IN RE: the Civil Commitment of: K.E. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] K.E. went to the emergency department of Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health (Hospital) twice in late September 2026 to report that she had been raped. The first time, K.E. left before a forensic exam could be done. When she returned a day or two later, staff found her too disorganized to assess, and Hospital admitted her. According to K.E.’s Hospital psychiatrist, K.E. said her mother had arranged the rape and needed to be killed. K.E. also said she was thinking about getting a gun.

[2] Hospital petitioned for K.E.’s temporary involuntary commitment, which the trial court granted after finding her to be mentally ill, dangerous to others, and gravely disabled. On appeal, K.E. does not dispute that she is mentally ill. Instead, she contends the evidence was insufficient to prove she was dangerous or gravely disabled and that the failure to prove both of those two conditions mandates reversal. Because clear and convincing evidence showed that K.E. was dangerous to others, we affirm and need not address the trial court's alternative finding that K.E. was gravely disabled.¹

Facts

[3] Before her most recent hospitalization, K.E., who is twenty-eight years old, had been hospitalized for mental illness six times since 2021. She was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). None of K.E.’s earlier hospitalizations had resulted in a commitment, however. Instead, her condition had improved with medication, and she had been in outpatient treatment as recently as March 2024.

[4] In late September 2026, K.E. went to Hospital's emergency department and reported that she had been raped. She left against medical advice before forensic and physical exams could be conducted. K.E. later explained that she left because she needed to care for her son. K.E. returned to Hospital's emergency department a day or two later and again reported that she had been raped. A forensic nurse could not complete an assessment because K.E.’s statements were so disorganized and tangential. A crisis team evaluated and admitted K.E. to Hospital, which then petitioned for K.E.’s emergency detention. The trial court granted Hospital's petition on September 28, and later that day, Hospital petitioned for K.E.’s temporary involuntary commitment.

[5] The next day, Dr. Syed Hassan, a psychiatrist, interviewed K.E. at Hospital. K.E. told Dr. Hassan that she had been raped and ambushed near her home and that her mother had orchestrated the attack. K.E. also disagreed with her prior schizoaffective disorder diagnosis. When Dr. Hassan referred to K.E.’s medical records documenting that diagnosis, K.E. became upset and left the interview. K.E. later explained that she left because Dr. Hassan insulted her by asking her which vein is used for a blood draw, despite her graduation “from the Indiana School of Phlebotomy for medical assisting” earlier in 2026. Tr., p. 23.

[6] Throughout K.E.’s hospitalization, she was preoccupied with her mother, whom she described as abusive and as arranging for others to harm her. K.E. told Dr. Hassan that her mother “needs to be killed” and that K.E. had slapped her mother in the past. Id. at 6. When Dr. Hassan asked K.E. whether she had ever thought about killing her mother, K.E. paused before answering. She also said she was thinking about getting a gun to protect herself. K.E.’s speech was rambling and tangential, and she quickly fluctuated between anger, irritation, and laughter. K.E. was also verbally, but not physically, aggressive with Dr. Hassan during their three sessions over three days, with the last occurring on the day of the commitment hearing.

[7] K.E. declined medication for her schizoaffective disorder throughout her hospitalization. Hospital staff reported that she took pills and spat them out, did not attend group sessions, and refused to talk with the social worker. K.E. did accept lorazepam and hydroxyzine for anxiety early in her hospitalization.

[8] At the commitment hearing on October 1, Dr. Hassan opined that K.E. was in an acute decompensation of schizoaffective disorder, lacked the judgment and reasoning to function independently, and was a danger to others but not to herself. He believed K.E.’s disorganized thinking, mistrust, and paranoia could escalate into violence against her mother, on whom K.E. focused. He also testified that K.E.’s insight into her illness was significantly impaired and that she would not comply with outpatient treatment. As a result, Dr. Hassan viewed temporary commitment as the least restrictive treatment option.

[9] K.E. was the only other witness at the commitment hearing. She disclosed that she lives in her own apartment with help from a housing agency and that she receives food stamps. She also reported that she had completed the phlebotomy program and was applying for medical assistant jobs. She acknowledged having PTSD but denied any other mental illness.

[10] K.E. also testified that (1) her father recently told her that she had been kidnapped and shot as a child; (2) her mother had been setting her up (including through police calls); and (3) her mother sought a sexual relationship with her. K.E. testified that she had spoken to her mother by phone a month or two earlier. She also denied wanting to kill her. But K.E. confirmed that when Dr. Hassan asked whether her mother needed to be killed, she told him that her mother “probably do[es] need to be killed.” Id. at 28. K.E. also testified that she told Dr. Hassan that “[m]aybe” her mother needed to be killed. Id.

[11] When K.E. was asked by Hospital's counsel whether she was considering buying a firearm, K.E. responded, “In a way.” Id. at 36. But she stated she wanted to take classes first because she was “a little crazy.” Id. Then, when her own counsel asked whether she would buy a gun and hurt her mother, K.E. first said she had no money and needed a job. Pressed on whether she would purchase the gun once she had money, she said no and explained that she wanted a gun for her own safety.

[12] The trial court found that K.E. lives with schizoaffective disorder and PTSD and is dangerous to others and gravely disabled. It committed her to Hospital for up to ninety days, until December 30, 2026, and ordered her to take prescribed medications. It ruled:

The Court considers the evidence collectively in making a determination of dangerousness to others and grave disability, including but not limited to denial of illness, paranoia, refusal to medicate, threats, hostile, disorganized thinking, unemployed, indicated to doctor that her mother needs to be killed, and has required ․ medication.

The Court found it very telling that when asked about buying a firearm to kill her mom, her first response was that she didn't have enough money for a gun. [W]ith regard to the credibility between Dr. Hassan and [K.E.], the Court would find that Dr. Hassan was more credible with regard to his assessment of [K.E. and her dangerousness to her mother.

Id. at 43.

Discussion and Decision

[13] On appeal, K.E. claims the evidence was insufficient to support her involuntary commitment. An individual may be involuntarily committed in Indiana if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that (1) “the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled” and (2) “detention or commitment of that individual is appropriate.” Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e) (Involuntary Commitment Statute). Because the Involuntary Commitment Statute “is written in the disjunctive, the petitioner need only prove that the individual is [mentally ill and] either dangerous or gravely disabled—not both—to carry the burden of proof.” A.P. v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 238 N.E.3d 704, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[14] Here, the trial court found that Hospital proved K.E. was mentally ill and both dangerous and gravely disabled. K.E. does not challenge the trial court's finding that she was mentally ill, but she argues that there was no clear and convincing evidence that she was either dangerous or gravely disabled. When reviewing such a claim, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the judgment and do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. A.S. v. Cmty. Fairbanks Behav. Health, 262 N.E.3d 853, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “We will affirm if clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's judgment.” Id. (quoting A.O. v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 206 N.E.3d 1191, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)).

[15] Applying this standard of review, we conclude the evidence supports the trial court's finding that K.E. was dangerous to others and affirm on that basis. See A.P., 238 N.E.3d at 709.

Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Finding That K.E. Is Dangerous

[16] In the commitment context, an individual is “dangerous” when, “as a result of mental illness,” she “presents a substantial risk” that she will harm herself or others. Ind. Code § 12-7-2.1-109(a) (effective July 1, 2026, and recodifying the now repealed Indiana Code § 12-7-2-53). The conduct alleged to show dangerousness must be a product of the mental illness, meaning it would not occur but for that illness. Id.; M.M. v. Clarian Health Partners, 826 N.E.2d 90, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[17] K.E. contends that her statements about her mother reflect, at most, animosity toward a parent she avoids. K.E. argues that she had neither the desire nor the means to hurt her mother, given that K.E. had no gun, no money to buy one, and no plan to harm her mother with the gun. She also argues that Hospital offered only a conclusory link between her statements and her illness and that the abuse she suffered as a child offers an independent explanation for her hostility toward her mother. We find these arguments unpersuasive.

[18] The “dangerous” finding depended on whether K.E., as a result of her mental illness, “presents a substantial risk” that she will harm herself or others—not whether K.E. had all the tools in place at the time of the commitment hearing to achieve such harm. See Ind. Code § 12-7-2.1-109(a). “[A] trial court is not required to wait until an individual commits a physical act before determining that the individual poses a substantial risk of harm to others.” B.M. v. Ind. Univ. Health, 24 N.E.3d 969, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[19] Although K.E. correctly notes that animosity toward an abusive parent does not, by itself, show dangerousness, the evidence of dangerousness here was more expansive than that. The record shows that K.E. had some contact with her mother, despite K.E.’s claims of her mother's nefarious conduct. The evidence also revealed K.E.’s statements that she was considering purchasing a gun and that her mother, whom K.E. had struck previously, should “[m]aybe” be killed. Tr., p. 28. Meanwhile, K.E. was not taking medication prescribed to control her mental illness. Dr. Hassan testified that K.E. was in an acute decompensation of schizoaffective disorder as evidenced by her disorganized and rambling thinking, paranoia, and rapid swings in mood. The trial court witnessed some of this behavior when K.E. testified.

[20] Beyond that, the evidence showed that K.E. had been hospitalized six previous times within the past five years. Although she had not been committed previously, K.E. now was rejecting the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder and refusing treatment for it. Dr. Hassan testified that her current behaviors, left unchecked, could escalate to violence against her mother.

[21] K.E.’s statements about harming her mother were contradictory, at best. At the commitment hearing, she denied wanting to hurt her mother, stated that she wanted a gun for her own safety, and explained that she had no money to buy one. But K.E. acknowledged telling Dr. Hassan that her mother “[m]aybe” needed to be killed, and K.E. made clear that she was considering buying a firearm. Id. at 28, 36. The trial court found Dr. Hassan's assessment of K.E.’s statements and their import to be more credible than that offered by K.E. We do not reassess such credibility determinations on appeal. Civil Commitment of T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015).

[22] The evidence of dangerousness here is far more substantial than that in In re Commitment of J.B., 581 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), an appellate decision upon which K.E. relies. The only evidence of alleged dangerousness in J.B. was the individual's repeated departure from her mother's vehicle at a busy intersection and one incident of hitchhiking. Id. at 449. The J.B. Court determined that this proof was insufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard because there was “no inherent showing in this conduct that it would not occur but for her mental illness.” Id. at 452.

[23] Three other appellate decisions on which K.E. relies heavily also do not require a different result. In the first of these decisions—T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 276-77—the treating physician himself did not believe that the individual posed a danger to himself or others, and there was no other expert opinion on that issue. The second and third cases cited by K.E.—B.J. v. Eskenazi Hosp./Midtown CMHC, 67 N.E.3d 1034, 1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), and In re Commitment of Steinberg, 821 N.E.2d 385, 388-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)—are distinguishable on their facts, as well.

[24] B.J. focused on whether evidence of grave disability was sufficient; the “dangerous” prong was not at issue. 67 N.E.3d at 1039-40. However, the individual's dangerousness was a factor in the psychiatrist's opinion that the individual was gravely disabled. Id. at 1040. The B.J. Court ruled that the evidence of grave disability rested on hypothetical future contingencies, rather than the individual's condition at the hearing, and therefore was insufficient to support the commitment. Id. Steinberg likewise is inapt. It involved a single incident in which the individual pointed an unloaded gun at people who threatened him. Steinberg, 821 N.E.2d at 388-89. No other evidence suggested that further dangerous behavior was likely. Id.

[25] Here, by contrast, Dr. Hassan's testimony linked K.E.’s condition at the time of the commitment hearing to his “dangerous” finding. In explaining his determination that K.E. was dangerous to others, he cited her paranoia, disorganized thinking, refusal to recognize her illness or take appropriate medications for it, and statements about her mother. K.E.’s rambling and sometimes confusing testimony at the commitment hearing appeared consistent with Dr. Hassan's own observations of K.E. Unlike in T.K., B.J., and Steinberg, clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's finding that K.E., as a result of her mental illness, was dangerous because she presented a substantial risk that she would harm others.

Conclusion

[26] Because clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's judgment, we affirm the court's commitment of K.E. to Hospital's care for a period not to exceed ninety days.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This expedited appeal is part of the two-year Marion County Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project (Project). Our Supreme Court established the Project to address timing issues in certain mental health commitment appeals in which the standard appellate timeline typically exceeds the commitment's duration. In re Marion Cnty. Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project, No. 24S-MS-190, Order p. 1 (Ind. July 16, 2024).

Weissmann, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.