I.P., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Sixteen-year-old I.P. violated the terms of his probation and the trial court modified the previous dispositional order by granting wardship of him to the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). I.P. appeals the modification, raising one issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by placing him in the DOC? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2025, I.P. was adjudicated delinquent for committing acts that would constitute Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by an adult ¹ and Class A misdemeanor unlawful carrying of a handgun.² At the dispositional hearing, the trial court recounted I.P.’s history with the juvenile justice system:

[I.P.], who is 15 years of age, is before the Court for what is designated as case number 14. Under any measure, he does have an extensive history of delinquent behavior before the Court․ [C]ommunity services have been attempted. Those do include Home Based Family Centered Casework Services, Individual Counseling, as well as Psychological Assessment, Drug and Alcohol Group, Moral Reconation Therapy. And then we've had Thinking Errors ordered, as well. We have had probation supervision at the Informal level. We did have an order for confinement here at the Allen County Juvenile Center [in another case]. It does not appear in that matter ․ that we had Formal Probation services, per se. I do find that [I.P.] has been given ample opportunity to alter his behaviors. Those do appear to be chronic at this point in time, somewhat escalating. I do find that [I.P.] remains in need of rehabilitation.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 27. The court then engaged in a discussion with I.P., concluding with the following exchange:

The Court: Okay. One of the things that we're trying to teach you here are consequences for your actions.

[I.P.]: Yes, ma'am.

The Court: I don't ․ like any of this. I don't like what I'm seeing you do here. I don't like what I've seen you do on probation. I don't like what you've done at school. All of those are negatives.

[I.P.]: Yes, ma'am.

The Court: However, on the other side of the equation, you've had two stints of Informal Adjustment. You have not had Formal Probation supervision, and your IYAS disposition tool shows that you're at a Moderate risk to reoffend․ So, here's what we are going to do here today, [I.P.], and I want you to hear this really, really clearly.

[I.P.]: Yes, ma'am.

The Court: I will not send you to the Department of Correction[ ] today. I have a feeling if you don't get your act together, that I will be sending you to the Department of Correction[ ].

[I.P.]: Yes, ma'am.

The Court: Are you and I on the same page, sir?

[I.P.]: Yes, ma'am.

Id. at 30–31.

[3] The trial court entered a dispositional order calling for I.P. to be confined at the Allen County Juvenile Center (“ACJC”) for sixty days to be followed by a period of probation supervised by the Allen County Juvenile Probation Department under the terms of the electronic monitoring program. While on probation, I.P. was ordered to comply with the rules and special conditions of probation, including that he obey the law and rules at home and not use illegal or intoxicating substances.

[4] I.P. was released from the ACJC on July 26, 2025. Four days later, he turned sixteen. In September, a probation officer filed an affidavit alleging I.P. had tested positive for illicit substances one or more times during the month of September. The trial court ordered I.P. detained at the ACJC pending resolution of a petition for modification of the dispositional order.

[5] At the modification hearing, I.P. admitted violating his probation. The probation department, the State, and I.P.’s mother all requested I.P. remain detained pending the modified dispositional hearing. The trial court continued I.P.’s detention, finding detention was essential to protect him and the community.

[6] Prior to the modified dispositional hearing, a placement board reviewed I.P.’s case. By a vote of nine to one, the board recommended I.P. be committed to the DOC. The ACJC reported I.P. had “received two disciplinary reports since being detained: one for a verbal altercation with [a] peer and one for having contraband in his room. He needs redirection from staff several times a week.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 119. And the predispositional report outlined I.P.’s juvenile history, which began when he was ten years old and includes twelve delinquency referrals for acts such as intimidation, criminal mischief, and battery—with some battery allegations involving a deadly weapon.

[7] At the modified dispositional hearing, I.P.’s probation officer testified:

[W]e have attempted Informal Administrative Probation, Informal Operational Probation, Formal Probation, and now we are on the strictest form of community-based supervision with the Electronic Monitoring Program․ [W]hen we look at therapeutic services that have been offered ․, it is absolutely an understatement to say that [we] have gone above and beyond to provide him with therapeutic intervention in the community.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 59–60. The State agreed with the placement board recommendation to place I.P. in the DOC. I.P.’s mother also agreed with the recommendation because she did not “want to see something happen to [I.P.], or something to happen to somebody else, or any of the other kids, or anybody in [their] family” and she had tried everything she could. Id. at 59. I.P. requested to be returned to probation, noting during previous detentions totaling sixty days, he had over fifty disciplinary reports compared to three reports ³ during his current forty-day stay, showing a “significant improvement in his behavior.” Id. at 62.

[8] The trial court recounted the previous placements and community-based services provided to I.P. and noted “community-based services have apparently been ineffectual[.]” Id. at 64. The court acknowledged I.P. had improved his behavior at the ACJC during this detention, but stated, given the multiple previous disciplinary reports, “it is still very difficult for the Court to find that he is adequately responding[.]” Id. The court concluded, “Under totality of circumstances at this point in time, I am going to accept the recommendation of the Probation Department. I will show that [I.P.] is committed to the Indiana Department of Correction[ ].” Id. The trial court in its written modified dispositional order found “detention is essential to protect the child or community and is in the child's best interests.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 140.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by committing I.P. to the DOC.

[9] “Juvenile courts enjoy significant discretion in crafting an appropriate disposition for juveniles found delinquent.” B.K. v. State, 235 N.E.3d 142, 143 (Ind. 2024). We review a chosen disposition for abuse of discretion, which occurs when a trial court misinterprets the law or issues a decision clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024). In conducting this review, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. A.F. v. State, 247 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[10] A trial court is provided with “wide latitude and great flexibility” when fashioning an appropriate disposition. R.G. v. State, 212 N.E.3d 720, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citation omitted). But the juvenile justice system aims to rehabilitate rather than punish. J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Therefore, a trial court must consider the following factors when choosing between dispositional options:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

I.C. § 31-37-18-6 (1997); see also M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (describing the trial court's discretion as “subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of favoring the least harsh disposition”), trans. denied, cert. denied. Ultimately, commitment to the DOC “should be treated as a last resort.” G.W., 231 N.E.3d at 190 (quoting C.H. v. State, 201 N.E.3d 202, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)).

[11] I.P. argues the “least restrictive setting is what is required of a court in a disposition” and there were placement alternatives that were less restrictive than a commitment to the DOC. Appellant's Br. at 13. But Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6 requires placement in the least restrictive setting only if “consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.” This represents a recognition that, in certain situations, the child's best interest is better served by a more restrictive placement because “commitment to a public institution is in the best interest of the juvenile and society.” M.C., 134 N.E.3d at 459 (citation omitted). And I.P.’s comparison of his case to D.P. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), is misplaced. In D.P., a majority of a panel of this Court concluded the trial court had abused its discretion in committing the juvenile to the DOC in part because the juvenile's conduct was not repetitive and serious and there was little evidence to suggest he would not respond positively to probation. See id. at 771. Here, however, I.P.’s misconduct has been repetitive, serious, and long-term, and the evidence shows he has not responded to probation and other less restrictive measures in a positive fashion. D.P. does not compel reversal here.

[12] The trial court's decision to commit I.P. to the DOC was consistent with the statute and the broader policy favoring rehabilitation. As set forth above, the evidence shows many less restrictive options and extensive therapeutic services have been offered but have failed to produce positive changes in I.P.’s behavior. The court noted in its modified dispositional order that I.P.’s conduct is “chronic and escalating and [he] has been offered ample opportunities to alter such behavior.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 139. I.P. violated probation even after the trial court told him that placement in the DOC was a likely outcome if he did so. Most of the placement board, the State, and I.P.’s mother all agreed I.P. should be placed in the DOC. And the court found that probation and community services had either been exhausted or would be ineffective and detention was essential to protect I.P. and the community.

[13] In light of I.P.’s extensive history of delinquent behavior, the nature of that behavior, and the fact less restrictive options and therapeutic services have not led to improvement, I.P.’s placement in the DOC was not an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

[14] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by committing I.P. to the DOC.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2024).

2.   I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(b) (2022). Subsection (b)(10)(A) of this statute states a person who is less than eighteen years of age may not knowingly or intentionally carry a handgun.

3.   The trial court noted that in addition to the two disciplinary reports previously identified by the ACJC, I.P. had recently received an additional report involving “a restraint with staff” during indoor recreation. Id. at 63.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.