I.K. (Father) Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] I.K. (Father) appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to his child. Father challenges several findings of fact and whether there was sufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father is the biological father of N.K. (Child), born in September 2016.¹ Father thereafter began a romantic relationship with J.R. (Custodian), and the couple had a child together in January 2023.

[3] In October 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report that Father was arrested and charged with two counts of Level 6 felony domestic violence battery after he “placed [Custodian] in a headlock” in the presence of Child. Supp. Ex. Vol. III p. 19. The report included additional allegations that Father physically abused and threatened Custodian, Child, and Child's sibling. Father left the residence after the criminal court ordered him to stay away from the home and Custodian. Custodian then obtained a civil protective order prohibiting Father from contacting her or Child.

[4] On November 21, Father picked Child up from school and absconded with him in violation of the protective order. Later that day, DCS removed Child from Father's care and placed Child with Custodian and his sibling.² On November 27, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). Therein, DCS alleged Father exposed Child to domestic violence and physically abused and threatened him.

[5] Before the CHINS factfinding hearing, Father independently completed a dual mental health and substance abuse assessment at the Evansville Office of Southwestern Behavioral Health Care (Southwestern). Southwestern staff diagnosed Father with antisocial personality disorder and recommended that he participate in therapy. Father attended two appointments but then stopped attending recommended treatment.

[6] Father admitted Child was a CHINS on February 24, 2024. On March 12, DCS submitted a predispositional report, recommending that Father complete mental health and substance abuse assessments. On March 20, the trial court issued a dispositional decree, ordering Father to complete any assessments recommended by DCS within thirty days. It also ordered Father to complete a domestic violence awareness program, refrain from all drugs and alcohol, follow all treatment recommendations, participate in supervised visitation, and maintain stable housing and employment. Father was not explicitly ordered to submit to drug and alcohol screens.

[7] After disposition, Father began participating in supervised visitation with Child. In April 2024, Father submitted to a drug screen with DCS that returned positive for THC. In May, Father pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony battery with a prior battery conviction and was sentenced to probation. As a condition of his probation, Father was required to refrain from drug and alcohol use and to submit to random drug screens.

[8] In October, DCS requested that Father complete a dual mental health and substance abuse assessment because Southwestern staff did not believe Father was truthful during his 2023 assessment. Family Case Manager (FCM) Sheila Denis referred Father to Southwestern's Gibson County office because “he did not want to go through the one that was in Evansville.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 120-21. Father completed the second assessment at Southwestern's Gibson County location and was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, moderate cannabis use disorder, and tobacco use disorder. Father did not participate in therapy services recommended by Southwestern staff.

[9] In February 2025, Child submitted a letter to the trial court with the help of his therapist, stating he “would not like to see [his] dad unless it is a supervised visit.” Supp. Ex. Vol. III p. 133. Child continued, stating,

My dad has thrown me down on the ground and told me that he hoped he broke my ribs. He has threatened to bash my skull in. He has threatened to choke the life out of me․ He has hit me in the stomach, back, and punched me in the throat several different times.

Id. Child also said he saw Father hit Custodian and put her in a “headlock” and spit in his sibling's face. Id. Describing how he feels about Father, Child said,

I feel nervous and scared when I think about seeing him or being around him. I worry that if I am alone with him, he will hurt me for telling the truth, and that no one would find me. I am worried every night when I go to sleep, that he will break into our house and hurt us. I sleep with a plastic knife under my bed to feel safe.

Id. Accordingly, Child's therapist, Peyton Abell, recommended that interactions between Father and Child not be forced because Child suffers from PTSD and expressed “ongoing fears about opening up to his [Father].” Id. at 147. The trial court held a hearing and suspended all visitation between Father and Child.

[10] On April 9, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's relationship with Child. On April 22, the trial court ordered Father to submit to a screen for alcohol because DCS reported that Father “smell[ed] of alcohol[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 6. Father complied and, ultimately, tested positive for THC.

[11] In May, Father began attending therapy sessions at Bayou Family Health Center (Bayou). Bayou staff diagnosed Father with alcohol dependency and adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. He did not complete Bayou's recommended treatment.

[12] The trial court held a three-day factfinding hearing on DCS's termination petition on July 31, August 11, and October 14. DCS presented evidence of the facts outlined above. DCS also presented evidence that Father violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for alcohol in February and April 2025. His probation officer testified that Father is not “open” about his alcohol usage and that he once smelled of alcohol at a probation meeting. Supp. Tr. Vol. II p. 148.

[13] Father disagreed with his mental health diagnoses and stated he has “zero mental health problems.” Id. at 26. He believed DCS and Custodian were conspiring to take Child away from him. He testified that he put Custodian into a headlock only in self-defense after she “struck [him] three times in [his] private area[.]” Id. at 13. He denied ever abusing or threatening Child, Child's sibling, or Custodian. As to services, Father testified that he completed the domestic violence awareness program in January 2025.

[14] Therapist Abell and FCM Denis both testified that Child disclosed Father's physical abuse to them. Therapist Abell testified that Child suffers from PTSD and has “a lot of fear and a lot of anxiety” surrounding Father. Tr. Vol. II p. 46. Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) Jordyn Sallee and FCM Denis opined that it was in Child's best interests for his relationship with Father to be terminated and recommended that Custodian adopt him. On February 24, 2026, the trial court issued an order terminating Father's relationship with Child.³ Father now appeals. Additional facts are provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[15] We recognize that “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child[ ] is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied. Accordingly, we subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child in resolving a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “[t]ermination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1151-52 (Ind. 2016) (quotation omitted).

[16] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In our review, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). In deference to the court's unique position to assess the evidence, “we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous.” Id.

II. Challenged Findings

[17] Father first contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights because several of the court's findings of fact are not supported by the evidence. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support it.” In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. An erroneous finding is harmless surplusage if it does not constitute the “sole support for any conclusion of law necessary to sustain the judgment.” Id. at 20. If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Additionally, we accept unchallenged findings as true. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

A. Findings I.C.2-4 and 6 and Mental Health Findings 4 13-14 and 20-22

[18] At the outset, we note that most of Father's challenges merely invite us to reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. Father challenges Finding I.C.2, which states that Child expressed fear of Father in therapy and disclosed actions he observed Father take against Custodian. Father concedes that Child addressed this with his counselor, but contends Child expressed “ ‘worry,’ not fear[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 13. He then challenges Finding I.C.3, which provides he admitted to placing Custodian in a choke hold. He concedes that he did so but argues that the finding ignores testimony that he was hit in his private area first. Father next challenges the portions of Finding I.C.4 and Mental Health Findings 20-22 that find his testimony was unreliable, simply arguing that his mistrust of DCS and Custodian should not lead the court to believe he is unreliable. He also challenges only the portion of Finding I.C.6 noting Father's “use of substances,” but concedes that he failed one drug screen for THC and two for alcohol. App. Vol. II p. 67. All of these challenges are requests that we reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, which we will not do. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. As such, we affirm these findings.

[19] Father next challenges Mental Health Findings 13 and 14, finding that he has a history of unstable housing and employment. He argues that he had housing and employment at the time of factfinding. But the findings acknowledge that at times he has had housing and employment, while also noting that he had a history of instability during the pendency of the CHINS case. This too is an improper request to reweigh the evidence. See id.

B. Mental Health Findings 1-7

[20] Father also generally claims Mental Health Findings 1-7 are not supported by the evidence. Yet, his only assertion as to those findings is that he indeed completed multiple assessments, sought treatment on his own, and then began attending counseling in Vincennes. But all of that is acknowledged in the findings. Father does not challenge any other substantive facts in these findings, including that he has a significant history of mental health disorders, that he was in fact diagnosed with numerous disorders, and that he prematurely quit treatment with Gibson County Southwestern. Because he agrees with portions of the findings and does not challenge the remaining substantive portions of these findings, we accept them as true.

[21] The limited exception appears to be Father's assertion that “[h]e did not choose the facility or counselor.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. This appears to be a direct challenge to the portion of Mental Health Finding 3, stating that “Father chose the Gibson County office with Southwestern.” App. Vol. II p. 68. In any event, the evidence showed that Father did not want to attend Southwestern in Evansville, and that he complied with an assessment in Gibson County after FCM Denis referred him. As such, this part of Mental Health Finding 3 is not clearly erroneous.

C. Mental Health Findings 10 and 11

[22] Father challenges Mental Health Findings 10 and 11, which state that Father refused to submit to random drug screens despite the trial court ordering them “at disposition in the underlying CHINS cause.” App. Vol. II p. 69. Yet the trial court did not order Father to submit to drug screens in its dispositional decree. See Supp. Ex. Vol. III pp. 74-79. Mental Health Findings 10 and 11 are clearly erroneous. However, these errors are “sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights” of Father. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). Mental Health Findings 10 and 11 are “merely harmless surplusage” because the remaining findings are sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate conclusions, as discussed below. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 20.

D. Mental Health Finding 12

[23] Father also raises a genuine challenge to Mental Health Finding 12, which states: “Father never completed substance abuse treatment either. He was offered multiple opportunities to do so, but, again, Father denied he had any issues with substance abuse, despite admitting to recently using substances during the pendency of this termination matter.” App. Vol. II p. 69. Father contends this finding is not supported by the evidence because he completed two assessments with Southwestern and one with Bayou. While Father completed assessments at each location, DCS presented evidence that he did not complete any of the recommended treatment that followed these assessments. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 119, 122-24. This evidence supports the trial court's reasonable inference that Father had not completed substance abuse treatment. Mental Health Finding 12 is not clearly erroneous.

E. Mental Health Findings 15-17

[24] Finally, Father challenges Mental Health Findings 15-17, which provide:

15. Father has an extremely concerning tendency to commit violent and illegal acts, without regard to the presence of any children.

16. His violent behavior is often targeted at women who [he] is romantically involved with at the time of the violence. Domestic violence cannot occur in a home where a child is safe.

17. Father's victim blaming and complete denial of any responsibility for his own actions illustrates his lack of understanding and recognition of his violence, despite having been offered a specific program addressing domestic violence.

App. Vol. II p. 70.

[25] Father acknowledges that he was “charged with a crime ․ that led to the underlying CHINS case and had a burglary charge as a minor.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. But he challenges the findings, claiming there is “no other evidence that Father had committed ‘violent and illegal acts’ and/or ‘violent behavior.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 16. We disagree: there is ample evidence in the record of Father's violent behavior. Father was not only convicted of a domestic battery offense, but also placed Custodian into a chokehold in the presence of Child. Child disclosed that Father directed his violent behavior toward Child and Child's sibling. He threatened them on multiple occasions; “thr[ew] [Child] down on the ground[,]” “hit [Child] in the stomach, back, and ․ in the throat several different times[,]” and “spit in [Child's sibling's] face[.]” Supp. Ex. Vol. III p. 133. As a result, Child suffered from PTSD and feared Father would break into his home and hurt his family. All this evidence supports the trial court's findings that Father has a pattern of violent behavior and a tendency to commit violent or illegal acts. Mental Health Findings 15, 16, and 17 are not clearly erroneous.⁵

III. Termination of Parental Rights

[26] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege, in relevant part, the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)-(4) (2024).⁶ In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Id. at (c)(2)-(3).

[27] DCS must prove each element by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).⁷

A. Remedying Conditions

[28] Father challenges the trial court's conclusions that termination of his parental rights was warranted under Indiana Code subsections 31-35-2-4(d)(2)(B), (d)(3), and (d)(4). Because Indiana Code subsection 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, we need only address Father's challenges to the trial court's conclusions under one requirement of subsection (d). See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Accordingly, we review his challenge to subsection (d)(3), which provides “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.”

[29] In reviewing a trial court's conclusion that the conditions warranting removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis: first, “we must ascertain what conditions led to [Child's] placement” and second, “we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (quotation and citation removed). In considering the second step, a “trial court must consider a parent's habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014).

[30] Here, Child was removed from Father because Child needed a safe and stable home free of domestic violence, and Child's safety could not be ensured without Father obtaining mental health and substance abuse treatment. To address these concerns, the court ordered Father to complete substance abuse and mental health assessments, follow all subsequent recommendations, complete a domestic violence awareness and accountability program, remain drug and alcohol free, cooperate with DCS, and maintain stable housing and employment. Father contends he remedied the conditions resulting in Child's removal by substantially complying with the trial court's dispositional decree. We disagree.

[31] While Father completed dual mental health and substance abuse assessments, he disputed his mental health and substance abuse diagnoses. He did not complete treatment recommendations for his mental health or substance abuse issues despite having multiple opportunities to do so. Father failed to address these issues—which “have caused [Child] to feel fear, anxiety, and stress.” App. Vol. II p. 67. Father also continued “victim blaming” and denied responsibility for his violent behavior, “illustrat[ing] his lack of understanding and recognition of his violence, despite having been offered a specific program addressing domestic violence.” Id. at 70. Child disclosed numerous instances of Father's violence toward him, Custodian, and his sibling. Child also expressed that he was “nervous[,]” “scared[,]” and “worried” about Father's violent actions. Supp. Ex. Vol. III p. 133. Father's unwillingness to address these issues establishes a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643, 647 (finding parent's history of domestic violence, refusal to accept responsibility for said violence, and his lack of cooperation established a reasonable probability that the conditions would not be remedied). Thus, the trial court's conclusion is not clearly erroneous.

B. Best Interests

[32] Finally, Father contends the trial court erred in concluding that termination is in Child's best interests. In determining whether termination is in the best interests of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied. “Central among these interests is children's need for permanency[,]” as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. (citations and quotation omitted). We have previously held that “the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[33] Here, FCM Denis and CASA Sallee both opined that termination was in Child's best interests. FCM Denis recommended termination because Father was “offered multiple opportunities for him to be reunified with his kid, and he has not followed through.” Tr. Vol. II p. 127. CASA Sallee recommended termination because Father had not made any progress toward reunification or demonstrated an ability to provide Child with safety, consistency, or comfortability. And, as we noted above, the trial court's determination that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Child's removal will not be remedied is supported by evidence and the court's findings. This evidence is sufficient on its own to support the trial court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests.

[34] Still, Father contends the trial court applied “an incorrect standard” by focusing on whether adoption is in Child's best interests rather than “considering factors including substantial compliance with the parent-participation plan.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. However, Father failed to address his substance abuse and mental health issues by failing to complete recommended treatment. And the trial court inferred from Father's dishonesty and attempts to shift blame that Father has not accepted responsibility for his domestic violence despite completing a domestic violence awareness program. Indeed, FCM Denis and CASA Sallee testified that Father had not made any progress toward reunification in the year-and-a-half since Child's removal.

[35] Moreover, Child was subjected to Father's threats and physical violence and witnessed Father's domestic violence against Custodian. Our Supreme Court has recognized that a child's exposure to domestic violence can cause harm to a child's developing brain and result in behavioral disturbances, such as PTSD. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 644-45. And here, Child suffered from PTSD and anxiety, as evidenced by Child sleeping with “plastic knives” or “a plastic sword” out of fear that Father would “break into [his] house and hurt [Child's family].” Tr. Vol. II p. 47; Supp. Ex. Vol. III p. 133. Additionally, Child is “well bonded” to Custodian, and DCS presented evidence that Child's needs are met in her care. App. Vol. II p. 72. All this evidence, together with the findings, supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests. We affirm.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's biological mother is deceased.

2.   Child's sibling was also removed from Father's care and placed with Custodian, but Child's sibling is not a subject of this appeal.

3.   On October 6, 2026, DCS notified our court that an adoption decree was entered for Child on August 19, 2026. Father filed a motion requesting that we determine this appeal on the merits, stating it was unclear whether DCS was requesting the appeal be dismissed as moot. Although we do not read DCS's notice as a motion to dismiss, we agree with Father that a termination case is not moot merely because an adoption decree is entered while the appeal is pending. Accordingly, we address the merits of Father's claim and deny as moot his motion asking us to do so.

5.   Father also challenges Finding I.B.5 because it states Child was detained on “11/21/2025” when Child was removed from Father's care in 2023. App. Vol. II p. 65. While Finding I.B.5 appears to contain a scrivener's error, Father does not challenge the substantive facts regarding the reason for Child's removal. Accordingly, we accept the substance of Finding I.B.5 as true.

6.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025. The relevant portions of the statute remain unchanged.

7.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8 was amended effective March 5, 2026. Subsection (a) remains unchanged.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.