Joseph W. Kruger, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joseph W. Kruger received a six-year habitual offender enhancement on his sentence for an armed robbery conviction. He filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, which the trial court denied. Kruger, pro se, raises a single issue for appellate review: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying his motion to correct erroneous sentence? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 1999, Kruger was convicted in Illinois state court of aggravated discharge of a firearm. He was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and released on parole in 2001. The following year, Kruger was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana of forcing a person to accompany him during the attempted commission of bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during a violent crime. He was sentenced to seventeen years, with three years of probation.¹

[3] Not long after his release, Kruger committed additional crimes, which this Court described in his direct appeal:

In the latter part of 2019, Kruger went on a bank robbery spree. On August 5, he went inside a bank branch in Lafayette, Indiana and pointed what appeared to be a firearm, but in reality was a BB pistol, at the door greeter. He then handed a teller a note that ordered her to give him cash. On August 26, Kruger, who was wearing a fake beard and a hat to disguise his identity, entered a branch of another bank in Lafayette. Again, he handed a teller a note. This note had written on it, “This is a robbery, I have a gun. Give me the money. No die [sic] packs, no GPS tracker, no alarms.” The teller gave Kruger money from his till, and Kruger fled. On October 3, Kruger went to a branch of another bank in Lafayette wearing a wig and a surgical mask. He then demanded the teller to give him cash, which the teller did. Lastly, on October 22, Kruger went to yet another bank branch in Lafayette, again wearing a fake beard, and handed the teller a note stating, “This is a robbery. I have a gun. No dye packs. No GPS tracers, No alarms.” The teller complied with Kruger's demands and gave him cash. The following morning, the police apprehended Kruger at a hotel in Shelbyville, Indiana.

As a result of these incidents, the State charged Kruger on October 29, 2019, with three counts of Level 3 felony armed robbery, three counts of Level 6 felony theft, and Class A misdemeanor theft. The State also alleged that Kruger was an habitual offender.

Kruger v. State, No. 20A-CR-797, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2020) (mem.) (internal citations omitted).

[4] Kruger ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of Level 3 felony armed robbery; one count of Level 3 felony attempted robbery; two counts of Level 5 felony robbery; and admitted to being a habitual offender. He received consecutive sentences totaling forty years—twelve years on each of the two Level 3 felony convictions, five years on each of the Level 5 felony convictions, and a six-year habitual offender enhancement to the sentence on the Level 3 felony armed robbery conviction. The habitual offender enhancement was based on Kruger's prior Illinois and federal court convictions.

[5] In November 2025, Kruger moved to correct erroneous sentence, alleging the habitual offender enhancement was contrary to statute. The trial court denied his motion.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kruger's motion to correct erroneous sentence.

[6] Kruger argues the “enhanced sentence imposed ․ was illegal at the time sentence was pronounced[.]” Appellant's Br. at 24. More specifically, he maintains his two previous out-of-jurisdiction convictions are Level 6 felonies as defined by statute and cannot support his habitual offender enhancement. See id. at 21–22.

[7] Kruger's motion to correct sentence arises from Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15, which provides:

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

[8] “The purpose of the statute ‘is to provide prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence.’ ” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Gaddie v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind. 1991)). A motion pursuant to Section 35-38-1-15 may only be filed to address a sentence that is “erroneous on its face.” Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. 2008) (citation omitted). “A sentence is defective on its face if it violates express statutory authority at the time the sentence is pronounced, as when the sentence falls outside the statutory parameters for the particular offense or is based on an erroneous interpretation of a penalty provision.” Lacey v. State, 124 N.E.3d 1253, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citation omitted). This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct sentence for an abuse of discretion. Woodcox v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[9] “The sentencing statute in effect at the time a crime is committed governs the sentence for that crime.” Harris v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927, 928–29 (Ind. 2008).

[10] Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8 (2017) states:

(b) A person convicted of murder or of a Level 1 through Level 4 felony is a habitual offender if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that:

(1) the person has been convicted of two (2) prior unrelated felonies; and

(2) at least one (1) of the prior unrelated felonies is not a Level 6 felony or a Class D felony.

[11] A “Level 6 felony conviction” is defined, in relevant part, as “a conviction, in any other jurisdiction at any time, with respect to which the convicted person might have been imprisoned for more than one (1) year but less than two and one-half (2 1/212) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-1(a)(2) (2018).

[12] Pursuant to the habitual offender finding, the trial court enhanced Kruger's Level 3 felony armed robbery conviction by six years.

[13] In his motion to correct erroneous sentence, Kruger argued the enhancement “was issued in error” because his prior out-of-jurisdiction convictions were “the equivalent of Level 6 felonies.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 28. The record shows in 1999 Kruger was convicted in Illinois state court for the offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm. He was sentenced to eight years in prison and released on parole in 2001. Then, in 2002, Kruger was convicted in federal court of forcing a person to accompany him during the attempted commission of a bank robbery and of brandishing a firearm. For those offenses he was sentenced to seventeen years of incarceration with three years of probation. Kruger's eight-year sentence in Illinois and either one of his federal court sentences exceed the two-and-one-half-year maximum of what constitutes a non-Indiana “Level 6 felony conviction.” I.C. § 35-50-2-1(a)(2). In other words, none of Kruger's prior unrelated convictions are a Level 6 felony. See I.C. § 35-50-2-8(b)(2). Kruger's sentence was therefore not erroneous on its face, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion. See Neff, 888 N.E.2d at 1251.

[14] Nevertheless, Kruger argues the trial court's decision is counter to the Indiana Supreme Court's holding in Calvin v. State, 87 N.E.3d 474 (Ind. 2017). In Calvin, the Supreme Court held that under the habitual offender statutes applicable when the defendant committed his crimes, all non-Indiana felonies were counted as Level 6 felonies. 87 N.E.3d at 479 (citing I.C. § 35-50-2-1(a) (2014)). But we look at the statute in effect at the time the crime is committed. See Harris, 897 N.E.2d at 928–29. When Kruger committed the underlying crimes, state law defined a non-Indiana Level 6 felony conviction as one with respect to which the convicted person might have been imprisoned for more than one year but less than two and one-half years. I.C. § 35-50-2-1(a)(2). As the State counters, “all the convictions used to find [Kruger] a habitual offender ․ are not Level 6 felonies, since they all resulted in longer sentences than the sentence range that defined a Level 6 felony in Indiana at the time [Kruger] offended.” Appellee's Br. at 10. In short, Calvin does not determine the outcome here.

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For forcing a person to accompany him during the attempted commission of bank robbery, Kruger was sentenced to 120 months. He received a sentence of 84 months for brandishing a firearm during a violent crime.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.