IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.H. (Mother) and M.O. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.H. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to one of her children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and J.O. (“Father”) are the parents of M.O. (“Child”), born in October 2022. Father's parental rights to Child were not terminated, and thus he is not a party to this appeal.

[3] Mother has a long history of involvement with the Department of Child Services (DCS), primarily due to her criminal activity and illegal drug use. She has four older children, all of whom were adjudicated children in need of services (CHINS) at various times. Two of the children were adopted, and custody of the other two was modified to a relative. As for Child, she was born exposed to THC. This resulted in a substantiation by DCS, but no CHINS petition was filed at that time.

[4] In January 2024, Father found bruises on one-year-old Child's back, legs, and vaginal area after she'd stayed with Mother for several days. Father took Child to the hospital for a sexual-assault examination, and the hospital reported concerns of neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse to DCS. DCS also had concerns about Mother's drug use—when DCS workers interviewed Mother, her eyes were glassy, her pupils were dilated, her speech was slurred, her home smelled like marijuana, and she admitted to occasionally using THC and recently relapsing on fentanyl. As a result, DCS removed Child from Mother and placed her in foster care.

[5] DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 (inability, refusal, or neglect) and 31-34-1-3 (victim of sex offense). The trial court entered a provisional order for services, including random drug screening. From January to April, Mother had eight positive screens for methamphetamine, amphetamine, fentanyl, and norfentanyl. One of those screens was also positive for cocaine, and several were positive for THC. In April 2024, after Mother admitted to some of the allegations in the petition, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS under Section 31-34-1-1.¹ In its dispositional decree, the court ordered Mother to, among other things, refrain from criminal activity, maintain contact with DCS, submit to random drug screens, successfully complete drug-and-alcohol counseling, attend visitation, and participate in home-based services.

[6] DCS referred Mother to Bowen Health for a mental-health assessment, substance-use assessment, and home-based services. Mother completed the assessments and submitted to some drug screens in April, but she stopped screening after that. As a result of the assessments, Mother was diagnosed with opioid and cannabis dependence and recommended for group and individual therapy. Mother attended one group therapy session in May 2024. She never completed drug-and-alcohol counseling or participated in home-based services. She initially attended visitation, but her last visit was in October 2024. After that, she was “essentially missing”—she didn't maintain contact with DCS and stopped participating in services altogether. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 171.

[7] Mother also failed to refrain from criminal activity. In November 2024, she was arrested for shoplifting in Allen County and charged with Level 6 felony theft. Then, in February 2025, she was again arrested in Allen County for possession of Adderall and charged with Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance. Two months later, she was arrested in LaGrange County for possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia.

[8] In the meantime, Child was moved to a different foster home in January 2025, where she has since remained. That April, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child.² In July, Mother pled guilty to Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine in the LaGrange County case and was sentenced to 18 months in the county jail (with credit for 83 days). Then, in November, she pled guilty in the Allen County cases. She was sentenced to one year executed for Level 6 felony theft and two years suspended to probation for Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance, consecutive to each other and to the LaGrange County sentence.

[9] The fact-finding hearing on the termination petition began in November 2025. Jennifer Young, Child's guardian ad litem (GAL), recommended termination of Mother's parental rights because Mother “has not been involved with [Child]” since 2024, and “her recent incarceration relates to possession of drugs which further shows there's not been a benefit from the few little bit of services she has participated in.” Id. GAL Young explained that Child, who'd just turned three, needed permanency because she'd been removed for over half of her life.

[10] The hearing continued and concluded in January 2026. Several days earlier, Mother had been released from the LaGrange County Jail and transferred to the Allen County Jail, where she said she had five months left to serve. Mother claimed that she'd be one year sober on February 11 but acknowledged that she didn't comply with random drug screens. She testified that she participated in a recovery program in the LaGrange County Jail and became a trustee. Mother also said she'd previously completed Recovery While Incarcerated while she was in the Department of Correction during the COVID-19 pandemic, but she relapsed after her release.

[11] In April 2026, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child.

[12] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[14] Here, DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c). As to the first requirement, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, the existence of the following circumstances in subsection (d) as it relates to Mother:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

See Ex. 1 p. 2; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 70, 73-74. Mother challenges the trial court's conclusions under subsection (d) and that termination is in Child's best interests. We address each challenge in turn.

I. The trial court did not err in concluding there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied

[15] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: first, the court identifies what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. This second step requires the court to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, considering evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id.

[16] Here, DCS removed Child from Mother due to neglect, suspected abuse, and Mother's illegal drug use. And DCS was never able to return Child to Mother's care because Mother failed to complete services, demonstrate sobriety, or refrain from criminal activity. From January to April 2024, Mother had eight drug screens that were positive for a variety of substances. She claimed at the fact-finding hearing that she was eleven months sober, but she hadn't submitted to any random drug screens for nearly two years (since April 2024), and she was arrested for possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia in April 2025. Although Mother underwent mental-health and substance-use assessments, she failed to complete the services recommended as a result of the assessments; she attended only one group therapy session and never completed drug-and-alcohol counseling or participated in home-based services. And Mother attended visitation only until October 2024, meaning she hadn't seen Child in over a year. After that, she didn't maintain contact with DCS, stopped participating in services, and was “essentially missing” until her incarceration. From November 2024 to April 2025, Mother was charged in three new criminal cases—two of which involved drugs—and all three led to felony convictions. As a result, she was in jail for the nine months leading up to the fact-finding hearing, and she still had at least five months left to serve at the time of the hearing. As GAL Young explained, the fact that Mother continued to commit drug-related offenses “shows there's not been a benefit from the few little bit of services she has participated in.”

[17] Mother claims that DCS provided evidence of her “past shortcomings” but did not prove “current conditions.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. But any lack of evidence of Mother's current conditions is on Mother—as just explained, she stopped submitting to drug screens, participating in services, and communicating with DCS by late 2024 and then was incarcerated for the rest of the proceedings. See, e.g., In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“A parent whose drug use led to a child's removal cannot be permitted to refuse to submit to drug testing, then later claim the DCS has failed to prove that the drug use has continued.”). Mother also argues that the trial court failed to consider her good behavior and participation in services while incarcerated. But the court acknowledged Mother's efforts in its findings of fact. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 63. To the extent Mother is asking us to give more weight to these efforts than the trial court did, that is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we do not do. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[18] The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.³

II. The trial court did not err in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests

[19] Deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests requires the trial court to look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the child. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied. Central among these interests is the child's need for permanency, as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. We have held that recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[20] Here, GAL Young recommended termination of Mother's parental rights because Mother “has not been involved with [Child]” since 2024, failed to complete all her services, and didn't show any benefit from the few services she did participate in. In addition to this recommendation and the evidence described above that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, as GAL Young explained, Child has been removed for over half of her life and needs permanency. Child, now four, was removed from Mother when she was one. Mother hasn't seen Child since October 2024 because she stopped attending visitation and then was incarcerated. As the trial court found, Mother “essentially abandoned” Child. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 70. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time of the CHINS adjudication, the results of Child's rape kit were still pending, so the trial court did not find Child to be a CHINS under Section 31-34-1-3. Once the results came back, the report of sexual abuse was unsubstantiated because there was “no male DNA present” in the rape kit and Child's exam was otherwise “unremarkable.” Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 116, 225.

2.   DCS also petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to Child, but in its order terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court concluded that DCS had not met its burden of proof as to Father.

3.   Because Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) requires the existence of only one of the circumstances in subsection (d), we need not address Mother's challenge to the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

Vaidik, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and May, J., concur.