Fabian Long, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Fabian Long appeals his conviction for Level 3 felony possession of cocaine.¹ He presents one issue for our review: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting an unprompted incriminating statement Long made to police while he was in custody but not given Miranda ² warnings? Considering all other evidence admitted at trial without objection and unchallenged on appeal, we hold that any error in the admission of Long's statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm his conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of December 18, 2020, Officer Joseph Stasko of the Lake County Sheriff's Department was patrolling along Cleveland Street in Gary when he noticed a white Cadillac driving without a license plate affixed to the bumper. Officer Stasko initiated a traffic stop and saw two people inside the car: a male driver, later identified as Long, and a female passenger, Marci Castillo. Officer Stasko approached the driver's side and spoke with Long, who handed the officer an identification card. Officer Stasko went back to his patrol car and, after running a computer search, learned Long was a habitual traffic violator (“HTV”). Officer Stasko decided to place Long under arrest for operating a vehicle while a HTV, so he went back to the Cadillac and directed Long to get out. He handcuffed Long and patted him down by the car's trunk.

[3] Meanwhile, Officer Branden Benton arrived as back-up to help with the traffic stop. Officer Benton approached the passenger side of the car to speak with Castillo. He saw in Castillo's lap a plastic baggie containing a white substance, which he suspected was illegal drugs. Officer Benton informed Officer Stasko about the baggie, then ordered Castillo out of the car and handcuffed her. The officers called for a female officer to conduct a pat-down search of Castillo.

[4] Officer Taronda Ferguson arrived, and during a pat-down search conducted at the rear passenger side of the Cadillac, discovered an object in Castillo's pants. Officer Ferguson shook the item loose from Castillo's pant leg; it was a plastic baggie containing a large white ball of suspected narcotics, which later lab tests revealed to be 27.75 grams of cocaine and lidocaine. Long made several statements on scene indicating the drugs were his, not Castillo's. Officer Stasko called and spoke to the on-call narcotics detective, Aaron Ramos. On the detective's advice, Officer Stasko released Castillo and only arrested Long that night. In all, the traffic stop lasted approximately 20 to 25 minutes. At no point did any officer give Miranda warnings to Long.

[5] The State charged Long with Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a HTV ³ and Level 3 felony possession of cocaine.⁴ The case eventually proceeded to a two-day jury trial beginning August 11, 2025. Although Long filed many motions in limine, he did not file a pre-trial motion to suppress any of his statements to police or police body camera footage.

[6] On the first day of trial, the State called Officer Stasko, who described the initial stop, arrest, and Long's statements to police. Regarding the large baggie retrieved from Castillo's pants, Officer Stasko testified: “As I was speaking with Mr. Long, he advised me that that was narcotics.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 160. Long objected on the grounds the response went “beyond the scope of the question,” which the trial court overruled. Id. The State again asked the officer what Long said on the scene, and he testified: “[Long] advised me that that was his narcotics, not hers, and to not take her.” Id. Officer Stasko also explained that he arrested Long (not Castillo) on Detective Ramos’ advice because “Long advised that was his narcotics.” Id. at 161. Long did not object to this additional testimony.

[7] The State then sought to introduce Officer Stasko's body camera footage showing the stop and arrest. Over Long's hearsay objection, the State published select portions of the video to the jury.

[8] The video shows that after Officer Ferguson shook the large baggie loose from Castillo's pant leg, Officer Benton collected it from the ground and handed it to Officer Stasko. Officer Ferguson continued to pat down Castillo, asking, “Is that all you had in there? Was one bag, or you got more?” and advising, “You might as well tell me now.” Ex. Vol. 1, page 6 at 4:10–4:18 (State's Exhibit 4, Officer Ferguson's body cam footage). Castillo did not respond. But Long—who was still handcuffed and standing next to the Cadillac's trunk—stated: “That's it.” Id. at 4:18–4:20; Ex. Vol. 1, page 4 at 11:55–12:02 (State's Exhibit 2, Officer Stasko's body cam footage); Ex. Vol. 1, page 5 at 5:03–5:10 (State's Exhibit 3, Officer Benton's body cam footage). After Long said, “That's it,” Officer Stasko immediately asked Long, “This yours or hers?” while pointing at the baggie, and Long responded: “It's mine.” Ex. Vol. 1, page 4 at 12:02–12:07.

[9] After publication to the jury and cross-examination of the officer, Long objected to the admission of the video footage containing his statements because police had not given him Miranda warnings. Despite this untimely objection, the trial court held a hearing on the issue outside the jury's presence. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court excluded Long's admission, “It's mine,” as the product of an unwarned custodial interrogation. It gave the jury a limiting instruction to disregard Long's response to Officer Stasko's questioning. But the trial court did not exclude Long's statement, “That's it,” determining Long had volunteered it.

[10] The State next called Officer Benton and sought to introduce his body camera footage. This time, Long timely objected to the video based on Miranda. The trial court overruled his objection. At one point, the video shows Officer Benton waiting by the Cadillac while Officer Stasko speaks on the phone to Detective Ramos. Long is nearby, handcuffed and standing at the back of the car. Officer Stasko approaches Long and asks him, “Ok, so none of that's hers?” and Long responds, “No.” Ex. Vol. 1, page 5 at 14:55–14:59. Officer Stasko walks away. About one minute later, Long tells Officer Benton—unprompted—that he grabbed Castillo and placed the drugs in her pants when they were first pulled over. Id. at 15:56–16:01 (Long stating, “Ain't none of that hers, I grabbed her and ․ pushed that shit down her pants.”). Officer Benton asks, “I'm sorry, what?”, and Long replies, “I grabbed her and pushed that shit in her pants.” Id. at 16:01–16:06. Officer Stasko then reapproaches, and once again confirms with Long the drugs were his. Id. at 16:42–16:45 (Officer Stasko asking, “You said that's yours, right?”, and Long responding, “Yeah.”). All these statements were admitted and published to the jury.⁵

[11] The State also called Detective Ramos. At the end of his testimony, a juror wanted to ask the detective why Castillo was not arrested as well. During a discussion at the bench, Long agreed Detective Ramos could answer. See id. at 19 (defense attorney stating, “If he's aware, I guess he can[.]”). Detective Ramos answered, “When I talked to Officer Stasko, he advised me that [Long] admitted that the dope found ․ during the traffic stop was his.” Id.

[12] The jury found Long guilty of Level 4 felony possession of cocaine and the HTV offense. Long waived jury trial for the enhancing circumstance and a bench trial was held. The trial court found Long guilty and entered judgment of conviction on possession as a Level 3 felony.

Any error in the admission of Long's statement was harmless error considering the admitted evidence.

[13] Long contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his statement to Officer Benton that he grabbed Castillo and put the drugs in her pants. This is the only statement Long challenges. Long argues this unprompted statement should have been excluded as a Miranda violation because he made it during an unwarned custodial interrogation after Officer Stasko had already obtained an inadmissible confession (“It's mine”) and immediately after Officer Stasko asked an additional question eliciting an incriminating statement (Long's response, “No” to Officer Stasko's question, “Ok, so none of that's hers?”).

[14] We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Ross v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

[15] Prior to any custodial interrogation, a defendant “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Miranda warnings are used to secure a criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination, Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), and “are meant to overcome the inherently coercive and police dominated atmosphere of custodial interrogation,” Payne v. State, 854 N.E.2d 7, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Statements elicited in violation of Miranda generally are inadmissible in a criminal trial. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (the “prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination”); see also Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995).

[16] Here, no officer gave Long Miranda warnings during the traffic stop. Because Long had been arrested for operating while a HTV and handcuffed at the back of a police cruiser, Long was in custody when he made the challenged statement. See White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. 2002) (“When the defendant made the statements, there is no doubt that the defendant was in custody; he had been arrested and was handcuffed.”); Ross, 151 N.E.3d at 1290 (“Given that [the defendant] was detained and handcuffed by the assisting officers, there is no dispute that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda.”); Hudson v. State, 129 N.E.3d 220, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding the defendant “was in custody when handcuffed for officer safety and placed in the back of the patrol vehicle”). Further, Officer Stasko had already begun to interrogate Long when he initially asked Long whether the drugs were his or Castillo's. See White, 772 N.E.2d at 412 (explaining that for the purposes of Miranda, “interrogation” includes both (1) express questioning, and (2) “words or actions on the part of the police that the police know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect”). The trial court determined Long's initial explicit confession, “It's mine,” was inadmissible as the result of a custodial interrogation.

[17] Yet in this case we need not determine whether Long's later statement to Officer Benton—that he grabbed Castillo and put the drugs in her pants—was the product of unwarned custodial interrogation. Even assuming it was, “[s]tatements obtained in violation of Miranda and erroneously admitted are subject to harmless error analysis.” Alford v. State, 699 N.E.2d 247, 251 (Ind. 1998). We review federal constitutional errors de novo. Id. The error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning we must be satisfied the State met its burden of demonstrating the admission of the confession did not contribute to the conviction. Id. To say an error did not contribute to the verdict is “to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” Id. (citation omitted). This is a “demanding standard.” Id.

[18] Here, the record shows that before the State introduced any police body camera footage or statements contained therein, Officer Stasko twice testified that Long said the drugs belonged to him, not Castillo. Although Long once objected to Officer Stasko's testimony because it “went beyond the scope of the question,” the trial court overruled the objection. Long does not challenge that evidentiary ruling on appeal, and even if he did, he could not now object on grounds that the statement was elicited in violation of Miranda. See White, 772 N.E.2d at 411 (“A party may not object on one ground at trial and raise a different ground on appeal.”). In addition to Officer Stasko's testimony, Detective Ramos testified he authorized Long's arrest and Castillo's release because Long admitted the drugs were his. Long did not object to this statement for any reason; rather, he agreed Detective Ramos could answer the question.

[19] As to Long's statements on the body camera footage, the jury saw footage taken of Officer Ferguson's pat-down search of Castillo. In it, Officer Ferguson asks Castillo if she has any more drugs in her pants, to which Long (not Castillo) responds, “That's it.” Ex. Vol. 1, page 6 at 4:18–4:20. The trial court did not exclude this statement, and Long does not challenge that evidentiary decision on appeal. This statement supports an inference the drugs were Long's, as Long had knowledge of the quantity of contraband concealed in Castillo's clothing.

[20] Finally, even though Long objected to the contents of Officer Benton's body camera footage based on Miranda, the only statement challenged at the trial court and on appeal is Long's statement that he grabbed Castillo and put the drugs in her pants. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 59–60; Appellant's Br. at 6. But the footage also recorded the questions Officer Stasko asked Long about the drugs, and Long's incriminating responses. See Ex. Vol. 1, page 5 at 14:55–14:59 (Officer Stasko asking Long, “Ok, so none of that's hers?”, and Long responding, “No.”); Id. at 16:42–16:45 (Officer Stasko asking Long, “You said that's yours, right?”, and Long responding, “Yeah.”). On appeal, Long observes he made those statements in the absence of Miranda warnings, but he does not argue for their exclusion.

[21] In sum, the following evidence was before the jury and remains unchallenged on appeal: Officer Stasko's testimony that Long said the drugs were his; Long's statement “That's it,” indicating he knew the quantity of drugs in Castillo's pants; and Long's incriminating answers to Officer Stasko's later questioning about who owned the drugs. Together, this evidence amounts to a confession that Long possessed the 27.75 grams of cocaine recovered from Castillo's pants. Even setting aside the challenged statement, a careful review of the record shows there was substantial evidence admitted at trial and unchallenged on appeal that Long admitted the drugs were his, not Castillo's. Any further statement that Long put the drugs in Castillo's pants was merely cumulative of the prior-admitted evidence. See Morales v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1260, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding the defendant's incriminating statement made to law enforcement and erroneously admitted due to Miranda violation was harmless error where it was cumulative of other evidence, including a similar statement the defendant made to another person). As a result, we are satisfied that Long's incriminating statement that he grabbed Castillo and put the drugs in her pants did not contribute to his conviction, and any error in the admission of that statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

[22] Considering all other evidence admitted without trial objection and unchallenged on appeal, any error in the admission of Long's cumulative incriminating statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(d)(2) (2014).

2.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3.   I.C. § 9-30-10-16(a)(1) (2015).

4.   The State charged Long only with possession of the large baggie of cocaine, not the smaller baggie observed on Castillo's lap. The offense of possession of cocaine is a Level 3 felony if “the amount of the drug involved is at least ten (10) but less than twenty-eight (28) grams and an enhancing circumstance applies.” I.C. § 35-48-4-6(d)(2); see also I.C. § 35-48-1-16.5 (2019) (definition of enhancing circumstance). In this case, the enhancing circumstance was Long's 1998 conviction in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana for possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine.

5.   See Tr. Vol. 2 at 184 (publishing Officer Benton's body camera footage from timestamp 14:49 to 16:50 at trial); Tr. Vol. 3 at 89–90 (publishing the same from timestamp 14:51 to 16:45 during jury deliberations).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.