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Vernon McIntosh, Appellant-Petitioner v. Nichole A. McIntosh, Appellee-Respondent
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] Vernon McIntosh (“Husband”) and Nichole McIntosh (“Wife”) (collectively, “the Parties”) were married in May of 2008. Husband petitioned to dissolve the Parties’ marriage on September 9, 2022. On February 15, 2026, the trial court issued an order dissolving the Parties’ marriage. In its order, the trial court found that Husband had dissipated marital assets, valued income from the Parties’ rental properties at $60,000.00, awarded Wife fifty-five percent of the marital estate, and ordered Husband to pay a portion of Wife's attorney's fees. Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he had dissipated marital assets, valuing the income from the Parties’ rental properties at $60,000.00, granting Wife an unequal distribution of the Parties’ marital estate, failing to consider certain tax consequences, and ordering him to pay a portion of Wife's attorney's fees. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The Parties were married on May 25, 2008. There were no children born of the marriage. Prior to the Parties’ marriage, Husband had owned a home in Tennessee. In 2022, Husband “converted this house via a 1031 tax exchange for” real estate located at 1333 Kappes Street (“the Kappes Property”) in Indianapolis. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. The Kappes Property “has no mortgage and is in Husband's sole name.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24.
[3] During the course of their marriage, the Parties had acquired the marital residence at 1226 Woodlawn Avenue in Indianapolis (“the Woodlawn Property”), which was “jointly deeded and mortgaged in the Parties’ names.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. The Parties had also acquired four other properties in Marion County: (1) a duplex located at 1210–1212 E. Southern Avenue, (2) 515 Clyde Avenue, (3) 2526 English Avenue, and (4) 2522 W. 17th Street. Each of these properties had been “jointly mortgaged and deeded in the Parties’ names.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. The Parties had used “[a]ll of the real estate, with the exception of” the Woodlawn Property as rental properties, which “were offered on Airbnb and Hospitable websites and via private leases.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25. The Parties had both had administrative rights and responsibilities on the rental websites and “were active in managing the properties.”1 Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25.
[4] Husband petitioned to dissolve the Parties’ marriage on September 9, 2022. The trial court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing on Husband's petition on October 22 and November 13, 2025. At the commencement of the evidentiary hearing, the Parties stipulated to the values of certain property. The Parties agreed that Husband would retain the Woodlawn Property “on the condition that he successfully removes Wife's name from the mortgage, either through an ‘assumption’ of the mortgage or a refinance.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29. The Parties further agreed that Husband would “be solely responsible for the mortgage and expenses related to” the Woodlawn Property. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29. The Parties also acknowledged that their 2021 federal and state tax debts, which had been included in their stipulated marital-estate values, “would likely increase due to additional fees and penalties.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29.
[5] The trial court heard evidence that Wife, who was forty years old, had worked in human resources for United Healthcare. “At the time of the hearing, [Wife] was voluntarily unemployed and caring for various family members.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25. “From 2017 through 2024, Wife earned income as high as $54,368[.00] and as low as $14,435[.00].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. Wife had voluntarily separated from her employer in 2022, claiming to have been “stretched thin” due to her additional management responsibilities related to the rental properties. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. Husband had made representations to Wife that they would earn net rental income of approximately $30,000.00 annually, which representation served as “a catalyst for Wife quitting her job.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26.
[6] The trial court also heard evidence that Husband, who was forty-two years old, “holds a PhD and has been employed as a scientist/project manager.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26. Husband had been employed with Signature Sciences since January of 2025, earning an annual salary of $146,000.00. Husband had earned income in the amount of $183,791.00 in 2019, $153,264.00 in 2020, and $186,381.00 in 2021. Husband had been “unemployed in 2023 and 2024, though he did consulting work during those years.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 26.
[7] “On October 14, 2025, the Court issued its Order on the Show Cause Motion.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27 (emphasis in original). The trial court “found Husband in contempt for [a] willful violation of failing to provide adequate documentation to the accountant related to the Airbnb/rental income and failing to pay mortgages resulting in additional marital debt.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. The trial court “deferred the issue of sanctions and attorney fees to the final hearing[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. “On October 30, 2025, the Court issued an Order Regarding Listing of Real Estate.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27 (emphasis in original). “The Order detailed terms for listing and selling the rental properties, the cooperation to be exercised by each party during the listing and selling process, payment of expenses at closing and the treatment of net proceeds.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. “On November 18, 2025, the Court issued an Order related to the preparation and payment of the Parties’ 2021 tax return.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27.
[8] On February 15, 2026, the trial court issued its order dissolving the Parties’ marriage. In its order, the trial court noted that Husband had initially requested an equal distribution of the Parties’ marital estate but had “later asserted that he should receive a greater division of the estate because he had made all the mortgage payments and paid other expenses on the rental properties.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30. The trial court further noted that Wife had sought “a deviation from the presumed equal division” and that Wife's request “was based on the Parties’ historical earning disparities, current incomes, Husband's dissipation of marital assets, Husband's disposition of the rental income for three years, and Husband's failure to pay mortgages.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31.
[9] With respect to Wife's claim of dissipation and the division of the Parties’ marital estate, the trial court found as follows:
48. Husband wished to exclude the Kappes property from the estate because he owned his previous home (which was converted via tax exchange to Kappes) prior to the marriage. Husband did not have a premarital agreement and the Kappes residence is part of the marital estate.
49. The assets and debts of the marital estate were jointly acquired by the Parties.
50. Husband has had and currently has a significantly greater income than Wife. The Court finds that Wife is currently voluntarily unemployed; regardless, even considering her highest income, Husband has consistently earned at least twice if not three times as much as Wife.
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52. Wife argues that Husband's conduct prior to his filing for divorce and during its pendency supports dissipation as well as Husband's disposition of rental income earned during the pendency of the dissolution.
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56. The Court finds the following events are supported by the evidence and support Wife's claim of dissipation: Husband eliminated Wife's administrative access to the Airbnb portal; Husband reported credit cards on which Wife was a joint user as “stolen;” on September 1, 2022, Husband transferred $62,000[.00] from a joint bank account on which Wife was the primary owner and Husband was an authorized user to an account in which Husband was the primary owner and Wife's access as a user was terminated; on September 7, 2022, Husband used a marital credit card to pay $4,800[.00] to his attorney; Husband withdrew $4,000[.00] from a joint account on September 8, 2022; and on September 6, 2022 and September 7, 2022, Husband converted $11,250[.00] in cash to a coin[-]based product but did not disclose this transfer.
57. Following filing for divorce, Husband deposited rental income into accounts solely owned and/or accessible by him, and Husband spent the funds without consultation with Wife or providing supporting documentation related to alleged expenses. Husband did not give Wife any of the rental income earned after the date of filing.
Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 31–32. The trial court further found that
82. The evidence supports a finding of dissipation on behalf of Husband due to his actions immediately prior to filing and during the pendency of the dissolution. Husband attempted to conceal funds in a coin[-]based account, he diverted $62,000[.00] to an account to which Wife had no access and he utilized $8,800[.00] of marital assets for his own benefit. Husband's accounting related to the income earned and expenses for the rental properties is questionable and he consistently failed to produce accurate supporting documents. Husband also was previously found in contempt for his willful failure to pay the mortgages.
83. Wife has met her burden of rebutting the presumptive equal division by showing a significant disparity in incomes as well as economic circumstances, the assets and debts of the marriage were acquired by joint efforts, and Husband's actions related to dissipation of marital assets. An equal division of the marital estate would not be just and reasonable. As such, a deviation in Wife's favor of 55% of the estate results in Husband owing $138,219.45 to Wife as a property settlement payment. Husband shall pay to Wife $138,219.45 as set forth below.
84. Husband has made most of the mortgage payments associated with the four (4) rental properties since this Court's order on September 25, 2025. Husband is ordered to pay the mortgages until each rental property is sold. The mortgage payment is a marital debt which secures marital assets. Both Parties have an interest in paying the debt and securing the asset. Husband's payment includes Wife's 50% payment. It is fair and reasonable that Husband shall be reimbursed 50% of any mortgage payment he pays from September 25, 2025 until each rental property is sold. To receive reimbursement Husband must verify (via written documentation) to Wife the mortgage payments made associated with house that is being sold. Any reimbursement due to Husband shall be made after the mortgage of the particular property, closing costs and realtor fees are paid. The balance of the net proceeds of each property shall be divided equally; however, Husband's share shall be paid to Wife to reduce the property settlement payment owed to her as set forth above in paragraph 83.
85. Once the rental properties have been sold and the proceeds distributed as set forth above, any remaining balance owed to Wife under paragraph 83 above shall be paid by Husband to Wife within 180 days.
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87. Husband shall receive the marital residence located at 1226 Woodlawn Avenue, Indianapolis, Indiana as his sole and separate property on the condition that he removes Wife's name from the mortgage. Husband shall be solely responsible for all mortgage payments, tax, insurance, utilities, expenses, encumbrances and the like associated with the house, and shall hold Wife harmless therefrom. Husband shall refinance the Woodlawn mortgage to remove Wife's name within sixty (60) days of issuance of the Decree. Wife shall cooperate by executing a Quitclaim Deed at closing upon request by the closing agent. If Husband is unable/unwilling to refinance the residence within 60 days, the property shall be listed for sale immediately. The Parties shall cooperate in removing Wife's name from all utilities.
88. Husband shall pay all expenses associated with the Kappes real estate and hold Wife harmless therefrom.
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90. Should any of the retirement accounts belonging to Husband but awarded to Wife in this Order have a value less than the stipulated values due to Husband's removal of funds, Husband shall pay the difference to Wife within 10 days of notice of the same. Unpaid funds shall be reduced to a judgment against Husband and in favor of Wife subject to statutory interest.
Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 38–40.
[10] With respect to the rental income generated from the Parties’ rental properties, the trial court found as follows:
62. The Parties dispute the amount of rental income earned while the dissolution was pending. Wife calculates a net value of $145,000[.00] and Husband calculates a $0[.00] net value, despite his contradictory testimony that he generally realized a net profit of $10,000[.00] - $20,000[.00] per year.
63. It is very difficult for the Court to ascertain the true net earnings of the rental property over the last three years. Both Parties submitted various spreadsheets for the Court's consideration – all with different numbers and expenses. It is clear the properties generated income; however, the true amount of expenses is challenging to glean. Making this task more difficult is the fact that Wife truly does not know as she wasn't involved in managing the rental properties, so her conclusions are largely speculative and based upon her lack of trust of Husband. On the other hand, the Court questions Husband's credibility due to his contradictory testimony throughout the final hearing.
64. Further, Husband's management of the rental income and expenses was extensively and consistently commingled with personal income and expenses making the determination of actual and legitimate rental expenses nearly impossible to determine.
65. Patrick Wanzer was retained in 2022 to prepare the Parties’ 2021 tax returns, which was the first year all the rentals were offered for lease. Husband provided a self-prepared profit and loss sheet to Wanzer. The document reflected net rental income of $22,228.95 which consisted of net income and compensation paid to officers (i.e. the Parties). The legitimacy of Husband's expenses could not be determined because supporting documents were not provided.
66. Husband provided similar documentation to Wanzer for preparing a tax return for tax year 2022 that reflected income of $161,291.53 and expenses of $156,958.99, resulting in a net income of $4,322.54. Underlying documents for the expenses were not provided. However, Husband's profit and loss statement reflected in Wife's Exhibit UU reflects income of $110,896.10, expenses of $107,498.02, and net income of only $3,398.08. This is indicative of the Court's inability to accurately determine net income derived from the rental properties.
67. Multiple profit and loss spreadsheets prepared by Husband were offered as evidence, most of which reflect different incomes and expenses during the same timeframe and none of which offered documentation supporting alleged expenses. For example, Wife's Exhibit UU shows income of $310,185.61 and expenses of $287,652.14 for January 2022 – December 2024 (excluding 2025) yet, Husband’[s] Exhibit 8 for the same timeframe shows income of $281,092.38 and expenses of $259,666.14. However, both exhibits arrive at a net income of approximately $21,000.00.
68. Husband testified regarding the following expenses he incurred in managing the rental properties: mortgages, utilities, repairs and maintenance of the homes and items inside the home, supplies, lawncare and cleaning crew. Wife disputes all the expense entries on Husband's profit and lost balance sheets except for mortgages and utilities, as those are easily verified.
69. Excluding the Woodlawn mortgage, the total monthly mortgage expense is $3,582[.00].
70. Husband's average payment for lawn and cleaning crew services is $722[.00] a month. It is unknown if this accounting includes payment related to the Woodlawn residence.
71. Income reflected on Wife's Exhibit UU from January 2023 through October 21, 2025, which is 33 months, is $239,092.25. Mortgage and lawn/cleaning crew expenses for 33 months is $138,600[.00]. Wife's estimate of utilities based on Husband's Verified Financial Declaration (“VFD”) is $1,465.39 a month or $48,357.87 for the 33-month period. Thus, the net income after payment of these expenses would be $52,134.38, which is equivalent to $18,957.96 annually.
72. Husband prepared and signed his VFD on August 26, 2023[,] and stated the rental income is $11,752.77 a week. However, Husband clarified that he had received this amount of income over a three[-]week period due to how the properties were being rented at the time. Despite Husband failing to supplement his financial declaration, the Court does not believe Husband actually earned this amount on a weekly basis from the rental properties.
73. Husband claims the rental properties were not designed to make a profit. However, Husband boasts that reviews of the rental properties gave him “superhost” ’ status and that the rentals were very busy.
74. During the last day of hearing, Husband admitted that a better picture of the rental income and expenses would be reflected had he filed taxes over the past four years.
75. After reviewing all of the evidence presented and given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the rental income, the Court finds that the net rental income earned during the three years the divorce was pending is $60,000.00. The Court finds this value is fair and reasonable and supported by the evidence and testimony.
Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 33–36.
[11] The trial court further ordered that “[t]he Parties shall not cause additional debt or encumbrance on any real estate while pending for sale and until such time Wife's name is removed from the Woodlawn mortgage.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 40. The trial court ordered the Parties to execute “all necessary documents to effectuate ownership of assets and debts consistent with this order within ten (10) days[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 41. The trial court indicated that “[t]he rentals listed for sale shall not be offered for rent” and that “[t]he Parties shall take all steps necessary, if any required, to further ensure the LLCs are closed.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 41. The trial court further ordered that
For tax years 2022–2025, Husband shall claim any income from and be solely responsible for any tax and penalty associated with: Airbnb/rental properties and income, Zoe Rentals LLC, Shelby Home Rentals LLC and any tax associated with the sale of each rental home. Husband shall hold Wife harmless. Each Party shall be responsible for any tax, penalty due and receive any refund as related to his/her respective income.
Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 41.
[12] The trial court noted Wife's request for attorney's fees. In connection to the trial court's previous contempt determination, the trial court ordered that “Husband shall reimburse Wife $2,500.00 within” thirty days of the court's order. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 42. Citing Husband's higher earning potential and the facts that Wife had been required to hire experts to value marital assets and the issues involved consisted “of addressing assets of a sizable estate, a long[-]term marriage, a dissolution that pended for three years, deviation from an equal division of the marital state[,] and identification of marital property[,]” the trial court ordered “that Husband shall pay the amount of $17,500.00” of Wife's attorney's fees. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 43.
Discussion and Decision
[13] In its order dissolving the Parties’ marriage, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon.
In reviewing an order in which the trial court makes findings of fact and conclusions thereon, our standard of review is well-settled. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment. Challengers must establish that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced a mistake has been made. Additionally, a judgment is clearly erroneous under Indiana Trial Rule 52 if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. We evaluate questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court's determination of such questions. Thus, on appeal, we shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Goodman v. Goodman, 94 N.E.3d 733, 741–42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal citations and quotation omitted), trans. denied.
I. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Determining that Husband had Dissipated Marital Assets
[14] Husband first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that he had dissipated marital assets. “Our court reviews findings of dissipation in various contexts under an abuse of discretion standard.” Goodman v. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “We will reverse only if the trial court's judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts.” Id.
[15] Waste and misuse are the hallmarks of dissipation. Our legislature intended that the term carry its common meaning denoting foolish or aimless spending. Dissipation has also been described as the frivolous, unjustified spending of marital assets which includes the concealment and misuse of marital property. Factors to consider in determining whether dissipation has occurred, include: (1) whether the expenditure benefited the marriage or was made for a purpose entirely unrelated to the marriage; (2) the timing of the transaction; (3) whether the expenditure was excessive or de minimis; and (4) whether the dissipating party intended to hide, deplete, or divert the marital asset.
Goodman, 94 N.E.3d at 743 (internal quotations omitted). Generally speaking, “[t]he test for dissipation of marital assets is whether the assets were actually wasted or misused.” Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).
[16] The trial court found that “[t]he evidence supports a finding of dissipation on behalf of Husband due to his actions immediately prior to filing and during the pendency of the dissolution.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 38. Specifically, the trial court found that Husband had (1) attempted to conceal funds in a coin-based account, (2) diverted $62,000.00 to an account to which Wife had no access, (3) utilized $8800.00 of marital assets for his own benefit, (4) provided questionable accountings related to the rental properties, (5) eliminated Wife's administrative access to the Airbnb portal; (6) reported credit cards on which Wife was a joint user as “stolen[,]” and (7) been found in contempt for willfully failing to make mortgage payments for the Parties’ properties. Appellant's App Vol. II p. 32. Husband asserts that “[n]one of those events establishes an actual loss to the marital estate” as the funds in question were included on the Parties’ final balance sheet of assets and therefore cannot support a finding that he had dissipated marital assets. Appellant's Br. p. 21. For her part, Wife asserts that the fact that “many of the funds were ultimately reflected on” the Parties’ balance sheet does not undermine the trial court's findings because
[i]nclusion of located funds in the marital estate prevents omission of an asset; it does not erase the trial court's ability to consider the fact that Husband moved those funds away from Wife's access, converted cash to cryptocurrency without disclosure, and used marital credit for his own attorney fee immediately before filing.
Appellee's Br. p. 13.
[17] Again, one of the factors to consider when determining whether a party had dissipated marital assets is “whether the dissipating party intended to hide, deplete, or divert the marital asset.” Goodman, 94 N.E.3d at 743 (emphasis added). Husband does not deny that he moved funds from certain accounts and placed the funds in accounts to which Wife had no access and that he terminated Wife's access to certain accounts. While Husband may not have hidden or depleted the assets in question, he undeniably diverted the assets from Wife's access. We conclude that by diverting marital assets from Wife's access prior to the dissolution of the Parties’ marriage, Husband misused the marital assets. Husband had also been found in contempt for his actions relating to some of the Parties’ marital assets during the dissolution proceedings. Given Husband's contemptuous acts and acts diverting marital assets from Wife's access, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Husband had dissipated marital assets. Husband's contention to the contrary effectively amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Goodman, 94 N.E.3d at 741.
II. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Valuing the Rental-Property Income at $60,000.00
[18] Husband next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the rental-property income at $60,000.00.
When reviewing valuation decisions of trial courts in dissolution actions, [the following] standard of review has been enunciated: that the trial court has broad discretion in ascertaining the value of property in a dissolution action, and its valuation will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. The trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is sufficient evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom to support the result. In other words, we will not reverse the trial court unless the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. A reviewing court will not weigh evidence, but will consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment.
Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
[19] We have previously concluded that “the income the properties earned” on jointly-owned rental properties “after the petition for dissolution was filed and before the court's valuation date was properly considered a marital asset under Indiana Code § 31-15-7-4.” Smith v. Smith, 854 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The Parties agree that the rental income was a marital asset but disagree as to the amount of income that was generated during the three years that the dissolution proceedings were pending.
[20] Husband argues that the trial court should have found the value of the rental income to be between $21,000.00 and $22,500.00, a value which he claims is supported by both his and Wife's submissions.2 Husband asserts that “[t]his Court should reverse the $60,000.00 finding and remand for a redetermination of net rental/Airbnb income supported by the record, and for recalculation of the equalization payment that flows from it; or a finding that the total net income for the three (3) year period was $22,500.00.” Appellant's Br. pp. 25–26.
[21] The Parties submitted various spreadsheets containing alleged valuations of the rental-property income, which included values ranging from zero to $145,000.00 for the three-year period in question. Wife testified that, prior to seeking dissolution of their marriage, Husband had told her that the rental properties generated “passive income ․ in about the amount of $30,000.00 a year[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 165.
[22] The trial court noted that it was difficult to determine the precise amount of rental-property income generated during the three-year period because Husband had failed to provide the trial court and accountants with complete financial records for the Parties’ rental properties. In setting the value of the rental-property income at $60,000.00, the trial court acknowledged the submissions Husband references on appeal. The trial court considered each of the Parties’ submissions and determined that a $60,000.00 value was “fair and reasonable and supported by the evidence and testimony.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 36. Given that $60,000.00 was squarely within the range of potential values argued by the Parties, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the value of the rental-property income to be $60,000.00. Again, Husband's contention to the contrary effectively amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Goodman, 94 N.E.3d at 741.
III. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Dividing the Marital Assets
[23] Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate to award Wife fifty-five percent of the marital estate. For her part, Wife contends that “Husband's appeal effectively asks this Court for a ‘do-over’ of the trial court's factfinding.” Appellee's Br. p. 5.
The division of marital assets is within the trial court's discretion, and we will reverse a trial court's decision only for an abuse of discretion. The party challenging the trial court's division of marital property must overcome a strong presumption that the trial court considered and complied with the applicable statute, and that presumption is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal. On review, we will neither reweigh evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition of the marital property.
Smith v. Smith, 136 N.E.3d 275, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
[24] “The division of marital property in Indiana is a two-step process.” O'Connell v. O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). “First, the trial court determines what property must be included in the marital estate.” Id. Once the trial court has determined what property is to be included in the marital estate, the trial court shall divide the parties’ “property in a just and reasonable manner[.]” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(b). “The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5.
However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:
(A) before the marriage; or
(B) through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
(A) a final division of property; and
(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.
Id.
[25] Husband argues that the trial court's unequal distribution of the marital estate was unjust, claiming that the trial court had not given him credit for making the mortgage payments for and maintaining the Parties’ rental properties during the three-year period. However, the trial court's order gives Husband credit for these acts and indicates that upon sale of the properties, Husband shall be compensated for the half of the mortgage payments that Husband had paid on Wife's behalf. For her part, Wife argues that “the evidence amply supports a modest five-percent deviation.” Appellee's Br. p. 9. We agree.
[26] The trial court found that Husband's earning potential was significantly more than Wife's earning potential. Husband holds a PhD and has consistently earned at least twice Wife's income. Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5(5) explicitly lists “[t]he earnings or earning ability of the parties” as an appropriate factor to consider when deciding whether to enter an unequal distribution of a marital estate. The Parties uneven earning potential supports the trial court's unequal distribution, and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. Husband's contention to the contrary again effectively amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Goodman, 94 N.E.3d at 741.
IV. The Trial Court did not Err by Failing to Equalize the Distribution of the Marital Assets Based on Current Tax Burdens
[27] Husband next contends that the trial court failed to consider the disparate liquidity and tax consequences of its division of the marital assets. Indiana Code section 31-15-7-7 provides that the trial court, “in determining what is just and reasonable in dividing property․, shall consider the tax consequences of the property disposition with respect to the present and future economic circumstances of each party.”
[28] The trial court ordered that Husband was responsible for the tax burden associated with the Parties’ rental properties and required to make an equalization payment to Wife with respect to the marital residence. In addition, Husband remained solely responsible for the Kappes Property. Husband argues that, on the other hand, Wife was awarded certain assets, i.e., retirement accounts, that “generate no current tax liability to her upon transfer.” Appellant's Br. p. 27. Husband claims that he bore “both the immediate liquidity burden of a six-figure cash judgment and mortgage refinancing as well as the tax burden on” the rental properties. Appellant's Br. p. 27. Husband controlled the Parties’ rental properties during the dissolution proceedings and continued to do so until the properties were sold. The mortgage refinancing was necessary as Husband was awarded the marital residence and Wife would no longer be financially responsible for the property to which she would have no further claim. Husband, therefore, alone had control over all factors that might affect any tax burdens, apart from basic property taxes for the properties. We cannot say that the trial court erred by holding Husband responsible for any potential burden accrued by him.
[29] Moreover, while Wife may not suffer any immediate tax burdens, given that the retirement accounts awarded to Wife appear to be traditional retirement accounts which are typically funded with pre-tax dollars and include tax burdens upon payout, Wife will face future tax burdens when she receives funds from the retirement accounts. See generally Maxwell v. Maxwell, 163 N.E.3d 337, 341–42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (discussing the fact that a recipient of pension funds will face tax consequences associated with said funds upon their receipt), trans. denied. We cannot say that the trial court overlooked Indiana Code section 31-15-7-7 simply because the tax burdens faced by Husband as a result of the dissolution of the Parties’ marriage were more immediate in time than those faced by Wife. To the extent that Husband challenges the equalization payment due to Wife as part of the division of the marital assets, his contention amounts to little more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Goodman, 94 N.E.3d at 741.
V. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering Husband to Pay a Portion of Wife's Attorney's Fees
[30] Finally, Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay a portion of Wife's attorney's fees. Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1(a) provides that in dissolution cases,
[t]he court periodically may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this article and for attorney's fees and mediation services, including amounts for legal services provided and costs incurred before the commencement of the proceedings or after entry of judgment.
In making a determination as to a request for attorney's fees, “the trial court is to consider the resources of the parties, their economic condition, the ability of the parties to engage in gainful employment and to earn adequate income, and other factors that bear on the reasonableness of the award.” Townsend v. Townsend, 20 N.E.3d 877, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “In this context, we review a trial court's award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court.” Id.
[31] Wife requested that Husband be ordered to pay $33,302.69 of her attorney's fees. The trial court found that Wife was “capable of paying a portion of her fees[,]” and ordered that Husband “shall pay the amount of $17,500.00” of Wife's attorney's fees.3 Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 43. In support of its order, the trial court noted the length of the dissolution proceedings, the fact that Wife had been “required to hire experts in valuing marital assets[,]” and Husband's superior financial position. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 43. Importantly, the trial court found that, at the time of the final hearings, “Wife was unemployed and Husband was employed earning $146,000.00 annually. Even considering that Wife is capable of earning at least $50,000.00 per year, Husband's income has been consistently and significantly higher than Wife's.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 43. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by considering these factors and determining that Husband should pay $17,500.00 of Wife's attorney's fees. Again, Husband's contention amounts to little more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Goodman, 94 N.E.3d at 741.
[32] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1. The Parties created two LLCs, i.e., Zoe Rentals LLC and Shelby Home Rentals LLC, for their rental business but never transferred “[t]he rental properties and mortgages” to the LLCs. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25.
2. Husband also asserts that a valuation of zero would have been appropriate based on his self-serving statements that the rental properties did not generate any profit during the relevant time period. The trial court, however, was not required to credit Husband's statements and apparently did not. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”)
3. This award was in addition to the trial court's order that Husband pay $2500.00 of Wife's attorney's fees in relation to the trial court's prior order finding Husband in contempt. Husband does not challenge the fee award that relates to the trial court's prior contempt order.
Bradford, Judge.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-DN-1056
Decided: November 06, 2026
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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