial court convicted Dalton Garrett Rowe of Level 6 felony criminal confinement,¹ Level 6 felony residential entry,² and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.³ He was also found to be a habitual offender.⁴ Rowe raises one issue for appellate review: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to give his proposed limiting instruction?

[2] Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Rowe and Brianna Goff were in a dating relationship which ended around February 2025. On March 28, at Goff's request, law enforcement issued Rowe a no-trespass warning applicable to Goff's apartment. Three days later, Goff sought and obtained an ex parte order for protection against Rowe.

[4] In the early morning of April 7, Goff and her boyfriend, Joshua Davidson, were sleeping in Goff's apartment when an intruder entered her bedroom through the window. Goff's bed was placed underneath the window, so when the intruder entered, he landed on the couple. Goff jumped out of bed screaming and ran out of the room. She called 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher, “Dalton Rowe just climbed through my window and he is fighting my boyfriend.” Ex. Vol. 4 page 21 at 00:06–00:09 (emergency call).

[5] Meanwhile, Davidson woke up with Rowe above him, and the two began to throw “[a] couple [of] punches[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 48. Davidson had difficulty moving around because he was under the blanket with Rowe on top. After about a minute of struggle, Davidson freed himself and got out of bed, but by then Rowe had climbed out the window.

[6] Several officers with the Greenfield Police Department responded to Goff's emergency call. Police detained Rowe within a block of Goff's apartment, minutes after she called 9-1-1. Both Goff and Davidson wrote witness statements about the incident. Goff's statement read:

We were sleeping. [Rowe] broke into my home ․ and started fighting my boyfriend. I do have a restraining order on [Rowe].

Ex. Vol. 4 at 8. Davidson's statement similarly named Rowe as the man who had climbed through the apartment window.

[7] The State charged Rowe with burglary; criminal confinement; residential entry; battery resulting in moderate bodily injury; invasion of privacy; and criminal trespass. The State also alleged Rowe was a habitual offender.⁵

[8] Both Goff and Davidson testified at Rowe's trial. At the start of her direct examination, Goff testified she did not see who the intruder was because it was dark. The State moved to admit Goff's witness statement, and Rowe objected on hearsay grounds. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 32; Supp. App. Vol. 2 at 24 (Defendant/Appellant's Verified Statement of the Evidence). The trial court had the State provide additional foundation, at which point Goff and the prosecutor had the following exchange:

Q: ․ And it was ․ early in the morning ․ [D]id you hear that person say anything?

A: I didn't hear a voice or anything, no. I did not.

Q: [A]nd then when you got out and called the police, you told them that somebody was attacking Mr. Davidson, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And [the jury] heard that on the 911 call?

A: Yes.

Q: And again, you were pretty confident at [sic] that call that it was Mr. Rowe?

A: Yes.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 34. When the State again moved to admit Goff's witness statement, the trial court admitted the statement over Rowe's objection. Rowe asked the court to give the jury a limiting instruction, and the court declined the request. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Goff the following:

Q: [I]s it your testimony that you don't know who it was that night? Is that your testimony?

A: No.

Q: Okay. [W]hat is your testimony then? [․]

A: I'm pretty sure that it was [Rowe].

Id. at 44.

[9] Davidson testified he did not see who the intruder was. But when the prosecutor asked why he had named Rowe as the perpetrator in his witness statement, Davidson testified he “wrote down the name that [Goff] was screaming.” Id. at 58. The State moved to admit Davidson's witness statement. Rowe did not object, and the trial court admitted the statement.

[10] At the end of day one of trial, Rowe asked the trial court to give a final instruction limiting the jury's use of Goff's and Davidson's statements. The trial court had Rowe email his proposed instruction, which read:

You have heard evidence related to prior statements made by witnesses. You may consider these statements for the limited purpose of attacking the credibility of the witness and/or to [i]mpeach the witness. You may not consider the witness statements for any other purpose.

Supp. App. Vol. 2 at 27. In response, the State argued that “[a]s long as a witness takes the stand ․ and is able to be cross-examined on the statement, the statement itself can be considered substantive evidence.” Id. at 28 (State's email response, citing Patterson v. State, 324 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 1975), among other authority). After the State rested, Rowe reminded the trial court to give the tendered instruction. The State opposed doing so, arguing Goff and Davidson “were available to be cross-examined on [their] prior ․ statements ․ [which] should be considered as substantive evidence[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 129. The trial court agreed with the State and denied Rowe's request.

[11] The jury found Rowe guilty of criminal confinement, residential entry, invasion of privacy, and criminal trespass. The jury found Rowe not guilty of burglary resulting in bodily injury and battery resulting in moderate bodily injury. Rowe waived a jury for the habitual phase and the trial court found he was a habitual offender. At sentencing, the court entered judgment only for criminal confinement, residential entry, and invasion of privacy due to double jeopardy concerns. Including the enhancement for the habitual offender finding, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of seven years with one year suspended to probation.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Rowe's proposed instruction.

[12] Rowe argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give the jury his proposed instruction. He specifically argues it “was reversible error” for the court “not to instruct the jury that it could not consider Goff's and Davidson's prior statements” as substantive evidence. Appellant's Br. at 13. According to Rowe, the written statements Goff and Davidson gave to police “constituted hearsay and could only be used at trial to impeach” their credibility. Id. at 17. He asserts the jury's reliance on the statements prejudiced his substantial rights. See id. at 20. Rowe asks this Court to reverse his convictions.

[13] We review a trial court's decision to give or refuse a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015). To determine whether a jury instruction was properly refused, we consider whether the instruction correctly states the law, is supported by the evidence, and is covered in substance by the other jury instructions. McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760, 763–64 (Ind. 2015). We reverse only if the appellant shows the instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights. Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 376. “The purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Monjar v. State, 876 N.E.2d 792, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

[14] Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c) (2014). Hearsay is not admissible in court unless otherwise provided by the rules of evidence or law. Evid. R. 802 (2014).

[15] In this case, the trial court refused to give the instruction in part because it concluded doing so was unnecessary so long as “the witness [was] present” and the defense had “the ability to cross-examine[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 129. The court arrived at this determination after considering authority the State provided, particularly the case of Patterson v. State. In Patterson, the Indiana Supreme Court permitted the admission of prior out-of-court statements not made under oath as substantive evidence if the declarant was present and available for cross-examination at the time of the admission. 324 N.E.2d at 484–85. But the Court has since overruled the so-called Patterson rule. See Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649, 653–54 (Ind. 1991). The State does not dispute the change in the law; rather, it argues Rowe incorrectly assumes “the written statements were only admissible as impeachment evidence.” Appellee's Br. at 8 (citing Evid. R. 801(d)(1)(C) (2014)). We agree with the State.

[16] Under Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C), a statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement “is an identification of a person shortly after perceiving the person.” See also Davis v. State, 13 N.E.3d 939, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (applying Rule 801(d)(1)(C) to review the admissibility of a witness's prior identification statements), trans. denied.

[17] Rowe's proposed instruction was inconsistent with Indiana law. Goff and Davidson provided their witness statements to the responding officers the morning of the incident. Both witnesses testified about their statements and were subject to cross-examination at Rowe's trial. Goff first identified Rowe by name while on the phone with the emergency dispatcher. She wrote her witness statement shortly after perceiving Rowe as the man who climbed through her bedroom window. See Robinson v. State, 682 N.E.2d 806, 810–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding witness statement given to police two months after a shooting was made “shortly” after the incident for purposes of Rule 801(d)(1)(C)), trans. denied. And because Rowe did not object to the admission of Davidson's statement, he cannot now argue it was admitted in error. In other words, the witness statements were admissible as substantive evidence and Rowe's tendered instruction would have improperly limited the jury's consideration of the evidence. See Kendall v. State, 790 N.E.2d 122, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding evidence admitted under Rule 801(d) is admissible as substantive evidence), trans. denied.⁶

[18] To the extent the trial court erred, Rowe has not convinced us any error impacted his substantial rights. See Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 376. The record shows Goff requested police issue Rowe a no-trespass warning, followed by an order for protection against him, less than two weeks before the incident. In her testimony, Goff acknowledged she had been “pretty confident” Rowe was the intruder when she called 9-1-1. Tr. Vol. 2 at 34. She concluded her testimony by stating she was still “pretty sure” Rowe was the perpetrator. Id. at 44. Davidson testified he identified Rowe as the intruder because that was the name he heard Goff scream. Defense counsel did not object to any of this testimony by either witness. And police detained Rowe within minutes after Goff called 9-1-1, less than a block from her apartment. Because substantial independent evidence supported Rowe's convictions, any error in the trial court's refusal to give his tendered instruction was harmless. See Ndiaye v. State, 234 N.E.3d 906, 911 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (noting because the evidence left no reasonable probability of the defendant's acquittal, any error in instructing the jury was harmless).

Conclusion

[19] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give Rowe's proposed limiting instruction.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a) (2019).

2.   I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5 (2014).

3.   I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(1) (2023).

4.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8(d) (2023).

5.   The State alleged Rowe was previously convicted of Class D felony dealing in marijuana; Class C felony robbery; Level 4 felony arson; and Level 6 felony escape.

6.   Although we focus on Evidence Rule 801(d), Goff's statement likely qualifies as an excited utterance. Under Rule 803(2), a hearsay statement is admissible if it is a “statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” See also Stinson v. State, 126 N.E.3d 915, 920–22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (applying the excited utterance exception). Goff's statement pertained to the startling event of the break-in. Her statement identifying Rowe as the intruder was directly related to the crime and made while she remained under the excitement caused by the event.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.