Adonis Logan, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Adonis Logan (“Logan”) pleaded guilty to murder ¹ and was sentenced to sixty years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). Logan appeals, raising the following restated issues:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Logan; and

II. Whether Logan's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the morning of September 22, 2023, officers from the Muncie Police Department (“MPD”) responded to the Elgin Manor Apartments on a report that an individual was in cardiac arrest. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15. Officers entered the unlocked apartment to find Jack Simpson (“the Victim”), deceased. Officers discovered blood on the floor and spent shell casings inside the apartment. An autopsy later revealed that the Victim died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds to his chest and extremities. See id. at 43. The Victim had been shot a total of ten times; five times in the torso, three times in the left arm, and twice in the left leg. See id. at 41–42.

[4] On September 16, 2023, Logan, who was eighteen years of age, was with Adriana Dillow (“Dillow”) and another friend. Logan, Dillow and the friend obtained a firearm from Dillow's mother's home and then drank alcohol, smoked marijuana, and used cocaine. Later that night, Logan, Dillow and the friend drove to the Victim's home at the Elgin Manor Apartments. Dillow was acquainted with the Victim.

[5] According to Logan, once inside the apartment, the Victim “started touching on [Dillow.]” Id. at 30. At that point, the Victim gave Dillow gas money. Dillow and the friend left the apartment and returned to the Nissan, leaving Logan alone in the apartment with the Victim. Logan then asked the Victim if “he ever molested [Dillow]” when she was fourteen years old. Id. According to Logan, while inside the apartment, he and the Victim got into an altercation that ultimately resulted in Logan shooting the Victim “once in the chest and ․ [Logan shooting him] again.” Id. Thereafter, Logan, Dillow, and the friend left the apartment complex.

[6] During the investigation, MPD discovered that the Nissan was registered to Dillow in Detroit, Michigan. See id. at 19. MPD eventually traced the Nissan to Detroit, Michigan. On October 4, 2023, Logan was taken into custody by law enforcement in Dearborn, Michigan. See id. at 20. While in custody in Dearborn, Logan signed a waiver of rights and participated in an interview with law enforcement. During the interview, Logan admitted to shooting the Victim “multiple times, including while [the Victim] was on the ground not moving.” Id. Logan explained that he “shot [the Victim] for [the Victim] molesting [Dillow] when she was [fourteen] years old.” Id. In addition, Logan revealed to law enforcement that he “took the gun back to Detroit and traded it for a bag of marijuana.” Id. at 34, 64.

[7] That same day, the State charged Logan with murder, a felony. Over the course of the next month, the State additionally charged Logan with conspiracy to commit murder and filed a firearm enhancement for the use of a firearm in the commission of the murder. At the time of the commission of the underlying offense, Logan was eighteen years of age and over the course of the next two years, accumulated fourteen incident reports while incarcerated at the Delaware County Jail (“the DCJ”).

[8] On September 24, 2025, Logan signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to murder and to leave sentencing to the trial court's discretion. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the conspiracy to commit murder charge and the firearm enhancement for the murder offense. See id. at 22–23.

[9] On October 1, 2025, Logan pleaded guilty to murder. The trial court accepted the factual basis of Logan's plea but took the matter under advisement and scheduled a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing on October 29, 2025, Logan testified and then read a prepared letter in which he apologized to the Victim's family and the court and asked for forgiveness. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 38, 39–40. Logan explained that he was “manipulated” by Dillow and her mother and expressed sorrow for his actions, but offered few details as to why he shot the Victim. See id. at 40.

[10] The trial court found several aggravating factors, including that “the harm, injury, or loss, or damage suffered by the [V]ictim was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission.” Id. at 43. Next, the trial court concluded that there “was a substantial degree of care and planning on the part of [Logan] in covering up his involvement[,]” noting that Logan told law enforcement that “he took the gun back to Detroit and traded it for a bag of marijuana ․ got rid of the gun because he didn't want to go to prison.” Id. at 43–44. Next, the trial court found that Logan's “role in the offense was that of a principle [sic].” Id. at 44. The trial court explained that during the interview, Logan told the girls in the apartment “to leave” and he said “he did what I had to do. I blasted him.” Id. The trial court noted that while incarcerated at the DCJ, Logan had accumulated fourteen incident reports. See id; See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 48–61. Furthermore, the trial court found that shooting a firearm inside of an apartment building, which was “adjacent to inhabited apartments[,]” put “lives at stake.” Tr. Vol. II p. 44. Lastly, the trial court concluded that the crime was “particularly heinous,” noting that during Logan's interview with law enforcement, he “reported that he popped [the Victim], he shot [the Victim] after he had fallen to the ground because he didn't know if [the Victim] was alive or dead.” Id. Further, the trial court stated that Logan said “he didn't intend to kill [the Victim], but wanted to paralyze him and show him that [he] don't play around.” Id.

[11] As to mitigating factors, the trial court concluded that Logan pleaded guilty and saved the county “three thousand dollars for a three[-]day jury trial.” Id. The trial court noted that Logan is “young [of] age”, that he reported to have family support, and he completed “nine (9) customer service classes, four (4) GED classes, one (1) Q360 class, one (1) NA/AA class, and one WRAP [c]lass” while incarcerated. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 64.

[12] Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Logan to sixty years executed in the DOC. Logan now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[13] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Id. (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). “A trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to enter the required sentencing statement, by failing to consider reasons that were advanced for consideration and clearly supported by the record, or by considering reasons that are not supported by the record or are improper as a matter of law.” Barbee v. State, 269 N.E.3d 888, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh such factors.” Higginson v. State, 209 N.E.3d 15, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490–91). “The trial court may assign aggravating weight to the harm, injury, loss or damage suffered by the victim if such harm was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense.” Sharkey v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Filice v. State, 886 N.E.2d 24, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied).

[14] Logan claims that certain aggravating factors found by the trial court were not supported by the record and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion. Logan argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it identified the following aggravating factors: (1) the “harm, injury, loss or damage suffered was greater than the elements necessary to prove murder[;]” (2) the crime was “particularly heinous[;]” and, (3) Logan “put[ ] lives at stake” by shooting the Victim inside the apartment “within a large apartment complex[.]” Appellant's Br. pp. 11, 12.

[15] With respect to the harm, injury, or loss factor, Logan argues that the trial court failed to “elaborate on why this particular murder by way of multiple gunshots” resulted in a greater harm, injury, loss or damage to the Victim. Id. at 11. Logan shot the Victim ten times, five times in the torso, three times in the left arm, and twice in the left leg. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 41–42. Next, Logan left the Victim to die in the apartment and fled to Michigan in order to evade detection. While it may not be overwhelming, there is support in the record for this aggravating factor.

[16] Next, Logan argues that there were “no specific facts which make this murder more heinous than another murder.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. Specifically, he argues that “a murder by way of multiple gunshots is not more heinous than another murder.” Id. However, the trial court thoughtfully considered the proffered aggravator and made the following remarks as to Logan's “particularly heinous” actions:

According to [Logan's] interview with officers, [Logan] reported that he popped him and he shot [the Victim] after he had fallen to the ground because he didn't know if [the Victim] was alive or dead. [Logan] further stated he, didn't intend to kill [the Victim], but wanted to paralyze him and show him that [he] don't play around.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[17] Lastly, Logan challenges the trial court's aggravating factor that he “put[ ] lives at stake” in committing his crime arguing that there “was no evidence that any of the shots fired did not strike [the Victim] or create[d] a dangerous situation for other tenants of the apartment complex.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. Logan simply attempts to recast the evidence in the record to highlight a more favorable outcome. To this end, he points to evidence that law enforcement did not arrive to the complex until a week after the shooting occurred and argues that “there is [a] complete lack of evidence to establish exactly where the shots were fired and if that action put other tenant's lives at risk.” Id. However, both the upstairs tenant and next door tenant reported to MPD during their investigation that they each heard gunshots on September 16, 2023, which establishes that they were home and present during the crime and could have been injured by an errant bullet or fragments. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16.

[18] Therefore, as to each challenged aggravating factor, there was ample evidence in the record to support them, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the existence of those aggravating factors.²

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[19] Logan argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 855–56 (Ind. 2024), cert. denied. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this court may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the [c]ourt finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[20] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) “should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1181 (Ind. 2020) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). The Indiana Supreme Court has long said that “sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222 (citing Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Ind. 1996)). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). We note that “[t]he defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted.” Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

[21] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014)), cert. denied. Here, Logan pleaded guilty to murder, which carries a sentencing range of forty-five years to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. The trial court imposed a sixty-year executed sentence in the DOC.

[22] Logan argues that a “completely executed sentence ․ [for] a first-time felony offender, was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. When reviewing the nature of the offense, this court considers “the details and circumstances” of the commission of the offense. Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Washington v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied). Logan fails to make any argument with respect to the nature of the offense, other than to note that he admitted to shooting the Victim, waived his right to trial, and pleaded guilty. Nonetheless the record reveals that Logan obtained a firearm and went to the Victim's apartment to confront him about an alleged incident with Dillow. Logan shot the Victim ten times, left him for dead in the apartment and then fled to Detroit and traded the firearm for marijuana. Logan has failed to present any compelling evidence that portrays the nature of his offense in a positive light, accompanied by restraint or regard. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[23] When reviewing the character of the offender, his character “is found in what we learn of his life and conduct.” Merriweather, 151 N.E.3d at 1286. Logan argues that his aggravated sentence is inappropriate because he has no prior criminal offenses, was employed prior to the commission of the offense, had just turned eighteen at the time of the offense, was remorseful, and accepted responsibility for committing the offense. See Appellant's Br. pp. 14, 15.

[24] We acknowledge Logan's youthful age, his lack of a criminal record, that he pleaded guilty with the sentence open to the trial court's discretion, made efforts toward rehabilitation while incarcerated, and expressed remorse. However, we must also consider that Logan evaded law enforcement for days, fled to Detroit, and disposed of the murder weapon. While Logan did admit to the crime and pleaded guilty, he received the benefit of avoiding a potential additional sentence from the dismissed count and sentence enhancement. Logan's admission also indicated that he was using illegal drugs and alcohol both prior to the offense and that he traded the firearm for a bag of marijuana when he fled to Detroit. Despite engaging in some programing while incarcerated at the DCJ awaiting trial, Logan accumulated fourteen incident reports varying from destruction of jail property to fighting with fellow inmates. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 48–61. Further, Logan's statement that he intended to “paralyze [the Victim] and show him that [he] don't play around” reflects negatively on his character. Tr. Vol. II p. 44. Logan has failed to present compelling evidence portraying his “virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character[.]” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[25] Logan, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that his sixty-year executed sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. See Shields, 248 N.E.3d at 1276.

Conclusion

[26] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Logan, and that his sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   To the extent Logan raises in his inappropriate sentence section of his appellate brief that the trial court abused its discretion because the trial court “did not use [his] past law-abiding life as a mitigating factor in determining his sentence[,]” we note that Logan failed to argue that the court should consider this as a mitigating factor during the sentencing hearing. Appellant's Br. p. 15. Our court has previously stated that it is “well-settled that it is not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to fail to consider a mitigating circumstance that a defendant did not raise at sentencing.” Keith v. State, 127 N.E.3d 1221, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492). Since Logan failed to present the mitigating factor at his sentencing hearing, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider a factor that was not proffered for its consideration.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.